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At the start of the year, some 1,200 immigrants were being held in immigration detention in the UK. The power to detain immigrants is separate from detention of individuals as part of a criminal sentence. There is a presumption against detention of immigrants and immigration detention, which can only be in accordance with one of the statutory powers (the majority of which are contained in the Immigration Act 1971 and the Immigration and Asylum Act 2002), and is allowed in the interests of maintaining effective immigration control, for example, to effect removal; to establish a person’s identity or the basis of their immigration claim; or where there is reason to believe that the person will fail to comply with any conditions attached to a grant of immigration bail.
In order to be lawful, not only must immigration detention be in accordance with one of the statutory powers, but it must also be in accordance with the limitations implied by the domestic common law and Strasbourg case law (ECHR Article 5), as well as with stated Home Office policy. Under the common law and ECHR Article 5, the statutory powers to detain are to be strictly and narrowly construed, i.e. if detention is not for a statutory purpose (or is no longer for that purpose) it will become unlawful. Additionally, the power to detain is impliedly limited to a period that is reasonably necessary for the statutory purpose to be carried out and must be justified in all the circumstances of the individual case, requiring an assessment of individual factors such as the risk of absconding, the likelihood of imminent removal, and the impact on the detainee.
Following news of the first immigration detainee testing positive for COVID-19, there was concern about the risk of COVID-19 deaths in immigration detention and about the legality of continued detention of immigrants. Detention Action Group has sought to challenge the continued detention of immigrants and the steps taken by the Secretary of State to address the position of persons in immigration detention in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
An application for urgent interim relief was made by the Detention Action Group in March for the release of some 736 immigrants in detention and was advanced, first in relation to those whose removal is not reasonably imminent as a result of the global pandemic and the consequential travel bans and restrictions around the world, and secondly in relation to vulnerable detainees such as those who are suffering from serious medical conditions or who are aged 70 and over.
A separate application for urgent interim relief was made by Samson Bello, a Nigerian deportee, seeking release from detention on the basis that restrictions to travel to Nigeria meant that his continued detention for the purposes of removal was no longer lawful. Both of these cases are discussed in detail below.
Last week on this blog we published Francis Hoar’s article which argued that the Coronavirus Regulations passed by the Government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic involve breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly in relation to the interference they create in the rights to liberty, private and family life, freedom of worship, freedom of assembly, the prohibition on discrimination, the right to property and the right to education.
In this first of two response articles, Leo Davidson, a barrister at 11KBW, argues that the Regulations do not involve any breach of human rights law, as they fall within the executive’s margin of discretion for the management of this crisis, particularly given the serious potential implications of the pandemic and the reliance that the Government has placed on scientific and medical advice.
In the second article, Dominic Ruck Keene and Henry Tufnell, of 1 Crown Office Row, will argue that the interferences in rights created by the Regulations are proportionate when taken in the context of the pandemic.
Note: This article involves examination of thelegal provisions that accompany some of the restrictions on movement of individuals announced by the Government in order to protect life in the current crisis. The current Government guidance setting out these and other restrictions can be found here. Legal scrutiny is important but should not be taken to question the undeniable imperative to follow that guidance.
Introduction
With the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, the Government has imposed a number of restrictive measures, colloquially referred to as the ‘lockdown’, in an effort to hamper the spread of the coronavirus.
These restrictions are controversial, and reasonable people disagree about whether they go too far, or not far enough. As a matter of human rights law, however, they are lawful. The Government has a positive obligation under human rights law to safeguard life and health; in balancing any conflict between this objective, and other rights, the Government has a significant margin of discretion, including in the assessment of scientific evidence.
Francis Hoar argues on this blog that the lockdown disproportionately interferes with various rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and is therefore unlawful. The analysis is wrong, primarily because:
It ignores the human rights implications of the pandemic itself, which must be balanced against the effects of the responsive measures.
In the circumstances, the Government has a wide margin of discretion when balancing competing rights and interests.
The margin is particularly wide given the complex scientific evidence underlying the decision.
R (o.t.a. Palestine Solidarity Campaign Ltd and Jacqueline Lewis) v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2020] UKSC 16- read judgment
As I said in my post on the 1st instance decision, many people like to have a say over the investment policies of their pension funds. They may not want investment in fossil fuels, companies with questionable working practices, arms manufacturers, Israel or indeed any company which supports Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip – to choose but a few of people’s current choices. And pension funds, left to their own devices, may wish to adopt one or more of these choices to reflect their pensioners’ views. But can they under current local authority pensions law?
This case is about Government “Guidance” aimed at local authorities, banning some of those “ethical” objections to investment policies but allowing other objections. “Guidance” in quotes because the net effect of the Act and secondary legislation was to make the Guidance mandatory: see [10] of Lord Wilson’s judgment. In particular, the policy ban was to apply to (a) boycotts to foreign nations and (b) UK defence industries. The sharp focus of the former was Israel. No surprises that the Quakers and the Campaign against the Arms Trade should appear in support of the challenge to the latter.
The Guidance is applicable to local government pensions affecting 5 million current or former employees. So it arose on that ceaseless battleground of government’s direction/intermeddling in local government affairs: was it or was it not authorised by the underlying legislation?
The Guidance said that those running local authority pensions must not use their policies to
pursue boycotts, divestment and sanctions…against foreign nations and UK defence industries…other than where formal legal sanctions, embargoes and restrictions have been put in place by the Government;
or
“pursue policies that are contrary to UK foreign policy or UK defence policy”.
Did these prohibitions go beyond the SoS’s powers under the relevant pension provisions?
Answer, according to the Supreme Court, yes, but by a majority of 3-2.
Unlike some of the rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, the prohibition on torture or inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 is absolute. There is no question of striking a balance between Article 3 and other considerations: the state simply may not act in a way which would breach this prohibition.
This means that this right can offer crucial protection to the sorts of people that some members of the public may not have instinctive sympathy towards, such as an immigrant with a serious criminal history who may otherwise struggle to resist deportation. Even if their case is otherwise unattractive, if it is shown that deporting them would expose them to inhuman or degrading treatment (or indeed constitute such treatment), their appeal must succeed.
In certain circumstances this will include a person with a serious medical condition who resists removal on the basis that the disparity between medical care in their country of origin compared to their host state would mean that removing them would constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. Such cases had previously been considered to succeed primarily for a person close to death, where removal would involve “in effect, pulling a man off his deathbed” (AM (Zimbabwe), para 14).
However, in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17, the Supreme Court has held that the proper approach to Article 3 was modified by the European Court of Human Rights in Paposhvili v Belgium[2017] Imm AR 867. The relevant test now is whether removal would give rise to a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in the person’s state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a substantial reduction in life expectancy. This does not require that death be imminent in the event of removal.
The QMLR covers developments in medical law in the broadest sense – clinical negligence, inquest, regulatory, judicial review and court of protection cases.
In Episode 109 we touch on some of the highlights from the most recent issue including articles from: John Whitting QC on causation, Suzanne Lambert on informed consent, Jeremy Hyam QC on gender reassignment in prison, Rajkiran Barhey on NICE Guidelines and the use of screens in inquests, and Jo Moore on the recent changes to statements of truth and witness statements.
The following cases are mentioned in this episode:
Clements v Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust [2018] EWHC 2064;
The world is reckoning this week with the human rights consequences of governmental efforts across the world to address the coronavirus pandemic. UN Secretary-General Antonio Gutierres has released a report on how the pandemic is becoming a ‘human rights crisis’. He highlights the disproportionate impact on minority communities, urging that national states of emergency must be proportionate, limited in scope, and alert to the risks of undue censorship and privacy violations. The report is available here.
Within the UK, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has been urging that more reasonable adjustments be made for the disabled and vulnerable in the handling of the pandemic.
In the sphere of criminal justice, the EHRC warns in an interim report that video hearings risk serious discrimination for people with learning disabilities, autism spectrum disorders, and mental health conditions. The report’s recommendations include ensuring disabled defendants have accessible information explaining their right to raise issues to do with participation, ensuring frontline professionals consider identifying people for whom video hearings may be unsuitable, and using registered intermediaries to support disabled defendants in video hearings. The report is available here.
Notably, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court’s view that the scheme does result in landlords discriminating against tenants without British passports on the basis of their actual or perceived nationality. However, the Court held that this discrimination was justified.
The Fisheries Bill 2020, part of the government’s core legislative program on post-Brexit environmental policy, is currently in the House of Lords at committee stage, and is expected to receive royal assent in the coming months (although exactly when is subject to how successfully the House of Lords can adapt to meeting via Microsoft Teams). It would establish Britain’s departure from the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) on January 1st 2021, and sets out how fishing rights would work post transition period and CFP.
Given the passion that fishing rights raise, you might be forgiven for thinking that they were absolutely essential to the functioning of the UK and EU economies. In fact, fishing accounts for around 0.1% of both. A joke going around environmental blogs is that green bills are like buses – none come when you need them, then they all arrive at once. Perhaps for the Environment and Agriculture Bills – discussed by me here and here. But the Fisheries Bill feels more like the Brexit Bus than a local routemaster. It promises the repatriation of sovereign powers and gains in the millions by taking back control of our waters, while hiding potential losses in the billions, if issues with fishing rights derail trade negotiations – a slim but real possibility.
Even the most entrenched remainer, however, would have to recognise the multiple failures of the CFP. It has been plagued by mismanaged quotas and outsized lobbying interests since its inception, and it has clearly favoured certain member states over others. The Fisheries Bill has as such been largely well received by environmental groups, such as Greener UK, who comment that the “focus on climate change and sustainability is very helpful”. I’ll start with what the bill actually says, then discuss the EU negotiation position and conclude with a few comments about what the legislation may mean for the future relations.
This is a summary of an article published here and inevitably simplifies the detailed arguments and considerations within it. The article represents the views of the author alone.
Note: This article involves examination of the legal provisions that accompany the restrictions on movement of individuals announced by the Government. The current Government guidance setting out these and other restrictions can be found here. Legal scrutiny is important but should not be taken to question the requirement to follow the Regulations.
The ‘lockdown’ imposed by the government to contain the coronavirus and Covid 19, the disease it causes has been enforced mainly through the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 (‘the Regulations’), imposed under powers delegated by the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 (‘the 1984 Act’).
Recently Lord Anderson QC, Robert Craig, Tom Hickman QC and others and Benet Brandreth QC and Lord Sandhurst QC have argued that the Regulations were or may have been ultra vires as secondary legislation beyond the delegated powers under Pt 2A of the 1984 Act. In turn, Prof Jeff King has argued that the delegated powers were exercised lawfully. It is the view of the author that the arguments against the vires of the legislation on that ground are more convincing.
This article argues that the Regulations are also a disproportionate interference with the rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’); and that, were they challenged by judicial review, should be disapplied if necessary to avoid a breach of s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
In this latest episode we consider the probable attitude of the judiciary to any challenges regarding the government’s responsibility for providing sufficient PPE, the risk imposed on individuals, such as prisoners and mental health patients in detention during lockdown, their obligations under Articles 2 and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as Article 11. How are we as a society, and the government, going to regard the question of “judicial activism” in this unprecedented situation in a post-pandemic UK?
Here are the statutes, statutory instruments and cases referred to in the course of my interview with Dominic Ruck-Keene and Darragh Coffey:
COVID-19 continues to dominate the news this week. The death toll in Europe has now risen to over 100,000, with the UK accounting for more than 16,000 of those. Although there appear to be signs that the infection curve is slowing elsewhere in Europe, and vaccine trials are now underway, it seems likely that we are in this for the long haul. UK government chief scientific adviser Patrick Vallance has written in the Guardian this week, explaining the challenges of ensuring any proposed vaccine is safe, and of scaling it up as required.
Pressure is building for the government to publish the findings of ‘Exercise Cygnus’, a three-day flu pandemic readiness exercise conducted in October 2016, as critics note the government’s apparent ill-preparedness for the coronavirus outbreak. According to the Observer, the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (Nervtag) recommended that the government:
Develop a ‘pandemic influenza concept of operations’ to improve coordination between the ‘complex network of partners’ involved;
Plan for ‘legislative easements’ to deal with the pandemic;
Work on ‘better understanding of the public reaction to a reasonable worst-case pandemic’; and
Strengthen ‘surge capability and capacity in operational resources in certain areas’, especially in respect of excess deaths, social care, and the NHS.
Lib Dem MP Philip Lee has urged Matt Hancock and Michael Gove to answer “when did they read the Cygnus report that has not been published and, having read that report, why did they conclude not to increase testing, PPE, and ventilator capacity in January?”. The Department of Health has insisted that the UK is “one of the most prepared countries in the world for pandemics.”
Concerns about criminal justice during the coronavirus pandemic continue. As the backlog builds up, DPP Max Hill QC has instructed the CPS to seek out-of-court solutions where possible, so as to limit the ‘expanding pipeline’ of cases waiting to be heard. Mr Hill and other voices such as James Mulholland, vice-chair of the Criminal Bar Association, have stressed the importance of deterrent sentences for offences related to COVID-19 and deliberate infection. However, ex-DPP Ken MacDonald QC has urged the courts not to mete out excessive jail term, arguing that prison is not the place for ‘nuisances’.
Lockdown is causing serious damage to family life too. There has been a surge in urgent care proceedings in the family courts, as increased drinking, money worries, and domestic violence put vulnerable children at risk. Unicef has released guidance for authorities on the protection of children during the COVID-19 pandemic. In light of the rise in domestic violence, Home Secretary Priti Patel this week launched an urgent awareness campaign, pledging £2m for domestic violence charities and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner.
Note: This article involves examination of thelegal provisions that accompany some of the restrictions on movement of individuals announced by the Government. The movement restrictions themselves are vital to the protection of life in the current crisis and must be adhered to by all persons. The current Government guidance setting out these and other restrictions can be found here. Legal scrutiny is important but should not be taken to question the undeniable imperative to follow that guidance.
The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 were made by the Health Secretary on 26 March 2020. Understandably, given the speed with which the crisis was and still is developing, the Regulations were made using a statutory emergency procedure, meaning that they were not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. They have yet to be challenged in the courts. In the meantime, a lively and important debate has developed about whether those regulations are lawful.
This post aims to provide an overview of the key contributions thus far, and to provide a starting point for newcomers to the debate. The summaries below are necessarily incomplete, and each of the pieces referred to is well worth reading in full.
On UKHRB we’ve considered a number of the potential human rights implications of the Covid-19 pandemic and the measures put in place to combat it (Alethea Redfern’s round up is the best place to start, there have been a number of posts since, and there will be a podcast coming up on the subject next week on Law Pod UK). It was only a matter of time before some of these issues started to come before the European Court of Human Rights and, on Wednesday, a case involving the UK Government concerning the impact of Covid-19 on conditions of detention in prison was communicated: Hafeez v the United Kingdom (application no. 14198/20).
Communication of a case takes place where an issue is considered to require further examination and the respondent state is invited to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. It is also an indication that the Court does not consider the case, on its face, inadmissible.
The latest episode of Law Pod UK features energy expert Thomas Muinzer of Aberdeen University and David Hart QC of 1 Crown Office Row. They discuss the complex provisions of the Climate Change Act 2008, the extent to which the UK has reached its own goals for carbon emission reduction, and two recent challenges in the courts to projects involving GHG emissions:
In a paper published today Lord Sandhurst QC and Benet Brandret QC follow up on the previous paper co-authored by Lord Sandhurst QC by making concrete proposals for addressing the issues identified previously (see the previous paper here and our post on it here). It sets out a more concluded position on the doubts as to the vires for SI 2020/350 by explaining why the Statutory Instrument is, indeed, ultra vires, and the need for new legislation. It also sets out routes to put legislation and Guidance on a sound footing.
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