proportionality
9 October 2026 by Lance Baynham
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The following piece was also posted here on 1 Crown Office Row’s Quarterly Medical Law Review
Birmingham Community Healthcare NHS Trust v Ibrahim [2026] EWHC 2468 (KB)
In Ibrahim, Mr Justice Soole upheld a Judge’s decision that the Defendant Trust had breached the Claimant’s rights under Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) when it failed to adopt an alternative procedure for dispensing Codeine outside of daylight hours during Ramadan in 2019. In reality, the Trust’s arguments were completely undermined by the fact that no one had actually thought about the issue at the time.
Background
The Claimant was a Muslim prisoner. The Trust was responsible for providing primary healthcare at the prison. The Claimant was prescribed Codeine. This was provided each day under supervision at a medicine hatch. The hatch operated during fixed hours each morning and afternoon. Generally, there was no system for providing medication under supervision outside those hours. There were, however, separate arrangements in certain other circumstances, such as prisoners arriving at the prison late in the evening.
Unless exempt, Muslims are required to fast during daylight hours throughout the month of Ramadan. This includes not consuming oral medication. In 2019, the hatch opening times were during daylight hours. The arrangements ultimately put in place by the Trust were that the Claimant was temporarily prescribed alternative painkillers during Ramadan which he was permitted to take in his cell, rather than under supervision at the hatch. The Judge found as fact that the temporary use of these alternative painkillers had no adverse impact on the Claimant.
The claims were for an unlawful interference with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR; an unlawful interference with the right to manifest religious beliefs under Article 9 ECHR; and unlawful discrimination on the grounds of religion in violation of Article 14 ECHR, when read with Articles 8 and 9 ECHR. It is unclear why no discrimination claim was brought under the Equality Act 2010.
Judgment below
His Honour Judge Najib held that Articles 8 and 9 ECHR were engaged but not violated. The Claimant was able to and in fact did fast throughout Ramadan. He was provided with alternative medication which, ultimately, had no adverse effect. There was no challenge to these findings on appeal.
However, the Judge also held that there was a breach of Article 14 ECHR. He identified the questions to be asked as set out by Baroness Hale in R (Stott) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] UKSC 59 at [207]:
- does the treatment complained of fall within the ambit of one of the Convention rights;
- is that treatment on the ground of some “status”;
- is the situation of the claimant analogous to that of some other person who has been treated differently; and
- is the difference justified, in the sense that it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?
Question two was not disputed: the ground was religion. On the other issues, the Judge held that: i) the treatment complained of fell within the ambit of Articles 8 and 9 ECHR – there was a “more than merely tenuous connection” [39]; ii) the Claimant’s situation was analogous to other prisoners who had been prescribed medication which could only be taken under supervision [51]; and iii) the failure to put in place alternative arrangements was not in pursuit of the legitimate aim of ensuring security and preventing the proliferation of opiate based and other controlled substances [68], but was instead due to an ‘apparent’ lack of resources and/or a need to prioritise limited resources [69] which was not made out on the facts [76]. As such, the Article 14 ECHR claim succeeded.
Appeal
The Trust’s appeal challenged the Judge’s conclusions on ‘ambit’ and ‘objective justification’ – i.e., the first and fourth of the Stott questions.
As to the ambit issue, the challenge “centred on the Judge’s finding of fact that Mr Ibrahim had not suffered withdrawal or any other adverse symptoms in consequence of not taking Codeine” [80]. Soole J rejected this argument for the following three reasons: firstly, ‘ambit’ and ‘interference’ are separate concepts – treatment can come within the ambit of an ECHR right even if that right is not violated [89]; secondly, the appropriate test is “whether the criticised measure or treatment has a more than merely tenuous connection to the core value(s) of a substantive Article” (emphasis added) [90]; and, thirdly, it is not necessary, for ‘ambit’ purposes, to establish that the relevant treatment had an adverse effect and the Judge was right to focus on the connection between the treatment complained of and the substantive ECHR rights [91]-[92].
The more substantial challenge was to the conclusion on objective justification. The Trust’s arguments all centred on the allocation of resources – that the Judge “failed to identify the allocation of scarce resources as a legitimate aim; and thus failed to take resources into account when considering proportionality” [105]. Moreover, to the extent that the Judge did consider the allocation of resources, he wrongly held that the Trust’s evidence that alternative procedures would have been impractical amounted to no more than a ‘bare assertion’ [97].
In rejecting these arguments, Soole J first sounded a warning against “the dangers of undue textual criticism” in the context of a necessarily lengthy judgment [106]. Giving a fair reading to the judgment as a whole, Soole J held that the Judge had indeed considered the allocation of resources. His rejection of this issue was based not on principle, but on the facts.
The reality was that no one had in fact turned their mind to the possibility of providing the Claimant with his medication by some alternative procedure. The evidence of Trust witnesses on resources and practicality “did not reflect the actual reasoning of anyone at the time”, but simply their beliefs that it would have been difficult if anyone had thought about it. This belief was itself “undermined” by the fact that alternative arrangements were made in other situations, e.g., for prisoners arriving at the prison late. In such circumstances, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the Trust’s evidence amounted to a ‘bare assertion’ and, in fact, it was “difficult to see how the Judge could have reached any other conclusion” [114].
It followed from this central finding that the resources had not formed any part of the Trust’s aim in not making alternative arrangements for the Claimant. As such, it was not necessary to consider proportionality but, had it been, the same finding of fact “would or should equally have compelled the conclusion that the test of proportionality was not met” [125].
Comment
There are some useful illustrations of principle in Soole J’s judgment, particularly on the ‘ambit’ issue. Firstly, that the appropriate test is whether the criticised measure or treatment has a “more than merely tenuous connection” to the core value(s) of a substantive ECHR Article. Secondly, that it is not necessary to establish that the relevant treatment had any adverse effect.
However, this was a case where “the very particular facts and circumstances” [126] carried the day. In some ways, this counted against the Claimant. The Article 8 and 9 ECHR claims were dismissed on the basis that the Claimant had been able to fast and did not experience any real issues as a result of temporarily not taking Codeine or having to take an alternative painkiller. The position would inevitably be very different if a Muslim prisoner was receiving some other medication such that this would have been a problem – i.e., so that they would effectively need to choose between their religion and their health.
The central finding of fact though was the “overall failure by anyone to apply their mind to [the issue]” [118]. The practical lesson for institutions is that it will be very difficult to justify discriminatory treatment as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, if the legitimate aim has been retrospectively manufactured. Before the question of whether issues of practicality and resources might amount to a legitimate aim in principle, there is the preliminary question of whether such issues were in fact the reason for the discriminatory treatment. If, in reality, the reason was simply that no one thought about it, then evidence of hypothetical impracticality or resource constraints is unlikely to carry much weight. Had the Trust taken even some perfunctory steps to investigate whether alternative arrangements would have been feasible, it seems likely that it would have been given a reasonably wide margin of appreciation. However, having taken none, it was “in an inherently weak position on its margin of appreciation” [121]. A further practical point is that, where a claim relates to a failure to make an exception, then other exceptions – such as for late-arriving prisoners in this case – are likely to carry significant weight and will need to be carefully explained.
Lance Baynham is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row.
17 March 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Samuel Talalay
Introduction
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”) provides qualified protection for speech. Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) criminalises certain speech acts relating to proscribed organisations. In the case of R v ABJ; R v BDN [2026] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether these two things could be reconciled: is s 12(1A) of the 2000 Act compatible with the Convention?
In its judgment, given on 26 February 2026, the Court answered this question with an unequivocal ‘yes’. The offence introduced by s 12(1A) was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Crucially, conviction would always represent a proportionate interference with the defendant’s Article 10 right to free speech where the elements of the offence, properly understood, were made out.
In providing such a resounding answer, however, the Court risks setting the bar too high for legislative provisions to be compatible with the Convention.
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10 December 2025 by Guest Contributor
By Samuel Talalay
Introduction
In its judgment in the case of IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, handed down on 26 November 2025, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the correct test for establishing the existence of family life between non-core family members under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human rights (“ECHR”). It also clarified the proper conceptual framework for considering the subtle interaction between the rights of non-claimant family members and the UK’s Convention obligations to individuals outside its territory. Finally, it emphasised the centrality of the Government’s immigration policy to any exercise considering the proportionality of an interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights in the immigration context.
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4 December 2025 by Guest Contributor
By Georgina Pein
To what extent does the law afford protection to couples looking to foster children, in circumstances where that couple possesses (and vocalises) strong religious beliefs? This was the issue for consideration before Turner J, who heard this appeal in the King’s Bench Division of the High Court. Judgment was handed down on 18 November 2025.
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25 August 2025 by Alice Kuzmenko
EBB and others v The Gorse Academies Trust [2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin)
In EBB and others v The Gorse Academies Trust [2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin), the Honourable Mrs Justice Collins Rice gave judgment in a multi-faceted, rolled-up permission and judicial review hearing concerning three high school students’ experiences of being disciplined within their school (“the School”).
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18 August 2025 by Guest Contributor
Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30
By Talia Zybutz
Introduction
These appeals – Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport – were a test case for the operation of the UK’s sanctions regime introduced in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The Supreme Court confirmed that while the court’s task is to assess proportionality for itself, a wide margin of appreciation will be afforded to the executive in judging how best to respond to and restrain Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
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18 June 2025 by Rosalind English
In ALR and others v Chancellor of the Exchequer [2025] EWHC 1467 (Admin), the High Court has dismissed a challenge against the government’s manifesto policy of adding VAT to private school fees. The claimants were a group of students, parents, and schools. Some of the students required specific schooling because of (inter alia) special educational needs and religious convictions; all claimants sought a declaration that the VAT addition was incompatible with the European Convention of Human Rights. Specifically, they argued that imposing VAT was incompatible with Article 2 Protocol 1 (right to education) and 14 (protection from discrimination).
This dismissal of the judicial review challenge represents a significant ruling on the interplay between fiscal policy, human rights law and the allocation of resources for education.
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6 February 2020 by Guest Contributor
In the previous post under this topic, I referred to Mr Justice Binnie’s proposal for the exercise of the standard of reasonableness review in the 2007 case of Dunsmuir v New Brunswick. This would eventually resurface in Vavilov, where the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the starting point should be a presumption that the reasonableness standard applied. In the interim, there had been much academic, practitioner and judicial commentary on the lack of clarity and consistency in the application of the principles espoused by the majority in Dunsmuir in subsequent cases and on the difficulty in applying such principles in claims. Members of the Supreme Court also expressed concerns in subsequent cases, for example, Abella J in Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd 2016 SCC 29. The majority in Vavilov explicitly refers to such criticism coming from the judiciary and academics but also from litigants before the Court and organizations representing Canadians who are affected by administrative decisions. As the Court stated,
These are not light critiques or theoretical challenges. They go to the core of the coherence of our administrative law jurisprudence and to the practical implications of this lack of coherence.
The Court also referred to concerns that the reasonableness standard was sometimes perceived as “advancing a two-tiered justice system in which those subject to administrative decisions are entitled only to an outcome somewhere between “good enough” and “not quite wrong”.
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12 November 2019 by Rosalind English
R (on the application of) Friends of Antique Cultural Treasures Ltd v Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – read judgment
“We believe that the legal market presents opportunities for criminals to launder recently poached ivory as old ivory products.” (Defra’s statement in consultation in introducing the Ivory Bill)
The Ivory Act 2018, which received Royal Assent in December 2018, proposes to prohibit ivory dealing with very limited exceptions. This includes antique items made with ivory. According to the Government, the Act contains “one of the world’s toughest bans on ivory sales”. No date has yet been fixed for it to become law.
The purpose of the Act is to enhance the protection of African and Asian elephants in the face of ongoing threats to their survival. It does so by prohibiting the sale, as opposed to the retention, of all ivory (that is, anything made out of or containing ivory), subject to a very limited and tightly defined exemptions. These prohibitions are backed by criminal and civil sanctions.
The claimant company represented UK dealers in antique worked ivory such as Chinese fans, walking canes with sculpted ivory tops and furniture with ivory inlay. The appeal of these items is not confined to Sinologist antiquarians. Netsuke, smaller carved ornaments worn as part of Japanese traditional dress, are an example. Even for the non connoisseur, Edmund de Waal’s novel The Hare with the Amber Eyes is a celebration of the significance and aura that these ornaments bestow on their owners, not just for the carving, but for the material of which they are made. Religious, hierarchical, magical, and even medicinal.
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28 October 2015 by David Hart KC
Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2015] EWCA Civ 105, 23 October 2015 read judgment
Bank Mellat is an Iranian bank, initially subjected to a 2009 order which prohibited anybody in the UK from dealing with it – until the Supreme Court quashed it: here, and my posts here and here.
The Treasury tried again, by orders made in 2011 and 2012 addressed at all Iranian banks, not just Bank Mellat. The EU has now taken over regulation of these banks.
In the current proceedings, the Bank seeks to set the 2011 and 2012 orders aside. These restrictions are, the Treasury says, addressed at the financing of Iran’s nuclear programme, in which all Iranian banks are complicit. Bank Mellat denies this, and the conundrum in the case is how to make sure that the challenge is fairly tried. Collins J (my post here) thought that the Treasury had not revealed enough about its case, and, in substance, on appeal the CA agreed.
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27 June 2015 by David Hart KC
R (ota Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, 24 June 2015 (see judgment)
The Supreme Court has reminded us, in a tour de force by Lord Reed, that there is no such thing as one-stop proportionality. It varies between ECHR and EU law, and the tests of EU proportionality then vary according to the nature of the EU issue in play.
And all this in a case about trying to improve standards for barristers’ advocacy.
Barristers challenged the Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates or QASA, on EU grounds. QASA requires barristers in the criminal courts to be assessed by judges before they are allowed to take on certain categories of cases.
Its EU-ness arises in this way.
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12 November 2014 by Rosalind English
R (on the application of Lord Carlile of Berriew QC and others) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2014] UKSC 60 – read judgment
The exclusion of a dissident Iranian from the UK, on grounds that her presence would have a damaging impact on our interests in relation to Iran, has been upheld by the Supreme Court. (My post on the Court of Appeal’s ruling is here).
At the heart of the case lies the question of institutional competence of the executive to determine the balance between the relative significance of national security and freedom of speech. The exclusion order was imposed and maintained because the Home Office is is concerned with the actual consequences of Mrs Rajavi’s admission, not with the democratic credentials of those responsible for bringing them about. The decision-maker is not required by the Convention or anything else to ignore or downplay real risks to national security where they originate from people acting for motives which are contrary to the values of this country.
The following summary of the facts is partly based on the Court’s press release. References in square brackets are to the paragraphs in the judgment.
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10 November 2014 by Rosalind English
In his lecture to the Administrative Law Bar Association earlier this month, Lord Sumption surveys the concept of “anxious scrutiny” – a judicial method which he characterises as a forerunner to the principle of proportionality. The term was actually coined by Lord Bridge in Bugdaycay (1986), and was meant to apply where the rights engaged in a case were sufficiently fundamental, and stretched the traditional “Wednesbury” test to public authority decisions or actions which were not, on the face of it, irrational. (The citation given in the PDF of the speech incidentally is incorrect). The same way of thinking had been arrived at in the US courts a few years earlier, with their “hard look” doctrine, but to Lord Sumption there was something peculiarly English about the “crab-like” way in which our courts approached and eventually acknowledged this doctrine, hitherto alien to the judicial toolbox.
But if we apply anxious scrutiny to the doctrine itself, Sumption suggests, it raises more questions than it answers.
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5 November 2014 by David Hart KC
Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2014] EWHC 3631 (Admin), Collins J, 5 November 2014 – read judgment UPDATED POST
Fireworks here from Collins J in making sure that Bank Mellat got some disclosure of information in its fight to discharge a financial restriction order against it.
Bank Mellat is an Iranian bank, initially singled out by an 2009 order which prohibited anybody from dealing with it. The order was part of sanctions against Iran in respect of its nuclear and ballistic missiles programme. However, it bit the dust, thanks to the Supreme Court: see judgment. I did a post on that decision, and followed it up with one (here) on the (dis)proportionality arguments which led to the order’s downfall.
However the Bank was subject to two further orders, made in 2011 and 2012. They led to the freezing of €183m held by it in London. The 2012 order has since been revoked, but the 2011 one remains. This is the subject of the Bank’s application to set it aside. On any view, as Collins J recognised, it had caused very serious damage to the Bank’s business.
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22 June 2013 by David Hart KC
Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39 (see judgment)
My post of earlier this week explained why the majority of the Supreme Court struck down a direction telling all financial institutions not to deal with this Iranian Bank. The legal ground (involving, as Lord Sumption described it, “an exacting analysis of the factual evidence in defence of the measure” [20]) was that the direction was “disproportionate”. The judgments (particularly the dissenting one of Lord Reed) tell us a lot about the scope of proportionality. And there is a good deal more to it than there might at first sight appear.
So it may be worth doing a bit of a bluffers guide, hand in hand with Lord Reed.
The concept arises in human rights law and in EU law. Its ECHR and EU incarnations derive from German administrative law, but its development in English law shows strong common-law influences. It applies in many different contexts, and the intensity of the review required critically depends on that context as well as the right being interfered with. So it is no simple thing to explain, but Lord Reed at [68] – [76] distils the main elements.
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