Article 14
9 October 2026 by Lance Baynham
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The following piece was also posted here on 1 Crown Office Row’s Quarterly Medical Law Review
Birmingham Community Healthcare NHS Trust v Ibrahim [2026] EWHC 2468 (KB)
In Ibrahim, Mr Justice Soole upheld a Judge’s decision that the Defendant Trust had breached the Claimant’s rights under Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) when it failed to adopt an alternative procedure for dispensing Codeine outside of daylight hours during Ramadan in 2019. In reality, the Trust’s arguments were completely undermined by the fact that no one had actually thought about the issue at the time.
Background
The Claimant was a Muslim prisoner. The Trust was responsible for providing primary healthcare at the prison. The Claimant was prescribed Codeine. This was provided each day under supervision at a medicine hatch. The hatch operated during fixed hours each morning and afternoon. Generally, there was no system for providing medication under supervision outside those hours. There were, however, separate arrangements in certain other circumstances, such as prisoners arriving at the prison late in the evening.
Unless exempt, Muslims are required to fast during daylight hours throughout the month of Ramadan. This includes not consuming oral medication. In 2019, the hatch opening times were during daylight hours. The arrangements ultimately put in place by the Trust were that the Claimant was temporarily prescribed alternative painkillers during Ramadan which he was permitted to take in his cell, rather than under supervision at the hatch. The Judge found as fact that the temporary use of these alternative painkillers had no adverse impact on the Claimant.
The claims were for an unlawful interference with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR; an unlawful interference with the right to manifest religious beliefs under Article 9 ECHR; and unlawful discrimination on the grounds of religion in violation of Article 14 ECHR, when read with Articles 8 and 9 ECHR. It is unclear why no discrimination claim was brought under the Equality Act 2010.
Judgment below
His Honour Judge Najib held that Articles 8 and 9 ECHR were engaged but not violated. The Claimant was able to and in fact did fast throughout Ramadan. He was provided with alternative medication which, ultimately, had no adverse effect. There was no challenge to these findings on appeal.
However, the Judge also held that there was a breach of Article 14 ECHR. He identified the questions to be asked as set out by Baroness Hale in R (Stott) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] UKSC 59 at [207]:
- does the treatment complained of fall within the ambit of one of the Convention rights;
- is that treatment on the ground of some “status”;
- is the situation of the claimant analogous to that of some other person who has been treated differently; and
- is the difference justified, in the sense that it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?
Question two was not disputed: the ground was religion. On the other issues, the Judge held that: i) the treatment complained of fell within the ambit of Articles 8 and 9 ECHR – there was a “more than merely tenuous connection” [39]; ii) the Claimant’s situation was analogous to other prisoners who had been prescribed medication which could only be taken under supervision [51]; and iii) the failure to put in place alternative arrangements was not in pursuit of the legitimate aim of ensuring security and preventing the proliferation of opiate based and other controlled substances [68], but was instead due to an ‘apparent’ lack of resources and/or a need to prioritise limited resources [69] which was not made out on the facts [76]. As such, the Article 14 ECHR claim succeeded.
Appeal
The Trust’s appeal challenged the Judge’s conclusions on ‘ambit’ and ‘objective justification’ – i.e., the first and fourth of the Stott questions.
As to the ambit issue, the challenge “centred on the Judge’s finding of fact that Mr Ibrahim had not suffered withdrawal or any other adverse symptoms in consequence of not taking Codeine” [80]. Soole J rejected this argument for the following three reasons: firstly, ‘ambit’ and ‘interference’ are separate concepts – treatment can come within the ambit of an ECHR right even if that right is not violated [89]; secondly, the appropriate test is “whether the criticised measure or treatment has a more than merely tenuous connection to the core value(s) of a substantive Article” (emphasis added) [90]; and, thirdly, it is not necessary, for ‘ambit’ purposes, to establish that the relevant treatment had an adverse effect and the Judge was right to focus on the connection between the treatment complained of and the substantive ECHR rights [91]-[92].
The more substantial challenge was to the conclusion on objective justification. The Trust’s arguments all centred on the allocation of resources – that the Judge “failed to identify the allocation of scarce resources as a legitimate aim; and thus failed to take resources into account when considering proportionality” [105]. Moreover, to the extent that the Judge did consider the allocation of resources, he wrongly held that the Trust’s evidence that alternative procedures would have been impractical amounted to no more than a ‘bare assertion’ [97].
In rejecting these arguments, Soole J first sounded a warning against “the dangers of undue textual criticism” in the context of a necessarily lengthy judgment [106]. Giving a fair reading to the judgment as a whole, Soole J held that the Judge had indeed considered the allocation of resources. His rejection of this issue was based not on principle, but on the facts.
The reality was that no one had in fact turned their mind to the possibility of providing the Claimant with his medication by some alternative procedure. The evidence of Trust witnesses on resources and practicality “did not reflect the actual reasoning of anyone at the time”, but simply their beliefs that it would have been difficult if anyone had thought about it. This belief was itself “undermined” by the fact that alternative arrangements were made in other situations, e.g., for prisoners arriving at the prison late. In such circumstances, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the Trust’s evidence amounted to a ‘bare assertion’ and, in fact, it was “difficult to see how the Judge could have reached any other conclusion” [114].
It followed from this central finding that the resources had not formed any part of the Trust’s aim in not making alternative arrangements for the Claimant. As such, it was not necessary to consider proportionality but, had it been, the same finding of fact “would or should equally have compelled the conclusion that the test of proportionality was not met” [125].
Comment
There are some useful illustrations of principle in Soole J’s judgment, particularly on the ‘ambit’ issue. Firstly, that the appropriate test is whether the criticised measure or treatment has a “more than merely tenuous connection” to the core value(s) of a substantive ECHR Article. Secondly, that it is not necessary to establish that the relevant treatment had any adverse effect.
However, this was a case where “the very particular facts and circumstances” [126] carried the day. In some ways, this counted against the Claimant. The Article 8 and 9 ECHR claims were dismissed on the basis that the Claimant had been able to fast and did not experience any real issues as a result of temporarily not taking Codeine or having to take an alternative painkiller. The position would inevitably be very different if a Muslim prisoner was receiving some other medication such that this would have been a problem – i.e., so that they would effectively need to choose between their religion and their health.
The central finding of fact though was the “overall failure by anyone to apply their mind to [the issue]” [118]. The practical lesson for institutions is that it will be very difficult to justify discriminatory treatment as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, if the legitimate aim has been retrospectively manufactured. Before the question of whether issues of practicality and resources might amount to a legitimate aim in principle, there is the preliminary question of whether such issues were in fact the reason for the discriminatory treatment. If, in reality, the reason was simply that no one thought about it, then evidence of hypothetical impracticality or resource constraints is unlikely to carry much weight. Had the Trust taken even some perfunctory steps to investigate whether alternative arrangements would have been feasible, it seems likely that it would have been given a reasonably wide margin of appreciation. However, having taken none, it was “in an inherently weak position on its margin of appreciation” [121]. A further practical point is that, where a claim relates to a failure to make an exception, then other exceptions – such as for late-arriving prisoners in this case – are likely to carry significant weight and will need to be carefully explained.
Lance Baynham is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row.
23 September 2026 by Guest Contributor
The UK Human Rights Blog is moving to Substack.
From 19th October, all new articles will be published exclusively on our Substack, and no new content will appear on our current website.
To stay up to date with our latest articles and insights, please subscribe here: https://substack.com/@ukhumanrightsblog
The UK Human Rights Blog is grateful to Dr Lewis Graham, the author, and to the Administrative Court Blog (where this post first appeared) for permission to reproduce the below.
The Supreme Court has, once again, rejected a challenge to the compatibility of primary legislation with the ECHR. It has ruled that section 128(1) of the Police, Crime, Courts and Sentencing Act 2022 (amending the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997) is compatible with Articles 5, 7 and 14 of the Convention. The case is R (Quaye) v Secretary of State for Justice [2026] UKSC 34.
The legislation under challenge
Children who commit murder are not given the same life sentences as adults. Instead, they are sentenced to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure (DHMP). As part of the sentencing procedure, the trial judge sets a minimum term which must be served before the offender can apply to the Parole Board for release. Prior to changes made in 2021, the Secretary of State operated a policy whereby at a certain point (halfway through the minimum term) the offender could apply to them for a review of that term, with the possibility of achieving early release. This policy was amended in 2021, and was put on a statutory footing in 2022, via the Police, Crime, Courts and Sentencing Act 2022, section 128(1). The effect of this provision was to remove any opportunity for child offenders sentenced to DHMP to seek a review of the minimum term if the offender was sentenced after they became an adult (i.e. after their 18th birthday).
The result of the legislation, therefore, was to separate child offenders into two categories: firstly, those who committed a crime as a child (under the age of 18), and who were sentenced as a child; secondly, those who committed a crime as a child (under the age of 18) but who were sentenced after their 18th birthday. The former category remain entitled to seek review of the minimum term by the Secretary of State; the latter category, thanks to section 128(1), do not.
The claimant in this case fell into the latter category. He committed murder before his 18th birthday, but was sentenced after he turned 18; section 128(1) therefore applied, and he was not entitled to have his sentence reviewed. He sought to challenge the legislation via judicial review, arguing that section 128(1) breached his rights under Articles 5, 7 and 14 of the ECHR.
The courts below
The High Court (William Davis LJ and May LJ) upheld, in part, the claimant’s challenge: see [2024] EWHC 211 (Admin). It ruled that depriving child offenders of the opportunity to have their sentences reviewed by the Secretary of State gave rise to the possibility of arbitrary detention, contrary to Article 5 of the Convention. The Court noted, in this respect, that prior to the legislative change, some child offenders successfully convinced the Secretary of State to reduce their minimum term. To deny them the opportunity to show that their rehabilitation was complete, and that the sentence is no longer necessary, was to breach their Article 5 rights: see [59] of that case. The High Court also upheld the challenge based on Article 14 of the Convention. It found that the provisions treated two groups differently based on their age, and that the justifications put forward by the defendant – the protection of those under 18 at the time of sentence and the need to promote the interests of victim families – did not justify the arbitrary differentiation between those who were 18 at the time of sentencing and those who were not: see [46]-[58] of the High Court’s judgment. The High Court did not consider it necessary to rule on the legislation’s compatibility with Article 7: see [62] of its judgment.
The Court of Appeal (Sharp P, Lewis LJ and Cobb J) overturned the High Court’s judgment: see [2025] EWCA Civ 226. It found that section 128(1) of the 2022 Act did not breach Articles 5, 7 or Article 14 of the Convention. The claimant’s lack of opportunities for review of his sentence did not render the sentence arbitrary for the purposes of Article 5: see [87] of that judgment. The changes made by the 2022 Act were “concerned with the manner of execution or enforcement of the sentence” rather than changing the sentence itself, so Article 7 was not violated: see [102] of that judgment. Finally, emphasising the significant margin of appreciation applicable in this context, the Court concluded that the decision to treat offenders differently depending on their age at the time of sentence was not disproportionate, and that a fair balance had been struck between the rights of the offender and the interests of the victims’ families: see [118]-[143], and especially [142]-[143], of that judgment.
The Supreme Court’s judgment
The Supreme Court, in a judgment jointly written by Lord Stephens and Lady Simler (with which Lords Sales, Briggs and Hamblen expressed agreement), dismissed the claimant’s appeal. It ruled, like the Court of Appeal below it, that section 128(1) of the 2022 Act did not breach any Convention rights.
Article 5 ECHR
The Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the High Court’s findings relating to Article 5. The High Court fell into error, said the Supreme Court, by taking as its “starting point” the position that the 2022 legislation “did not change the essential nature of a sentence of [DHMP] and that an inherent element of the sentence was the requirement of continuing review”: [59]. Legislation had already governed the field since at least the year 2000 and, in any case, the combined effect of legislative intervention, up to and including section 128(1) of the 2022 Act, had created a complete code governing DHMP, or as the Court put it at [61]: “Since 2022 the scheme for sentencing persons who commit murder as children to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure is an entirely statutory one”.
The core question, then, was “whether by excluding any opportunity to review the minimum term for those aged 18 and over when sentenced to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure, section 27A(11) gives rise to a risk of arbitrary detention under article 5 ECHR”: [62]. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that Article 5 does not require there to be an opportunity for review in this sense, either for sentences in general or for DHMP: [64], [68], [69]. Article 5 simply required there to be a sufficient connection between the conviction and the sentence actually imposed; this test was clearly met on the facts: [67]. Being sentenced to a minimum term, without the opportunity to petition the Secretary of State to reduce that sentence, was not arbitrary: [69].
Article 7 ECHR
The Supreme Court drew upon the familiar distinction, in the context of Article 7, between the retrospective modification of a sentence (or “penalty”) and changes made to the “execution” or “enforcement” of a sentence. The former is prohibited under Article 7; the latter is not: [129]. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal in finding that the changes made by section 128(1) fell into the latter, rather than the former category: [144]. The changes related “exclusively to a change in the regime for early release on licence”: [143]. The sentence imposed on the claimant was DHMP, and it remained so after the changes made by the 2022 Act took effect: [142]. Article 7 was not breached by the relevant provisions of the 2022 Act: [144].
Article 14 ECHR
The Court also ruled that the provisions did not breach Article 14 of the Convention. Whilst the effect of section 128(1) was to create two categories of offender, which were treated differently based on a protected status (age) – see [114] – the Court found that the difference in treatment pursued a legitimate aim, the effect of which was to constitute a proportionate interference with the claimant’s rights.
The aim behind the legislation was the protection of the victim’s family members. In particular, the Court highlighted that victim families are contacted every time an application to vary the minimum term is made: [98]. Repeated engagement with this process caused “obvious and inevitable” distress for them: [100]. The desire to reduce this distress was “a consideration Parliament was entitled to regard as powerful”: [99]. The aim behind the legislation was therefore a legitimate one: [101]. There was a rational connection between the pursuit of that aim and the legislation in question: [115].
As to proportionality, the Court applied “low intensity of review” [79] for five reasons: first, the discrimination in this case was based on the ground of age, which is not a suspect category calling for heightened scrutiny: [80]; second, the provision under review is primary legislation: [88]; third, the legislation involves considerations of “social policy”: [89]; fourth, there is no European consensus on the issue at hand: [93]; fifth, the legislation in question involves consideration of “competing interests”: [94]. All of this meant that the legislature was in a stronger position than the court when it came to determining the proportionality of the measure, and the court should be slow to intervene in its judgment: [124]-[125]. The legislation did not breach Article 14: [126].
Comment
This judgment provides yet another instance of the Supreme Court rejecting a human rights challenge to legislation. In doing so, the Court applied a relatively orthodox understanding of what protection from arbitrariness requires in the context of Article 5, and was unwilling to recognise any wider principle that the needs of child prisoners to be protected from arbitrary detention mandates that their sentences be kept under review (at least in part because there existed no explicit Strasbourg authority to this effect: [64]).
The Court’s reasoning in relation to Article 14 is also noteworthy. By largely approving the reasoning of Sharp P in the Court of Appeal (see our blog on that judgment here) the Court once again applies a very deferential approach to discrimination issues in human rights law. Whilst the Court at least accepts that the intensity of review to be applied in Article 14 cases “varies according to the circumstances, the subject matter and the background” ([78]), the Court goes on to provide five reasons as to why a low intensity review is justified in the present case. These reasons are familiar and, as I have argued elsewhere, largely fail to convince. For example, almost all legislation – and certainly any legislation which involves differential treatment capable of engaging Article 14 issues – will involve “competing interests”. And the courts have interpreted “social policy” so widely that it has come to encompass almost any kind of legislative issue.
We also see in this judgment some now-expected language emanating from the case of SC: “the assessment of proportionality in this case ultimately depends on whether Parliament made the right judgement… this question cannot be answered by a process of legal reasoning because there are no legal standards by which a court can decide where the balance should be struck”: [124]. I have argued elsewhere that in some cases, this language has been used to justify an abdication of the duty of the courts to perform the required proportionality assessment (“there are no legal standards…”). This interpretation was rejected recently in the case of LMN, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that SC should not be treated as authority for the position that in some cases a proportionality assessment should not be carried out at all. Thankfully, the Supreme Court appears to confirm this in Quaye. After setting out the above passage, the Court confirms: “it follows that the court should be slow to substitute its own view for the political judgement of Parliament in this respect”. The message, therefore, is that courts should apply a low intensity review, rather than no review at all. This is a subtle but important difference, and a welcome clarification that SC is not to be treated as authorising the courts to abandon the proportionality test altogether in cases involving social and political controversy.
Dr Lewis Graham is a Lecturer in Human Rights Law at the University of Manchester and an editor of the Administrative Court Blog.
5 August 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Matthew Howarth
In R (Al Hashimi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 943, the Court of Appeal held that a woman living in the United Arab Emirates could not invoke Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) to challenge sex discrimination in UK nationality legislation. The preliminary obstacle was Article 1: she was not within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction for Convention purposes (§1).
The decision is a clear restatement of the territorial limits on the ECHR. A decision taken in the UK, even one that substantially affects the interests of a person abroad, does not itself establish jurisdiction over that person (§§28-29, 39).
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16 July 2025 by Allyna Ng
Introduction
On 10 July 2025, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Semenya v Switzerland. The case arose from the legal challenge by Olympic champion Caster Semenya to World Athletics’ regulations (“the DSD Regulations”)requiring athletes with differences in sex developments, also known as ‘intersex’ athletes, to lower their testosterone levels in order to compete in the female category of certain events.
Importantly, the Applicant’s case in the ECtHR was not against World Athletics (since World Athletics is not an entity directly subject to the Convention) but against Switzerland for the role of its Federal Supreme Court (“SFSC”) in upholding the arbitral award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”). The case therefore highlights the complexities involved in protecting human rights in the realm of international sports arbitration.
The Grand Chamber’s judgment, while ostensibly narrow in some respects, affirms the importance of Article 6 ECHR safeguards and arguably broadens the scope of its protection, particularly where fundamental rights are concerned in compulsory arbitration.
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7 November 2024 by anuragdeb
Anurag Deb and Lewis Graham
Introduction
There are many well-tuned arguments both for and against the liberalisation of the UK’s strict euthanasia laws, some more helpful than others. This piece is not concerned with weighing up the policy arguments for or against such a move, nor does it consider which “side” of the argument is ultimately more convincing. Indeed, the authors do not necessarily agree with one another on the discrete question of whether Kim Leadbeater MP’s Bill should be supported.
But one curious argument has recently emerged which is of serious concern to both authors: the argument that liberalising euthanasia laws, in line with the proposed changes in Leadbeater’s Bill, should be resisted, as doing so would be to contravene the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In this post, we seek to debunk this argument.
There are, we think, two main variants of ECHR-based arguments to this effect: one invoking Article 14 (freedom from discrimination) and the second relying on Article 2 (right to life). Neither is convincing.
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12 November 2019 by Alex Ewing
J.D. and A v the United Kingdom (nos. 32949/17 and 34614/17) – read judgment
Much may have changed in the political world since the Coalition Government introduced its controversial ‘bedroom tax’, but the legal fall-out from the policy continues. The European Court of Human Rights has delivered its verdict on the compatibility of the scheme with the prohibition on discrimination set out in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Strasbourg Court has found that the policy discriminated unlawfully against women at risk of domestic violence.
Background
As is well known, in 2012 the United Kingdom government introduced new regulations with the effect that those in social housing with an ‘extra’ bedroom had their housing benefit reduced: the so-called ‘bedroom tax’. The purported aim of the policy was to save money and to incentivise those with an ‘extra’ bedroom to either move property or take in a lodger thereby resulting in a saving of public funds.
It is not difficult to imagine why someone might have an extra bedroom but have strong reasons (related to disability or gender) for not moving house. The Government sought to make provision for such cases through a discretionary scheme operated by local authorities but funded by central government.
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21 September 2016 by Rosalind English
Smith v Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust and another [2016] EWHC 2208 (QB) – read judgment
Under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 those who live together but are not married are not entitled to damages for bereavement. The High Court has found that though this did not directly engage the right to family life and privacy under Article 8, the difference in treatment between cohabitees and those who were married or in a civil partnership could not be justified and consideration should be given to reforming the law.
The issues before the Court
The claimant had cohabited with a man for over two years before he had died as a result of the first and second defendants’ negligence. She had made a dependency claim under s.1 of the 1976 Act, which by a 1982 amendment had been extended to people who had been cohabiting for more than two years, but the bereavement damages provisions in s.1A(2)(a) still applies only to spouses and civil partners.
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19 July 2016 by Hannah Lynes
In the news
Theresa May has been sworn in as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, prompting speculation about the impact her leadership will have on human rights.
The former Home Secretary has been a vocal and long-standing critic of the Human Rights Act. In a 2011 speech she insisted that the legislation “needs to go”, making controversial reference to what legal commentators argued was a “mythical example” of an immigrant who could not be deported because “he had a pet cat”. Her appointment of Liz Truss as Justice Secretary, who has previously spoken out against the HRA, suggests that the Government will continue with plans to replace the Act with a British Bill of Rights.
Nonetheless, it appears that the UK will remain a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, at least in the near future. During her campaign to be Prime Minister, Theresa May stated that she would not pursue pulling out of the ECHR, describing the issue as divisive and lacking majority support in Parliament. Amnesty International have said that they “warmly welcome” this commitment, and have called on the Prime Minister to “turn the corner on human rights” in the UK.
In an examination of “Theresa May’s Eight Human Rights Highs and Lows”, RightsInfo has noted that in 2012 May “came out strongly in support of the proposal to change the law so people of the same sex could marry”. Pink News charts her evolution on LGBT rights to become the “unsung hero” of equal marriage, while pointing out criticisms that conditions for LGBT asylum-seekers have worsened under her tenure as Home Secretary.
On the issue of freedom of religion, commentators have similarly looked to Teresa May’s actions as Home Secretary for an indication of her position. David Pocklington provides an overview for Law & Religion UK, noting her recent launch of an independent review into the operation of sharia law in England and Wales.
Meanwhile, the Government’s review into whether victims of trafficking have effective access to legal advice has yet to be published. Writing in the Justice Gap, Juliette Nash has called on Theresa May to deliver on her promise to tackle modern slavery and implement any recommendations of the review as soon as possible: “the spotlight is now on …the Prime Minister…to ensure that justice is done”.
In other news:
The Guardian: Lawyers acting on behalf of a British citizen are seeking to challenge the lawfulness of the Government triggering Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union without parliamentary approval. We have posted on the “divorce” process here. The UK Constitutional Law Association Blog provides extensive academic discussion of the constitutional issues surrounding the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
Law Society’s Gazette: In a report on the impact of tribunal fees published on 20 June, the House of Commons Justice Committee made a number of recommendations, including that the fees charged in the employment tribunal should be ‘substantially reduced’. In the meantime, Unison has continued to pursue its quest for judicial review of the lawfulness of the fees, with an appeal to the Supreme Court set for December 2016.
BBC: An investigation is under way following the death of 18 year-old Mzee Mohammed in police custody, who had been detained by security staff at a shopping centre. The charity Inquest has called for “the most thorough and robust scrutiny of the actions of the security guards and the police” who were in contact with Mr Mohammed before his death.
Daily Telegraph: Figures released by the CPS show that the number of prosecutions for hate crimes against disabled people has increased by 41.3% in the last year, while prosecutions for homophobic and transphobic crime have risen by 15% over the same period.
In the courts:
Taddeucci and McCall v Italy (judgment in French only)
This case concerned the refusal of Italian authorities to grant a residence permit to a gay couple, on the basis that they did not constitute family members. The Court found that the restrictive interpretation of the notion of family member applied by the authorities did not take into account the fact that under Italian law the couple were unable to marry. In deciding to treat homosexual couples in the same manner as unmarried heterosexual couples, Italy was in breach of article 14 (freedom from discrimination) taken together with article 8 (right to respect for private and family life).
Buzadji v the Republic of Moldova
This case concerned the detention of a businessman for ten months, pending trial on an allegation of attempted fraud. The Court affirmed that judicial authorities were required to give relevant and sufficient reasons for detention, in addition to having a “reasonable suspicion” that the relevant individual had committed an offence. Importantly, this requirement was held to apply already at the time of the first decision ordering detention, and “promptly” after the arrest.
On the particular facts, the Court found that the reasons given for detention had been stereotyped, abstract and inconsistent. As such there had been a violation of article 5 (the right to liberty).
UK HRB posts
Whose fair trial prevails? – David Hart QC
Justice for everyone: another Grayling reform bites the dust – Gideon Barth
Book review: “The Inquest Book: The Law of Coroners and Inquests” edited by Caroline Cross and Neil Garnham – Michael Deacon
The Chilcot Report – an Illegal War? – Dominic Ruck Keene
Another door closes for the Chagossians – Dominic Ruck Keene
Get out the back, Jack? make a new plan, Stan? – Rosalind English
Hannah Lynes
25 May 2016 by Rosalind English
Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam) 20 May 2016 – read judgment.
The Court of Protection has granted an order for a declaration of incompatibility with Convention rights of a section in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act on grounds of discrimination.
This case concerned a child, Z, who was born in August 2014 in the State of Minnesota in the United States of America. Z was conceived with the applicant father’s sperm and a third party donor’s egg implanted in an experienced unmarried American surrogate mother. The surrogacy arrangements were made through the agency of an Illinois company and in accordance with Illinois law.
Following Z’s birth, the father obtained a declaratory judgment from the appropriate court in Minnesota, relieving the surrogate mother of any legal rights or responsibilities for Z and establishing the father’s sole parentage of Z. Following that court order he was registered as Z’s father in Minnesota. The father has since returned to this country, bringing Z with him.
The legal effect of this is that the surrogate mother, although she no longer has any legal rights in relation to Z under Minnesota law, is treated in the UK as being his mother. By the same token, whatever his legal rights in Minnesota, the father has no parental responsibility for Z in this country. The only two ways in which the court could secure the permanent transfer of parental responsibility from the surrogate mother to the father is by way of a parental order or an adoption order. The father would obviously far prefer a parental order.
Continue reading →
22 January 2016 by Guest Contributor
Special Guest Post by Professor Robert Wintemute
On 19-20 January, the England and Wales High Court (Mrs. Justice Andrews) heard the judicial review of the ban on different-sex civil partnerships brought by Rebecca Steinfeld and Charles Keidan. It was argued on behalf of the supposedly LGBTI-friendly UK Government (represented by Nicky Morgan, the Secretary of State for Education and Minister for Women and Equalities) that the High Court should follow two anti-LGBTI decisions from 2006.
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4 March 2015 by Hannah Lynes
After a brief hiatus, the Human Rights Round-up is back. Our new team of expert summarisers – Hannah Lynes, Alex Wessely and Laura Profumo – is installed and ready to administer your regular dose of UK human rights news.
This week, Hannah reports on the Global Law Summit, access to justice, and what’s happening in the courts.
In the News
‘If you wrap yourself in the Magna Carta…you are inevitably going to look ridiculous if you then throw cold water on an important part of its legacy.’ Lord Pannick QC was not alone last week (23-28th February) in suggesting that there was some irony in Lord Chancellor Chris Grayling evoking the spirit of the Magna Carta at his launch of the three-day Global Law Summit.
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29 October 2014 by Rosalind English
Cotton and others, (R on the application of) v Minister for Work and Pensions and others, 15 October 2014 [2014] EWHC 3437 (Admin) – read judgment
Whether you call it the “spare room subsidy” or the “bedroom tax”, the removal of this type of housing benefit has been nothing short of controversial. There have been several previous legal challenges to the Regulations, as well as to the benefit cap introduced as part of the same package of welfare changes. The outcome of these cases was not promising for these claimants, in particular the decision of the Court of Appeal in R (MA) v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions [2014] EWCA Civ 13. Another important case is R (SG (previously JS)) v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions [2014] EWCA Civ 156.
Now the High Court has settled one aspect of the matter by ruling that these amendments did not breach the rights of singe parents under Article 8 ECHR who looked after their children under shared care arrangements where they received discretionary housing payments to make up the shortfall.
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19 May 2012 by Alasdair Henderson
Burnip v. Birmingham City Council, Trengrove v. Walsall Metropolitan Council, Gorry v. Wiltshire Council [2012] EWCA Civ 629 – read judgment
In the same week that the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan-Smith, announced his intention to implement sweeping reforms of the current system of disability benefits, the Court of Appeal has ruled that housing benefit rules were discriminatory against disabled people, in breach of Article 14 read with Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention.
Mr Duncan-Smith has already faced opposition to his reform proposals but has made it clear that he is willing to tackle this controversial issue. However, this week’s ruling is a timely reminder that social security law is extremely complex and that the Government will have to tread very carefully to avoid unwittingly causing further instances of unlawful discrimination.
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5 June 2010 by Guest Contributor
The European Convention - now it has its own blog page
We have added a new “ECHR” page where you can access an index of the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The page can be accessed by clicking here, or by clicking on the “ECHR” tab at the top of any page on the blog.
Each Article has its own separate page with the wording of the Article itself and a brief summary of how it works in law.
You can access this summary by clicking on the “more info” link. You can also click on the “posts” link to see all posts on the UK Human Rights Blog relating to that Article. A few articles don’t have a live link “posts” as we have not posted on it yet. We would welcome your comments on this or on any way we can make the blog better.
The index is reproduced below:
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28 March 2010 by Adam Wagner
Carson and Others v The United Kingdom (Application no. 42184/05)
The European Court of Human Rights has rejected a claim by British pensioners living abroad that their pension payments should be uplifted to take into account inflation. The case was supported by Pension Parity UK, a pressure group. The majority in the Court held that the pensions system was not a breach of ECHR Article 14 (non discrimination), saying at [86]:
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