extradition

Double Feature: Article 6 and extradition in Bertino and Merticariu

4 April 2024 by Benjamin Seifert

Introduction

On 6 March 2024 the Supreme Court handed down two separate judgments in the cases of Bertino v Public Prosecutor’s Office, Italy [2024] UKSC 9 and Merticariu v Judecatoria Arad, Romania [2024] UKSC 10. The constitution of the Court for both cases was the same with the judgments written by Lord Stephens and Lord Burnett. Lords Hodge, Sales and Burrows completed the panel.

These two appeals both concern Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the Act”) which deals with convicted individuals who are subject to convictions in their absence. Trials in absentia are extremely common in civil law jurisdictions and it is sometimes said that there is the possibility of unfairness arising from a trial with an absent defendant

Section 20(3) requires an extradition judge to decide whether or not a person has deliberately absented themselves from their trial. In those circumstances they can be extradited to serve a sentence without an entitlement to a retrial.

If the Court determines that the person was not deliberately absent Section 20(5) must be addressed and it is necessary to decide if they would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) a review amounting to a retrial. The case of Bertino considered deliberate absence within Section 20(3) and Merticariu the right to a retrial within Section 20(5).

These issues are integral to the protection of Article 6 of the ECHR. It is plain that deliberately absenting oneself from a trial would not subject someone to a violation of Article 6 but the two basic principles of that Article are the right to be present and the right to be represented (Bertino §27).

Bertino: the facts

The Appellant’s extradition was sought pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) issued for his extradition to serve a year’s imprisonment after trial in his absence at the Italian Court of Pordenone. He was convicted for the offence of sexual activity with an under-age person.

The Appellant signed a document confirming that he was under investigation and he “elected domicile” in Italy. The document stipulated that he was obliged to notify the authorities of any change of address. Without such a notification service of any document would be executed by delivery to his lawyer. Mr Bertino elected his domicile by giving an address in Venetico, Messina and also indicated that he would be assisted by a court-appointed lawyer.

However he then left the country in November 2015 and came to the UK where he began to work. Meanwhile the prosecution in Italy commenced on 8 June 2017, a writ of summons for the court hearing was issued on 12 June 2017 and he was summoned to appeal at the Pordenone Court on 28 September 2017. The summons included a warning that his non-attendance without “lawful impediment” would lead to judgment in his absence. However he had never received the summons and by then the judicial authority knew that he was no longer at the address in Venetico. He had also failed to notify the authorities of any change of address.

There were then many unsuccessful attempts to trace him in Italy between 2016 and 2019. The Appellant did tell Westminster Magistrates’ Court that he had informed the authorities of his departure to the UK for family law purposes because, by then, his marriage was failing and arrangements were to be made for the children, but not the police in connection with the investigation.

The Council Framework Decision

EAWs must be drafted in a prescribed form according to the Council Framework Decision of 26 February 2009 2009/299/JHA, and there are various options which the issuing judicial authority is required to tick. In this case the EAW indicated that he was absent from his trial. There are a range of boxes for indicating, roughly, why this was; in Mr Bertino’s case none of those boxes was ticked and the evidence was that he was unaware of the date and place of his trial and even that there had been a decision to prosecute him.

The Deputy Senior District Judge ordering extradition found that, because the Appellant left his address without notifying a forwarding address and then came to the UK he had demonstrated a “manifest lack of diligence” [§10], a phrase echoing Court of Justice of the European Union case law.

On appeal Swift J found that there was no reason in principle to distinguish between a requested person’s awareness of the date and place of trial and the knowledge that if he does not attend trial he could be tried in absentia. This, he observed, is in accordance with Article 6 ECHR which guarantees a person’s right to be present at trial but that right, so he said, could be waived expressly or by inference.

Swift J certified the following point of law of general public importance:

For a requested person to have deliberately absented himself from trial for the purpose of Section 20(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 must the requesting authority prove that he has actual knowledge that he could be convicted and sentenced in absentia?

The Court’s conclusions on the law

If the EAW is used to convey information which demonstrates that one of the criteria from the 2009 Framework Decision is met that is normally determinative of whether or not the extraditee can be considered deliberately absent (§44). However the Framework Decision (§45) acknowledges that the question of whether or not to extradite is a matter of domestic law when none of the criteria has been satisfied. Consequently Section 20 falls to be analysed.

The phrase “deliberately absented himself from his trial” is the same, under Strasbourg jurisprudence, as the suggestion that an accused has unequivocally waived his right to be present at trial. If those circumstances lead to a finding of a breach of Article 6 then the judge must be required to consider retrial rights under Section 20(5).  However if the trial in absentia did not lead to a breach of Article 6 then the person will have deliberately absented himself from his trial.

It is also for the requesting judicial authority to prove to the criminal standard that an appellant has unequivocally waived his right to be present at his trial.

Application of the facts to the law

The Appellant was never arrested, charged or questioned. He was never informed that he was to be prosecuted and was never notified of the time and place of his trial (§50). He knew that he was suspected of a crime which was being investigated but there was no certainty that he would subsequently be prosecuted. When he left Italy, without giving the judicial police a new address, there were no criminal proceedings of which he could have been aware and definitely no trial from which he could have deliberately absented himself. This was the basis upon which the Supreme Court ruled that the Courts below had erred in finding that he had deliberately absented himself.

At paragraph 52 the Court stated that the Magistrates’ Court and the High Court had inferred that he had unequivocally and intentionally waived his right to be present at his trial by finding that he could reasonably foresee that the trial would proceed in his absence. The Supreme Court noted that the concepts of waiver and reasonable foreseeability were from Strasbourg case law and were not synonymous with the same concepts in English private law. The Strasbourg standard is that, in order for a waiver to be unequivocal and effective, knowing and intelligent, the accused must ordinarily be shown to have appreciated the consequences of their own behaviour and will usually require them to have been warned (§54).

The District Judge had described the Appellant’s “manifest lack of diligence” but the Supreme Court concluded (§55) that this would not have been a waiver by the fact that he could have avoided the situation which led to an impairment of his rights. It was on that basis that the Supreme Court found that the courts had previously overly broadened the definition by finding that deliberate absence is found where the person’s conduct led to him becoming unaware of the date and time of trial. However (§58) these cases are clearly to be considered on their individual facts and there may be circumstances where accused people knowingly and intelligently place themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the prosecuting and judicial authorities  so that a trial in their presence is impossible and they could be considered to appreciate that a trial in absentia is the only option.

The Court therefore ruled that Mr Bertino did not unequivocally waive his right to be present at his trial and was not deliberately absent. The appeal was therefore allowed.

Merticariu: the facts

The EAW was issued in 2019. District Judge Ezzat gave judgment on 26 August 2020 and found that Mr Merticariu had not deliberately absented himself from his trial but did have a right to a retrial in Romania and therefore, with this apparent guarantee, extradition was ordered.

On appeal (§6) to the High Court Chamberlain J dismissed the appeal, having found that he was bound by the authority of BP v Romania [2015] EWHC 3417 where the Divisional Court held that Section 20(5) of the Act will be satisfied even if the right to a retrial is conditional on a finding in the requesting state that the person was not deliberately absent from their trial.

The certified question

Chamberlain J certified the following question of general public importance arising from his decision. He refused leave to appeal.

In a case where the appropriate judge has decided the questions in section 20(1) and (3) of the Extradition Act 2003 in the negative, can the appropriate judge answer the question in section 20(5) in the affirmative if (a) the law of the requesting state confers a right to retrial which depends on a finding by a judicial authority of that state as to whether the requested person was deliberately absent from his trial; and (b) it is not possible to say that a finding of deliberate absence is ‘theoretical’ or ‘so remote that it can be discounted’? If so, in what circumstances?

The decision

As a Romanian extradition case the High Court considered Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provided that the person has a “right to ask for a retrial of the case”(§34). However this was not sufficient for the Supreme Court. The “natural and ordinary” meaning of the words in Section 20(5) were clear. It is not solely a question of being entitled to apply for a retrial. The answer to the question in Section 20(5) should not be “perhaps” or “in certain circumstances” (§51). The entitlement to a retrial therefore cannot be contingent on the court making a factual finding that the person was not present at or was not deliberately absent from their trial. The question is clear: are they entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial?

The decision in BP was therefore wrong at paragraph 44 where it stated that an application for a retrial was a procedural step contingent on the court determining whether the person had or had not instructed a lawyer to represent her at her trial (§52). The 2009 Framework Decision replaced “an opportunity to apply for a retrial” with “a right to a retrial.”

The Supreme Court also agreed that the right to a retrial was consistent with Strasbourg principles where there is a “duty to guarantee the right of a criminal defendant to be present in the courtroom” (§54). It is consistent with Article 6 obligations.

Furthermore the principle of mutual trust and confidence, which pervades extradition arrangements between the UK and EU (§60) runs both ways because the issuing judicial authority takes part and is represented in the proceedings in the UK court and it would be entirely in accordance with this principle that courts in requesting states respect the executing courts’ decisions in this country.

The answers to the certified questions

The Supreme Court found that an appropriate judge cannot answer Section 20(5) in the affirmative if the law confers a right to a retrial which depends on a finding by a judicial authority as to whether the person was deliberately absent from their trial.

In relation to (b) of the question the Court found that it is for the issuing judicial authority to provide information in the EAW or in response to a request for further information. The executing court should not take part in a “mini trial” as to whether, on the facts and law of the requesting state, a finding is theoretical or so remote that it can be discounted. The evidence should be clear. (§64)

The application to the case

Given that the judicial authority in this case was unable to confirm whether or not the Appellant had a right to a retrial and Article 466 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure demonstrated that he would not be regarded as having been tried in absentia he had no right to a retrial (§67).

Comments

In Bertino, This decision represents a pendulum swing from the past ten years of High Court authority where the concept of “manifest lack of diligence” had imposed a significant level of responsibility on a person who may not have fully understood the consequences of their decision to leave the country after they may have only been partly aware of a criminal prosecution. It provides a greater protection to those lay persons who assume that the authorities will contact them. It also now requires District Judges to exercise greater inquiry into the circumstances of an individuals departure from the country which requests their extradition.

In Merticariu, the Supreme Court has finally resolved what is a very short point. If the Court is required to consider Section 20(5) there can be no assumptions in these cases, in the absence of any clear evidence, that a right to a retrial exists. There was always a doubt that the requesting state’s s findings about deliberate absence would chime with those of the executing state and now they need to be considered together. These questions are fundamental to the fair carriage of extradition cases between the UK and EU. Whilst the earlier cases assumed compliance with Article 6 on the basis of mutual trust and confidence the UK courts now do not need to be so quick to reach the same conclusions and they will also offer greater protections to those who find themselves in our extradition courts.

Benjamin Seifert is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row Chambers.

USA successfully appeals Assange case

13 December 2021 by Sapan Maini-Thompson

In Government of the United States v Julian Assange [2021] EWHC 3313 (Admin), the High Court allowed the appeal of the United States of America against the ruling of Westminster Magistrates’ Court, thereby permitting the extradition of the WikiLeaks founder to the US where he faces criminal charges relating to the unlawful obtaining and publication of classified defence and national security materials.

The High Court held that diplomatic assurances given by the US government regarding Assange’s prospective detention conditions were sufficient to quash the original basis upon which his extradition was initially discharged, namely that his mental condition was such that it would be “oppressive” to extradite him, per s.91 Extradition Act 2003.

The Weekly Round-Up: The Queen’s Speech and Gendered Violence

18 May 2021 by Alethea Redfern

In the News:

In the Queen’s Speech last week, the government presented its legislative programme for the next session of parliament, including a number of bills with important human rights implications. The speech was of particular interest because of the extent to which Brexit and COVID-19 have dominated the prime minister’s time in office so far.

Last Tuesday’s to-do list includes an enormous 31 bills, listed in full here and set out in greater detail here. Two bills with key implications are addressed below.

The Weekly Round-Up: Lockdown Again (Again)

5 January 2021 by Alethea Redfern

In the News:

So: here we are again.

Rampant spread, fuelled by a combination of a new variant that is around 50-70% more transmissible, plus a lifting of restrictions at the beginning of December, brings us into another national lockdown.

In many ways, Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s first address of 2021 felt unpleasantly like a return to early 2020.

The original “Stay Home” messaging made a comeback. The Prime Minister was deliberately vague about how long lockdown would last. Big Brother Watch criticised the  government for “yet again … evading the democratic process” by denying MPs a meaningful vote on the new national restrictions prior to their televised announcement to the nation, or their coming into force. The new guidance differs from the Tier 4 guidance in emphasis, if not substance.

Ever the optimist, the Prime Minister was keen to emphasise “one huge difference” between this lockdown and the first one: the UK is “rolling out the biggest vaccination programme in its history”. He also managed to get in a jab at the UK having delivered more vaccines than the rest of Europe combined.

There were other, more subtle differences, as No. 10 tweaked its messaging in light of past mistakes.

The Weekly Round-Up: Tension Over Begum and Procurement

24 November 2020 by Alethea Redfern

In the News:

There is a long history of crossover between lawyers and politicians; more members of parliament come from the law than almost any other profession. But the relationship – never totally tranquil – has become more strained in recent years.

The Round-Up: Worboys Ruling Strikes a Blow to Parole Board Privacy, Criminal Bar to Strike over Legal Aid Cuts, and Did Vote Leave Breach Election Law?

2 April 2018 by Eleanor Leydon

Image Credit: Guardian

R (On the application of) DSD and NBV & Ors v The Parole Board of England and Wales & Ors & John Radford: in a landmark ruling, the High Court has quashed the Parole Board’s decision to release black cab driver and serial sex offender John Worboys, on grounds of irrationality. The Board acted irrationally in that it “should have undertaken further inquiry into the circumstances of his offending and, in particular, the extent to which the limited way in which he has described his offending may undermine his overall credibility and reliability” [201].

Continue reading →

Honeymoon murder suspect can be extradited to South Africa, says High Court

1 February 2014 by Rosalind English

Government of the Republic of South Africa v Dewani  [2014] EWHC 153 (Admin) 31 January 2014 – read judgment

Shrien Dewani, the British man facing charges of murdering his wife on honeymoon in South Africa, has lost his appeal to block extradition there (so far three men have been convicted in South Africa over Mrs Dewani’s death). The Court ruled that it would not be “unjust and oppressive” to extradite him, on condition that the South African government agreed to return him to the UK after one year if his depressive illness and mental health problems still prevented a trial from taking place.
Continue reading →

Jihadist suspect cannot be extradited to United States because of his mental illness

21 April 2013 by Rosalind English

Aswat v United Kingdom, 16 April 2013 – read judgment

The Strasbourg Court has ruled that a terrorist suspect detained in the United Kingdom’s Broadmoor hospital should not be extradited to the United States because of the risk that his mental condition would deteriorate there.

The applicant was indicted in the US in respect of a conspiracy to establish a jihad training camp in Oregon.  He was arrested in the UK in 2005 and in 2006 the Secretary of State ordered his extradition. He unsuccessfully appealed the High Court and the Court of Appeal on the grounds that his extradition would not be compatible with Article 3 of the Convention because he could be detained in a “supermax” prison. In November 2011 a mental health tribunal determined that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
Continue reading →

Extradition injustice remains despite European ruling in Radu – Alex Tinsley

12 February 2013 by Guest Contributor

Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] ECR I-0000 – Read judgment

The European Court of Justice’s Grand Chamber has ruled that the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not allow refusal to execute a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) on the basis that the person was not heard by the issuing authority.

With reform of the EAW at the centre of the debate concerning the UK’s big 2014 opt-out decision, all eyes were on the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) when it gave judgment in this case widely seen as an opportunity for it to address some key issues in the operation of the EAW system. There is some disappointment at the outcome.

Continue reading →

Bye bye Abu Hamza – but why did it take so long?

25 September 2012 by Adam Wagner

The European Court of Human Rights has refused the request of Mustafa Kamal Mustafa (Abu Hamza) and four others to refer their extradition appeal to its Grand Chamber for another hearing. This means that their case, which was decided in the Government’s favour in April (see our post) is now final. There are therefore no remaining barriers to their extradition to the United States to face terrorism charges.

But why has it taken so long to decide the case? The men argued that if extradited there was a real risk that their article 3 (torture and inhumane treatment) rights would be contravened by being held at a ‘Super-max’ prison and by having to face extremely long sentences. The extradition requests were made by the United States in July 1999 (Adel Bary), May 2004 (Abu Hamza) March 2005 (Barbar Ahmad), August 2005 (Haroon Rashid Aswat) and September 2006 (Syed Tahla Ahsan). In other words, a long time ago.

Continue reading →

The Assange Reality Distortion Field

21 August 2012 by Adam Wagner

It was once said of Apple’s Steve Jobs that he could convince himself and others to believe almost anything with a mix of charm, charisma, bravado, hyperbole, marketing, and persistence. Following Jobs’ untimely death, Wikileaks founder Julian Assange has taken over the mantle of his patented Reality Distortion Field.

It would seem (on Twitter at least) that you are now either with Assange or against him. To be with him is to believe that he is in the throes of an international conspiracy involving, but not limited to, the British Government, courts, the Swedish Government, his rape (not bad sexual etiquette) accusers, of course the Americans and possibly the saucer people too. To be in the other (artificially exaggerated) camp is to not automatically believe that his Swedish accusers have been concocted by a dastardly international conspiracy, but rather that their accusations should be met with (whisper it) due process. Moreover, Assange has had his days in court, all the way to the UK Supreme Court, and now must face his accusers.

Since Assange happens to be in the UK (well, technically in Ecuador I suppose), the UK legal blogging community has taken it upon itself to bring reality back into line. Not since the Freemen of the Land has a legal issue generated a series of counter-woo posts of such quality, and after this rather lengthy introduction, all I seek to do is link to them with approval:

Continue reading →

Interests of children should not prevent extradition for serious offences

21 June 2012 by Rosalind English

HH (Appellant) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa (Respondent); PH (Appellant) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa (Respondent) [2012] UKSC 25 – read judgment

These appeals concern requests for extradition in the form of European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) issued, in the joined cases of HH and PH, by the Italian courts, and in the case of FK, a Polish court. The issue in all three was whether extradition would be incompatible with the rights of the appellants’ children to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR.

Put very briefly, HH and PH had been arrested in Italy on suspicion of drug trafficking. They left Italy in breach of their bail conditions and went to the United Kingdom. They were convicted in their absence. European arrest warrants were later issued. They challenged their extradition on the basis of the effect that it would have on their three children, the youngest of whom was 3 years old.

FK was accused of offences of dishonesty alleged to have occurred in 2000 and 2001. She had left Poland for the UK in 2002 and European arrest warrants had been issued in 2006 and 2007. F had five children, the youngest of whom were aged eight and three. She has not been tried or convicted of the alleged offences yet.
Continue reading →

Assange, secret trials and data retention – The Human Rights Roundup

4 June 2012 by Wessen Jazrawi

Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your weekly buffet of human rights news. The full list of links can be found here. You can also find our table of human rights cases here and previous roundups here.

The big news this week has been the unexpected turn of events in the Assange extradition case. Almost immediately after the Supreme Court handed down its judgment that he could be extradited, his counsel Dinah Rose QC threw a spanner in the works… The upshot is that it looks like Assange shall be sticking around for at least another couple of weeks. The other significant news of the week is that the Government has published the Justice and Security Bill.

by Wessen Jazrawi

Continue reading →

No extradition for Shrien Dewani – for now

31 March 2012 by Isabel McArdle

The Government of the Republic of South Africa v Shrien Dewani- Read decision

The extradition to South Africa of Shrien Dewani, the man accused of murdering his wife on honeymoon there in 2010, has been delayed pending an improvement in his mental health.

The case made headlines in 2010, when the story broke of a honeymooning couple who had been ambushed in the township of Gugulethu, South Africa. Mr Dewani told police he had been travelling in a taxi which was ambushed by two men. He described being forced from the car at gunpoint and the car driving away with his wife still inside. She was found dead shortly after.  However, evidence emerged which led the South African authorities to believe that Mr Dewani had initiated a conspiracy with the taxi driver and the men who ambushed the taxi to murder his new wife. Consequently, they sought his extradition from the UK, to which he had returned, to face a trial for murder.

In an appeal to the High Court from a decision by a Senior District Judge that Mr Dewani could be extradited, Mr Dewani made two arguments:
1.    Prison conditions in South Africa were such that his Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment) Convention rights would be violated if he were extradited;

2.    His mental health and risk of suicide were such that his should not be extradited.
Continue reading →

Extradition of murder accused to US not breach of human rights

19 January 2012 by Isabel McArdle

HARKINS AND EDWARDS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM – 9146/07 [2012] ECHR 45 – Read judgment

The European Court of Human Rights has found that there would be no breach of Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) in extraditing two men accused of murder to the US.

The men argued that they face the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole if found guilty. The US had given assurances to the UK government that the death penalty would not be sought. The following summary is based on the Court’s press release (my abridgement):

Continue reading →