C (a child)  EWCA Civ 798 read judgment
This is the most recent in the long series of legal steps touching on the violent career of Ben Butler, recently convicted of the murder of his daughter, Ellie.
Butler was convicted for Grievous Bodily Harm, and then cleared on appeal. Care proceedings were commenced at the end of which Ellie was ordered to be returned to her parents by Hogg J in October 2012. A year later, on 28 October 2013, Ellie was found dead.
C, the subject of this appeal, is Ellie’s younger sister. In June 2014, Eleanor King J, in the family courts, found that Butler had caused Ellie’s death, Ellie’s mother (Jennie Gray) had failed to protect her from Butler, and C had been the victim of physical and emotional abuse. This judgment had been the subject of reporting restrictions.
Immediately after Butler’s conviction in June 2016, media organisations applied for the release of Eleanor King J’s judgment to Pauffley J in the family court. Pauffley J dismissed this application. Her decision was roundly reversed in this decision of the Court of Appeal.
The human rights clash is the familiar one of freedom of expression under Article 10 versus the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR.
Many readers will know that I have banged on, long and hard, via this blog about the constant problem we have in the UK trying to ensure that the cost of planning and environmental litigation is not prohibitively expensive for ordinary people. The UK system has been held repeatedly to be in breach of Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention, which says that members of the public should be able to challenge environmental decisions, and the procedures for doing so shall be adequate and effective and “not prohibitively expensive”. For Aarhus beginners, have a look at my bluffers guide – here
So I was delighted to be asked recently to chair the Environmental Law Foundation whose main role is to help out people, for free, with their planning and environmental problems. ELF is going to have its 25th birthday next year, and this short post is an unashamed plug for the job that it does – together with an invitation to contact it (see below) if you have a problem you think they may be able to help with, or if you want to volunteer to assist on someone else’s problem.
Hayward v. Zurich  UKSC 48 27 July 2016 read judgment
and Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung AG  UKSC, 20 July 2016 read judgment
Twin doses of dishonesty in the Supreme Court, last month. Both raised dilemmas for the SC trying to steer a principled way (in different circumstances) towards determining the cost of lying.
In the first, Mr Hayward claimed over £400,000 from his employers for a back injury at work. The Zurich smelt a rat and alleged exaggeration in its defence but felt ultimately they could not sufficiently prove it in court. So in 2003 they settled the claim by paying Mr Hayward just under £135,000. In 2005, his neighbours told insurers that they thought he had been dishonest. So the Zurich started proceedings to set the compromise aside and to get its money back. Mr Hayward sought to strike it out, saying “a deal was a deal”, without success. So he then faced a trial of Zurich’s claim, at the end of which Zurich was successful. But the saga was not over. He now faced a retrial of his original claim, in which he repeated the lies he had come out previously. The judge was thoroughly unconvinced, and gave him £14,700. It was that result which was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court.
The second claim concerned marine insurers of a ship who sought to repudiate a claim on the policy because the insured owners had told a lie in presenting the claim, even though the lie proved to be irrelevant to the insurer’s liability. Owners claimed over €3,200,000 for the loss of a vessel. They said that the crew had informed them that the bilge alarm had sounded at noon that day, but could not be investigated because of heavy weather. This was a lie told by the owners to strengthen the claim. But it turned out to be irrelevant to the result, because of the judge’s finding that the vessel’s loss had been caused by a peril of the seas.
Both lower courts found that this lie was a “fraudulent device”, which meant the insurers did not have to pay out under the policy.
So what did the Supreme Court do with these two claims about lying?
Da Costa and another v. Sargaco  EWCA Civ 764 14 July 2016 read judgment
Two people say they owned motorbikes which they kept outside their house – until, it is said, the bikes were mown down by the defendant’s car, a collision which their witness claimed to have seen. The car’s insurers said that the claim was fraudulent and it was all a conspiracy. The judge agreed it was a fraud, whereas the Court of Appeal disagreed – but still disallowed the claim because, the CA said, the owners had not proved their case.
But the point of general interest arose because the judge decided that each claimant should give evidence in the absence of the other. And the CA said this was wrong. As I shall explain, I disagree. But let’s see where the Article 6 ECHR battle lines lie so you can come to your own view.
Schindler and MacLennan v. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  EWCA Civ 469 20 May 2016 – read judgment
Last month, I posted here on this challenge to the rule stopping long-time expatriates from voting on the Brexit proposals. The case went swiftly to the Court of Appeal, who, today, swiftly dismissed the expats’ appeal.
The challengers said that the 15 year rule on voting was an unjustified restriction of the rights of freedom of movement under EU law, not least because if the UK were to leave the EU, they would end up without rights of abode in their current EU countries.
PJS v. News Group Newspapers Ltd  UKSC 26 – read judgment
The Supreme Court has this morning continued the interim injunction concerning PJS’s extra-marital goings-on until after the full trial of the claim – after a rollercoaster ride for his claim through the courts.
Cranston J refused an injunction on 15 January 2016.
The Court of Appeal granted it on 22 January (Matt Flinn’s post here), and then discharged it on 18 April due to the effect of subsequent publicity which they said had led the injunction to have no remaining purpose (my post here). The subsequent publicity was in US newspapers and via the internet (with, as Lord Toulson commented, some fairly obvious twitter hashtags involved.)
The Supreme Court swiftly convened a hearing on 21 April, leading to today’s judgment reversing the Court of Appeal.
The decision (4-1) was not unanimous, with Lord Toulson dissenting. There are three concurring judgments (all agreed to by the majority).
Bank Mellat v HM Treasury  EWCA Civ 452 1258, Court of Appeal, 10 May 2016: read judgment
Bank Mellat’s challenge to the Treasury’s direction under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 has been before the courts on a number of occasions. In 2009, the Treasury had concluded that the Bank had connections with Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme. In 2013, the Supreme Court quashed the direction, which had stopped any institution in London from dealing with the Bank.
The Bank claims for damages caused by the unlawful direction. The claim is under the Human Rights Act via A1P1 of the ECHR, (the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions).
Preliminary issues on damages came before Flaux J (judgment here, my post here). The Treasury appealed, with, as we shall see, some measure of success.