ECtHR
9 October 2026 by Lance Baynham
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The following piece was also posted here on 1 Crown Office Row’s Quarterly Medical Law Review
Birmingham Community Healthcare NHS Trust v Ibrahim [2026] EWHC 2468 (KB)
In Ibrahim, Mr Justice Soole upheld a Judge’s decision that the Defendant Trust had breached the Claimant’s rights under Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) when it failed to adopt an alternative procedure for dispensing Codeine outside of daylight hours during Ramadan in 2019. In reality, the Trust’s arguments were completely undermined by the fact that no one had actually thought about the issue at the time.
Background
The Claimant was a Muslim prisoner. The Trust was responsible for providing primary healthcare at the prison. The Claimant was prescribed Codeine. This was provided each day under supervision at a medicine hatch. The hatch operated during fixed hours each morning and afternoon. Generally, there was no system for providing medication under supervision outside those hours. There were, however, separate arrangements in certain other circumstances, such as prisoners arriving at the prison late in the evening.
Unless exempt, Muslims are required to fast during daylight hours throughout the month of Ramadan. This includes not consuming oral medication. In 2019, the hatch opening times were during daylight hours. The arrangements ultimately put in place by the Trust were that the Claimant was temporarily prescribed alternative painkillers during Ramadan which he was permitted to take in his cell, rather than under supervision at the hatch. The Judge found as fact that the temporary use of these alternative painkillers had no adverse impact on the Claimant.
The claims were for an unlawful interference with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR; an unlawful interference with the right to manifest religious beliefs under Article 9 ECHR; and unlawful discrimination on the grounds of religion in violation of Article 14 ECHR, when read with Articles 8 and 9 ECHR. It is unclear why no discrimination claim was brought under the Equality Act 2010.
Judgment below
His Honour Judge Najib held that Articles 8 and 9 ECHR were engaged but not violated. The Claimant was able to and in fact did fast throughout Ramadan. He was provided with alternative medication which, ultimately, had no adverse effect. There was no challenge to these findings on appeal.
However, the Judge also held that there was a breach of Article 14 ECHR. He identified the questions to be asked as set out by Baroness Hale in R (Stott) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] UKSC 59 at [207]:
- does the treatment complained of fall within the ambit of one of the Convention rights;
- is that treatment on the ground of some “status”;
- is the situation of the claimant analogous to that of some other person who has been treated differently; and
- is the difference justified, in the sense that it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?
Question two was not disputed: the ground was religion. On the other issues, the Judge held that: i) the treatment complained of fell within the ambit of Articles 8 and 9 ECHR – there was a “more than merely tenuous connection” [39]; ii) the Claimant’s situation was analogous to other prisoners who had been prescribed medication which could only be taken under supervision [51]; and iii) the failure to put in place alternative arrangements was not in pursuit of the legitimate aim of ensuring security and preventing the proliferation of opiate based and other controlled substances [68], but was instead due to an ‘apparent’ lack of resources and/or a need to prioritise limited resources [69] which was not made out on the facts [76]. As such, the Article 14 ECHR claim succeeded.
Appeal
The Trust’s appeal challenged the Judge’s conclusions on ‘ambit’ and ‘objective justification’ – i.e., the first and fourth of the Stott questions.
As to the ambit issue, the challenge “centred on the Judge’s finding of fact that Mr Ibrahim had not suffered withdrawal or any other adverse symptoms in consequence of not taking Codeine” [80]. Soole J rejected this argument for the following three reasons: firstly, ‘ambit’ and ‘interference’ are separate concepts – treatment can come within the ambit of an ECHR right even if that right is not violated [89]; secondly, the appropriate test is “whether the criticised measure or treatment has a more than merely tenuous connection to the core value(s) of a substantive Article” (emphasis added) [90]; and, thirdly, it is not necessary, for ‘ambit’ purposes, to establish that the relevant treatment had an adverse effect and the Judge was right to focus on the connection between the treatment complained of and the substantive ECHR rights [91]-[92].
The more substantial challenge was to the conclusion on objective justification. The Trust’s arguments all centred on the allocation of resources – that the Judge “failed to identify the allocation of scarce resources as a legitimate aim; and thus failed to take resources into account when considering proportionality” [105]. Moreover, to the extent that the Judge did consider the allocation of resources, he wrongly held that the Trust’s evidence that alternative procedures would have been impractical amounted to no more than a ‘bare assertion’ [97].
In rejecting these arguments, Soole J first sounded a warning against “the dangers of undue textual criticism” in the context of a necessarily lengthy judgment [106]. Giving a fair reading to the judgment as a whole, Soole J held that the Judge had indeed considered the allocation of resources. His rejection of this issue was based not on principle, but on the facts.
The reality was that no one had in fact turned their mind to the possibility of providing the Claimant with his medication by some alternative procedure. The evidence of Trust witnesses on resources and practicality “did not reflect the actual reasoning of anyone at the time”, but simply their beliefs that it would have been difficult if anyone had thought about it. This belief was itself “undermined” by the fact that alternative arrangements were made in other situations, e.g., for prisoners arriving at the prison late. In such circumstances, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the Trust’s evidence amounted to a ‘bare assertion’ and, in fact, it was “difficult to see how the Judge could have reached any other conclusion” [114].
It followed from this central finding that the resources had not formed any part of the Trust’s aim in not making alternative arrangements for the Claimant. As such, it was not necessary to consider proportionality but, had it been, the same finding of fact “would or should equally have compelled the conclusion that the test of proportionality was not met” [125].
Comment
There are some useful illustrations of principle in Soole J’s judgment, particularly on the ‘ambit’ issue. Firstly, that the appropriate test is whether the criticised measure or treatment has a “more than merely tenuous connection” to the core value(s) of a substantive ECHR Article. Secondly, that it is not necessary to establish that the relevant treatment had any adverse effect.
However, this was a case where “the very particular facts and circumstances” [126] carried the day. In some ways, this counted against the Claimant. The Article 8 and 9 ECHR claims were dismissed on the basis that the Claimant had been able to fast and did not experience any real issues as a result of temporarily not taking Codeine or having to take an alternative painkiller. The position would inevitably be very different if a Muslim prisoner was receiving some other medication such that this would have been a problem – i.e., so that they would effectively need to choose between their religion and their health.
The central finding of fact though was the “overall failure by anyone to apply their mind to [the issue]” [118]. The practical lesson for institutions is that it will be very difficult to justify discriminatory treatment as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, if the legitimate aim has been retrospectively manufactured. Before the question of whether issues of practicality and resources might amount to a legitimate aim in principle, there is the preliminary question of whether such issues were in fact the reason for the discriminatory treatment. If, in reality, the reason was simply that no one thought about it, then evidence of hypothetical impracticality or resource constraints is unlikely to carry much weight. Had the Trust taken even some perfunctory steps to investigate whether alternative arrangements would have been feasible, it seems likely that it would have been given a reasonably wide margin of appreciation. However, having taken none, it was “in an inherently weak position on its margin of appreciation” [121]. A further practical point is that, where a claim relates to a failure to make an exception, then other exceptions – such as for late-arriving prisoners in this case – are likely to carry significant weight and will need to be carefully explained.
Lance Baynham is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row.
17 March 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Samuel Talalay
Introduction
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”) provides qualified protection for speech. Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) criminalises certain speech acts relating to proscribed organisations. In the case of R v ABJ; R v BDN [2026] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether these two things could be reconciled: is s 12(1A) of the 2000 Act compatible with the Convention?
In its judgment, given on 26 February 2026, the Court answered this question with an unequivocal ‘yes’. The offence introduced by s 12(1A) was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Crucially, conviction would always represent a proportionate interference with the defendant’s Article 10 right to free speech where the elements of the offence, properly understood, were made out.
In providing such a resounding answer, however, the Court risks setting the bar too high for legislative provisions to be compatible with the Convention.
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5 March 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Kian Leong Tan
INTRODUCTION
In Medmoune v France App no 55026/22 (ECHR, 5 February 2026), the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights considered the extent of a Member State’s obligation under Art. 2 ECHR (the right to life) when deciding to withdraw life support, in circumstances where the patient had explicitly asked for it to be continued.[1] The judgment helpfully illustrates the contentious boundary at which informed patient consent must give way to the expert opinion of medical professionals.
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10 December 2025 by Guest Contributor
By Samuel Talalay
Introduction
In its judgment in the case of IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, handed down on 26 November 2025, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the correct test for establishing the existence of family life between non-core family members under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human rights (“ECHR”). It also clarified the proper conceptual framework for considering the subtle interaction between the rights of non-claimant family members and the UK’s Convention obligations to individuals outside its territory. Finally, it emphasised the centrality of the Government’s immigration policy to any exercise considering the proportionality of an interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights in the immigration context.
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1 October 2025 by Guest Contributor
By Lewis Graham
In 2005, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights handed down its landmark decision in Hirst v the United Kingdom, finding that the effect of section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, bringing into effect a blanket ban on the ability of prisoners in the UK to vote in elections, constituted a breach of Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the Convention (the right to free elections).
To say the case was controversial is an understatement, with the judgment becoming something of a bête noire for Strasbourg sceptics. Murray suggests that the judgment was pivotal in the “monstering” of the European Court. It is often presented as a case which epitomises Strasbourg overreach, taking the number 1 spot in the Judicial Power Project’s buffet of unfavourable, “problematic” legal cases. David Cameron, of course, famously remarked that the idea of complying with the judgment and giving (some) prisoners the vote made him feel “physically sick”.
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25 August 2025 by Alice Kuzmenko
EBB and others v The Gorse Academies Trust [2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin)
In EBB and others v The Gorse Academies Trust [2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin), the Honourable Mrs Justice Collins Rice gave judgment in a multi-faceted, rolled-up permission and judicial review hearing concerning three high school students’ experiences of being disciplined within their school (“the School”).
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8 October 2024 by Paula Kelly
The name ‘Chris Pincher’ has become synonymous with Boris Johnson’s downfall, but it was the case of Owen Paterson that precipitated the unrest in the Conservative Party that ultimately led to the former Prime Minister’s resignation.
Owen Paterson stepped down as an MP in November 2021, following a report by the House of Commons Select Committee on Standards that found he had breached the MPs’ Code of Conduct by engaging in paid advocacy and recommended that he be suspended from the House for thirty sitting days. After initially whipping MPs in an attempt to support Mr Paterson and to avoid a possible by-election in North Shropshire, Boris Johnson eventually conceded that the parliamentary party was not with him. Mr Paterson resigned before MPs could vote on the sanction.
The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has dismissed a complaint by Mr Paterson (Patterson v UK App no. 23570 (ECtHR, 19 September 2024)) that the proceedings and/or the finding breached his rights under Article 8 of the Convention to respect for his private and family life.
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29 August 2023 by anuragdeb
Introduction
On 11 August, a piece from Professor Richard Ekins KC (Hon) set out a case for the UK denouncing the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and leaving the treaty system altogether. One of the main arguments in favour of this is that it would ‘restore Parliament’s freedom, on behalf of the British people, to decide what our laws should be’. This marks one of the more recent such calls, amid a growing chorus of Ministers in the UK Government and Conservative Party MPs to leave the ECHR. Also, it should be noted that we have been here before. The constitutional aspects of such a move aside, there are particular reasons why it would impact Northern Ireland. While Northern Ireland does not feature in Professor Ekins’ 11 August piece, he has previously written about the interaction between the ECHR and the Good Friday Agreement 1998 (GFA), which underpins the modern devolution settlement in Northern Ireland and which brought an end to a brutal and deadly conflict. This interaction is the subject of this post.
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5 January 2023 by Jasper Gold
The year passed was, unsurprisingly, another year of tumult and surprise, something that by now registers as the norm rather than an aberration. Even so, 2022 must be a standout year – even by recent standards. From Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the death of Queen Elizabeth II, the collapse of two consecutive Tory governments, dramatic election results around the world from Israel to Brazil, and in the run up to the festive season a football World Cup as mired in human rights controversy as in any sporting event can be, 2022 was not a quiet year.
Nor did the legal world disappoint. On the Parliamentary side of things, Justice Secretary Dominic Raab’s controversial Bill of Rights Bill continues to clunk through Parliament, and other bills with interesting human rights implications have had their moment in the sun as well. To take but one example, the Online Safety Bill, whose controversial but central parts dealing with ‘legal but harmful’ speech were removed recently, is yet to become law after extensive reform following criticisms based on freedom of expression.
But the focus of this post is not on Parliament, or politics in general, but on the highlights of 2022 in the Courts. So with no further ado and in no particular order, the cases which (in the completely impartial and objective joint opinion of the co-editors of this blog) have defined 2022 are:
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20 September 2022 by Guest Contributor
On 8 September 2022, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handed down its decision in Drelon v France (application nos. 3153/16 and 27758/18).[1] The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to the collection by the French Blood Donation Service, the Établissement Français du Sang (EFS), of personal data relating to a potential blood donor’s presumed sexual orientation and the excessive length of time the data was kept in a public institution.
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16 August 2021 by Guest Contributor
A and B v Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and another [2021] UKSC 27
On appeal from [2018] EWCA Civ 1534
The claimants in the case were victims of human trafficking with unspent convictions in Lithuania. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (CICS) provides compensation to victims of crime, apart from where they have unspent criminal convictions (“the exclusionary rule”). The question for the Supreme Court was whether the exclusionary rule breached the claimants’ rights under Articles 4 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court found that the rule did not breach these rights.
Factual background
The CICS is a statutory scheme established by the Secretary of State for Justice which permits compensation to be given to a person “if they sustain a criminal injury which is directly attributable to their being a direct victim of a crime of violence”. But this is subject to the exclusionary rule for a person with an unspent conviction for an offence with a custodial sentence.
The appellants, A and B, were Lithuanian nationals and twin brothers. They were convicted of burglary and theft respectively in 2010 and 2011. They were then trafficked to the United Kingdom in 2013, where they were abused and subjected to labour exploitation. The traffickers were convicted for these criminal offences in January 2016.
On 16 June 2016, the appellants applied for compensation under the CICS. A’s conviction for burglary only became spent in June 2020, while B’s conviction for theft became spent on 11 November 2016. Because at the time of their application to the CICS they both had unspent convictions, they were disqualified from receiving compensation. They brought a claim for judicial review against the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CICA) and the Secretary of State for Justice.
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11 June 2020 by Alex Ewing
When a provision of legislation is held to be incompatible with a Convention right, a Minister of the Crown ‘may by order make such amendments to the primary legislation as he considers necessary’. This power to take remedial action, contained within section 10 of the Human Rights Act (HRA), applies when a domestic court finds an incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and also when the Minister considers a provision of legislation incompatible with the Convention ‘having regard to a finding of the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR). A recent draft remedial order laid before Parliament aims to remedy an incompatibility of the latter kind, following the ECtHR’s judgment in Hammerton v United Kingdom no. 6287/10 ECHR 2016. The draft remedial order is of particular interest because it purports to amend the Human Rights Act itself.
Professor Richard Ekins, writing for Policy Exchange, has criticised the draft remedial order as ultra vires and ‘of doubtful constitutional propriety’ and argues that the power in section 10 does not authorise ministers to amend the HRA itself. Further, he contends that the Hammerton judgment of the Strasbourg Court – which gives rise to the draft remedial order – is open to question. This blog post seeks to demonstrate that, whatever the merits of the wider argument about the constitutional propriety of amending the HRA through the power in section 10, the Hammerton judgment itself is based on well established ECHR case law. It is suggested that, in so far as it rests on a characterisation of the Hammerton judgment as unreasoned or lacking a reasonable basis, any view that the draft remedial order is of questionable validity is mistaken
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11 October 2019 by Joanna Curtis
Pastörs -v- Germany (Case no. 55225/14))
On 3 October 2019 the European Court of Human Rights dismissed an application by former NDP leader Udo Pastörs that his criminal conviction in Germany for making a “qualified Auschwitz denial” in a parliamentary speech infringed his right to freedom of speech under Article 10 ECHR. The Court held that, although interferences over statements made in parliament must be closely scrutinised, they deserve little, if any, protection if their content is at odds with the democratic values of the ECHR system.
Previous Holocaust denial cases before the European Court have arisen from statements made in various media, including a book (Garaudy -v- France (dec.), no. 65831/01, 24 June 2003), a TV show (Williamson -v- Germany, no. 64496/17, 8 January 2019) and even as part of a comedy routine (M’Bala M’Bala -v- France, no. 25239/13, 20 October 2015). This time the Court was called upon to consider statements made in a parliamentary context. The case involves ultra-right wing nationalist politics, parliamentary immunity from prosecution, the parliament’s ability to self-regulate that immunity, and the courts as final arbiters of such disputes. Although the statements concerned were made back in 2010, 9 years later the case still feels very topical.
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7 October 2019 by Conor Monighan
This post is the first in a series of five reports by Conor Monighan from this year’s conference held by the Administrative Law Bar Association. We will be publishing the next four posts over the next month every Monday.
This year’s ALBA conference featured an impressive list of speakers. There were talks from a Supreme Court judge, a former Lord Chancellor, top silks, and some of the best academics working in public law.
The conference covered a number of practical and substantive topics. The highpoint was an address given by Lord Sumption, in which he responded to criticism of his Reith Lectures. This post, together with those that follow, summarises the key points from the conference.
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22 January 2017 by Rosalind English
Artificial intelligence … it’s no longer in the future. It’s with us now.
I posted a review of a book about artificial intelligence in autumn last year. The author’s argument was not that we might find ourselves, some time in the future, subservient to or even enslaved by cool-looking androids from Westworld. His thesis is more disturbing: it’s happening now, and it’s not robots. We are handing over our autonomy to a set of computer instructions called algorithms.
If you remember from my post on that book, I picked out a paragraph that should give pause to any parent urging their offspring to run the gamut of law-school, training contract, pupillage and the never never land of equity partnership or tenancy in today’s competitive legal industry. Yuval Noah Harari suggests that the everything lawyers do now – from the management of company mergers and acquisitions, to deciding on intentionality in negligence or criminal cases – can and will be performed a hundred times more efficiently by computers.
Now here is proof of concept. University College London has just announced the results of the project it gave to its AI researchers, working with a team from the universities of Sheffield and Pennsylvania. Its news website announces that a machine learning algorithm has just analysed, and predicted, “the outcomes of a major international court”:
The judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have been predicted to 79% accuracy using an artificial intelligence (AI) method.
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