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Rights groups criticise airlines for removals under ‘one in, one out’ scheme
The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants and 27 other human rights organisations have written letters to four airlines criticising them for providing removal flights under the UK and France’s ‘one in, one out’ pilot scheme.
Under the scheme, which became effective in August 2025, asylum-seekers arriving in the UK from France in small boats can be detained and removed to France for readmission. The UK has a reciprocal obligation to maintain a voluntary application route for qualifying individuals to be transferred legally from France to the UK.
The letters call on the airlines – Air France and three private charter companies – to cease participation in the scheme or face boycotts. They refer to correspondence published earlier in February, in which UN mandate-holders said that the scheme ‘may result in serious violations of international human rights law’ and urged the UK and French governments to end it.
UN publishes human rights report on Gaza and the West Bank
A report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that there are ‘serious concerns of ethnic cleansing’ in Gaza and the West Bank and has questioned Israel’s compliance with the Genocide Convention. The report was published last week in advance of the Human Rights Council’s 61st session which begins today, 23 February.
The report accuses the Israeli military of conduct indicating recurrent violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, during the reporting period of 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025. These violations are described as occurring ‘amid a pervasive climate of impunity’.
In the courts
Open justice and deferred prosecution agreements
The High Court has held that the principle of open justice applies when determining whether individuals should be identified by name in connection with deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs). The case is Simms-Davies v Southwark Crown Court [2026] EWHC 337 (Admin).
The claimant was a director of two companies which entered into DPAs with the Serious Fraud Office for offences relating to bribery. The DPAs were granted court approval in a reasoned judgment pursuant to Schedule 17 para 8 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. At this time the claimant was involved in connected criminal proceedings in an individual capacity. The judgment was therefore barred from publication, and the claimant was not named. When those proceedings later concluded with the claimant’s acquittal, the DPA judgment was published and identified him by name.
Sitting in the High Court, Lewis LJ dismissed the claim for judicial review, which was argued on the basis that the judge should not have published the claimant’s name absent some necessity to do so. The court’s reasoning was that the process of approving a DPA fell within the scope of the ‘administration of justice’ and therefore the principle of open justice applied ([41]). This was not changed by the fact that the claimant was not a party to the DPA and was not involved in the pre-approval hearing ([45]).
The correct flow of analysis is that the court will include the names of individuals in a judgment approving a DPA unless it is shown to be necessary not to do so in order to protect the individuals’ rights – most obviously under Article 8 ECHR but equally under any applicable common law right ([42]).
Vulnerable appellants and witnesses in the First-tier Tribunal
The appellant was a national of Bangladesh who challenged the respondent’s decision to refuse him leave to remain in the UK. On appeal from the Upper Tribunal (UT), he was permitted to advance the sole ground that the FTT had erred in law by failing to comply with the 2010 guidance when hearing his original challenge. It does not appear to have been disputed that the appellant was vulnerable in the relevant sense.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that non-compliance with the guidance was in itself sufficient to make the decision of the FTT wrong in law. Lewis LJ (with Yip and May LJJ concurring) rejected this submission. The guidance does not impose ‘free-standing’ legal obligations on tribunals and the fact of a breach does not necessarily mean that a tribunal’s decision is legally flawed. That will depend on whether, in the circumstances, there has been sufficient compliance with the underlying principle of procedural fairness ([37], [48]).
In this case, there was no evidence to suggest any actual procedural unfairness. There was no proper basis for concluding that the appellant’s vulnerability had, or might have, affected the decision-making process in any way ([49]-[52]).
Restraining verbal abuse of lawyers in proceedings
In a wide-ranging judgment, the Court of Appeal has confirmed the existence of a jurisdiction to make an order to restrain verbal abuse directed at a party’s legal team, despite holding that it would ultimately have been inappropriate to grant the order in the present case (see [79] et seq.). The case is Titan Wealth Holdings Ltd & Ors v Okunola [2026] EWCA Civ 138.
The appellants were companies within the Titan Wealth Group and two employees of the group. The defendant was a former employee who had launched a campaign of abuse against various individuals connected with Titan. The appeal arose from the decision of Hill J that there was no jurisdictional basis for her to grant Titan’s application for an injunction requiring the defendant, as a litigant-in-person (LIP), to stop verbally abusing its lawyers.
The Court of Appeal decided that the judge was wrong in this conclusion. Albeit qualified by human rights law and the immunity for statements made in the course of litigation, the court has an inherent discretionary power at common law to issue orders against parties to litigation to protect the integrity of its processes and proceedings in the interests of justice ([40]). This jurisdiction is not limited to dealing with conduct amounting to a criminal contempt of court ([27]).
The court held that it would be necessary to consider Article 10 ECHR and section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 where the verbal conduct complained of fell short of contempt. A careful and detailed examination of the conduct would be required, especially with regard to ‘mixed’ statements ([52]). If the conduct came to no more than mere ‘vulgar abuse’, it would certainly fall within the derogation under Article 10(2) and also be outside the scope of the immunity ([51]-[52], [62]).
On the UK Human Rights Blog
Rosalind English highlights the EU’s adoption of new measures to prevent the destruction of unsold apparel, clothing accessories and footwear, putting downward pressure on overproduction by fast fashion brands.
The Divisional Court in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2026] EWHC 292 (Admin)(Dame Victoria Sharp P and Swift and Steyn JJ) has held that the proscription of Palestine Action should be quashed on the basis that the Home Secretary had failed to follow relevant policy guidance and had not struck a fair balance in respect of relevant rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
This ‘extended look’ article will examine the grounds on which the claim succeeded and evaluate the Home Secretary’s potential prospects on appeal.
Factual Background
On 5th July 2025 Palestine Action was added to the list of proscribed organisations under Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000, following events on 20th June in which members of Palestine Action broke into RAF Brize Norton and sprayed red paint into the turbines of two Voyager military aircraft. This incident took place in a context of what the Home Secretary stated was “a nationwide campaign of direct criminal action against businesses and institutions, including key national infrastructure and defence firms”, which had “increased in frequency and severity since the start of 2024“, with methods that had become “more aggressive”, and included a recent attack against a Jewish-owned business in North London “where the glass-front of the building was smashed and the building and floor defaced with red paint including the slogan ‘drop Elbit’” (para 3). Elbit Systems UK Ltd is a defence technology company and a subsidy of Israel’s largest military manufacturer.
In an application for judicial review, the claimant, one of the co-founders of Palestine Action, challenged the decision of the Home Secretary to proscribe Palestine Action under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (the 2000 Act).
Under these provisions, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes the organisation is “concerned in terrorism”. “Terrorism” is defined at s. 1 as the “use or threat of action” when the use or threat is “designed to influence the government […] or to intimidate the public or a section of the public” and “is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause”. “Action” is defined as including “serious violence against a person” and “serious damage to property”.
The effect of an organisation being proscribed include it becoming an offence to belong to the organisation, invite support for it, arrange a meeting to support it or further its activities, wear clothing or display in public any article that would arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of it, or fundraise for it (see ss. 11 to 17 of the Terrorism Act 2000).
In her evidence, the Claimant stated that the aim of Palestine Action was to take “direct action against Israel’s arms trade in Britain and to stop the complicity of corporate actors in atrocity crimes”. The organisation’s own position on the attack on RAF Brize Norton was that it “interrupted Britain’s direct participation in the commission of genocide and war crimes across the Middle East”.
The Court stated that what Palestine Action refers to as “direct action” “comprises for the most part various types of criminality including acts of criminal damage such as spray painting, damaging buildings or other property and destroying or attempting to destroy property”,and rejected as “false” the Claimant’s contention that these were acts of protest in the tradition of Gandhi’s campaign against the Indian Salt Act 1882 or the civil rights movement in the United States in the 2950s and 60s (paras 21-22). Rather, the Court stated that the “core hallmarks of civil disobedience, namely the objective of seeking a change in the law or government policy, an approach to law breaking that is characterised by restraint and acceptance of the legal consequences of their actions, are emphatically not the hallmarks of Palestine Action’s campaign”, as its campaign had “not been pursued with restraint”, was “designed to intimidate the persons and businesses targeted so they end their commercial relationships with Elbit” and did not involve “the type of persuasion that is consistent with democratic values and the rule of law” (para 23). Overall, it was found that it was “not a sustainable proposition” that Palestine Action was a ‘non-violent’ organisation (para 29).
Failure to follow relevant policy
The Court stated that the Home Secretary has “a long-standing policy in respect of the exercise of the power” to proscribe, which provides guidance to the effect that if the threshold test for proscription is met, i.e. the Home Secretary believes that the organisation “is concerned in terrorism”, then consideration should be given to whether proscription would be “proportionate”. When considering this question, the Home Secretary would take into account “other factors including: [1] the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities; [2] the specific threat that it poses to the UK; [3] the specific threat that imposes to British Nationals overseas; [4] the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and [5] the need to support other members of the International community in the global fight against terrorism” (para 37).
The Court held that: (i) it had been “appropriate” for the Home Secretary to treat as pertinent the nature and scale of Palestine Action’s activities and the extent of the threat the organisation posed in the United Kingdom; (ii) “the Home Secretary’s assessment of those matters as weighing in favour of proscription was reasonably open to her”; and (iii) notwithstanding that only three of Palestine Action’s many actions had been assessed as reaching the threshold of acts of terrorism, the Home Secretary “was entitled to attach significant weight” to any act occurring in the United Kingdom that came within the definition of terrorism, and “was entitled to attach weight to the risk that Palestine Action’s activities would deter development of the United Kingdom defence industry and thereby cause prejudice to the United Kingdom’s strategic defence objectives” (para 88).
However, the Court held that the Home Secretary’s approach to “other factors” had not been consistent with the policy. In particular, the Home Secretary had considered that proscription would be advantageous because it would mean that relevant offences could be used against any person supporting Palestine Action, that the presumptions arising from the definitions of “terrorist property” and “for the purposes of terrorism” that adversely affect proscribed organisations could also be applied to Palestine Action, and that these consequences would provide significant disruptive benefits beyond the current policing powers being utilised to deal with Palestine Action (para 89). It was held that the consequences of proscription were “designed to disrupt proscribed organisations, and in the present case would have that effect on Palestine Action”, but that “so far as concerns the lawful application of the Home Secretary’s policy on the use of the discretion to proscribe, that is not a relevant consideration”, notwithstanding the latitude given to the Home Secretary to decide for herself which matters were appropriate “other factors” (para 90).
In this regard, the Court stated that the purpose of this policy was “to limit use of the discretionary power to proscribe” and that each of the five factors stated on the face of the policy “has that effect” and that any “other factor” considered when applying the policy “must be of the same nature” (para 91).
The Court noted that its conclusion “may appear to rest on a very narrow basis”, particularly where “the Home Secretary had, after all, formed the belief that Palestine Action is an organisation concerned in terrorism” (and that had not been challenged), but stated that “operational consequences and advantages of proscription is not a factor consistent with the policy for the obvious reason that such consequences and advantages will apply equally to any organisation that could be proscribed”, such that “notwithstanding the latitude that the policy provides, the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was not consistent with her policy” (paras 92 to 95).
Articles 10, 11 and/or 14 of the European Convention
On behalf of the Home Secretary, it was submitted that violent protest did not fall within the scope of Convention rights, and reliance was placed on Article 17 of the Convention, which makes clear that activity intended to destroy the rights and freedoms provided under the Convention cannot itself claim the protection of Convention rights.
The Court noted that it was settled law that Convention rights “do not afford any protection to violent or non-peaceful protest” (para 108). However, it held that
that does not provide the Home Secretary with the answer to the claimant’s claim. The interference with Convention rights that needs to be justified does not comprise the prohibitions so far as they affect Palestine Action’s ability to persist (for example) in its campaign of undertaking and encouraging damage to property. Rather, what needs to be justified is the restriction on actions comprising peaceful protest, consistent with Convention rights, under the Palestine Action banner.” (para 109)
Further, it held that
“this case is primarily concerned with the rights of individuals who have not acted unlawfully either before or since proscription, who would have wanted to express support for and associate with Palestine Action – whose stated aim is “to stop genocide and other atrocity crimes by causing disruption to corporate actors who aid, abet, facilitate and profit from those crimes” – and who wished to engage in peaceful protests under the banner of Palestine Action, but are stopped from doing so. It cannot sensibly be said that such persons are seeking to deflect the article 10 and 11 rights from their real purpose by employing them for ends contrary to Convention values. Nor could that be suggested in respect of others, such as journalists, academics and civil society organisations who are conscientiously seeking to abide by the law, and whose rights are impacted. […]” (para 115)
This notwithstanding, the Court stated that the Claimant had overstated the impact of the proscription, as: (i) proscription would not prevent continuing expressions of support through peaceful protest in support of the Palestinian cause or in opposition to actions undertaken in Gaza by the government of Israel and/or the Israel Defence Forces; (ii) the proscription of Palestine Action would not prevent any or all demonstrations targeted at Elbit; and (iii) it was not considered that particular forms of protest action were so closely or uniquely associated with Palestine Action that either undertaking such actions or advocating them could properly be considered to be support for Palestine Action (para 117).
However, the Court held that the proscription would still give rise to a “very significant” interference with Article 10 and 11 rights, as it was reasonable to expect people to be risk averse and “exercise self-restraint in terms of what they say and what they do” in the context of the proscription, particularly among those who were very closely associated with Palestine Action (paras 121-124).
This was qualified by the Court’s view that “the adverse impacts are generally limited to those who have or would support Palestine Action and do not have any widespread or general impact on expressions of support for the general Palestinian cause” (para 124).
When considering proportionality, the Court considered putative less intrusive measures, and stated that: (i) taking measures against individuals involved in undertaking action for Palestine Action such as asset freezes or criminal behaviour orders or other similar orders was “not realistic”; (ii) relying on the existing criminal law was not an alternative measure but rather involved keeping to the status quo better considered when determining proportionality overall; and (iiii) encouraging those affected to seek civil remedies through the courts was not appropriate as “this type of self-help remedy may not be readily or reasonably available to many who might potentially be affected by Palestine Action’s campaign” (paras 130-134).
The Court also stated that
“[…] We do not consider that the proscription of Palestine Action is likely to result in any general impact on expressions of support for the Palestinian cause or even opposition to Elbit. This provides some support for a conclusion that the proscription was proportionate.” (para 136)
Further, the Court stated that real weight must attach to the fact that Palestine Action had organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism, and it was significant that “Palestine Action has not suggested that its actions that have been assessed to comprise terrorism were either a mistake or an aberration” but rather had “lauded those who took part in those actions”, and published an Underground Manual, which provided “good evidence of Palestine Action’s continuing intention to promote the use of violence regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public” (para 137).
Despite this, the Court held that a fair balance had not been struck:
“Deciding where the balance should be struck in this case is difficult. When striking the balance between issues such as these the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was disproportionate. At its core, Palestine Action is an organisation that promotes its political cause through criminality and encouragement of criminality. A very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act.” (para 138)
In this regard, it was held that the criminal law was available to prosecute those concerned and any convictions “would serve as a significant deterrent to others” (para 139), and that
“Considering in the round the evidence available to the Home Secretary when the decision to proscribe was made, the nature and scale of Palestine Action’s activities, so far as they comprise acts of terrorism, has not yet reached the level, scale and persistence that would justify the application of the criminal law measures that are the consequence of proscription, and the very significant interference with Convention rights consequent on those measures.” (para 140)
The question of whether it was right or wrong to proscribe Palestine Action is a complex political one that is outside the scope of this article.
But as a matter of law, notwithstanding the strong credentials of the three members of this Court, I think that this decision is surprising, and vulnerable to a potential successful appeal.
In essence, having made a series of findings that seem to indicate that proscription was capable of being justified under relevant policy and under the European Convention, the Court then appears to undertake a volte face and find that proscription was nevertheless not justified.
On the first successful ground, it was uncontested that the threshold requirements for proscription were met. In this context, when assessing proportionality, the relevant policy states that the Home Secretary will consider “other factors including” the five listed factors. It is difficult to see why this means that the Home Secretary may not also consider other factors, such as those considered here.
Moreover, the Court’s characterisation of the five listed factors as all having the effect of limiting the use of the discretionary power to proscribe (at para 91) seems very doubtful. In particular, it might well be thought that the fifth factor (“the need to support other members of the International community in the global fight against terrorism”) is one that broadens rather than circumscribes when proscription might be justified – for example, this factor might, in principle, indicate in favour of proscribing an organisation that poses only a limited threat to the UK or British nationals and with only a very limited presence in the UK, if it does post an important threat to the UK’s allies.
Overall, I think that on appeal there is a significant chance that the Court’s reasoning on this ground may be overturned on the basis that it took an unduly rigid approach to the policy, and, despite saying that it was giving proper latitude to the Home Secretary, failed to do so in practice.
On the second successful ground, the Court found that: (i) the adverse impact of proscription had been overstated, was generally limited to those who have or would support Palestine Action and did not have any widespread or general impact on expressions of support for the general Palestinian cause (paras 117, 124 and 136); (ii) Palestine Action had organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism (para 137); (iii) Palestine Action had not suggested that its actions that have been assessed to comprise terrorism were either a mistake or an aberration, but rather had “lauded those who took part in those actions” (para 137); and (iv) there was “good evidence of Palestine Action’s continuing intention to promote the use of violence regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public” (para 137).
In this context, as a matter of law the conclusion that proscription was nevertheless disproportionate seems surprising. It is unclear to me why decisive weight should be attached to the rights of members of Palestine Action to demonstrate under this specific banner, rather than under another banner, in the context of the countervailing factors noted by the Court, including that Palestine Action had not disavowed the acts that constituted terrorism but rather had lauded those who took part in them.
Those of us environmentally minded citizens have been dismayed in recent months when taking bags of unwanted textiles to our local recycling centres to be told that they no longer accept these as recyclable waste since they do not make a profit; into landfill they go. There are of course charity shops but they only accept a small fraction of textiles that households get rid of. And used clothing and shoes are in themselves a fraction of the bulk of textiles that go straight from manufacture to landfill/furnace without ever being worn – it will come as no surprise to readers of this blog that garmets bought online and returned for whatever reason are not resold but disposed of, that being the cheapest option.
At last the second element of this extremely wasteful industry has now been addressed by the EU.
On 9th of February this year the European Commission adopted new measures under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR) to prevent the destruction of unsold apparel, clothing accessories and footwear, including additional detail on mandatory disclosures. These rules will apply from 19 July 2026 and aim to reduce the practice of textiles being destroyed before they are sold and worn.
The ESPR addresses overproduction amid fast fashion’s 264,000-594,000 tonne annual waste.
Background
The ESPR – which entered into force on 19 July 2024 – introduced two key measures: a prohibition on the destruction of unsold apparel, clothing accessories and footwear, and mandatory disclosure requirements for unsold consumer products that are discarded. The Delegated Regulation and Implementing Regulation adopted on 9 February 2026 provide the detailed rules necessary for businesses to comply with these obligations.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 targets physical goods, excluding food, feed, medicines, living plants, animals, and vehicles, to promote durability, reusability, repairability, and resource efficiency while ensuring free movement of compliant products.
A core innovation is Chapter VI, which addresses the destruction of unsold consumer products, initially focusing on textiles (apparel, clothing accessories, and footwear). This responds to estimates that 4-9% of EU textiles—up to 594,000 tons annually, as mentioned above, are destroyed pre-use, contributing to waste and emissions. The regime prohibits destruction by economic operators, mandates preventive measures, and introduces disclosure requirements, supported by delegated and implementing acts adopted in February 2026.
The HM Inspectorate of Prisons has published a report which found that there was an “inadequate provision of interpretation” and “almost no information was available” to migrant people, during their removal to France under the ‘one in, one out’ pilot scheme. Almost all of those removed had arrived recently at the Kent coast and few were able to understand English.
Under the ‘Agreement on the Prevention of Dangeround Journeys’, ratified in August, any asylum seeker who has crossed the Channel unlawfully can be returned back to France. There is also a provision for “reciprocal admittance”, whereby an asylum seeker in France who has a genuine family link to someone in the UK and has not attempted to enter the UK unlawfully, will be allowed to enter the UK.
The report also raised concerns that migrant people did not have proper access to justice prior to their removal to France under the scheme. Although migrant people were signposted to legal firms while detained at Immigration Removal Centres, the report noted that many people’s cases were refused by solicitors and they were unable to access legal advice.
The publication of the report comes as a legal challenge against the removal of 16 migrant people under the ‘one in, one out’ scheme was heard at the High Court on Wednesday. The case centres on whether it was unlawful for the Homes Secretary to withdraw migrant people’s right to have rejected modern slavery claims reconsidered. The claimants also allege that French authorities do not adequately support trafficking victims. The Court heard that 40 per cent of migrant people detained under the scheme have made trafficking claims.
In international news
Last week, pro-democracy media tycoon Jimmy Lai was sentenced to 20 years in prison under Hong Kong’s National Security Law. The 78-year-old Apple Daily founder was found guilty last December of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces and publishing seditious materials. Thibaut Bruttin, the director of Reporters Without Borders, warned that “the court decision underscores the complete collapse of press freedom in Hong Kong”.
On 10 February, the European Parliament approved the amendments to the ‘safe third country’ concept in the EU Asylum Procedures Regulation and adopted an EU-wide list of “safe countries of origin”, making it easier for member states to reject asylum applications as inadmissible and to forcibly transfer people seeking safety to countries to which they have no connection. The new rules also remove the suspensive effect of appeals in asylum cases, meaning that a person could be removed while waiting for determination of their claim and any judicial review.
On Friday, the High Court ruled that the former home secretary Yvette Cooper had acted unlawfully when banning Palestine Action last year, under the Terrorism Act 2000. The Court concluded that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was “disproportionate” [138].
The judicial review proceedings were brought by Huda Ammori, Palestine Action’s co-founder.
The Court upheld the claimant’s challenge that the proscription breached the rights of freedom of expression and assembly as guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. The Court found that the offences under the Terroism Act 2000 “comprise a very significant interference with the right to free speech”. For example, a person cannot address a meeting to encourage support for Palestine Action [106]. The Court also concluded that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action had resulted in a “stark” interference with Article 11 rights, since the purpose of proscription is to put measures in place that prevent the organisation from continuing to exist [135].
Additionally, the Court concluded that the Home Secretary failed to properly apply her policy on the use of the discretion to proscribe [89 – 95]. The policy required the Home Secretary to approach the exercise of her discretion comprehensively, taking into account the consequences on Palestine Action members, the characteristics of the organisation, foreign policy and “other factors” [74]. Instead, the Home Secretary presented the “significant disruptive benefits” to “deal with” Palestine Action as a central reason for exercising the discretion to proscribe [89]. The Court clarified that Home Secretary’s policy did not include the expected significant disruptive benefits of proscription as a relevant consideration [90].
According to evidence submitted by the claimant, there have been many arrests since proscription referring to Palestine Action, including more than 2,000 people at protests immediately following the proscription decision [118].
In a statement after the judgement, the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, said the government intends to appeal the decision.
The High Court ruled that Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 (IMA) is “likely to have a more muted practical impact” [168]. The Court clarified for the first time that the right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR constrains the effect of IMA on the judicial oversight of immigration detention decisions.
The case stemmed from a claim alleging the unlawful detention of MXV, a Zimbabwean national, who was held under immigration powers for 101 days from 11 March 2024.
Section 12 of the IMA sought to “overturn” the Court’s role as primary decision maker when it comes to assessing limbs (ii) and (iii) of the Hardial Singh principles, which relate to the reasonableness of the period of detention and whether deportation can be effected within such a reasonable period. Instead, Section 12 requires the Court to assess whether the Secretary of State’s decision about the period was a reasonable assessment.
The Court ruled that Parliament had expressly restricted judicial oversight and Section 12 should be followed [166]. However, compliance with Article 5(1)(f) ECHR requires the Court to retain its role as primary decision maker. The Court confirmed that Article 5(1)(f) ECHR “mirrors” the domestic application of the Hardial Singh principles [144] and, where Article 5 is relied upon, the Court remains able, as primary decision maker, to assess the reasonableness of detention.
The court found that the detention of MXV was unlawful in the period from 1 June 2024 to 19 June 2024.
On the UKHRB
Dr Lewis Graham considers the potential far-reaching effects in Hall v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 124 (TC), where the First-Tier Tribunal ruled that it had the jurisdiction to consider public law grounds, despite the tribunal having no inherent public law jurisdiction.
Rosalind English explores the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dairy UK Ltd v Oatly AB UKSC 4, in which the Court held that Oatly’s registered trade mark “POST MILK GENERATION” cannot lawfully be used in relation to their oat-based food and drink products.
Rosalind English also reviews a letter about animal welfare from The Animal Law Foundation and the League against Cruel Sports, that was presented to the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs last week.
The post below was originally published on the Administrative Court Blog, of which its author, Dr Lewis Graham, is an editor. It is republished here with the Dr Graham’s permission.
The First-tier Tribunal had delivered a ruling in which it has allowed a claimant to challenge the imposition of a liability order on public law grounds, despite the jurisdiction for this not being set out explicitly in the relevant statute. The decision does not set a precedent, and strictly involves a narrow point of construction relating to the Finance Act. However, its reasoning, if approved or adopted on appeal, may have significant ramifications for claimants wishing to rely on public law grounds before tribunal appeals more generally. The case is Hall v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 124 (TC) (13 January 2026).
The claimant, Hall, was issued a Joint and Several Liability Notice (JSLN) and sought to appeal it before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). He wished to challenge the notice on five grounds. It was undisputed that the tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the first two grounds (whether the prerequisite conditions were met, and whether the notice was necessary for the protection of revenue, respectively). However, HMRC disputed the tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider Grounds 3 to 5 (relating to the proportionality of the measure, the rationality of the measure, and a failure to follow relevant guidance) and applied for these grounds to be struck out, under rule 8(2) Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The question for the tribunal was, therefore, whether it did have the jurisdiction to consider these – public law – grounds.
Because the tribunal has no inherent public law jurisdiction, it can only be granted the ability to review such grounds by statute: see [65]. This in turn raises an issue of statutory construction. In this case, the jurisdiction of the tribunal when considering appeals to the issuing of a JSLN is set out in paragraph 14(1) of Schedule 13 to the Finance Act 2020. That section says that on appeal, the tribunal “must set aside the notice” if “any of the relevant conditions were not met when the notice was given” (para 4(1)(a)(i)), “it is not necessary for the protection of the revenue for the notice to continue to have effect” (para 4(1)(a)(ii)) or “the amount specified is incorrect” (para 4(1)(b)). If these grounds are not made out, “the tribunal must uphold the notice” (para 4(1)(c)). HMRC argued that the effect of these provisions was to exclude any public law challenge: [32], and that public law grounds could only be argued in a judicial review, rather than statutory appeal: [33].
The tribunal judge was unconvinced by this argument. She said that she could “see no language” in the statute “which precludes an assessment of proportionality or rationality when determining whether the Appellant has made out its defensive case”: [81]. Thus, the third and fourth ground of appeal could be considered by the tribunal. Although it was not confirmed, this, presumably, also meant that the statute did not preclude consideration of the fifth ground – whether HMRC failed to comply with its policies.
At first blush, it seems that the judge arrived at this interpretation via ordinary methods of construction. But the judge preceded her analysis with an overview of the interpretive powers available to her under section 3 of the HRA (see [60]):
“Where a Convention right is impermissibly limited by the terms of the statutory language chosen by Parliament the relevant provision should be construed so far as is possible to ensure a Convention compliant outcome… the line between a section 4 HRA declaration of incompatibility… and conforming interpretation [is] the “grain of the legislation”. Legislation need not be ambiguous in order for it to be interpreted expansively so as to protect Convention rights, an interpreting court or tribunal can read words in and change the meaning of the language used but cannot cross the constitutional line of legislating, in particular when choosing between alternative means of achieving a Convention-compliant meaning.”
The judge also followed her conclusion with the observation that the wider construction she adopted “also meets the Article 6 requirement that there be a forum with full jurisdiction on all matters of fact and law when considering the issue of the JSLN” and that “separating the issues between the administrative court and the Tribunal would run the risk of facts being evaluated differently and thereby inhibiting a fair trial”: [83]. Therefore, it appears that the judge’s conclusion was either made pursuant to, or reinforced by, the need to adopt a Convention-compliant interpretation under section 3 HRA.
Comment
With respect to the tribunal judge, her reasoning on the construction issue is a little thin and a number of issues in the judgment remain open to debate.
First, it is, as above, unclear whether section 3 was even applied in the first place. In some other cases, a similar result has been achieved by applying a presumption that a claimant “should be entitled to defend himself by challenging the validity of… the decision… on public law grounds” in order to uphold “the rule of law” (see KSM Henryk Zeman SP ZOO v HMRC [2021] UKUT 182 (TCC) at [34]). This was not the case here; as noted above, the interpretation appears to be based on section 3 HRA. But notably absent from the judgment is any discussion as to whether a Convention-compliant interpretation would fall foul of what is “possible” – whether recognising the jurisdiction of the tribunal to consider public law grounds would go “against the grain” of the legislation.
Second, it is not immediately clear that Article 6 requires that the tribunal act as a forum for the determination of Convention rights (as opposed to, say, the Administrative Court). All we are told is that there is an “Article 6 requirement that there be a forum with full jurisdiction on all matters of fact and law” ([83]). It is true that the Article 6 authorities (see e.g. Schmautzer v Austria (1995), paras 34-37) speak of the need for a “judicial body that has full jurisdiction” in the context of determining the validity of a criminal charge (the tribunal had already determined that the issuing of a JSLN was a criminal charge: [75]). However, in a number of different areas the Strasbourg Court has accepted that a tribunal or court exercising more limited powers of appeal or review has satisfied the requirements of Article 6 (see e.g. Stefan v UK (1997); Ali v UK (2016)). The Strasbourg case law in this area is hardly straightforward and it was surprising to see that the judgment didn’t feature any engagement with the key authorities on this matter.
Third, it is unclear why the judge insisted that the First-tier Tribunal ought to be imbued with full jurisdiction (see, mutatis mutandis, Mattu v the University Hospitals of Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust [2012] EWCA Civ 641 at [120]-[122]) Firstly, the claimant can appeal to a court which itself holds full jurisdiction (something which the Strasbourg Court has found to be relevant when assessing compliance with Article 6: see McMichael v UK (1995)). Secondly, the claimant can lodge a judicial review before the Administrative Court, which also holds full jurisdiction: see Runa Begum v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2003] UKHL 5.
Fourth, Article 6 is – it seems – invoked in order to justify the recognition of the tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to not only the consideration of Convention grounds, but two further public law grounds. Does the Convention really operate so as to require the tribunal – rather than another court – to determine rationality (and consistency with policy) alongside the determination of Convention rights?
As suggested above, the decision, being one of the First-tier Tribunal, does not formally set a precedent and does not bind other tribunal judges. Further, the case is, strictly speaking, concerned only with the interpretation of paragraph 14 of Schedule 13 to the Finance Act 2020, and not with wider issues relating to the jurisdiction of tribunals more generally. Nevertheless, the wide interpretation of both the requirements of Article 6 ECHR and the scope of section 3 HRA will no doubt make it more likely that similar challenges will arise in the future, in relation to other tribunal actions limited by statute. Whether the decision will survive appeal, and review by later judges, is less certain.
Dr Lewis Graham is a Lecturer in Human Rights Law at the University of Manchester
The Supreme Court has just come up with a ruling in an attempt to end a dispute over non-cow based milk products. In April 2021, plant-based company Oatly registered the trade mark “POST MILK GENERATION” for use in relation to certain categories of products. The issue on this appeal was the validity of that trade mark in relation to their popular oat-based food and drink products.
Lactose intolerant and vegetarian/vegan consumers, as well as those with an eye on the environment, have flocked to buy their cartons of “milk” in preference to the products of animal dairy farming. The photo accompanying this post is the one we are most familiar with, along with the “Wow no cow” slogan. Their “POST MILK GENERATION” mark, which was accompanied by an image of a stylised milk wave, was opposed by Dairy UK Ltd before the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO).
Background law and facts
Oatly is a Swedish company whose business involves the manufacture of oat based food and drink products as alternatives to dairy products. The respondent, Dairy UK Ltd, is the trade association for the UK dairy industry.
In November 2021, Dairy applied for a declaration that the registration of Oatly’s trade mark was invalid under the Trade Marks Act 1994. Under s.3(1)(c) of this Act, marks contrary to law or morality cannot be registered. Dairy also argued that Regulation (EU) No.1308/2013 (part of post-Brexit retained EU law) contained such a prohibition.
Oatly appealed successfully to the High Court, which found “POST MILK GENERATION” not a “designation of milk” due to its metaphorical nature. The Court of Appeal reversed this ruling, deeming it a prohibited “designation.” Oatly then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues before the Supreme Court The Court considered two key questions:
Whether “POST MILK GENERATION” constituted a “designation” of milk under Article 78(1), prohibiting trade mark registration for imitation dairy products.
If it did so, did it qualify for exemption under Article 78(2)(b) as a term “used to clearly… describe… a characteristic quality of the product,” like composition or production method.
Article 78 states: “Member States… shall ensure that… no designations of milk… are used… in respect of… products not obtained by the milking of animals… [except] where those products are used to clearly… describe… a characteristic quality of the product.” The Court interpreted “designation” broadly and exemptions narrowly.
Decision of the Court The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Oatly’s appeal on 11 February 2026, upholding the prohibition. Lords Hamblen and Burrows delivered the judgment, with Lords Hodge, Briggs and Stephens concurring. On issue one, “POST MILK GENERATION” was held a “designation” because it evokes “milk” imagery via “milk” and the milky wave device, positioning oat drinks as a successor generation to dairy milk. The Court rejected Oatly’s “metaphorical” argument, noting that trade mark law targets consumer perception, not literal meaning.
On issue two, no exemption applied. The slogan did not, in the Court’s view “clearly describe a characteristic quality” like oat composition or plant-based production. Instead, it aimed to market superiority over milk without factual clarity.
Reasoning behind the Court’s decision
Article 78(1) prohibits “designations of milk” (e.g., cream, butter) on non-animal products to protect the dairy sector. There is also a notion about protecting the consumer here, although arguably the consumer is all too aware that this “milk” does not come from a cow, which is why the product is popular in the first place.
The regulation’s use of the word “designation” is important. It encompasses evocative phrases, not just exact terms, per ordinary meaning and purpose. In the Court’s view, the “milky device” of Oatly’s TM functioned as an imitation evoking dairy fluidity.
According to the Court, even though this trade mark could be regarded as referring to a characteristic quality of the products (namely, the characteristic of being milk-free), it was doing so in an oblique and obscure way and was certainly not doing so “clearly” see para [40]. In particular, it did not make clear whether the product is entirely free of milk, or only that the milk content is low [41].
There are exemptions under Article 78(2), but only for terms which “clearly describe” inherent qualities of a product (e.g., “soya-based”) excluding vague or comparative claims. The Supreme Court found that Oatly’s slogan failed as promotional rhetoric, not descriptive elucidation.
Comment
This is the start of a very long battle of trade marks, food descriptions and labelling requirements. “Meat” and “dairy” products that are not derived from livestock are here to stay. Whilst plant-based claims are easy to dismiss on the basis of their origin, what about “beef”products grown from stem cells in a laboratory, fed by animal serum (so-called “clean meat” because of their drastically reduced carbon footprint?)
Plant based products fall within the Novel Foods Regulation, part of our EU retained law (Regulation (EU) 2015/2283). Because of its proximity to real livestock, cultivated meat is outside the NFR and comes within Regulation (EC) 853/2004 (the legislation that provides specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin). This is because these cell-cultivated products originate from a cell, or cells, taken from animals.
So whilst this decision lies in the way of claims to dairy and meat equivalence for plant-based products, industry lobbying is bound to ratchet up as alternatives to livestock farming gain traction.
Does this judgment stifle innovation? For the moment, perhaps. Oatly will have to rebrand their UK marketing (although for the author of this post, their slogan “Wow no cow” has always been reason to buy the product in full knowledge of its origin). Incidentally, the slogan “Wow No Cow” apparently evaded direct prohibition by avoiding exact dairy terms but fuelled Dairy UK’s opposition to Oatly’s trade marks. “It exemplified Oatly’s irreverent style, turning lawsuits into PR wins”.
Comment from one vegan barrister:
“It really is baffling, this run of appeals was about the phrase “POST MILK GENERATION” being used on oat milk cartons. At least by the time of the SC appeal hearing, both parties agreed that it was NOT the name of the product and that it was not confusing consumers, so the dairy lobby has really spent all this money just to stop Oatly using that phrase on their cartons.”
And another:
“In case anyone was misled into thinking that oats, unlike coconuts, had breasts”
On the 10th of February, the The Animal Law Foundation and the League against Cruel Sports presented a letter to the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The full text is attached to this post. In the letter, which marks the twentieth aniversary of the passing of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, the ALF and the LACS ackowledge that the Act has undoubtedly improved the lives of many animals. However, its full potential is yet to be realised.
The authors of the letter identify several key areas that have yet to be addressed:
a. The overly permissive interpretation of what constitutes
“unnecessary suffering”;
b. The inconsistent and inadequate application of animals’ welfare
needs; and
c. The exclusion of certain animals from protection.
The term “unnecessary” has been far too loosely interpreted. Harmful practices continue not because they are genuinely required, but because they are traditional, convenient, or commercially profitable. Details of these practices are set out in the letter. Commercial expediency is often enlisted as a necessity, but, as the letter points out, ” the law is clear: financial gain can never justify cruelty.”
“Under section 9 of the Act animals are entitled to a suitable environment, an appropriate diet, the ability to express normal behaviour, appropriate social contact, and protection from pain, suffering, injury, and disease. Despite this, many millions of animals continue to live in conditionsthat plainly fail to meet these minimum legal standards.”
‘In peril’: Human Rights Watch publishes their World Report 2026
On Wednesday, Human Rights Watch published World Report 2026, the 36th edition of its annual review of human rights practices in over 100 countries.
Introducing the Report, Executive Director Philippe Bolopion describes 2025 as a potential ‘tipping point’: US hostility to multilateral institutions, he argues, now compounds longstanding efforts by China and Russia to erode the rules-based international order.
The Report’s UK chapter highlights restrictions on protest, including the proscription of Palestine Action, alongside rising absolute poverty, disability benefit cuts and far-right anti-migrant mobilisation. It criticised the Supreme Court’s ruling that ‘sex’ in the Equality Act 2010 refers to biological sex rather than legal gender identity (For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16). The same ruling forms part of a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, discussed further below.
The World Report also welcomed Parliament’s vote to decriminalise abortion. Although the Abortion Act 1967 permitted lawful terminations in specified circumstances, abortion itself remained a criminal offence. In June 2025, the House of Commons voted 379 to 137 to add Clause 191 to the Crime and Policing Bill, removing women from criminal liability in relation to their own pregnancies at any gestational stage. The provision, which represents the most significant reform of abortion law in England and Wales in nearly 60 years, is currently before the House of Lords.
Human Rights Watch’s full global report can be accessed here.
On Monday, the Home Secretary published a white paper outlining her proposals for reforming the police. The proposed changes include the establishment of a National Police Service to oversee policing of organised crime, counter-terrorism and trafficking across England and Wales. This body will also appoint a Senior National Coordinator for public order policing, who will manage police responses to large scale national protests, such as the riots following the Southport stabbings in July 2024.
The Home Secretary also seeks to invest in new policing technologies, establishing a National Centre for AI policing and expanding the use of Live Facial Recognition vans to locate offenders. Meanwhile, on Tuesday and Wednesday this week, the High Court heard a judicial review challenge to the Met Police’s September 2024 Live Facial Recognition policy, on the basis that it violated Articles 8, 10 and 11 ECHR (R (Thompson and Carlo) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis).
Finally, the white paper also suggests that the policing of non crime hate incidents is to be overhauled, with the aim of ‘reducing unnecessary recording burdens’.
Government confirms 20-25% cuts to prison education delivery hours
In November 2025, the Justice Committee released a report expressing its alarm regarding reports of cuts of up to 50% to prison education budgets. It recommended that the Government clarify the scale of, and rationale for, planned cuts to prison education budgets, and set out how it plans to ensure core education provision continues.
The government’s response was published this week, stating that whilst the budget had increased in recent years, these increases had been outpaced by rising delivery costs. As such, the government has implemented a national reduction of prison education delivery hours of around 20-25%, with some prisons experiencing more significant reductions.
In Suresh & Ors v General Medical Council [2025] EWHC 804 (KB), the High Court considered claims brought by the family of a doctor who died by suicide after receiving a letter from the General Medical Council (GMC). That letter stated that his Fitness to Practise was under investigation for allegedly sexually assaulting a 15-year-old patient.
It is important to emphasise that Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, recorded at the outset of his judgment that identification evidence provided to the police by the complainant was inconsistent with the perpetrator being Dr Suresh. The Crown Prosecution Service decided that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute. Dr Suresh has never been found to have committed the offence alleged [4].
Dr Suresh’s family brought claims against the GMC in negligence and under the Human Rights Act 1998. The Defendant successfully applied to have both claims struck out and/or summarily dismissed. This article considers the court’s analysis of the human rights claim.
UN Human Rights Council responds to situation in Iran
In its 39th Special Session on Friday, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) called for an urgent investigation into human rights violations by the Iranian state in the context of its repression of nationwide protests beginning in late December last year.
The UNHRC also extended the mandates of the Fact-Finding Mission and Special Rapporteur on Iran. The Special Session was informed of credible reports that thousands have been killed, many more injured, and over 24,000 arrested since the start of the protests, which have been accompanied by a complete internet and mobile services shutdown since 8 January. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, said:
“The only way out of this frightening escalation is through dialogue based on the human rights of all Iranians. The aspirations and ideas in particular of women, girls, young people and ethnic and religious minorities must be allowed to shape Iran’s future. We remain available to support any change in direction that fully respects Iran’s human rights obligations.”
European Committee of Social Rights publishes 2025 Conclusions
On Wednesday, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) published its Conclusions on Labour Rights for 2025. The Conclusions for the UK make findings of non-conformity with Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the European Social Charter on several grounds, including:
a lack of a right to disconnect from work;
a lack of coverage by health and safety regulations for domestic and self-employed workers;
a failure to promote the freedom of association and collective bargaining of gig economy workers; and
the denial of the right to strike to the police, prison officers, and members of the armed forces without effective alternative means of negotiating terms and conditions.
The crux of the issue in this appeal is both narrow and, to some degree, exceptionally broad. It is narrow in that the central issue before the Court of Appeal was “whether an application made under s.75(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 by a mental health patient to the First-tier Tribunal while subject to a conditional discharge is extinguished by the recall to hospital of that patient by the Secretary of State for Justiceunder s42(3) of the Act” [1]; a pithy, glamorous summary.
However, the appeal has simultaneously broad implications; the Court considered whether certain mechanisms of judicial oversight were effective as judicial safeguards and in providing speedy consideration of a person’s deprivation of liberty as required by Article 5(4) ECHR. In what was ultimately an academic discussion which was somewhat removed from the generative facts, the Court of Appeal examined whether there was indeed a “lacuna” in the FtT’s oversight of offenders who have been conditionally discharged with a restriction order.
The inquiry into the conditions at Manston Short-Term Holding Facility has begun hearing evidence in public. The purpose of the inquiry is to investigate “the decisions, actions and circumstances” that led to significant overcrowding, outbreaks of infectious disease and mistreatment of detained migrant people at the former military base between June and November 2022. The inquiry will also investigate the death of Hussein Haseeb Ahmed, who died from diphtheria after contracting the infection while detained at Manston. The inquiry was downgraded from statutory to independent in September 2024, reducing its powers to compel witnesses to attend. The Home Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Cabinet Office, the Treasury, and the Ministry of Justice are due to participate in the inquiry.
On Sunday, the government pulled the third reading of the Public Office (Accountability) Bill 2024-26 — widely referred to as the ‘Hillsborough Law’ — from the parliamentary schedule, amid criticism of a proposed amendment. The draft legislation would create a statutory duty of candour and assistance for public authorities and officials when engaging with inquiries and inquests. The bill would also create a new criminal offence of misleading the public. However, a new amendment proposed by the government had been critcised for creating an opt-out for intelligence officials, by allowing heads of security services to decide whether information is released. Families of the Manchester Arena bombing wrote to the Prime Minister earlier this month, stressing the need for the law not to exempt security agencies. The UK’s Security Service (also known as MI5) was found by the Manchester Arena Inquiry not to have given an “accurate picture” of the key intelligence it held on the suicide bomber who carried out the attack, instead presenting “a retrospective justification” for their actions.
The Applicant, a national of St Lucia, made an application on 2 December 2022 for ILR under Category 4 of the Windrush Scheme. Her father was a member of the Windrush generation and entered the UK in 1956. He was granted British citizenship in 2018 [4]-[19].
To fall within Category 4, an applicant should satisfy the following criteria [7]:
A person in the UK,
who is a child of a Commonwealth citizen parent,
where the child was born in the UK or arrived in the UK before the age of 18,
and has been continuously resident in the UK since their birth or arrival,
and the parent was settled before 1 January 1973 or has the right of abode (or met these criteria but is now a British citizen).
Although the Applicant satisfied the other criteria, because of her repeated travel to St Lucia since arriving in the UK in August 2000, the Respondent refused her application on the basis that she failed to satisfy criterion (d) above [18]-[19].
“It sometimes seems to me that it is not so much extremism as normalisation that we have to fear”, Hall observed.
It is indeed an important and nuanced reflection on the subject that is worth summarising again on the UKHRB for readers who are not subscribed to Rozenberg’s Substack or who have missed it for any other reason.
Jonathan Hall KC’s lecture articulates a compelling case that contemporary anti‑Jewish agitation cannot be treated as routine protest but must be recognised as a vector of risk for real-world violence and ultimately terrorism. His core insight is that what threatens liberal democracy is less spectacular “extremism” than the slow “normalisation” of sectarian calls to violence, particularly against Jews. For our lawyer readers, the speech matters because it shows how existing doctrines on precaution, public order and incitement must be read through the lens of this normalisation if law is to discharge its protective function without abandoning its commitment to free expression.
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