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In this episode of LawPod UK, Lucy McCann is joined by Professor Valena Beety, legal scholar, innocence litigator and former federal prosecutor, to discuss her new book Pink Crime. Professor Beety explores her concept of ‘Pink Crime’ a distinctive category of wrongful convictions of women and queer people, often in cases where no crime actually occurred, by examining historic cases and contemporary prosecutions involving pregnancy loss, parenting decisions, and queer identity.
The conversation considers the impact of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization, including the growing criminalisation of miscarriage and stillbirth, as well as the ways in which similar assumptions about identity and deviance have shaped the treatment of LGBTQ+ people.
Lucy and Professor Beety also discuss the dangers of unreliable forensic evidence, the different approaches to equality in the US, Canada and the UK, and the role that lawyers can play in challenging unjust outcomes.
Law Pod UK is published by 1 Crown Office Row. Supporting articles are published on the UK Human Rights Blog. Follow and interact with the podcast team on Twitter.Contact us with feedback on LawPodUK@1cor.com
This decision is only available in French. The petitioner deputies (members of the French Assembly) referred to the Constitutional Council Article 1 and Articles 6 – 9 of the Act to protect minors from the risks posed by their use of social networks. The contested provisions of Article 6-9 of the Act of 21 June 2004 provide that access to an online social networking service provided by an online platform is, in principle, prohibited to minors under fifteen.
They challenged the conformity of this Act with the Constitution. criticising these provisions for instituting a general ban on access to social networks for all minors below a certain age threshold, without distinguishing between the services concerned, in particular according to their nature, their functionalities, the risks they generate, or the safeguards that could be put in place. In their view, such a ban would not be necessary, appropriate, and proportionate to the objective pursued, given that other, less restrictive measures could protect minors. They argued that these provisions therefore disregard minors’ freedom of expression and communication and are, moreover, tainted by negative incompetence (the legislature’s failure to exercise the full extent of its own jurisdiction). They further maintained that, through this ban, the legislature deprived holders of parental authority of the ability to assess whether it was appropriate for their child to access certain services, in violation of the protection of the best interests of the child.
In addition, the petitioning deputies noted that such a ban would necessarily entail the introduction of technical processes to verify the identity of social network users in order to confirm their age. They criticised the absence of any legislative provision governing the processing of this sensitive data and specifying who is responsible for it and the technical arrangements for such verification. In doing so, they argued, the legislature failed to exercise the full extent of its jurisdiction and deprived the right to respect for private life, as well as freedom of expression and communication, of legal safeguards.
Finally, the petitioners submitted that the scope of these provisions is too imprecise, since the legislature failed to define the scope of the penalties applicable in the event of a breach of the ban and failed to determine whether the ancillary social functionalities (“fonctionalités sociales accessoires) of certain platforms were also covered. They considered that this resulted in a failure to meet the constitutional objective of accessibility and intelligibility of the law.
They relied, inter alia, on Article 11 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which proclaims: “The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man: every citizen may therefore speak, write, and print freely, subject to accountability for abuse of that freedom in cases determined by law.” Given the current state of means of communication and the widespread development of online public communication services, as well as the importance these services have taken on for participation in democratic life and the expression of ideas and opinions, this right implies the freedom to access these services and to express oneself on them.
Article 34 of the Constitution provides: “Statutes shall determine the rules concerning … civic rights and the fundamental guarantees granted to citizens for the exercise of public freedoms.” On this basis, the legislature may enact rules concerning the exercise of the right to free communication and the freedom to speak, write, and print.
On Wednesday, the Guardian reported that the Metropolitan Police are planning to use live facial recognition (LFR) technology on Oxford Street – the busiest shopping street in the UK.
Furthermore, such infrastructure would be permanently installed, with cameras fixed to street furniture – making it the first of its kind in the country. At a session of City Hall in July this year, Mayor Sadiq Khan announced that the Met was working to ‘use LFR in a sensible way’.
LFR has attracted heavy criticism from human rights campaign groups, in particular regarding evidence that the algorithm used risks discrimination against black people.
Following the announcement, Ruth Ehrlich, from the campaign group Liberty, said:
‘If live facial recognition is to be deployed in one of the country’s busiest shopping and tourist destinations, there must be full transparency about how it will be used, what safeguards are in place and how its impact on people’s rights will be monitored.’
‘Gender Identity’ in the Scottish Parliament
On Saturday, the Times reported that the Scottish Government’s draft Human Right Bill for Scotland, which is due to be put before MSPs shortly, contains a clause requiring public bodies to consider ‘gender identity’ when delivering services and designing policy.
According to the Times, campaigners have criticised the proposed clause for going beyond the meaning of ‘gender reassignment’ – the relevant protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010. It has been pointed out that ‘gender identity’ is currently left undefined in the ministers’ proposals.
While modification of the Equality Act is outside of the competence of the Scottish Parliament under schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998, legislation making supplementary provisions to the Act falls under an exception to the reserved matter.
The campaign group ‘For Women Scotland’, who notably succeeded against Scottish Government Ministers in the Supreme Court last year, have indicated that the bill represents another attempt by the Scottish Government to circumvent the Supreme Court’s decision on the meaning of ‘sex’ in the Equality Act.
In Cherrington v University of Derby [2026] EAT 107, the Mr Justice Cavanagh in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) held that an Employment Tribunal (“ET”) was not obliged to consider the Appellant’s Article 10 ECHR right to freedom of expression of its own motion when deciding whether or not his dismissal was fair. His right to freedom of expression did not “shout out” from his case, and nor was the ET obliged to consider the ECHR “as a matter of course” in unfair dismissal complaints, or even particular species of unfair dismissal complaints.
This case note briefly sets out the background to the case and the judgment, and then offers some brief comments by way of conclusion. References in square brackets are to paragraphs of the judgment.
On 2nd June 2026 the Supreme Court handed down their judgment in Re Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference (Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] UKSC 16. You can read the full analysis of the case by Anogika Souresh and Esme Cairns posted on 9th June. A brief reminder: the Attorney General for Northern Ireland referred to the Supreme Court whether proposed revisions to the region’s Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards Code of Practice — allowing incapacitated adults’ expressed wishes and feelings to count as valid consent to care arrangements — would satisfy Article 5 ECHR, even though this diverged from Cheshire West’s approach.
In this episode of Law Pod UK Rosalind English discusses with Amelia Walker the unanimous decision by the Supreme Court to overturn Cheshire West’s rigid “acid test” which they said wrongly departed from Strasbourg jurisprudence, replacing it with a multifactorial approach weighing restriction type, setting, duration, and effect. Crucially, it held that lacking capacity doesn’t automatically preclude someone from validly consenting to arrangements that would otherwise be a deprivation of liberty.
Law Pod UK is published by 1 Crown Office Row. Supporting articles are published on the UK Human Rights Blog. Follow and interact with the podcast team on Twitter, and post feedback to LawPodUK@1cor.com
In R (Al Hashimi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 943, the Court of Appeal held that a woman living in the United Arab Emirates could not invoke Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) to challenge sex discrimination in UK nationality legislation. The preliminary obstacle was Article 1: she was not within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction for Convention purposes (§1).
The decision is a clear restatement of the territorial limits on the ECHR. A decision taken in the UK, even one that substantially affects the interests of a person abroad, does not itself establish jurisdiction over that person (§§28-29, 39).
On Thursday, the House of Commons Defence Select Committee (DSC) published a report which found that a serious data breach of the sensitive personal data of thousands of Afghans was a ‘foreseeable systemic failure’ that became part of a wider failure of governance, accountability and public trust [30].
In February 2022, a member of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) sent a spreadsheet to a trusted third party which mistakenly contained detailed personal information relating to over 18,500
Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP) applications [45]. The breach was not discovered until August 2023, when part of the dataset appeared in a Facebook group [63].
The Shifting heaven and earth? The Afghan data breach and resettlement schemes report found that the MOD handled sensitive immigration casework using tools and controls ‘not appropriate for a life-endangering dataset’, which contained the personal information of Afghans who faced danger from the Taliban in connection with their work with or for the UK. DSC chair, Tom Dhesi, said that the MoD “should never have been left to run immigration casework schemes”.
From September 2023, for nearly two years, an ‘unprecedented superinjunction’ prevented media outlets from reporting on the incident [2]. The report found that the government did not strike ‘the right balance between operational secrecy and democratic accountability’ [97] and warned that the case should not set a precedent for normalising injunctions that suppress matters of widespread public interest [104].
The report also raised concerns that the government’s ‘self-move’ policy – which requires eligible Afghans to make their own way to a third country within twelve months – announced in April, ‘risks becoming in practice an exclusion mechanism for eligible people who are too poor, too vulnerable or too exposed to travel independently’ [215]. The DSC called on the government to publish a clear policy explaining how they will help Afghans who are eligible to come to the UK but who have not yet been evacuated.
In the courts
Animal activists challenge protest regulations
This week, the High Court granted animal rights campaigners permission to apply for a judicial review of the Public Order Act 2023 (Interference With Use or Operation of Key National Infrastructure) Regulations 2026 (‘the Regulations’).
The Regulations classify ‘life sciences infrastructure’, including animal testing facilities, as ‘key national infrastructure’. Under Section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023, interfering with the use or operation of key national infrastructure is a criminal offence punishable by up to 12 months’ imprisonment, a fine, or both.
Before Parliament approved the Regulations, a coalition of animal welfare charities wrote to the home secretary, Shabana Mahmood, warning that the measures would restrict ‘lawful, peaceful protest against animal experimentation’ and create a ‘fear of excessive criminalisation’.
Animal Aid challenges the Regulations on two grounds. First, it argues that the definition of ‘life sciences infrastructure’ goes beyond the natural meaning of the term ‘infrastructure’ and extends the concept of ‘key national infrastructure’ beyond Parliament’s intention. Second, Animal Aid argues that by not consulting animal rights groups, the Secretary of State failed to conduct a lawful consultation on the proposed Regulations.
Lawyers for Animals and Maria Iriart, a campaigner with Camp Beagle, also announced this week that the High Court had granted permission in their separate judicial review. Their claim is brought on two grounds. First, they argue that the Home Secretary exceeded her powers by classifying the life sciences as ‘key national infrastructure’. Second, they argue that the Regulations are irrational because existing criminal offences already protect the sector, the Government has produced no meaningful evidence to justify the claimed risks and the concept of ‘interference’ is insufficiently defined.
Palestine Action
On Wednesday, Palestine Action’s co-founder, Huda Ammori, was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Court of Appeal’s decision that the former home secretary, Yvette Cooper, had acted lawfully when banning the group last year under the Terrorism Act 2000.
The hearing is to be expedited and is due to be heard before the end of the year.
For further detail, see Jonathan Metzer’s in-depth analysis of both the Divisional Court’s and Court of Appeal’s judgments for the UK Human Rights Blog. You can also hear him discussing the Divisional Court’s ruling with Lucy McCann in episode 233 of Law Pod UK and the Court of Appeal’s reversal in episode 240.
On Monday, the Supreme Court ruled that a foreign state cannot invoke state immunity in proceedings relating to personal injury caused by acts within the UK, even if other causative acts take place abroad and the actor is not present in the UK [134].
The case stems from a claim brought by Bahraini activists, Dr Saeed Shehabi and Moosa Mohammed, who allege that agents of the Kingdom of Bahrain installed and operated spyware on their computers [8]. At the time the spyware was allegedly installed and used, both activists and their computers were located in the UK. However, the spyware was allegedly operated by Bahraini agents from outside the UK via a server located in Bahrain [156].
The central issue before the Court was whether the ‘territorial tort exception’ in section 5 of the State Immunity Act 1978 (SIA) would apply in cases where the actors or some of the acts causing personal injury were located outside the UK [49]. Section 5 of the SIA provides that a foreign state cannot rely on state immunity to escape accountability for death, personal injury or property damage ‘caused by an act or omission in the United Kingdom’ [1].
The Supreme Court held, by a majority of 3 to 2, that limiting the scope of section 5 of the SIA to situations where an agent of a foreign state was present in the UK at the time when the acts which caused the injury occurred (a presence requirement) would be ‘an unduly restrictive reading’ and fail to take account of the ability of modern technology to carry out acts remotely from abroad [133]. The Court emphasised that a rigid distinction between an act and its effects can lead to ‘artificial and unprincipled results’ [129].
Although article 11 of the European Convention on State Immunity (ESCI) expressly imposes a presence requirement, the Court held that the principle of consistent interpretation had no application [77]. The SIA was not intended to be a precise implementation of the ECSI and Parliament had made a ‘deliberate decision’ to depart from the ECSI scheme in this particular respect [76].
On Tuesday, the new Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, announced that the Government would scrap plans to bring in mandatory digital ID. The policy, announced under the Starmer administration, was intended to help tackle illegal migration and working, as well as improve access to public services.
However, the plan received considerable criticism at the time, in particular from human rights charities, being described by Amnesty International UK as ‘a serious cause for concern’, which carried with it ‘new risks of discrimination … including racialised policing.’ The development of the policy was later characterised by the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, Dame Karen Bradley as a ‘fiasco’ which ‘raised fears of government over-reach into people’s lives’.
Burnham styled his move to ditch the plans as a ‘reprioritisation of public resource’ but notably refrained from criticising the policy on rights grounds. Although the plans had already been watered down somewhat, Burnham’s recent decision has received immediate praise. Akiko Hart, a Director at Liberty commended the move as ‘a victory for civil liberties in the UK’.
Charity Commission investigates Amnesty International UK:
On Tuesday, the Charity Commission opened a compliance case into Amnesty International UK. This followed Amnesty’s self-referral to the Commission following the significant backlash it received for a now-withdrawn report published on its website. That report had sparked controversy for labelling over one-hundred gender critical organisations as being part of an ‘Anti-Rights Movement’.
One such organisation listed by the Amnesty International UK in the report was Beira’s Place – a female-only sexual violence support centre founded by JK Rowling in 2022. Following the publishing of the report, Beira’s Place threatened to take legal action against Amnesty, alleging the report to have been defamatory and demanding a retraction and apology. JK Rowling herself then offered legal funding to any groups that had been named by Amnesty in the report.
Amnesty swiftly withdrew the report, explaining that it had failed to go ‘through the established internal review processes that are in place to ensure consistency, accuracy and alignment with Amnesty International UK’s position.’ It has added that it is ‘engaging fully’ with the Charity Commission’s investigation.
In Westminster: Parliament rises for summer recess, Immigration and Asylum Bill latest, and FAC inquiry into UK-Russian long-term relationship launched
The House of Commons adjourned on Thursday for the summer recess and will not sit again until Tuesday 1st September. It rose with the Immigration and Asylum Bill, debated at second reading the previous Monday, fresh in its wake, and with the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ (‘JCHR’) legislative scrutiny of the Bill under way.
The JCHR has invited written submissions on the Bill’s compatibility with domestic and international human rights obligations until 1st September, so the recess will be no quiet interlude for those preparing evidence.
On Wednesday, the Chair of the JCHR, Lord Alton of Liverpool, welcomed the Bill’s strengthened safeguards against forced labour in UK supply chains. The Committee’s July 2025 report on the same had warned that the UK risked becoming a ‘dumping ground’ for goods made using forced labour, and called for mandatory human rights due diligence and improved access to justice for victims in the UK courts. That report is to be debated in the House of Lords on Friday 4th September. Lord Alton’s welcome of these safeguards is notable for its selectivity: the Committee’s scrutiny of the Bill’s more contested provisions, not least the proposed restriction of Article 8 claims in immigration appeals, continues.
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Elsewhere in Westminster, the Foreign Affairs Committee (‘FAC’) launched an inquiry into Russia, which will consider the UK’s bilateral relationship and ask whether the UK’s long-term strategic approach to a post-conflict Russia is clearly defined.
A challenging week for the International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) has had a week of striking contrasts. As the week opened, the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, announced a campaign to ‘dismantle’ the Court, contending that it had strayed beyond its mandate in pursuing American personnel. The United Nations responded the same day by defending the Court’s critical role in the global fight against impunity and, on Wednesday, a resolution urging the United States to join the Court was introduced in the House of Representatives.
The diplomatic pressure formed the backdrop to the Court’s Security Council briefing on Darfur (on which, see below).
The ICC’s difficulties are not only external. On Tuesday, the Bar Standards Board confirmed that the ICC Prosecutor, Karim Khan KC, has been suspended from practice as a barrister pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings arising from allegations of sexual misconduct, which he denies. Mr Khan was separately suspended by the ICC’s governing body in June.
In the Courts
R v McCafferty and others: the Supreme Court narrows statutory public nuisance
On Tuesday, the Supreme Court handed down judgment in R v McCafferty and others [2026] UKSC 20, unanimously allowing the appeals of six Animal Rising (then Animal Rebellion) protestors, with the result that they stand acquitted. Lord Leggatt gave the main judgment, with which Lord Reed, Lady Simler and Lord Doherty agreed; Lord Sales concurred in the result.
On the morning of 8th September 2022, the six defendants obstructed the entrance to a dairy works owned by Müller UK, chaining themselves to temporary fencing and gluing themselves to the surface of Pointon Way — a private road providing the only access to the site — so that for some four hours no vehicle could enter or leave. They were charged under the second limb of the statutory offence of public nuisance (Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.78): an act which obstructs the public, or a section of the public ‘in the exercise or enjoyment of a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large.’
The trial judge found no case to answer, on the basis that the defendants had obstructed a private road leading to private premises. The Court of Appeal reversed that ruling, and certified a question of general public importance: whether those who go to private business premises — as employees, customers or suppliers — are a section of the public exercising such a right when they approach, enter or leave.
The Supreme Court’s answer was no. A ‘right’ within s.78(1)(b)(ii) means a genuine public right — the paradigm being the right of passage along the highway — and is to be distinguished from a mere licence or permission granted by a landowner, which confers no right at all. There was no evidence that the public at large had been granted permission to use Pointon Way, let alone a right to do so. Lord Leggatt invoked the principle that a criminal penalty — particularly one carrying a potential loss of liberty — should not be imposed on a doubtful construction of a statute.
The Crown’s fallback argument, that the protestors had at least obstructed the right of those inside to leave the premises, fared no better: a trespasser does not cease to be a trespasser upon making for the exit. Nor could the prosecution salvage matters by pointing to offences it had never charged: no application had been made to amend the indictment to allege the first-limb offence or aggravated trespass, and there was accordingly no basis for disturbing the judge’s ruling.
The judgment substantially narrows the reach of the second limb of s.78 as applied to protest at private premises, and channels such conduct towards the offences Parliament actually designed for it. Coming a month after the Court of Appeal upheld the proscription of Palestine Action, it is a reminder that the law of protest continues to develop in both directions at once: the courts will uphold broad executive and legislative measures where lawfully made, but will not stretch penal statutes beyond their terms to catch disruptive protest.
S.T. v. the Czech Republic: a death in police custody and the duty to investigate
On Thursday, the Strasbourg Court gave judgment in S.T. v the Czech Republic, finding several violations of the Convention arising from the death of the applicant’s brother, a Roma man, following a police intervention in 2021, and from the ensuing investigation. The Registry’s summary is stark: the use of the prone position by police was followed by the man’s death, and the authorities failed both to protect his life and to investigate effectively the use of force and its potential discriminatory motives (see the Court’s press release).
The case arises from the death of Stanislav Tomáš in Teplice in June 2021, after an officer knelt on him in the course of his restraint: an incident captured in footage and circulated widely which drew comparisons, at the time, with the death of George Floyd. The domestic authorities had concluded that there was no causal link between the police intervention and the death. Strasbourg’s insistence that allegations of racially discriminatory motives in policing must themselves be effectively investigated continues a line of authority of obvious relevance on this side of the Channel, where the disproportionate use of force against minority communities remains under scrutiny.
Bazhenov and Others v. Russia and Ukraine: property rights in occupied Crimea
Between 2015 and 2017, the Russian authorities cancelled the applicants’ titles to plots of land in Sevastopol, Crimea, which had originally been transferred into private ownership by the Ukrainian authorities. The plots were reclaimed as public property on the footing that they were forest lands which ought never to have been privatised.
The Court held that there was no legal basis for the Russian authorities to deprive the applicants of their ownership. The applications were directed against both Russia and Ukraine, though the findings summarised by the Registry concern the acts of the Russian authorities.
The judgment adds to the growing body of Strasbourg case law on the consequences of the occupation of Crimea for private rights, following the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), and is a further instance of the Court adjudicating upon the acts of an occupying administration against Convention standards notwithstanding Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe.
In The Hague: The ICC’s first Libya case goes to trial, Darfur update, and Rome Statute anniversary
On Wednesday, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC rejected the defence challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction in The Prosecutor v. Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri, holding unanimously that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the case.
The majority reasoned that the alleged conduct remains covered by the Security Council’s referral of the situation in Libya under Resolution 1970 (2011), notwithstanding Libya’s more recent acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction by declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute.
The following day, the Chamber unanimously confirmed all charges against Mr El Hishri and committed him to trial. The Chamber found substantial grounds to believe that Mr El Hishri — alleged to have been one of the most senior officials at Mitiga Prison in Tripoli — is responsible for seventeen counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against thousands of detainees between May 2014 and June 2020, comprising torture, cruel treatment, imprisonment, outrages upon personal dignity and other inhuman acts; rape, attempted rape and other forms of sexual violence; murder and attempted murder; enslavement; and persecution.
Mr El Hishri was arrested in Germany on 16 July 2025 and surrendered to the Court in December 2025, with the confirmation hearing held in May of this year.
This is the first case in the ICC’s Libya situation to be sent to trial in fifteen years of investigation; Human Rights Watch described the decision as a ‘milestone for justice’ in Libya.
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Meanwhile, regarding the situation in Darfur, the Office of the Prosecutor announced on Tuesday that it seeks to withdraw the charges against Abdallah Banda — a request originally filed confidentially in October 2023 and made public only this week — drawing the curtain on one of the Court’s longest-dormant cases. The charges against Mr Banda, arising from an attack on African Union peacekeepers in 2007, were confirmed in 2011, and he has been at large under a warrant of arrest since 2014.
On Wednesday, the Deputy Prosecutor, Nazha Shameem Khan, briefed the UN Security Council on the situation in Darfur pursuant to Resolution 1593 (2005), against the backdrop of continuing atrocities in the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces — and of the week’s diplomatic assault on the Court itself.
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The week closed with the President of the ICC, Judge Tomoko Akane, marking the Day of International Criminal Justice on Friday: the anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998, an occasion which this year found the Court as productive as it is embattled.
Described by the government as “a framework of new, enhanced powers and offences to improve UK border security and to strengthen the asylum and immigration system”, the Bill contemplates a raft of reforms which have been summarised in a previous post on this blog.
Launching the JCHR’s inquiry into the Bill, Lord David Alton said:
We need to make sure that, as the Government sets out to deal with long-term issues such as the asylum backlog, costly asylum accommodation and low public confidence in the asylum and immigration processes, it does not come at the cost of the human rights of those engaging with the system.
The JCHR invites written submissions until 1st September 2026 on a number of issues relating to the Bill’s compatibility with domestic and international human rights obligations.
UNHRC concludes 62nd regular session
The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) concluded its 62nd regular session on 8th July, having adopted 28 resolutions on a range of country-specific and thematic issues.
The UNHRC adopted resolutions relating to the current human rights situations in Sudan, Myanmar and Eritrea and on a variety of thematic issues, including:
freedom of expression;
the rights of women and girls in humanitarian situations;
forced marriage;
protection of healthcare in armed conflict;
judicial independence; and
extreme poverty.
Calls for ICO to be investigated for eVisa oversight failures
The Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee has been asked to open an investigation into the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) for alleged failures in upholding data protection law in relation to the Home Office’s eVisa scheme.
In a letter to the Committee’s chair, a group of 20 immigration, data protection and human rights organisations assert that the eVisa scheme has been affected – since its rollout – by systemic data protection and accessibility issues.
The signatories note that these issues have had a “high and unjustifiable” price, preventing individuals from proving their immigration status, applying for jobs, enrolling in education, and claiming benefits.
Against this background, the signatories criticise the ICO’s failure to take any action as part of its oversight responsibilities, despite being approached in November 2025. They ask the Select Committee to consider whether institutional changes are needed at the ICO, as well as investigating the specific eVisa issues.
Concerns over facial recognition technology in UK shops
Civil liberties groups have described a “dangerous escalation” in the use of facial recognition technology in UK shops – such as Sainsbury’s, B&M and Spar – to monitor shoplifting.
The technology, known as Facewatch, is expected to alert police in real time to the presence of known offenders based on live facial recognition matching.
Critics say this raises proportionality issues given the risks of misidentification, as well as threatening infringements of data and privacy rights as people’s faces will be scanned and their features stored without meaningful consent.
In defence of the technology, Facewatch’s CEO has said:
This is about the people who commit dozens and, in some cases, hundreds of offences, not the millions of people who simply want to do their shopping. If technology can help protect retail workers, prevent further crime and support policing, we believe it has a responsible role to play.
How was your last lobster bisque or thermidor? What is a crayfish anyway, a sentient animal with feelings to be regarded, or just a large marine woodlouse to be tossed into a pot of boiling water, alive, because they’re quite complicated and sometimes expensive to kill humanely?
Under the Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 the government gave legal recognition to decapod crustaceans as sentient beings. The Animal Law Foundation has now written to the Welsh Government to advise on what this means for the killing of crabs and lobsters in Wales.
Summary
The letter reproduced below, addressed to Mr Gruffydd, cabinet minister in the Welsh Government on behalf of The Animal Law Foundation and co-signatory animal protection organisations and legal experts, calls for urgent regulatory guidance on the killing of decapod crustaceans (such as crabs and lobsters) in Wales.
The letter’s central argument rests on the legal recognition of decapod crustaceans as sentient beings under Section 5(1)(c) of the Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022. The authors argue this recognition has direct legal implications for how these animals must be treated under the Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing (Wales) Regulations 2014 (WATOK).
Specifically, the letter notes that Schedule 4 of WATOK already extends welfare protections at the time of killing to invertebrates including decapod crustaceans. Paragraph 4 of that Schedule makes it an offence to restrain, stun, or kill such animals in ways causing avoidable pain, distress, or suffering, and requires that anyone carrying out these acts have the necessary knowledge and skill to do so humanely.
The letter draws on the London School of Economics review that underpinned the original sentience recognition, which identified humane killing methods for decapods—such as double spiking for crabs, whole-body splitting for lobsters, or specialist electrical stunning devices—as being fast (whole-body splitting taking no more than 10 seconds when performed competently). By contrast, the letter highlights that boiling crustaceans alive, a widespread practice in restaurants and homes, can take several minutes and causes significant suffering. Since humane alternatives exist, the authors argue boiling alive constitutes “avoidable” suffering, and is therefore already unlawful under the combined effect of sentience recognition and WATOK’s existing provisions.
The letter strengthens this argument by pointing to the UK Government’s Animal Welfare Strategy commitment (as of December 2025) to publish guidance on which killing methods for decapods comply with existing welfare-at-time-of-killing law, explicitly including clarification that live boiling is unacceptable. Because Wales operates under the same underlying legal framework as England on this point, the authors contend that this UK-level interpretation is highly relevant and should be mirrored in Wales.
In its concluding “next steps” section, the letter appeals to the newly elected Welsh Government and its manifesto commitment to produce a renewed Animal Health and Welfare Plan. It urges the government to act urgently by issuing clear guidance confirming that decapod crustaceans are protected under WATOK, and that consequently they should not be boiled alive. The letter frames this as a long-overdue reform and calls on the government to take decisive action.
In essence, the letter is a legal and evidentiary appeal urging Welsh ministers to formally clarify—via guidance rather than new legislation—that existing animal welfare law already prohibits the live-boiling of crustaceans, using the precedent of sentience law, scientific evidence on humane slaughter methods, and an emerging parallel commitment from the UK government as its main pillars of support.
On Tuesday, Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood introduced the Immigration and Asylum Bill to Parliament. The Bill reforms the interpretation of the right to family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), changes the Modern Slavery regime, establishes a new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority and provides for the recovery of asylum support costs.
According to the accompanying Explanatory Notes, the Bill aims to establish “a firm but fair immigration system” by bringing into effect the Restoring Order and Control reforms announced in November 2025.
The Bill defines ‘family life’ for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR as “normally limited to their core cohabiting family” (clause 18(4)).
Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is also amended in the Bill to provide that it will only be unreasonable to expect a child to leave the UK where the child would: (1) receive no education in the new country; (2) face very significant obstacles to integration; or (3) experience a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect as a result of the relocation (clause 19(7)).
The Bill further provides that delays in disclosing modern slavery experiences and material inconsistencies in the information provided will damage a person’s credibility as a victim of modern slavery (clause 36).
It also establishes a body corporate called the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority to determine all types of immigration appeal (clause 1). While senior adjudicators must have practised law for at least two years or have experience in law-related activities, there is no such requirement for executive adjudicators (clause 2).
Additionally, the Bill introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to require people who have received asylum support to contribute to the costs of providing support (clause 23).
On Thursday, the Cabinet Office released a Draft Bill that would effectively ban LGBTQ+ ‘abusive conversion practices’ – colloquially known as ‘conversion therapy’ – in England and Wales. In 2022, the previous government also proposed a ban but, significantly, one that would not include protection for transgender people. At the time, that exception was considered to be due to concerns over criminalising exploratory discussions about a person’s gender identity.
The currently proposed legislation, which includes protection for transgender people, would create two new offences. The first would criminalise ‘carrying out an abusive conversion practice on an individual’, with potential prison sentences and unlimited fines in store for those convicted. The second would do likewise where a ‘United Kingdom person’ encourages or assists abusive practices that take place outside of England and Wales.
In cases where an abusive conversion practice is carried out by an organisation or ‘encouraged or assisted’ by one outside the jurisdiction, the proposed legislation would introduce criminal liability for the relevant officer of the organisation.
Alongside this, the proposals also include conferring a new power on the High Court and family court to make ‘conversion practice protection orders’, enabling the prohibition and restriction of the practice.
In response to the publication of the Draft Bill, the Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Mary-Ann Stephenson, welcomed the proposals.
However Stephenson went on to say: ‘It is crucial that the legislation is based on clear definitions and boundaries that protect legitimate medical treatment and therapy as well as ensuring people’s rights to freedom of religion and freedom of expression are not disproportionately restricted’.
The charity, Sex Matters, expressed a similar concern regarding definitions in the Draft Bill, characterising the definition in the proposed legislation of ‘conversion practice’ as ‘open-ended and subjective’. Because the proposed ban is trans-inclusive, the charity has expressed fear that instances such as ‘parents telling a child they will not pay for puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones’ would become criminal conduct.
On the other hand, the charity, Stonewall, who have long advocated for a ‘fully inclusive’ ban, labelled the proposal ‘a momentous step forward towards LGBTQ+ equality’ but one that was notably ‘long-overdue’.
Immigration and Asylum changes on the horizon?
In other legislative news, there is speculation that the Government’s new Immigration and Asylum Bill, which was announced earlier this year in the King’s Speech, will be laid before the House of Commons in the upcoming week. However, given Parliament’s summer recess period is due to begin on the 17th of July and that a new PM is likely to be in office by the time Parliament returns in September, it is unclear what the future of such a bill is.
The Government originally announced the intended legislation in the King’s Speech, which would be aimed at significantly changing and tightening the asylum process. In particular, it had outlined plans to restrict the use of Article 8 ECHR claims in immigration appeals, which has attracted considerable criticism from campaign groups. The proposal to limit the operation of Article 8 was also said to include a statutory redefinition of ‘family life’, reducing it to mean a ‘core family unit, such as spouses, parents, and children’. Furthermore, the bill is also supposed to entail the creation of a new ‘independent appeals body’ to hear asylum claims, separate from other immigration appeals and would take over cases retrospectively.
The proposed bill would mark a significant change to human rights law, likely involving a surgical removal of Strasbourg jurisprudence on Article 8. However, the impending turnover of Cabinet roles expected in the next month or so means the timing of its introduction remains uncertain.
The case concerned a protestor in Batumi, Georgia, who was removed from a public area, arrested and subsequently convicted of an administrative offence for refusing to cancel a solo protest he had planned and given notice the authorities notice of. The protest, which concerned the lack of free lunches provided in public schools in Georgia, was due to be held outside the Constitutional Court in Batumi and involved pitching a small tent. The applicant was initially stopped by the police upon erecting the tent on the grounds that his protest would disrupt planned New Year’s celebrations and was too close to a protected monument as well as the Constitutional Court building. Later, in a police interview, Karvacha was repeatedly requested to cancel the protest and was charged with the offence after refusing to do so. He was convicted in the Batumi court and received a reprimand, which was then upheld on appeal.
Decision and reasoning
The Strasbourg Court found that, while the applicant’s removal from the area of protest, arrest and prosecution were interferences with Article 10 (read in the light of Article 11) that pursued a legitimate aim, they were nevertheless not necessary in a democratic society [46-49].
The Court found that the applicant’s specific protest was of heightened public interest and therefore, a particularly good justification was needed for its lawful restriction. The Georgian Government relied on three grounds for doing so: (i) the need to enforce the law concerning the proximity of assemblies to the Court building; (ii) the need to protect a public statue; and (iii) the need to ensure the safety of the applicant from pyrotechnics to be used at the New Year’s celebrations [51].
As regards the first ground, the Court found [52] that because, in domestic judicial proceedings, there had been no reference to that ground, it could not be relied on as a sufficient justification.
On the second ground [53], the Court held that the applicant could not have posed a genuine risk to the statue. It stated that he ‘neither engaged in violent conduct nor displayed any intention to damage, destroy, impair, or even temporarily alter the monument’ [53].
Finally, the Court was not persuaded that the risk of the applicant being affected by pyrotechnics was sufficiently clear [54]. It had not been verified for instance that the area in which the applicant began to set up his tented protest was designated for pyrotechnics.
Separately, the Court found that the sanction would have been disproportionate. It reasoned that the applicant’s removal and arrest, combined with the judicial reprimand resulted in a cumulative sanction and one which had a ‘chilling effect’ on the exercise of his right to freedom of expression [56].
News just in: The UK’s drug regulator has approved a daily pill version of the obesity drug semaglutide (Wegovy) for weight loss.
The tablet form of Wegovy, manufactured by Novo Nordisk, is the first glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) receptor agonist pill to be approved by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) for weight loss and weight management in the UK. (BMJ newsletter, 26 June 2026)
This short judgement follows an application for a website blocking order, or more accurately, an application to vary and extend an existing order made by Mellor J dated 2 October 2025. For the sake of clarity I will first summarise the earlier ruling made by Mellor J ([2026] EWHC 1094 (Ch)). The key takeaway from these two judgments is that this is the first time that the courts have used the website blocking system, which used to be aimed exclusively at copyright piracy, in the field of public health.
Here the judge upheld Novo Nordisk’s application for a website-blocking order against six major UK ISPs (BT, EE, Plusnet, Sky, TalkTalk, Virgin Media), directed at four target websites — Viogen Pharma, Pharma-Labs, Leo Labs and The Steroid Supplier — which were advertising, offering and selling counterfeit and unlicensed semaglutide to UK consumers, branded as or referencing Ozempic, Wegovy, Rybelsus, Victoza and Saxenda. The evidence established a proliferation of “falsified” products in three forms: outright counterfeits bearing NN branding, unlicensed third-party versions marketed under the INN, and products substituting an entirely different substance such as insulin. Sample purchases all showed impurities, and NN adduced FDA and WHO data linking falsified semaglutide to hundreds of hospitalisations and deaths globally. The MHRA had separately tried and failed to have the sites taken down and supported the application.
Mellor J observed that this was the first such application concerning counterfeit and unlicensed prescription-only medicines. Advertising or offering unlicensed prescription-only medicines is itself a criminal offence under the Human Medicines Regulations 2012. The question was whether NN had standing to enforce breaches of the Regulations or restrain repeated offences under them.
Jurisdictional basis
The judge applied the established Cartier framework (Court of Appeal and Supreme Court), holding that the four threshold requirements were satisfied: the ISPs were “intermediaries”; the website operators were infringing NN’s rights; UK consumers used the ISPs’ services to reach the sites and conclude purchases; and the ISPs had actual knowledge via service of the evidence. Importantly, he confirmed that the Cartier jurisdiction is not confined to IP infringement but rests on the court’s equitable protective jurisdiction over facilitators “unwittingly mixed up” in a legal wrong — civil or criminal, per Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd. Any form of civil or criminal wrongdoing would suffice, because the jurisdiction derives from ordinary principles of equity, which draws no relevant distinction between civil and criminal wrongdoing.
Mellor J was satisfied NN had standing here — significantly influenced by the MHRA’s active support for the application.He grounded this within the wider modern law of injunctions, drawing on his own earlier review in COPA v Wright [2024] EWHC 3315 (Ch) and the Supreme Court’s Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2024] 2 WLR 45 and the Privy Council’s Convoy Collateral v Broad Idea International [2023] AC 389: the equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions is broad, unconfined by rigid categorisation, and can evolve to meet new circumstances provided the exercise remains principled.
The UK equality watchdog reports to the UN on race
On Thursday, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) published the report it had submitted in May to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), under the Committee’s follow-up procedure.
After its last full review of the United Kingdom in 2024, the Committee had asked for evidence of progress in three areas: the right to peaceful assembly, the Windrush generation, and counter-terrorism.
On peaceful assembly, the Commission found that the cumulative expansion of police powers across the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the Public Order Act 2023 and the Crime and Policing Act 2026 had placed mounting restrictions on the right to protest, and recommended that the legislation be amended to recognise a positive duty to facilitate peaceful protest. On counter-terrorism, while noting the recent reforms to Prevent, it pressed for stronger oversight against discriminatory application of the Prevent duty and for the publication of referral data broken down by race, ethnicity, religion and nationality. On Windrush, it called for better funding of the Windrush Compensation Advocacy Support Fund.
The Committee will consider the UK’s follow-up at its session in August. The report came a day after the Commission set out its latest equality objectives under the public sector equality duty.
Human rights and the Iran peace deal
On Friday, a group of independent UN experts welcomed the signing of a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran, intended to draw a line under months of conflict, but warned that any settlement which ignored the human rights situation inside Iran would be “fundamentally incomplete”. The Memorandum, they observed, is concerned almost wholly with military withdrawal, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear question, sanctions relief and a $300 billion reconstruction fund; the Iranian people, the experts said, must be heard in any negotiation that claims to secure their future.
Earlier in the week, two UN special rapporteurs voiced grave concern for a British couple wrongfully detained in Iran, both by then on hunger strike: one for more than thirty days, the other for more than twenty.
In the Courts
R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: Palestine Action’s proscription upheld
On Monday, the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 721, upholding the proscription of Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000. A five-judge Court — comprised of the Lady Chief Justice (Lady Carr of Walton-on-the-Hill CJ), the Master of the Rolls (Sir Geoffrey Vos), the Vice President of the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division (Edis LJ) and Lewis and Whipple LLJ — allowed the Home Secretary’s appeal, holding that the ban was a lawful and proportionate interference with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
Founded in 2020, Palestine Action’s principal target has been Elbit Systems UK, the British arm of the Israeli arms manufacturer, with the aim of disrupting the Israeli arms trade in Britain. After an escalating campaign of property damage — including at Thales in Glasgow, Instro Precision in Kent and Elbit Systems in Bristol, and, days before the decision, the breaking into RAF Brize Norton and the spray-painting of two military aircraft — the then Home Secretary announced the proscription to Parliament on 23 June 2025. It took effect on 5 July 2025, making it an offence under sections 11 and 12 of the Act to belong to, or invite support for, the organisation, punishable on indictment by up to fourteen years’ imprisonment.
In February, the Divisional Court ([2026] EWHC 292 (Admin)) had quashed the proscription on two grounds: first, that the Home Secretary had acted inconsistently with her own published policy by taking into account that proscription would give the authorities “additional levers to disrupt” the group’s operations; second, applying the four-stage test in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700, the group’s qualifying activity had not reached the scale needed to justify the interference with Articles 10 and 11.
The Court of Appeal disagreed on both points. The Proscription Policy was a short, open-textured document whose list of relevant factors was not exhaustive and was never meant to fetter the Home Secretary’s discretion; the disruptive effects of proscription went to its efficacy and were a legitimate part of the proportionality balance. More fundamentally, the Divisional Court had afforded the executive too little latitude and had drawn the factual picture too narrowly, gauging the threat by reference only to the handful of incidents that met the statutory definition of terrorism, in isolation from Palestine Action’s wider conduct: its escalation, recruitment and fundraising, and the covert, cell-based model described in its own “Underground Manual”. The assessment of future risk to national security, the Court held, is pre-eminently a matter for the executive, which is better placed than a court to weigh it and entitled to a wide margin of respect. Once the fuller picture was restored, the Bank Mellat balance fell in favour of the ban: its objectives were sufficiently important and rationally connected to it, no adequate less intrusive measure had been identified, and a fair balance had been struck, notwithstanding the “chilling effect” the Court acknowledged the proscription might have on the significant number of people who wish to voice support for the Palestinian cause by wholly lawful means.
The quashing order is accordingly set aside and the proscription stands: expressions of support for Palestine Action remain capable of constituting a terrorism offence, and the ongoing prosecutions continue. Ms Ammori has said that she will seek permission to appeal to the Supreme Court and, if necessary, to Strasbourg.
V.T. and Others v Azerbaijan: a Strasbourg first on the 2016 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
On Thursday, in its first judgment arising from the “Four-Day War” of April 2016, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights found Azerbaijan responsible for the torture and unlawful killing of an ethnic Armenian serviceman. The case is V.T. and Others v. Azerbaijan (app. no. 20075/16).
The three applicants — the parents and sister of the deceased, an officer in the army of the then unrecognised “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” (referred to by the Court as H.T.) — said that he had been captured alive, mutilated and killed during the fighting, his body recovered near the village of Talish.
The Court found violations of Article 2 (right to life) and Article 3 (the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), each in its substantive limb. He had, it held, been killed when already hors de combat: conduct the Court observed was also contrary to international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions. The mutilated condition in which his remains were returned, which prevented his family from giving him a complete burial, had itself caused them suffering contrary to Article 3. It awarded €60,000 jointly to the parents and €30,000 to the sister in non-pecuniary damages, with a further €14,210 in costs.
The judgment is the first arising out of the 2016 fighting, with twenty-one similar applications still pending in Strasbourg. Azerbaijan, which disputes the Court’s jurisdiction, is expected to reject the judgment.
Tuncer Çetinkaya v. Türkiye: a Zaman journalist and the post-coup detentions
On Tuesday, the Second Section returned to the detention of journalists in the aftermath of the July 2016 attempted coup, in Tuncer Çetinkaya v. Türkiye (app. no. 79795/17) (judgment available only in French).
The applicant, the former regional representative of the newspaper Zaman in Antalya, was remanded in custody on 26 July 2016 on suspicion of membership of the organisation the authorities designate “FETÖ/PDY”. The Court found violations of Article 5(1) (no reasonable suspicion to justify the initial detention), Article 5(3) (the length of his pre-trial detention) and Article 10 (freedom of expression).
CNEWS v. France: no Article 10 violation for the news channel
On Thursday, by contrast, the Fifth Section found no violation of Article 10 in a complaint brought by the operator of the French news channel CNEWS (CNEWS v. France, app. no. 41355/23) (judgment available only in French). It should not be confused with a domestic development of the same week: on 15 June, the French broadcasting regulator, ARCOM, made public a formal notice of its decision dated 12 June requiring CNEWS to comply with its pluralism obligations, following a complaint lodged in January by Reporters Without Borders.
Ottlakán v. Hungary: an illusory remedy for poor prison conditions
On Tuesday, the Second Section found a violation of Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) read with Article 3 in Ottlakán v. Hungary (app. no. 17201/23). The applicant, a whole-life prisoner with no prospect of release, had been awarded some €1,500 in the domestic courts for 488 days spent in cells below the statutory minimum of four square metres of personal space. That remedy was inadequate: the money was set aside in an account administered by the prison until his release and, because no mechanism could ever lead to this prisoner’s release, he had no real prospect of receiving it.
Iskrenović v. Serbia: insulting the police, and the right to examine witnesses
Finally, on Tuesday the Third Section found a violation of Article 6(1) read with Article 6(3)(d) (the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses) in Iskrenović v. Serbia (app. no. 39427/23), in the case of a man convicted, in minor-offence proceedings, of insulting police officers in the performance of their duties.
On the UKHRB
This week, Jonathan Metzer takes an extended look at the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Ammori, examining in greater detail the treatment of the Home Secretary’s proscription policy, the four-stage Bank Mellat analysis, the wide margin afforded to the executive in matters of national security, and the Court’s conclusion that Palestine Action could not properly be characterised as a non-violent civil-disobedience protest group.
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