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UK Human Rights Blog - 1 Crown Office Row
Search Results for: puberty blockers consent/page/47/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)
The vigilant gaze of the European Commission will begin to turn away from UK when the post-Brexit transition period ends at the turn of the year. The Commission has used its powers as the ‘guardian of the treaties’ to enforce EU laws relating to nature conservation, waste and air pollution. Its absence will leave a governance gap, and replacement institutions are needed to ensure that environmental laws are enforced.
This article discusses the functions and powers of the ESS in the Bill and then analyses the proposals through the lens of the UN’s Paris Principles (used for assessing the credibility of national human rights institutions).
The result of this decision by the CJEU is summed up in a pithy summary by EU Business entitled “EU court backs angry honeymaker in GM pollen row.” The underlying question arose when food law met honey law (yes, there is one) met GMO licensing law, It was all about whether adventitious contamination of honey and pollen deriving from GMO maize renders the honey a GMO product.
Paradoxically the beekeeper sought that outcome in what we would call statutory tort proceedings. He sued the State of Bavaria who owned various experimental GM maize plots, for damaging his honey via GM pollen. Monsanto, the real object of the case, said that it didn’t matter really that its GMO pollen was in the pollen, and it didn’t cause damage for which our apiarist could sue. As we shall see, the CJEU decided it did matter – a lot.
Not all of you will know that EU legislators have dedicated a whole Directive to honey; of Council Directive 2001/110/EC. In the lyrical yet precise prose of the Eurocrat: ‘Honey is the natural sweet substance produced by Apis mellifera bees from the nectar of plants or from secretions of living parts of plants or excretions of plant‑sucking insects on the living parts of plants, which the bees collect, transform by combining with specific substances of their own, deposit, dehydrate, store and leave in honeycombs to ripen and mature.’ : Annex I. Honey consists predominantly of sugars but also contains solid particles derived from honey collection, as Annex II tells us.
The HM Inspectorate of Prisons has published a report which found that there was an “inadequate provision of interpretation” and “almost no information was available” to migrant people, during their removal to France under the ‘one in, one out’ pilot scheme. Almost all of those removed had arrived recently at the Kent coast and few were able to understand English.
Under the ‘Agreement on the Prevention of Dangeround Journeys’, ratified in August, any asylum seeker who has crossed the Channel unlawfully can be returned back to France. There is also a provision for “reciprocal admittance”, whereby an asylum seeker in France who has a genuine family link to someone in the UK and has not attempted to enter the UK unlawfully, will be allowed to enter the UK.
The report also raised concerns that migrant people did not have proper access to justice prior to their removal to France under the scheme. Although migrant people were signposted to legal firms while detained at Immigration Removal Centres, the report noted that many people’s cases were refused by solicitors and they were unable to access legal advice.
The publication of the report comes as a legal challenge against the removal of 16 migrant people under the ‘one in, one out’ scheme was heard at the High Court on Wednesday. The case centres on whether it was unlawful for the Homes Secretary to withdraw migrant people’s right to have rejected modern slavery claims reconsidered. The claimants also allege that French authorities do not adequately support trafficking victims. The Court heard that 40 per cent of migrant people detained under the scheme have made trafficking claims.
In international news
Last week, pro-democracy media tycoon Jimmy Lai was sentenced to 20 years in prison under Hong Kong’s National Security Law. The 78-year-old Apple Daily founder was found guilty last December of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces and publishing seditious materials. Thibaut Bruttin, the director of Reporters Without Borders, warned that “the court decision underscores the complete collapse of press freedom in Hong Kong”.
On 10 February, the European Parliament approved the amendments to the ‘safe third country’ concept in the EU Asylum Procedures Regulation and adopted an EU-wide list of “safe countries of origin”, making it easier for member states to reject asylum applications as inadmissible and to forcibly transfer people seeking safety to countries to which they have no connection. The new rules also remove the suspensive effect of appeals in asylum cases, meaning that a person could be removed while waiting for determination of their claim and any judicial review.
On Friday, the High Court ruled that the former home secretary Yvette Cooper had acted unlawfully when banning Palestine Action last year, under the Terrorism Act 2000. The Court concluded that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was “disproportionate” [138].
The judicial review proceedings were brought by Huda Ammori, Palestine Action’s co-founder.
The Court upheld the claimant’s challenge that the proscription breached the rights of freedom of expression and assembly as guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. The Court found that the offences under the Terroism Act 2000 “comprise a very significant interference with the right to free speech”. For example, a person cannot address a meeting to encourage support for Palestine Action [106]. The Court also concluded that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action had resulted in a “stark” interference with Article 11 rights, since the purpose of proscription is to put measures in place that prevent the organisation from continuing to exist [135].
Additionally, the Court concluded that the Home Secretary failed to properly apply her policy on the use of the discretion to proscribe [89 – 95]. The policy required the Home Secretary to approach the exercise of her discretion comprehensively, taking into account the consequences on Palestine Action members, the characteristics of the organisation, foreign policy and “other factors” [74]. Instead, the Home Secretary presented the “significant disruptive benefits” to “deal with” Palestine Action as a central reason for exercising the discretion to proscribe [89]. The Court clarified that Home Secretary’s policy did not include the expected significant disruptive benefits of proscription as a relevant consideration [90].
According to evidence submitted by the claimant, there have been many arrests since proscription referring to Palestine Action, including more than 2,000 people at protests immediately following the proscription decision [118].
In a statement after the judgement, the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, said the government intends to appeal the decision.
The High Court ruled that Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 (IMA) is “likely to have a more muted practical impact” [168]. The Court clarified for the first time that the right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR constrains the effect of IMA on the judicial oversight of immigration detention decisions.
The case stemmed from a claim alleging the unlawful detention of MXV, a Zimbabwean national, who was held under immigration powers for 101 days from 11 March 2024.
Section 12 of the IMA sought to “overturn” the Court’s role as primary decision maker when it comes to assessing limbs (ii) and (iii) of the Hardial Singh principles, which relate to the reasonableness of the period of detention and whether deportation can be effected within such a reasonable period. Instead, Section 12 requires the Court to assess whether the Secretary of State’s decision about the period was a reasonable assessment.
The Court ruled that Parliament had expressly restricted judicial oversight and Section 12 should be followed [166]. However, compliance with Article 5(1)(f) ECHR requires the Court to retain its role as primary decision maker. The Court confirmed that Article 5(1)(f) ECHR “mirrors” the domestic application of the Hardial Singh principles [144] and, where Article 5 is relied upon, the Court remains able, as primary decision maker, to assess the reasonableness of detention.
The court found that the detention of MXV was unlawful in the period from 1 June 2024 to 19 June 2024.
On the UKHRB
Dr Lewis Graham considers the potential far-reaching effects in Hall v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 124 (TC), where the First-Tier Tribunal ruled that it had the jurisdiction to consider public law grounds, despite the tribunal having no inherent public law jurisdiction.
Rosalind English explores the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dairy UK Ltd v Oatly AB UKSC 4, in which the Court held that Oatly’s registered trade mark “POST MILK GENERATION” cannot lawfully be used in relation to their oat-based food and drink products.
Rosalind English also reviews a letter about animal welfare from The Animal Law Foundation and the League against Cruel Sports, that was presented to the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs last week.
Seton v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55287/10, 31 March 2016 – read judgment.
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has held that the use of telephone recordings as evidence in a criminal trial, despite the inability of the accused to challenge the caller, did not violate his rights under Article 6, ECHR. This judgment follows a number of Grand Chamber judgments on similar issues that have altered the ECtHR’s stance on the subject of absent witness evidence.
by Fraser Simpson
Background
The applicant, Mr Seton, was on trial for murder. Prior to the trial, he submitted a defence statement stating that he believed that the murder had been carried out by Mr Pearman. The applicant alleged that he had previously been involved in a drug deal with Mr Pearman and the victim.
Mr Pearman, who was at the time imprisoned for drug dealing, was interviewed by the police but he refused to cooperate and answered “no comment” to all questions. Following these interviews, Mr Pearman phoned his wife and son from the prison and stated that he had never heard of the applicant and had no knowledge of the murder. These calls were recorded – a standard practice that Mr Pearman would have been aware of.
During the applicant’s trial for murder, it was accepted that the primary issue to be determined by the jury was whether the applicant or Mr Pearman had committed the murder. Mr Pearman had refused to attend the trial or make a formal witness statement. Accordingly, the prosecution sought to rely upon these recordings to disprove the applicant’s version of events. The trial judge, in deciding whether the recordings could be admitted as evidence, referred to s.114, Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“CJA 2003″). After considering the relevant considerations – such as the probative value of the evidence, whether it was self-serving, the reliability of the recording, and the prejudice that the applicant would face if it were to be admitted – the judge decided that the recordings could be relied upon during the trial. In summing up, the trial judge outlined the limitations of the telephone recordings and stated that it was up to the jury, in light of these limitations, to decide the relevant weight to be attached to the recordings. The applicant was subsequently convicted by the jury and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The applicant unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal (see, Seton v. R., [2010] EWCA Crim 450). The Court of Appeal considered that compelling Mr Pearman to attend the trial, which was an option, would have “been a fruitless exercise”. Mr Pearman could have invoked the protection against self-incrimination and had consistently refused to cooperate so the “prospect of any sensible evidence being given by him was, on a realistic view, nil” (paragraph 22 of Court of Appeal judgment). The Court of Appeal would only interfere with the trial judge’s decision if the decision was “marred by legal error, or by a failure to take relevant matters into account or it is such that the judge could not sensibly have made”. The Court of Appeal held that the relevant consideration under s.114(2), CJA 2003 had been covered by the trial judge and there were no other grounds to overturn the conviction.
Further, the Court of Appeal commented on the safety of the conviction. Due to the “overwhelming” evidence against the applicant, including eye-witness accounts, telephone call records between the applicant and the victim and cell site location evidence placing the applicant in the vicinity of the murder, the conviction was deemed to be safe.
The Strasbourg Court
The applicant applied to the European Court of Human Rights and alleged that his right to a fair trial within Article 6(1) and 6(3)(d) had been violated. Article 6(1) includes the right to a fair hearing when facing criminal charges whilst Article 6(3)(d) ensures that the individual has the right:
“to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him”
The default position is that witness evidence should be provided during the trial and the accused should have the opportunity to challenge this evidence during this trial. However, the use of witness evidence when the witness does not attend the trial does not automatically result in a violation of Article 6(1) and 6(3)(d). The Grand Chamber has previously set out specific guidance in assessing whether the use of such evidence complies with Article 6. In Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom (GC), Application nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 15 December 2011 (see paragraphs 118-151), the Grand Chamber outlined a general three-part process:
Consider whether good reasons exist for the absence of the witness.
Consider whether the evidence was the “sole or decisive” decisive evidence against the accused.
Assess the existence of sufficient counterbalancing factors and procedural safeguards which allow the reliability of the evidence to be fairly and properly tested.
This process was clarified in Schatschaschwili v. Germany (GC), Application no. 9154/10, 15 December 2015. The Grand Chamber stated that the lack of good reasons for lack of attendance was not sufficient to result in a violation of Article 6, but it was a strong factor to be considered when assessing the overall fairness of the proceedings (paragraph 113). Additionally, the necessary extent of counterbalancing factors depends upon the weight of the evidence provided by the absent witness in the overall context of the proceedings (paragraph 116).
Were there good reasons for the non-attendance of Mr Pearman? (paragraphs 61-62)
The ECtHR has previously adopted a robust approach to assessing whether “good reasons” existed for the absence of the witness at the trial. Previously, even in situations where the witness was located in another country (Gabrielyan v. Armenia, Application no. 8088/05, 10 April 2012), or could not be located at all (Lučić v. Croatia, Application no. 5699/11, 27 February 2014), the ECtHR have held that the authorities have failed to satisfy their duty to secure attendance of the witness. In light of this, the ECtHR unsurprisingly concluded that no good reasons existed for Mr Pearman being absent from the trial. The trial court could have compelled Mr Pearman to attend the trial and whilst they could not compel him to give evidence, due to his right to silence, the jury would have at least been able to assess his demeanour when facing cross-examination.
Was the evidence of Mr Pearman the “sole or decisive” evidence? (Paragraphs 63-64)
The ECtHR considered that the recorded telephone calls could not be considered the “sole or decisive” evidence in the criminal trial. The Court of Appeal, in commenting on the safeness of the conviction, had listed the other “overwhelming” evidence against the applicant. However, the evidence had been described as “important” by the trial judge. Accordingly, following the Grand Chamber decision in Schatschaschwili, it was necessary to consider whether sufficient counterbalancing factors existed during the trial.
Did sufficient counterbalancing factors exist? (Paragraphs 65-68)
In the present case, the ECtHR highlighted the detailed legislative scheme intended to ensure that evidence from the absent witness could only be relied upon in limited circumstances. The need to assess the significance of the evidence, its reliability, and the prejudice that the applicant would face as a result of being unable to challenge the witness was an important procedural safeguard intended to uphold respect for the applicant’s rights. Additionally, the instruction of the judge as to the limitations of the evidence was another important counterbalancing factor.
As clarified by the Grand Chamber in Schatschaschwili, the assessment of counterbalancing factors is a relative one – fewer factors will be required if the evidence provided by the absent witness is not especially important. In light of the existence of separate “overwhelming” evidence against the accused, the counterbalancing factors in the present case were considered sufficient.
In conclusion, the ECtHR decided that the criminal proceedings as a whole had been fair. Having following the procedure outlined in Al-Khawaja, the ECtHR concluded that there had been no violation of Article 6.
Comment
This decision of the ECtHR is the consequence of previous Grand Chamber decisions tending to dilute the procedural protections contained within Article 6(3). The right to examine witnesses has slowly been weakened in favour of a more holistic approach that focusses upon the overall fairness of the proceedings instead of potential individual deficiencies.
When considering the three part test in Al-Khawaja, the first step – whether good reasons existed for the non-attendance of the witness – was previously considered determinative. If no good reasons existed, then Article 6 had been violated. Such a stance has even been adopted by the ECtHR following the judgment in Al-Khawaja and only months before the decision in Schatschaschwili (see Karpyuk and Others v. Ukraine, Application nos. 30582/04 and 32152/04, 6 October 2015, paragraph 123). Additionally, if such good reasons did exist but the evidence was the “sole or decisive” evidence in the case, then Article 6 had also been violated (Saïdi v. France, Application no. 14647/89, 20 September 1993, paragraph 44). Now, the position is that these considerations are merely factors that can be balanced away.
But the balancing process places an undue weight upon the existence of other incriminating evidence against the accused. The position appears to be that it is more acceptable to deny the accused the right to cross-examine a witness if the prosecution’s case against him/her is strong. This move towards focussing on the accuracy of the verdict, as opposed to upholding the rights of individuals, is a potentially worrying development. Indeed, the contemporary Strasbourg position appears, in effect, similar to the Court of Appeal’s consideration of the safety of the conviction.
It could be argued that the ECtHR may be surrendering its role as an upholder of fundamental human rights and moving towards that of an international criminal appeal court.
A, R (o.t.a A) v. Chief Constable of B Constabulary [2012] EWCA 2141 (Admin), Kenneth Parker J, 26 July 2012, read judgment
The public/private divide still gets lawyers excited, even in an Olympic summer, and for good reason – my image is simply to cool the fevered brow of those fresh from the stadium or the beach. Now for the problem met head on in this case. Generally speaking, parties to a contract may treat the others how they please, as long as that treatment does not offend the terms of the contract or specific consumer protection rules. But, equally generally, a public body is obliged to treat others in accordance with public law rules of fairness, and can challenge unfairness by judicial review. And this case is a good example of the intersection between these principles.
A had run a breakdown recovery service for the police for some years. The police then interposed a main contractor, FMG, who awarded the contract to A for the continuation of the job, now as a subcontractor. But the sub-contract, understandably enough, provided that its award was subject to vetting by the police. And the police then refused to give A clearance. Why? The police would not say, even when A threatened proceedings. And they said that they did not have to. Their line in court was that it was all governed by the contract, and the courts had no business in poking its nose into their reasoning – in the jargon, it was non-justiciable. They relented to some extent in the course of the proceedings, by giving some information, but still said that they were not obliged to do so.
Procedural fairness is a bit like an elephant. It is difficult to define in abstract, but you know a fair procedure when you see one. So Lawton LJ put it in Maxwell v Department of Trade [1974] QB 523, 539
The trouble is it seems that different courts have different ideas of “elephantness”. Since we know that fairness is a necessarily context-sensitive notion, this, in itself, does not seem to give rise to too much difficulty. But practical problems start to arise when, for example, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) starts to endorse a view of fairness that is binding on the UK courts, but at odds with the approach taken by the UK Supreme Court. Add the facts that a) the UK is required to take into account the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which seems to have a different conception of fairness to that of the CJEU and b) the UK courts themselves do not necessarily speak with one voice, there’s a heady mix.
This brief post attempts to survey the area, and to discern the bumps in the road. Smoothing them out is another challenge in itself, and will probably require more than filling in the odd pot-hole. Continue reading →
Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your regular airport departure board of human rights news and views. The full list of links can be found here. You can find previous roundups here. Post by Sarina Kidd, edited and links compiled by Adam Wagner.
This week the Conservative Party Conference is likely to generate human rights headlines. Meanwhile, previous controversies still bubble away. Chris Grayling, taking a break from legal aid cuts, offered his opinion on the Europe debate. Meanwhile, others considered the role of transparency, demeanour, religious freedom and niqabs in the courts, and, with the proposed smoking ban in prisons, smokers may have found another reason not to break the law.
R (QSA and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept and Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWHC 407 (Admin) – read judgment
The High Court ruled on 2nd March 2018 that three women forced into prostitution as teenagers will no longer have to disclose related convictions to potential employers.
The claimants challenged the criminal record disclosure scheme which required them to reveal details of multiple decades-old convictions for ‘loitering or soliciting’ for the purposes of prostitution.
The women had been groomed, coerced or forced into sex work, two of them when they were children. They were required to divulge their convictions under the regime of the DBS (Disclosure and Barring Service) governed by Part V of the Police Act 1997. DBS checks (previously CRB checks) are made when an applicant seeks certain paid or voluntary work involving children or vulnerable adults. While the claimants weren’t strictly barred from such jobs, they had to inform would-be employers of their historical convictions. They said this placed them at an unfair disadvantage, caused embarrassment and put them off applying in the first place. They argued that this interference with their private and working lives was unjustified by the scheme’s aims and unlawful. The Court agreed.
Last week’s decision of the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v Hodges has been lauded across the world as a quantum leap for equality and human rights – “a victory for America”, according to President Obama. The Court held by a 5-4 majority that, pursuant to the 14th Amendment, same-sex couples across the United States have a constitutional right to marry. You can read my colleague Matthew Flinn’s analysis of the ruling here. Continue reading →
Omar & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2012] EWHC 1737 (Admin) (26 June 2012) – read judgment
The Divisional Court has ruled that common law principles cannot be used to obtain evidence from the Foreign Secretary for use in a foreign court.
Angus McCullough QC of 1 Crown Office Row appeared as a special advocate in the closed proceedings in this case. He is not the author of this post.
“Norwich Pharmacal” orders are sometimes granted to obtain information from third parties to help the court establish whether unlawful conduct has taken place. A court can in such a case compel the third party to assist the person suffering damage by giving them that information. In the cases of Binyan Mohamad and Shakar Aamer the courts extended the application of these orders to foreign cases. Now it appears that both may have been wrongly decided.
WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA 2339 (22 October 2018) – read judgment
The Court of Appeal has ruled that the supermarket chain was vicariously liable for one of its employees’ unlawful disclosure of personal data belonging to other employees even though this act took place away from the workplace and the was part of a sequence of planned events leading to the commission of this wrongdoing.
The central issue before the Court was whether an employer is liable in damages to those of its current or former employees whose personal and confidential information has been misused by being disclosed on the web by the criminal act of another employee, who had a grudge against the employer, in breach of the Data Protection Act 1998, and in breach of that employee’s obligation of confidence. The Court held that it did; the common law remedy of vicarious liability of an employer for its employee’s misuse of private information and breach of confidence was not expressly or impliedly excluded by the Data Protection Act 1998, notwithstanding that the Act itself excluded an employer’s liability for wrongful processing of personal data by an employee. Continue reading →
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has voted to reopen its monitoring of Turkey on account of its “serious concerns” regarding respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law there. This will have come as a blow to Turkey; the country has been involved in “post-monitoring dialogue” with the Assembly since 2004 and had high hopes for its negotiations this year to join the EU.
What prompted this?
In the wake of the failed coup attempt last July there have been growing concerns over human rights abuses in Turkey. The vote was prompted in particular by a report from Ingebjørg Godskesen and Marianne Mikko, who are part of the Monitoring Committee and have been co-rapporteurs for the post-monitoring dialogue with the country. Since the coup, Turkey has declared a state of emergency and made large-scale use of decree laws (which bypass parliamentary procedures). While the Monitoring Committee recognised the ongoing trauma and terrorist threats following the coup, it nevertheless registered concern over the large-scale and disproportionate implementation of such measures.
The Lord Chief Justicehas announced the appointment of Mr Justice Tugendhat as Judge in charge of the Jury and Non-Jury Lists with effect from 1 October 2010. This makes him the senior ‘media judge’ in England and Wales, and he will play an important role in balancing rights to privacy against freedom of expression.
The Jury and Non-Jury lists contains general civil law, including defamation and privacy. The Judge in charge has responsibility for managing the work in the lists and assigning judges to cases.
Bancoult v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Divisional Court, Richards LJ and Mitting J, 11 June 2013 read judgment
The Divisional Court has now dismissed the claim by Mr Bancoult on behalf of the Chagossian islanders. He had challenged the designation of the waters around the islands as a “no take” Marine Protected Area, i.e. one which could not be fished.
Mr Bancoult said that the decision was flawed (i) by having an improper purpose (it would put paid to the Chagossians’ claims for resettlement); (ii) by inadequate consultation and (iii) by amounting to a breach of an EU obligation to promote the economic and social development of the islands. The Court ruled against all these claims.
The case has, to say the least, quite a back-story. It started with the Chagossians’ eviction from their islands in the Indian Ocean in the late 1960s and early 1970s, on which I have posted here, here, and, in Strasbourg, here. After a judgment from the courts in 2000, the Foreign Office accepted that the original law underlying their departure was unlawful, and agreed to investigate their possible resettlement on some of their islands.
The Prime Minister’s recent decision to delay plans to lift coronavirus restrictions by a month has been met with criticism among some legal commentators. The removal of restrictions is now due to take place on 19 July, instead of 21 June. The new deadline was described by the PM as a “terminus date” after which we must “learn to live with Covid”.
In his announcement, the Prime Minister cited the spread of the highly transmissible Delta variant, which now accounts for more than 90% of cases in the UK, and promised to use the extra time to accelerate the vaccination programme. New analysis by Public Health England shows for the first time that two doses are highly effective against hospitalisation from the variant. More than half of UK adults have had their second jab, including 91% of people over 50, and people as young as 18 will be invited to book a jab from the end of the week.
Former Supreme Court Justice Lord Sumption, a prominent critic of the government’s lockdown measures, called the continued lockdown “wicked” and raised the “extreme example” of “Nazi race laws” in arguing that there was no moral obligation to comply with certain laws. In response, barrister Adam Wagner quipped that Lord Sumption’s comments represented “the best case for his own argument that judges should not get involved in politics.”
Elsewhere, however, Wagner acknowledged that the courts have been reluctant to intervene with Covid restrictions, but suggested that at this stage a legal challenge to a refusal to allow a business such as a nightclub to open to double vaccinated customers might be effective. Wagner suggested that “the continued closure of a small number of businesses when the balancing factors have radically changed due to vaccination” might engage Article 1 of protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires any interference with the ‘peaceful enjoyment of property’ to be proportionate. The delay is predicted to cost UK hospitality £3bn in lost sales and have a “critical impact on struggling businesses.
The announcement was widely anticipated and the public response has been understated. However, it remains to be seen whether the midsummer “terminus date” will truly put lockdowns behind us once we enter the darker, colder months of this pandemic’s second year.
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Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your regular airport departure board of human rights news and views. The full list of links can be found 
WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA 2339 (22 October 2018) – 
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