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UK Human Rights Blog - 1 Crown Office Row
Search Results for: prisoners/page/23/ministers have been procrastinating on the issue, fearing that it will prove unpopular with the electorate.
NHS Trust v Y (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) and Others, Supreme Court 30 July 2018 – read judgment
The question for the Court was a simple but important one: whether the permission of a court was always required by law before doctors could withdraw feeding from a person in a persistent vegetative state.
Background
The patient at the heart of this case, known only as Y, had been an active man in his 50s before suffering a cardiac arrest which led to severe brain damage. He never regained consciousness and needed to be fed through a tube (known technically as “clinically assisted nutrition and hydration” or “CANH”) to stay alive.
Doctors had determined that Y was suffering from a “prolonged disorder of consciousness”known as “PDOC”.PDOC covers those who are in a persistent vegetative state and also those in a minimally conscious state, what we might informally call a coma. Continue reading →
Delaney v. Secretary of State for Transport, Jay J, 3 June 2014 – read judgment
Many readers may be wondering how it comes about that a drug-dealer is entitled to compensation against Her Majesty’s Government in circumstances where he was injured during the course of a criminal joint enterprise. The understandable reaction might be: there must be some rule of public policy, reflecting public revulsion, which bars such a claim. The short answer is that there is not.
Well put by the judge. Because as well as being the innocent victim of bad driving, the Claimant happened to have 240g of cannabis on him, and the negligent driver was found to have a smaller quantity. We are back in the familiar territory of ascertaining and applying a rule of law designed to compensate the injured without letting any free-floating moral disapproval get in the way of deciding what that law is. If, by contrast, you feel like a good dose of outrage, just click here for a link to a certain tabloid well-versed in all that.
The problem for the Secretary of State for Transport was, as the judge found, European Law required victims to be compensated in the circumstances, even if the driver’s insurance did not cover the claim. And there was no warrant for a domestic rule preventing such liabilities being paid by the Motor Insurers Bureau (MIB) or insurers whose job it was to provide compensation in accordance with European law.The judge therefore awarded Francovich damages (see below) against the UK for its breach in not conforming to EU law.
The post below was originally published on the Administrative Court Blog, of which its author, Dr Lewis Graham, is an editor. It is republished here with the Dr Graham’s permission.
The First-tier Tribunal had delivered a ruling in which it has allowed a claimant to challenge the imposition of a liability order on public law grounds, despite the jurisdiction for this not being set out explicitly in the relevant statute. The decision does not set a precedent, and strictly involves a narrow point of construction relating to the Finance Act. However, its reasoning, if approved or adopted on appeal, may have significant ramifications for claimants wishing to rely on public law grounds before tribunal appeals more generally. The case is Hall v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 124 (TC) (13 January 2026).
The claimant, Hall, was issued a Joint and Several Liability Notice (JSLN) and sought to appeal it before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). He wished to challenge the notice on five grounds. It was undisputed that the tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the first two grounds (whether the prerequisite conditions were met, and whether the notice was necessary for the protection of revenue, respectively). However, HMRC disputed the tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider Grounds 3 to 5 (relating to the proportionality of the measure, the rationality of the measure, and a failure to follow relevant guidance) and applied for these grounds to be struck out, under rule 8(2) Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The question for the tribunal was, therefore, whether it did have the jurisdiction to consider these – public law – grounds.
R (Tigere) v. Secretary of State for Business [2015] UKSC 57, 29 July 2015 read judgment here
Ms Tigere is 20. She arrived in the UK from Zambia when she was 6. She did very well at school. In 2013, she applied for a student loan to fund a university place.
The current English system does not allow her to apply for a loan, because of her immigration status. In particular, she did not
(1) have Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) here (and so did not comply with the “settlement rule”), and
(2) have three years of “lawful” ordinary residence here (so did not comply with “the residence rule”).
In a very close run thing, the Supreme Court decided that the application of the settlement rule was incompatible with her Convention rights, under Article 2 of the First Protocol and/or Article 14. By contrast, the residence rule was not incompatible with her rights.
The result was 3-2, and Lord Hughes (of the majority) disagreed with important elements of the reasoning of Lady Hale and Lord Kerr who found for Ms Tigere.
The case is a perfect example of the difficulties of deciding human rights cases in the context of social benefits, as we shall see.
At present, the lockdown continues. Image: The Guardian
Previously on this blog we published Francis Hoar’s article which argued that the Coronavirus Regulations passed by the Government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic involve breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In the first of two response articles, Leo Davidson argued that the Regulations do not involve any breach of human rights law, as they fall within the executive’s margin of discretion for the management of this crisis.
In this article, Dominic Ruck Keeneand Henry Tufnell argue that the challengers to the legislation have not shown that the measures adopted by theGovernment are disproportionate in the circumstances of the pandemic.
This is a summary of a paper published here and inevitably simplifies the detailed arguments and considerations within it. The article represents the views of the authors alone.
Note:This post involves examination of the legal provisions that accompany the restrictions on movement of individuals announced by the Government. Legal scrutiny is important but should not be taken to question the requirement to follow the Regulations.
Introduction
The inevitable has finally happened – a letter before action has been sent to the Health Secretary challenging the legality of the various restrictions that cumulatively make up the current Covid-19 lockdown within the UK through the mechanism of the Health Protection (Coronavirus) (England) Regulations 2020 (as amended) (‘the Regulations‘). The letter before action builds on the opinions previously outlined by Francis Hoar both on the UK Human Rights Blog and in a previous paper concerning the compatibility of the ‘lockdown’ with the ECHR. This post seeks to develop Leo Davidson’s earlier analysis of those arguments.
Here, we make the argument that there has not been a breach of all or any of the relevant ECHR rights, namely Articles 5 (right to liberty), 8 (right to private and family life), 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), 11 (freedom of assembly and association) and 14 (prohibition on discrimination) and by Articles 1 (protection of property) and 2 (right to an education) of Protocol 1. Further, that there is in fact no deprivation of liberty under Article 5.
On 2 May, a draft majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States was leaked, suggesting that the court has voted to strike down the landmark decision of Roe v Wade and sparking widespread anger. In the opinion, Justice Samuel Alito states that “Roe was egregiously wrong from the start” and that “it is time to heed the Constitution and return the issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives.” This is the first time in history that a draft decision has been disclosed publicly while a case was still pending. On 3 May, Chief Justice John Roberts confirmed the authenticity of the decision, which would remove federal constitutional protection of abortion rights and leave the decision in the hands of each state.
Under a new pilot scheme, victims could have the right to attend full Parole Board hearings from as early as next month. The Parole Board will also be required to take into account victims’ submissions and victims will be allowed to ask questions. Currently, victims can ask to read a statement in person but are not allowed to hear the rest of the evidence.
Police are investigating a gathering attended by Sir Keir Starmer and Angela Rayner in April 2021. Having initially decided to take no action, Durham Constabulary has now begun conducting an investigation into potential breaches of Covid-19 regulations in light of “significant new information”. Durham Constabulary had previously stated that it had a policy against retrospective Covid fines, after allegations of lockdown breaches by Dominic Cummings.
On 4 May, foreign secretary Liz Truss announced in a press release that there will be a ban on services exports to Russia, covering services such as accountancy, consultancy and PR advice. Lawyers, however, will still be able to service Russian clients.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
Credit: The Guardian
In the News:
The Government has announced that civil partnerships will be available to all couples, not just those which are same-sex. The government has said the move will address the “imbalance” of the current system. It will also provide a way of giving couples and their families greater security.
Concerns have previously been raised about the precarious state of cohabiting couples, many of whom incorrectly believe they possess similar rights to married couples. Widening access to civil partnerships may go some way to solving this issue.
Civil partnerships were originally created in 2004, and offer homosexual couples legal and financial benefits resembling those available under a marriage. Marriage for same-sex couples was subsequently legalised by the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, giving them a free choice between the two.
The proposed change comes in response to R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for International Development, which was decided by the Supreme Court in June. There, the court ruled that precluding mixed-sex couples from entering into a civil partnership was incompatible with Article 14 ECHR (when read in conjunction with Article 8). The Civil Partnership Act 2004 will, therefore, need to be amended or replaced. Continue reading →
Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your weekly bulletin of human rights news. The full list of links can be found here. You can also find our previous roundups here.
by Daniel Isenberg
A relatively quiet news-week in the world of human rights, with judges and politicians having (in some cases) a well-earned break. Same-sex marriage managed to remain in the headlines with High Court Judge, Sir Paul Coleridge, saying it was a ‘minority issue’. Looking back over the past few weeks there has been some recent interesting commentary on the European Court of Human Rights’ decision against Macedonia; as well as the domestic High Court’s ruling on Scientology. Finally, a pair of articles on the historical and recent relationship between Jews and human rights.
You may also notice that the UK Human Rights Blog has a slightly refreshed design – please do send us your comments if you have any. If you are looking for some new year’s reading, why not try:
Yesterday, the Divisional Court (Lewis LJ and Swift J) held that, in principle, the relocation of asylum seekers to Rwanda was consistent with the Refugee Convention and other legal obligations on the government, including those imposed by the Human Rights Act 1998. However, the Court also held that Home Secretary had failed to properly consider the circumstances of eight individual claimants to decide whether there was anything which meant that their asylum claim should be determined in the UK or they should not be relocated to Rwanda. Therefore, the decisions in those cases were set aside and referred back to the Home Secretary for her to consider afresh.
The Court’s judgment is detailed and addresses a number of issues. In this post, the focus will be on the general challenge made to removal to Rwanda in principle and what can be expected in the (likely) event that this aspect of the case is appealed further.
R (ota Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, 24 June 2015 (see judgment)
The Supreme Court has reminded us, in a tour de forceby Lord Reed, that there is no such thing as one-stop proportionality. It varies between ECHR and EU law, and the tests of EU proportionality then vary according to the nature of the EU issue in play.
And all this in a case about trying to improve standards for barristers’ advocacy.
Barristers challenged the Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates or QASA, on EU grounds. QASA requires barristers in the criminal courts to be assessed by judges before they are allowed to take on certain categories of cases.
AT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 42 – Read Judgment
The Court of Appeal has upheld a challenge to a control order on the basis that the person subject to the order (‘the controllee’) had not been given sufficient information about the case against him.
The focus of this blog post is on yet another challenge to the imposition of a control order. Introduced by the Labour government in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, a control order is a controversial tool used to restrict and monitor suspected terrorists. They have now been superseded by Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (or “TPIMs”, described by some critics as “control orders lite”), which will in due course have their time in the legal spotlight. For now, there remain a small number of cases brought under the old control orders regime which are being determined. As this decision demonstrates, even their consignment to history has not shielded them from careful judicial scrutiny.
The applicant, VM, entered the UK illegally on 18 November 2003 with her son (S). Soon after, her son became the subject of an interim care order and the applicant was charged with child cruelty under the relevant legislation. Following an unsuccessful application for asylum due to fears for her life back in Nigeria, VM pleaded guilty to the child cruelty charges in August 2004. However, following the granting of bail pending the next hearing in February 2005, VM absconded for a period of over two years.
In September 2007 the applicant was again arrested, this time on charges relating to possession of false documentation with intent to commit fraud. Following conviction she was sentenced to nine months in prison. The applicant was also eventually convicted of the child cruelty charges in April 2008. Before sentencing, a psychological report was produced that indicated the applicant suffered from depressive and psychotic symptoms. However, such symptoms were being adequately managed through therapy and medication. Accordingly, there was no need to consider specialised treatment in a hospital or prison healthcare wing under the Mental Health Act 1983. The applicant was therefore sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, with an additional three months due to the failure to surrender to bail, in July 2008. At this point, due to the severity of the offences, the domestic judge recommended that the applicant be deported. Continue reading →
The Terms of Reference and the Protocol for the Government’s impending Detainee Inquiry have recently been published. The Protocol makes clear that the Inquiry is to be granted unfettered access to a broad range of information, but the limitations on the publication of that information have prompted criticism from human rights groups.
On 6th July 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron announced to the House of Commons that an independent inquiry would be held into whether or not the UK Government was implicated in or aware of the improper treatment of detainees held by other countries in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks. On the same day, he wrote to Sir Peter Gibson inviting him to lead the inquiry, and appointed as his fellow panel members Dame Janet Paraskeva and Peter Riddell. Philippa Whipple QC of 1 Crown Office Row has been appointed as counsel to the inquiry – she is not the writer of this post.
A detailed summary of the issues and the facts in this case can be found in the Supreme Court’s Press Release. The report below gives a very short account of these followed by a focus on the majority and dissenting judgments. I quote Lord Sales in some detail as the concerns expressed in his dissent will only prevail if Parliament were to legislate for them to do so.
Legal and factual background
In December 2018, the second respondent, Horse Hill Developments Ltd, sought planning permission from the first respondent, Surrey County Council (“the Council”), to retain and expand an existing onshore oil well site and to drill for four new wells, enabling the production of hydrocarbons from six wells over a period of 25 years. The environmental impact assessment for the project had to be carried out under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 (which implemented the Directive 2011/92 EU).
The Council considered the environmental impacts of “the direct releases of greenhouse gases from with the well site boundary resulting from the site’s construction, production, decommissioning and subsequent restoration over the lifetime of the proposed development.” However, it did not assess the environmental impacts of the downstream greenhouse gas emissions that would inevitably result when the oil extracted from the development site was later refined and then used, for example, as fuel. The developer argued that, as regards the impact of the project on climate, the scope of the EIA should be confined to the direct releases of greenhouse gases from within the well site boundary during the lifetime of the project; and that the EIA need not include an assessment of the greenhouse gas emissions that would occur when the oil extracted from the wells was ultimately burnt elsewhere as fuel. The council accepted this approach and granted planning permission for the development on 27 September 2019. The appellant, acting on behalf of a local action group, applied for judicial review of the Council’s decision. Her claim was unsuccessful before the High Court and the Court of Appeal. This was her appeal to the Supreme Court
The question that the Court had to decide was this. Was it unlawful for the Council not to require the environmental impact assessment for a project of crude oil extraction for commercial purposes to include an assessment of the impacts of downstream greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the eventual use of the refined products of the extracted oil?
Poshteh v Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea S [2017] UKSC 36, 10 May 2017 – read judgment
For the last 15 years, whether the right of the homeless to suitable council accommodation is an Art.6(1) ECHR civil right has been argued over in the courts. And the question arose again in today’s judgment of the Supreme Court.
Ms Poshteh had been imprisoned and tortured in Iran, and asked her local council in London to house her as she was homeless in the UK. She then rejected the offer of a flat because she said its windows reminded her of those in her Iranian prison cell. This rejection was held fatal to her housing claim, as we shall see.
To understand the Art.6 point, we need to have a quick look at the council’s housing duties for the homeless.
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NHS Trust v Y (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) and Others, Supreme Court 30 July 2018 – read judgment
AT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 42 – 
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