Search Results for: environmental/page/17/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)

Quantifying Damages for Breach of Privacy

25 October 2016 by Gideon Barth

TLT and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 2217 (QB)

How do you quantify damages for data breaches? Is the distress caused by an accidental data breach comparable to phone-hacking? Should damages for distress be equivalent to damages for psychiatric injuries?

In October 2013, the Home Office published statistics on its family returns process, the means by which children with no right to remain in the UK are sent back to their country of origin. In addition to anonymised statistics uploaded onto the government website, the Home Office mistakenly uploaded the spreadsheet of raw data on which those statistics were based. That spreadsheet included personal details such as names and rough geographical locations of applicants for asylum or leave to remain, though not their addresses. The data was online for 13 days before being removed, but a number of IP addresses in the UK and abroad visited the relevant web page.  Those concerned were notified, and brought claims under the Data Protection Act 1998 and the common law tort of misuse of private information.

As far as privacy breaches go, this appears less sinister than having the contents of your private telephone conversations splashed across the front pages. But consider the effect on these individuals at a time when their residence status is uncertain. Taking one example, an Iranian man – referred to as TLT – had applied for leave to remain with his family. They had been told that a member of their family had been detained in Iran and questioned about them. They reasonably believed that the Iranian authorities would have looked at the published details and, as a result, they feared for their lives if they were returned to Iran, their security in the UK and their extended family in Iran. A significant issue is how to quantify ‘distress’ of that nature for the purposes of claims brought.

Judgment

It was not in dispute that the inadvertent publication of the information constituted misuse of private information and a breach of the first, second and seventh principles of the Data Protection Act. Neither was it in dispute that, following the Court of Appeal decision in Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311, a claimant can recover damages for ‘distress’ for such a breach.

But Mitting J’s judgment is interesting for two reasons. First, it tackled four questions which will provide guidance for similar claims in the future. Secondly, and perhaps more controversially, he considered the quantification of damages for individual breaches in this new and developing area of law.

1. Can individuals who were not named in the data, but who were identifiable as family members, recover?

Simply, yes. Given that the data related to family asylum or leave to remain applications, Mitting J found that anyone with knowledge of the family would be able to identify the children and other family members from the lead applicant.

2. Is there a level of distress which is below the threshold for the recovery of damages?

Again, and perhaps unsurprisingly, yes: the de minimis threshold which applies in personal injury cases also applies to data breaches.

3. Should the courts take guidance from the damages awards in the phone-hacking cases – or, as Mitting J referred to them, “cases involving deliberate dissemination for gain by media publishers or individuals engaged in that trade, such as Max Clifford” [16]?

Without going into any detail, this idea was dismissed by Mitting J. The distress described by the claimants was comparable to a psychiatric injury suffered as a result of an actionable wrong.

4. Can you recover damages for the loss of the right to control private information?

Yes – a claimant can recover for the loss of control of personal and confidential information but there is no separate and additional award. Rather, the judge takes it into account when making an award for distress.

Damages awards and Gulati

Mitting J made awards ranging from £2,500 to £12,500 for each claimant, using psychiatric and psychological damage cases as guideline comparators after carefully assessing the evidence of the applicants and the distress caused by the data breaches. In Gulati v MGN [2015] EWCA Civ 1291 – one of the phone-hacking cases – the Court of Appeal affirmed the principle that damages for non-pecuniary loss for the misuse of private information should have some “reasonable relationship” with damages for personal injury. Arden LJ explained the reason for this [61]:

“if there is no such consideration or relationship, the reasonable observer may doubt the logic of the law or form the view that the law places a higher value on a person’s right to privacy than it does on (say) a person’s lifelong disability as a result of another’s negligence, and this would bring the law into disrepute and diminish public confidence in the impartiality of the legal system.”

However, this rationale also undermines the very basis on which Mitting J made awards. A claimant in a psychiatric personal injury case must demonstrate that they have suffered a recognised psychiatric injury; simple distress is not sufficient. The awards in TLT take into account the loss of control of private information, but are predominantly awards for distress. None of the individuals were shown to have suffered a recognised psychiatric injury as a consequence of the publication of their details, yet their damages awards were made by comparison to those for recognised and diagnosed psychiatric injury.

In seeking consistency, this judgment sits uncomfortably with psychiatric damage cases. Was Arden LJ’s warning prophetic? If Mitting J’s approach is followed in the future, will the reasonable observer form the view that the law places a higher value on a person’s right to privacy than a lifelong disability?

Oliver Sanders and Michael Deacon of One Crown Office Row acted for the Defendants in this case. This blog post was written independently by Gideon Barth.

Poppy burning, free speech and the £50 question

9 March 2011 by Adam Wagner

Updated | CPS -v- Mohammad Razaul Haque and Emdadur Choudhury – Read judgment

A man has  been found guilty of public order offences for burning poppies and chanting “British soldiers burn in hell” on Remembrance Day. He was fined £50.

The ruling, and in particular the fine, has led to public anger. The Sun called the fine “pathetic” and asked whether Britain is now “deep in a quicksand of political correctness and hand-wringing over human rights“. The Prime Minister has said that we should be “making a stronger statement that that sort of behaviour is completely out of order and has no place in a tolerant society”

The Sun is wrong that Emdadur Choudhury’s low fine had anything to do with human rights; Chief Magistrate Riddle made clear that “invoking the criminal law to interfere with freedom of expression is proportionate“. But two important questions do arise.  First, whether the conviction represents a disproportionate breach of Emdadur Choudhury’s right to freedom of speech. Secondly, if the £50 fine was adequate.

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Supreme Court reverses informed consent ruling: Sidaway is dead

13 March 2015 by David Hart KC

Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, 11 March 2015  – read judgments here

James Badenoch QC of 1COR was for the mother in this case. He played no part in the writing of this post.

An important new decision from a 7-Justice Supreme Court on informed consent in medical cases. 

In the mid-1980s a majority of the House of Lords in Sidaway decided that it was on the whole a matter for doctors to decide how much to tell patients about the risks of treatment, and that therefore you could not sue your doctor in negligence for failing to inform you of a risk if other reasonable doctors would not have informed you of the risk. Thus the principle that the standard of medical care is to be determined by medical evidence (which all lawyers will know as the Bolam principle) was extended to the quality of information to be provided to a patient about a given treatment.

The Supreme Court, reversing the judgments at first instance and on appeal, has now unequivocally said that Sidaway should not be followed.

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Privacy and the peace protestor — an extended look

30 January 2019 by Dominic Ruck Keene

Dominic Ruck Keene is a barrister at One Crown Office Row.

The European Court of Human Rights has held in Catt v The United Kingdom (43514/15))  that that the retention by UK police of information on the Domestic Extremism Database about a 90 year-old activist’s presence at political protests was a breach of his Article 8 ECHR rights. The ruling follows the Supreme Court’s contrasting judgment that such gathering and retention had been lawful and a proportionate interference with Mr Catt’s Article 8 ECHR rights.

Divisional Court upholds Government’s Rwanda policy – an extended look

20 December 2022 by Jonathan Metzer

R ((AAA) Syria and Ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 3230 (Admin)

On 14^th April of this year, the then-Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, announced a new ‘Migration and Economic Development Partnership’ between the UK Government and the Government of Rwanda to enable the removal of certain persons to who enter the UK to claim asylum (particularly those who arrive in small boats crossing the English Channel) to Rwanda, where – if their claims succeeded – they would be resettled.

Yesterday, the Divisional Court (Lewis LJ and Swift J) held that, in principle, the relocation of asylum seekers to Rwanda was consistent with the Refugee Convention and other legal obligations on the government, including those imposed by the Human Rights Act 1998. However, the Court also held that Home Secretary had failed to properly consider the circumstances of eight individual claimants to decide whether there was anything which meant that their asylum claim should be determined in the UK or they should not be relocated to Rwanda. Therefore, the decisions in those cases were set aside and referred back to the Home Secretary for her to consider afresh.

The Court’s judgment is detailed and addresses a number of issues. In this post, the focus will be on the general challenge made to removal to Rwanda in principle and what can be expected in the (likely) event that this aspect of the case is appealed further.

Divisional Court strikes down DRIPA communications data law

19 July 2015 by David Hart KC

R (ota Davis et al) v. Secretary of State for Home Department [2015] EWHC 2092 – 17 July 2015 – read judgment

When a domestic Act of Parliament is in conflict with EU law, EU law wins. And when a bit of the EU Charter (given effect by the Lisbon Treaty) conflicts with an EU Directive, the EU Charter wins.

Which is why the Divisional Court found itself quashing an Act of Parliament on Friday – at the behest of four claimants, including two MPs, the Tories’ David Davis and Labour’s Tom Watson. 

The doomed Act is the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 or DRIPA. It was in conformity with an underlying EU Directive (the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC or DRD – here). However, and prior to DRIPA, the DRD had been invalidated by the EU Court (in the Digital Rights Ireland case here)  because it was in breach of the EU Charter.

All this concerns communications data, which tell us who was sending an email, to whom, from where, and when – but not the content of the email. DRIPA in effect compels telecoms providers to keep communications data for 12 months, and to make it available to public bodies such as intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

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Myanmar’s Compliance with the ICJ Provisional Measures Order & the Road Ahead

3 September 2020 by Guest Contributor

In this article, Prachiti Venkatraman and Ashley Jordana of Global Rights Compliance analyse the case before the International Court of Justice relating to the persecution of the Rohingya people by the Myanmar authorities.

Readers are encouraged to read the previous articles about this topic published on the blog here and here.

To read more about Global Rights Compliance’s work with the Rohingya, please see: https://www.globalrightscompliance.com/en/projects/the-rohingya-accountability-project.

The perilous situation of the Rohingya in Myanmar continues – the recent UN policy brief on Covid-19 in South-East Asia highlighted the compounded effects of the nation’s weak healthcare system and an ongoing armed conflict that targets ethnic communities.

On 11 November 2019, The Gambia filed an Application to commence proceedings against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (‘the Court’). The Application alleged that Myanmar had violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by committing acts intended to destroy in whole or in part the Rohingya community, as well as attempting and conspiring to commit genocide, inciting genocide, being complicit in its commission, and failing to prevent and punish genocide. To demonstrate the validity of these allegations, The Gambia relied on the actions of the Burmese military (‘the Tatmadaw’) and individuals connected to the State of Myanmar during the ‘clearance operations’ in 2016 and 2017 which led to the mass murder, sexual violence, and destruction of Rohingya villages in Rakhine state.

Capacity to engage in sexual relations: the relevance of the partner’s consent

26 November 2021 by Clare Ciborowska

A Local Authority (Respondent) v JB (by his Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor) (Appellant) – UKSC 2020/0133 Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

The Supreme Court has upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision that to have capacity to engage in sexual relations, a person needs to be able to understand that their sexual partner must have the capacity to consent to the sexual activity and must, in fact, consent before and during the sexual activity.

The appellant, JB, is a 37 year-old single man with a complex diagnosis of autistic spectrum disorder combined with impaired cognition. He has a complex diagnosis of autistic spectrum disorder (Asperger’s syndrome) combined with impaired cognition as a result of suffering significant brain damage from epilepsy.

JB has expressed a strong desire to have a girlfriend and engage in sexual relations. Part of JB’s diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome caused him to be

…obsessionally fixated on a particular woman, sending inappropriate sexual messages, inappropriate touching, and targeting the vulnerable

His previous behaviour towards women has led the respondent local authority to conclude that he cannot safely have unsupervised contact with them. JB had argued in the Court of that he had capacity to consent to sexual relations in circumstances where the expert evidence had found that JB understood the mechanics of sexual acts and the risks of pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease but that his ‘understanding of consent’ was lacking.

The outcome for JB, if he was found to lack capacity to make decisions in respect of sexual relations, would be that he would be deprived of all sexual relations and that no other person could consent on his behalf (S27(1)(b) Mental Capacity Act 2005(MCA).

JB was successful at first instance in the Court of Protection, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision and found in favour of the Local Authority. On further appeal to the Supreme Court the court agreed with the Court of Appeal the result being that JB did, in fact, lack capacity.

Freedom of information: Redact, but don’t rewrite

11 August 2010 by Adam Wagner

Redaction in Al Rawi

Gradwick v IC and the Cabinet Office (EA/2010/0030) – Read decision

The Panopticon Blog has highlighted an interesting recent case in the General Regulatory Tribunal which may prove to be useful in the many different situations where documents are disclosed in redacted form.

The General Regulatory Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) regulates information rights, amongst other things. Simply, the Tribunal held that if parts of documents disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 are to be redacted (blacked out), it is not good enough to transcribe a new document with the offending parts removed. This is because, as the Tribunal said:

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Facial Recognition Technology: High Court gives judgment

12 September 2019 by Sapan Maini-Thompson

R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 2341 (Admin)

The High Court has dismissed an application for judicial review regarding the use of Automated Facial Recognition Technology (AFR) and its implications for privacy rights and data protection.

Haddon-Cave LJ and Swift J decided that the current legal regime is adequate to ensure the appropriate and non-arbitrary use of AFR in a free and civilised society. The Court also held that South Wales Police’s (SWP) use to date of AFR by has been consistent with the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and data protection legislation.

Nonetheless, periodic review is likely to be necessary. This was the first time any court in the world had considered AFR. This article analyses the judgement and explores possible avenues for appeal.

New Zealand’s Parliament to consider assisted dying – David Seymour

28 March 2018 by Guest Contributor

David Seymour is a New Zealand MP sponsoring a Bill in support of assisted dying.

Our liberal history can be briefly sketched out in two stages. Establishing a bundle of rights and then expanding them to include a wider range of people. In one sense, the right to assisted dying is a continuation of this movement and perhaps its final chapter.

In dark ages past people had few dimensions of freedom and little self-expression. Most people had one option for spiritual thinking with severe penalties for deviance.  As for choice in sexuality, the electoral franchise, freedom of speech, unless you fitted in exactly the right box, forget it.

In my maiden speech to parliament, I borrowed heavily from AC Grayling’s excellent Towards the Light of Liberty where from the Inquisition to the Reformation through the abolition of slavery, the liberation of women and expansion of the franchise, the black civil rights movement and finally the LGBTI movement, the sphere of liberty was expanded and then eventually included all people.

The British Commonwealth has long been an important institution for advancing these liberties. The Treaty of Waitangi, which established ‘the same rights and duties as citizens of England’ for all New Zealanders, was an extraordinary document for colonial times marred by arrogance and violence by colonisers. Today, the Commonwealth Charter sets out an admirable set of values that would make the world a better place if only they were universally followed. They include access to health: voluntary euthanasia is merely consistent with this value.
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A searching question

22 November 2010 by Guest Contributor

There are now over 400 posts on the UK Human Rights Blog. This landmark provides a good opportunity to remind readers how to search the site.

The most basic search function is by entering a word into the “search” box which is always available at the top right of the screen.

You can also search by category via the blog archive or the drop down menu which is on the sidebar to the right. Each post is ‘tagged’ with:

1. A blog category (for example ‘case summary‘ or ‘in the news‘)
2. A legal category (for example, family law) and
3. An article of the European Convention on Human Rights (for example, Article 2, the right to life).

You can read more about the individual rights on our ECHR page, which is also in a tab above. The full list of categories is reproduced below:

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As dust settles, Coalition gets cautious welcome on human rights

14 May 2010 by Adam Wagner

The Coalition Government is only a few days old but it is already receiving a cautious welcome from civil liberties commentators and bloggers, with all eyes on significant policy commitments in the Con-Lib deal. The previous government enacted major civil liberties legislation within a year of taking power; the question now is whether the Coalition has the time, will and co-operative potential to fulfil its lofty promises.

In its final years, New Labour was regularly criticised on civil liberties issues, particularly in relation to anti-terrorism law. But it is undeniable that within around a year of coming to power it had enacted a major piece of civil liberties legislation in the Human Rights Act 1998, which was followed shortly after by two others; the Data Protection Act 1998 and Freedom of Information Act 2000. Some, such as the Human Rights in Ireland Blog, say that sadly this was a high water mark and not to be repeated.

The Con-Lib coalition has already made significant early promises. The focus of commentators has been on the cabinet appointees who will influence law and order policy, as well as the surprisingly full civil liberties section in the Con-Lib Coalition agreement. Just as important, however, is what has been left out.

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No right to gist of case before Special Immigration Appeals Commission

4 August 2010 by Rosalind English

W(Algeria) and 7 Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 898 (Jacob LJ, Sullivan LJ and Sir David Keene) 29 July 2010 – read judgment

Article 6 of the Convention did not require an “irreducible minimum of information” that had to be provided to appellants in proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission about the risk they posed to national security.

In their appeal against decisions of the respondent secretary of state to deport them on grounds of national security (upheld by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)) the appellants all claimed that they would be at risk of ill-treatment if they were deported. They had obtained relevant information which had been provided on the understanding that it could only be made available if there were clear guarantees that it would not become known to their national government.

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Newspaper prevented from publishing information about former loyalist murder suspect

18 October 2010 by Rosalind English

An injunction sought against the publication of certain information has been granted by the High Court in Northern Ireland under Article 2 (the right to life). The claimant also invoked the Prevention of Harassment (NI) Order and sought damages for misuse of private information. The Article 8 claim was only partially successful and the harassment claim was dismissed.

The claimant, who had been accused and subsequently cleared of murdering a journalist working for the defendant newspaper sought to prevent the publication of details relating to his address, his partner, his wedding plans and other personal  information and photographs.  The judge held that the publication of this information, in the light of threats from loyalist paramilitaries and dissident republican paramilitaries, would result in a “real and immediate risk” to the claimant’s life.

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