Foreign criminal cannot be deported because of his right not to be discriminated against on grounds of illegitimacy

aeroplane in sunsetJohnson, R (on the application of) the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 2386 (Admin) 17 July 2014 – read judgment

The proposed deportation to Jamaica of a man convicted of drug smuggling and manslaughter would breach his rights under Article 8 and Article 14 because he had not obtained British citizenship on grounds of illegitimacy, the High Court has ruled.

The claimant challenged his proposed deportation to Jamaica, following his conviction and imprisonment for a very serious criminal offence. He submitted that deportation would violate his right to private and family life under Article 8 combined with the prohibition on discrimination under Article 14. The discrimination was said to arise because the claimant did not become a British citizen when he was born in Jamaica as the illegitimate child of a British citizen, whereas he would have been a British citizen if he had been a legitimate child, and a British citizen cannot be deported.

Following his conviction for manslaughter the claimant was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment. The length of his sentence meant that he was subject to automatic deportation as a foreign criminal pursuant to Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007. On his appeal against the respondent’s notice, the issue of discrimination arose because of the fact that the claimant would not have been a foreign national had his British father been married to his Jamaican mother when he was born (in Jamaica). Continue reading

Government still on the standing warpath


706x410q70fdb2ae613e49ab38bae8e09d0a46a228O (R o.t.a) v. Secretary of State for International Development [2014] EWHC 2371 (QB) 14 July 2014  read judgment

One proposal of the Lord Chancellor on reforming judicial review last year was the narrowing of the tests for standing, namely the ability to come to court and complain about some public law unlawfulness: see, e.g. here. The idea of statutory reform of standing was later shelved, but the current case is an interesting example of the Government probing the boundaries of the tests laid down by the courts.

The underlying dispute concerns the funding of international aid to Ethiopia by DFID. Mr O is an Ethiopian citizen who says he was the victim of human rights abuses in the course of a programme to re-settle villagers in new and larger communes – this programme (the Commune Development Programme or CDP) is said to involve forced internal relocation. As a result, O fled to Kenya, leaving his family behind. There is evidence of widespread human rights abuses perpetrated in this process of “villagisation”.

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Minimum income rules for immigrants do not breach human rights – Appeal Court

money_1945490cMM(Lebanon) and Others, R (on the application of ) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 985 (11 July 2014) – read judgment

Neil Sheldon of 1 Crown Office Row acted for the appellant Secretary of State in this case. He has not had anything to do with the writing of this post.

Provisions in the Immigration Rules which impose income requirements on individuals living in the United Kingdom, who wish to bring their non-European Economic Area citizen spouses to live with them, are not a disproportionate interference with their right to family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal has also underlined the important (but often misunderstood) point that there is no legal requirement that the Immigration Rules should provide that the best interests of the child should be determinative. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 is not a “trump card” to be played whenever the interests of a child arise.  Continue reading

The Tory human rights “car crash”

Car crash human rights

Imagine you are on the board of large corporation. You attend the Annual General Meeting and asked the chief executive about that controversial tax avoidance scheme the company had been considering, but which the in-house legal team had advised against. The Chief Exec smiles and says that has been dealt with: “we just sacked the lawyers”. 

The BBC is reporting what many suspected. Attorney General Dominic Grieve QC was sacked in order to clear the path for major reform of the relationship between the UK and the European Court of Human Rights. This is bad news, for the UK and potentially for the European Court of Human Rights too.

The Attorney General’s advice, which has been leaked to the BBC, was that plan to limit the power of the European Court of Human Rights were “incoherent” and a “legal car crash… with a built-in time delay“. Intriguingly, the BBC’s Nick Robinson also reports that William Hague, the now-former Foreign Secretary, also raised doubts over the plans.

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Tory Human Rights Plans, Child Abuse Inquiry and the Burqa Ban – the Human Rights Roundup

Niqab HRRWelcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your regular tour de force of human rights news and views. The full list of links can be found here. You can find previous roundups here. Links compiled by Adam Wagner, post by Celia Rooney.

This week, the role of Lady Butler-Sloss in the forthcoming inquiry into child abuse is challenged, while the government pushes for emergency legislation to monitor phone and internet records. Meanwhile, the European Court of Human Right upholds France’s niqab ban and the Tories get closer to announcing their plans for human rights reform.

In the News Continue reading

The non-residents legal aid case – LC advised to go for the ball, not for his opponent’s shins

roy-keane_1342720cPublic Law Project  v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 2365 – Read judgment / summary

Angela Patrick of JUSTICE has provided an excellent summary of this important ruling, which declared a proposed statutory instrument to be ultra vires the LASPO Act under which it was to have been made.  The judgment is an interesting one, not least for some judicial fireworks in response to the Lord Chancellor’s recourse to the Daily Telegraph after the hearing, but before judgment was delivered. 

But more of that after some thoughts on the discrimination ruling.

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Plan to stop non-residents getting Legal Aid is unlawful, rules High Court – Angela Patrick

PLP v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 2365 – Read judgment / summary

Residence Test UKHRBAs the House of Lords is scheduled to vote on the Government’s proposals for a residence test for access to legal aid, Angela Patrick, Director of Human Rights Policy at JUSTICE considers today’s judgment of the Divisional Court in PLP v Secretary of State for Justice.

While we are all following the exciting live feeds on both the reshuffle and the progress of emergency legislation on surveillance, the freshly appointed Attorney General, Jeremy Wright MP, may want to cast his eyes to BAILLI.

The Administrative Court may this morning have handed him one of his first “to-do” list items.   In – PLP v Secretary of State for Justice - a rare three judge Divisional Court has held that the Government’s proposal to introduce a residence test for legal aid – where all applicants will have to prove 12 months continuous lawful residence in the UK – is both ultra vires and discriminatory.

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Successful A1P1 claims by photovoltaics

Breyer Group plc and others v Department of Energy and Climate Change [2014] EWHC 2257 (QB) – Coulson J read judgment 

This is an important judgment on governmental liability for a rather shabby retrospective change of the rules about subsidies for photovoltaic schemes. The Court of Appeal had decided in 2012 that the changes were unlawful: see judgment  and my post here.  The question in Breyer was whether businesses could obtain damages under A1P1 arising out of the Secretary of State’s decision. Though the judgment proceeds on a number of assumed facts, some critical findings of law were in favour of the businesses.

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Family comes first (even if they’re in Poland)

Adoption blueP (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 888 – read judgment here.

1 Crown Office Row’s Martin Downs represented the parents in this appeal (not at first instance), but is not the author of this blog post.

In this successful appeal against care and placement orders in respect of a young infant with Polish parents, the Court of Appeal were sharply critical of comments made by the first instance judge which made it clear he had closed his mind at an early stage to the possibility of the baby being looked after by her grandparents in Poland. The Court held that both the judge and the local authority had failed to give sufficient weight to their positive obligation under Article 8 to consider ways of retaining a child within the family.

The parents in this case were Polish nationals who moved to England in 2011. Their daughter was born in September 2012. For the first five-and-a-half months of the little girl’s life, there were no concerns about the care she was receiving from her parents. However, in February 2013 she was taken to her local hospital in Warrington with a head injury which was found to be non-accidental and probably inflicted by the father. On discharge from hospital the baby was taken into foster care. Proceedings were instituted and after several hearings before HHJ Dodds concluded in December 2013 with an adoption placement.

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Retrospective legislation that interfered with judicial ruling violated the Convention and the rule of law

PoundlandR(on the application of Reilly (No. 2) and another) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2014EWHC 2182 (Admin) – read judgment

The High Court has issued a declaration of incompatibility following a successful challenge to the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013. The regulations under the Act that sanctioned those who did not participate in unpaid “work for your benefit” schemes by depriving them of an allowance violated the rule of law protected by the Convention and this country’s unwritten constitution. However, the dispute did not engage Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR.

Factual background

The claimants, Caitlin Reilly and Jonathan Hewstone (CR and JH)  had been unemployed and claimed jobseeker’s allowance. They objected to participation in schemes devised under the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Employment, Skills and Enterprise Scheme) Regulations 2011, in which they were required to work for no pay. As a sanction, the allowance could be withheld from those who refused to participate. CR complied with the requirement under the regulations to take unpaid work at Poundland so did not suffer any sanction. However, attendance on the scheme meant she was unable to continue her voluntary work in a museum, which she hoped would lead to a career in museums (see my previous post on her successful challenge to the scheme).  After that ruling, the regulations were amended to overcome the defects identified by the court. But the 2013 regulations, which applied prospectively, had the effect of retrospectively validating the 2011 Regulations, which the Court of Appeal had held to be unlawful. Then the Supreme Court allowed the secretary of state’s appeal against the Court of Appeal decision on the basis that the Act was in force. But the declaration in favour of CR remained valid, following the 2013 Act and that Supreme Court judgment; indeed counsel for the Secretary of State acknowledged the fact that Ms Reilly’s position was “not affected by the 2013 Act.”

JH had not been a party to Reilly No. 1. but his position was  clearly affected by that ruling. After initial attendance on a scheme for some months, he refused to participate further, and so his JSA payments were stopped for four specified periods by way of sanction. He in turn had successfully appealed against sanctions imposed by the 2013 scheme. The secretary of state’s appeal against those decisions had been stayed pending the outcome of Reilly.

The claimants submitted that the 2013 Act was incompatible with their rights under Article 6. It was an intervention in the ongoing proceedings in Reilly No. 1 which had the effect of determining the litigation in the government’s favour by retrospectively validating its unlawful acts. It thereby deprived both claimants of a fair determination of their civil rights and obligations, contrary to to the first paragraph of Article 6.  JH also relied upon Article 1 Protocol 1, claiming that by withholding his JSA, the defendant deprived him of a “possession” to which he was entitled. He submitted that the deprivation could not be justified as being in the public interest.

The court allowed the applications in respect of Article 6 but not A1P1.

Reasoning behind the judgment

Article 6 and the rule of law

CR and JH had brought proceedings against the state. The 2013 Act was directly targeted at resolving the Reilly litigation. As such, this legislative act by the government had amounted to an interference in ongoing legal proceedings: it had influenced the judicial determination in the secretary of state’s favour in Reilly and was likely to do so in JH’s appeals. Although Parliament was not precluded in civil matters from adopting retrospective provisions,  it cannot legislate so as to interfere with the courts’ handling of disputes before them:

 the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial contained in Article 6 preclude any interference by the legislature–other on compelling grounds of the general interest –with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute. (Zielinski v France (2001) 31 EHRR 19)

Nor did the ruling in National & Provincial Building Society v United Kingdom (1998) 25 EHRR 127 avail the defendant, even though the Strasbourg Court ruled there that legislation to close an unforeseen tax loophole was compatible with Article 6. The government in that case, the Court concluded, had “compelling public interest motives” to make the applicant societies’ judicial review proceedings and the contingent restitution proceedings unwinnable.  By contrast, in the instant case the claimants could not have foreseen Parliament’s retrospective validation of its own unlawful act.

Although these principles emanate from decisions of the Strasbourg Court, in Lang J’s view, they also accurately reflected fundamental principles of the UK’s unwritten constitution, which enshrines the fundamental principle of the rule of law:

It requires, inter alia, that Parliament and the Executive recognise and respect the separation of powers and abide by the principle of legality. Although the Crown in Parliament is the sovereign legislative power, the Courts have the constitutional role of determining and enforcing legality. Thus, Parliament’s undoubted power to legislate to overrule the effect of court judgments generally ought not to take the form of retrospective legislation designed to favour the Executive in ongoing litigation in the courts brought against it by one of its citizens, unless there are compelling reasons to do so. Otherwise it is likely to offend a citizen’s sense of fair play.

The secretary of state submitted that there had been compelling public interest grounds for the retrospective legislation. Lang J acknowledged that it was understandable that a government faced with the prospect of substantial repayments would consider it in the public interest not to pay them. But it was apparent from Strasbourg’s judgments, such as Scordino and Zielinkski, that financial loss alone was not a sufficiently “compelling reason in the public interest”. If it were, then retrospective legislation of this kind would be commonplace.” (para 107).

Not only was there insufficient public interest to justify the retrospective legislation but the government had been aware of the concerns about the legality of the statute because it had been brought to the attention of its proposer by the report of the Constitution Committee. One of its members, Lord Pannick, told the House:

this Bill contravenes two fundamental constitutional principles. First, it is being fast-tracked through Parliament when there is no justification whatever for doing so. Secondly, the Bill breaches the fundamental constitutional principle that penalties should not be imposed on persons by reason of conduct that was lawful at the time of their action. Of course, Parliament may do whatever it likes – Parliament is sovereign – but the Bill is, I regret to say, an abuse of power that brings no credit whatever on this Government.

Whilst judicial review is more properly concerned with the substance of the legislation, not the reasons for it, Lang J wryly observes that the absence of any consultation with representative organisations, and the lack of scrutiny by the relevant parliamentary committees, “may have contributed to some misconceptions about the legal justification for the retrospective legislation.” (para 96). The government’s statement to Parliament explaining why the 2013 Act would be Convention compatible had not explained that Parliament was being asked to justify a departure from the legal norm, which would only be lawful if made for compelling public interest reasons. Further, the statement had erred in concluding that the case was comparable to National & Provincial as the legislation would be closing a loophole. It was not accurate to characterise the flaws in the 2011 Regulations as a loophole. The 2013 Regulations had remedied the technical defect identified by the court in the original Reilly litigation, but that did not mean there were compelling grounds to justify the interference with CR and JH’s rights under Article 6 to a judicial determination of their claims. The 2013 Act therefore violated Article 6(1) in relation to those who had pursued claims in the courts or tribunals.

Article 1 Protocol 1: had the Second Claimant been “deprived” of his “possessions”?

JH failed in his claim that he had suffered a violation of the right to respect for peaceful enjoyment of possessions. This was not because he had succeeded under Article 6 –  the rights protected by the respective provisions were different (AXA General Insurance Ltd, Petitioners [2011] UKSC 46).  Lang J accepted the claimants’ argument that a wholly state-funded non-contributory benefit could constitute a possession under A1P1, but JH’s right to the allowance depended on whether he met the conditions for receipt of the benefit. He had not met the conditions for future payment. He had not been deprived of an existing possession because there was no revocation of benefits previously received. This was made clear in Moskal v Poland, where the Strasbourg Court observed that

Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not create a right to acquire property. This provision places no restriction on the contracting state’s freedom to decide whether or not to have in place any form of social security scheme, or to choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any such scheme. ((2010) 50 EHRR 22)

It was clear from this statement of principle that, in order to establish a property right, the applicant must fulfill the requirements for receipt of the benefit at the relevant time.  Nor did he have a reasonable expectation that the allowance would be paid if his legal claim was successful. His claim was not an “asset” within A1P1.  His only reasonable expectation had been that his appeal would be determined in accordance with the law as it stood from time to time.

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You cannot be serious! Peers call ‘out’ on Government’s judicial review reforms – Angela Patrick

mcenroeLast night saw the House of Lords’ first reaction to the Government’s proposed changes to judicial review as the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill had its second reading.   Already dissected at some length in this blog, the proposals have been roundly criticised by both the senior judiciary and the Joint Committee on Human Rights.   Consultations responses, including from JUSTICE, expressed concern that the measures appear, by design or coincidence, to undermine the rule of law, inhibit transparency and shield the Government from judicial scrutiny. Two key concerns arise from the Government proposals: restricting access for individuals without substantial means and limiting the courts’ discretion to do justice in the public interest. Yesterday’s debate was robust and eloquent, with former Law Lords joined by bishops and backbenchers alike to condemn the new measures.  

Metaphors were rife. Descriptions of the Government’s proposals ranged from Lord Woolf’s invocation of the image of Governmental wolves among some unlikely judicial sheep, to the titular and topical tennis imagery used with devastating effect by Lord Brown of Eaton –under-Heywood:

“More and more areas of our lives are controlled by public authorities. At the same time we have become understandably, I suggest, less trusting and certainly less deferential towards those with authority over us. I sometimes wonder whether it did not all start with John McEnroe’s outraged questioning of line calls at Wimbledon way back in the 1970s. However, we should consider how in the long run his behaviour has contributed to the hugely improved policing of those lines that is in operation today…By the same token, the use of judicial review has to my mind undoubtedly raised the standards of public decision-making in recent years.” (Col 1591) Continue reading

France’s ban on religious clothing in schools did not prevent removal of asylum seeker there under Dublin Regulation

niqab R (On the application of Mofazzar Baradarn and Malik Baradarn0 v Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Sikh Council Hampshire 24 June 2014 [2014] EWCA Civ 854 – read judgment

David Manknell of 1 Crown Office Row represented the Home Office in these proceedings. He has had nothing to do with the writing of this post.

France is a country which observes its Convention obligations therefore it is not in breach of Article 3 or any other of the Convention’s provisions to return an asylum seeker thence under the Dublin Regulation, since that system provides that once a Member State has “taken charge” of an application for asylum (as France has in this case) it has exclusive responsibility for processing and determining the claim for asylum. The prohibition on religious clothing in public schools in France did not disclose a threat to the second appellant’s Convention rights.

Background facts

The appellants were Iranian nationals (father and daughter) who challenged the Secretary of State’s decision on 5 December 2011 to refuse their asylum claims on safe third country grounds and to remove them to France. France had accepted responsibility for their asylum claims pursuant to the Dublin II Regulation. Before Hickinbottom J, they objected to their return to France because under French law they were banned from the wearing of the burka and the niqab in public. They alleged that this would breach their rights under articles 3, 8, 9, 11 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Their claims were dismissed by the judge in their entirety. Maurice Kay LJ gave them permission to appeal in relation only to articles 8, 9 and 14 by reference only to the French Law 2004-228 (“the 2004 law”) and in relation to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (“BCIA”). The 2004 law had not featured in argument before the judge. It was, however, common ground that the appeal was concerned with the 2004 law and not the 2010 law. The 2004 Law provides that “in public elementary schools, middle schools and secondary schools, the wearing of symbols or clothing by which the students conspicuously indicate their religious belief is prohibited”. Continue reading

‘Do Not Resuscitate’ and the Right to Die – the Human Rights Roundup

Do-not-resuscitate-band-HRRWelcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your regular game, set and match of human rights news and views. The full list of links can be found here. You can find previous roundups here. Links compiled by Adam Wagner, post by Celia Rooney.

In the News

The Right to Die

This week, in the cases of R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of AM) (AP) v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] UKSC 38, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal of campaigners who asserted a right to die under Article 8 of the Convention.

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Supreme Court rejects right to die appeals

Tony NicklinsonR (on the application of Nicklinson and another) (Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent); R (on the application of AM) (AP) (Respondent) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant) [2014] UKSC 38 - read judgment

On appeal from [2013] EWCA Civ 961

The Supreme Court has declined to uphold a right to die a dignified death.  However, a glimmer is is to be found in this judgment in that two out of the seven justices who concluded that it was for the United Kingdom to decide whether the current law on assisted suicide was incompatible with the right to privacy and dignity under Article 8, would have granted such a declaration in these proceedings., particularly where the means of death was one that could have been autonomously operated by the disabled appellant, leaving no doubt as to the voluntary and rational nature of his decision.

But the majority concluded that this was a matter for Parliament, not for the Courts.

The following summary is from the Supreme Court’s Press Summary

Bacground 

These appeals arise from tragic facts and raise difficult and significant issues, namely whether the present state of the law of England and Wales relating to assisting suicide infringes the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”), and whether the code published by the Director of Public Prosecutions (“the DPP”) relating to prosecutions of those who are alleged to have assisted suicide is lawful. Continue reading

“Europe needs the Convention and Europe needs the Court”

PhaleTwo fascinating speeches to recommend.

Lord Phillips, former Supreme Court President, gave a thoughtful speech at Kings College on whether human rights are a “force for good or a threat to democracy”. He expressed quite significant concerns over some recent Strasbourg decisions on jurisdiction, prisoner votes etc. (you know the drill – see Rosalind’s post on the other senior judges/former judges speaking their minds).

The conclusion he reaches, on balance but also with “no hesitation”  is that “Europe needs the Convention and Europe needs the Court. … Strasbourg is a powerful force for good.

I really must do a chart of the senior judiciary and ex-judiciary’s positions on Strasbourg. They are falling over themselves to express a view.

Meanwhile, over at the Law Society of Ireland, Lady Hale gave a speech on Freedom of Religion and Belief, which readers will know is one of this blog’s pet topics (see our other posts on religion).