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The Court of Appeal has revisited the tension between the wish of a transgender person to have their legal gender recognised on their child’s birth certificate and the right of the child to discover the identity of their biological mother.The Court has ruled that as the person who gave birth to the child, the appellant (a transgender male) must be registered as the “mother” on the child’s birth certificate.
This article first appeared on the UK Constitutional Law Association blog — the original can be found here.
As we watch the Covid-19 pandemic unfold our attention is naturally on the steps that HM Government (‘HMG’) is taking to mitigate the immediate crisis. The time is approaching, however, when it will be necessary to evaluate HMG’s preparation for, and response to, the pandemic. Calls are being made by the TUC and doctors’ groups for a public inquiry into one aspect of its response, namely failures to procure adequate personal protective equipment (‘PPE’) for NHS staff, at least 100 of whom are believed to have died having contracted the virus while treating patients. HMG is accused of failing to respond to a national exercise in 2016 testing the UK’s resilience to a similar flu pandemic which highlighted an increased need for ventilators. Other criticisms go further. This blog argues that the state owes a duty under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights to investigate some deaths caused by Covid-19. This duty will require not only inquests into individual deaths but also a public inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 to address those systemic issues not suitable for determination by an inquest. The post builds on and responds to posts by Conall Mallory, James Rowbottom and Elizabeth Stubbins Banes. It also foreshadows the need for reform in this area.
Latest news: GCHQ has published a detailed blog article which seeks to explain (and defend) the new NHS contact tracing app, which the Government regards as the key to a controlled exit from lockdown.
Coronavirus presents a serious threat to society, legitimising the collection of public health data under Article 9:2 (g) of GDPR regulations, which allows the processing of such data if “necessary for reasons of substantial public interest”. Some of this collection will take the form of contact tracing apps, which have been used in containing the spread of coronavirus in countries such as Singapore.
They work by broadcasting a bluetooth signal from a smartphone which is picked up by other smartphones (and vice versa), meaning that if one user contracts coronavirus, those who have been in contact with that user can be effectively warned and given further advice to stop the spread.
NHSX, the body responsible for setting NHS data usage policy and best practice, has been developing a contact tracing app which is currently undergoing effectiveness trials at RAF Leeming. As it stands, the app either tells you “You’re okay now” or “You need to isolate yourself and stay at home”. It seems likely that this or a similar app will be rolled out over the UK in the coming months.
In the latest episode of Law Pod UK, Rosalind English talks to William Edis QC of 1 Crown Office Row about the recent Supreme Court ruling on whether damages can be claimed against the NHS in respect of a commercial surrogacy arrangement in California, following the admitted negligence of a hospital in the UK rendering the respondent unable to bear a child. See Bill’s post on that ruling here.
Commercial surrogacy agreements – that is where the surrogate makes a profit for bearing the commissioning mother’s child – are against the law in this country. But it is not illegal to travel, so those with the means to do so can go to another jurisdiction where such arrangements are common practice. An interesting legal conundrum arose where a woman sought damages for such an arranged surrogacy in the States where a UK hospital, by its own admitted negligence, had rendered her unable to have a child. Here are the relevant laws and cases referred to in the podcast episode:
As this could otherwise get confusing, I’m going to call the Regulations that are currently in force, i.e. the Original Regulations as amended by the Amending Regulations, the Current Regulations.
The Amending Regulations enact a number of changes to the lockdown law, some more consequential than others. This post does not go through the more insignificant changes in any great detail; for example, Amending Reg (4)(b)(iv) correcting the name of DWP in Original Reg 6(i)(iii) from “Department of Work and Pensions” to “Department for Work and Pensions”.
What this post does instead is outline four of the changes provided for by the Amending Regulations in ascending order of importance.
At the start of the year, some 1,200 immigrants were being held in immigration detention in the UK. The power to detain immigrants is separate from detention of individuals as part of a criminal sentence. There is a presumption against detention of immigrants and immigration detention, which can only be in accordance with one of the statutory powers (the majority of which are contained in the Immigration Act 1971 and the Immigration and Asylum Act 2002), and is allowed in the interests of maintaining effective immigration control, for example, to effect removal; to establish a person’s identity or the basis of their immigration claim; or where there is reason to believe that the person will fail to comply with any conditions attached to a grant of immigration bail.
In order to be lawful, not only must immigration detention be in accordance with one of the statutory powers, but it must also be in accordance with the limitations implied by the domestic common law and Strasbourg case law (ECHR Article 5), as well as with stated Home Office policy. Under the common law and ECHR Article 5, the statutory powers to detain are to be strictly and narrowly construed, i.e. if detention is not for a statutory purpose (or is no longer for that purpose) it will become unlawful. Additionally, the power to detain is impliedly limited to a period that is reasonably necessary for the statutory purpose to be carried out and must be justified in all the circumstances of the individual case, requiring an assessment of individual factors such as the risk of absconding, the likelihood of imminent removal, and the impact on the detainee.
Following news of the first immigration detainee testing positive for COVID-19, there was concern about the risk of COVID-19 deaths in immigration detention and about the legality of continued detention of immigrants. Detention Action Group has sought to challenge the continued detention of immigrants and the steps taken by the Secretary of State to address the position of persons in immigration detention in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
An application for urgent interim relief was made by the Detention Action Group in March for the release of some 736 immigrants in detention and was advanced, first in relation to those whose removal is not reasonably imminent as a result of the global pandemic and the consequential travel bans and restrictions around the world, and secondly in relation to vulnerable detainees such as those who are suffering from serious medical conditions or who are aged 70 and over.
A separate application for urgent interim relief was made by Samson Bello, a Nigerian deportee, seeking release from detention on the basis that restrictions to travel to Nigeria meant that his continued detention for the purposes of removal was no longer lawful. Both of these cases are discussed in detail below.
Last week on this blog we published Francis Hoar’s article which argued that the Coronavirus Regulations passed by the Government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic involve breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly in relation to the interference they create in the rights to liberty, private and family life, freedom of worship, freedom of assembly, the prohibition on discrimination, the right to property and the right to education.
In this first of two response articles, Leo Davidson, a barrister at 11KBW, argues that the Regulations do not involve any breach of human rights law, as they fall within the executive’s margin of discretion for the management of this crisis, particularly given the serious potential implications of the pandemic and the reliance that the Government has placed on scientific and medical advice.
In the second article, Dominic Ruck Keene and Henry Tufnell, of 1 Crown Office Row, will argue that the interferences in rights created by the Regulations are proportionate when taken in the context of the pandemic.
Note: This article involves examination of thelegal provisions that accompany some of the restrictions on movement of individuals announced by the Government in order to protect life in the current crisis. The current Government guidance setting out these and other restrictions can be found here. Legal scrutiny is important but should not be taken to question the undeniable imperative to follow that guidance.
Introduction
With the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, the Government has imposed a number of restrictive measures, colloquially referred to as the ‘lockdown’, in an effort to hamper the spread of the coronavirus.
These restrictions are controversial, and reasonable people disagree about whether they go too far, or not far enough. As a matter of human rights law, however, they are lawful. The Government has a positive obligation under human rights law to safeguard life and health; in balancing any conflict between this objective, and other rights, the Government has a significant margin of discretion, including in the assessment of scientific evidence.
Francis Hoar argues on this blog that the lockdown disproportionately interferes with various rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and is therefore unlawful. The analysis is wrong, primarily because:
It ignores the human rights implications of the pandemic itself, which must be balanced against the effects of the responsive measures.
In the circumstances, the Government has a wide margin of discretion when balancing competing rights and interests.
The margin is particularly wide given the complex scientific evidence underlying the decision.
R (o.t.a. Palestine Solidarity Campaign Ltd and Jacqueline Lewis) v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2020] UKSC 16- read judgment
As I said in my post on the 1st instance decision, many people like to have a say over the investment policies of their pension funds. They may not want investment in fossil fuels, companies with questionable working practices, arms manufacturers, Israel or indeed any company which supports Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip – to choose but a few of people’s current choices. And pension funds, left to their own devices, may wish to adopt one or more of these choices to reflect their pensioners’ views. But can they under current local authority pensions law?
This case is about Government “Guidance” aimed at local authorities, banning some of those “ethical” objections to investment policies but allowing other objections. “Guidance” in quotes because the net effect of the Act and secondary legislation was to make the Guidance mandatory: see [10] of Lord Wilson’s judgment. In particular, the policy ban was to apply to (a) boycotts to foreign nations and (b) UK defence industries. The sharp focus of the former was Israel. No surprises that the Quakers and the Campaign against the Arms Trade should appear in support of the challenge to the latter.
The Guidance is applicable to local government pensions affecting 5 million current or former employees. So it arose on that ceaseless battleground of government’s direction/intermeddling in local government affairs: was it or was it not authorised by the underlying legislation?
The Guidance said that those running local authority pensions must not use their policies to
pursue boycotts, divestment and sanctions…against foreign nations and UK defence industries…other than where formal legal sanctions, embargoes and restrictions have been put in place by the Government;
or
“pursue policies that are contrary to UK foreign policy or UK defence policy”.
Did these prohibitions go beyond the SoS’s powers under the relevant pension provisions?
Answer, according to the Supreme Court, yes, but by a majority of 3-2.
Unlike some of the rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, the prohibition on torture or inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 is absolute. There is no question of striking a balance between Article 3 and other considerations: the state simply may not act in a way which would breach this prohibition.
This means that this right can offer crucial protection to the sorts of people that some members of the public may not have instinctive sympathy towards, such as an immigrant with a serious criminal history who may otherwise struggle to resist deportation. Even if their case is otherwise unattractive, if it is shown that deporting them would expose them to inhuman or degrading treatment (or indeed constitute such treatment), their appeal must succeed.
In certain circumstances this will include a person with a serious medical condition who resists removal on the basis that the disparity between medical care in their country of origin compared to their host state would mean that removing them would constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. Such cases had previously been considered to succeed primarily for a person close to death, where removal would involve “in effect, pulling a man off his deathbed” (AM (Zimbabwe), para 14).
However, in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17, the Supreme Court has held that the proper approach to Article 3 was modified by the European Court of Human Rights in Paposhvili v Belgium[2017] Imm AR 867. The relevant test now is whether removal would give rise to a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in the person’s state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a substantial reduction in life expectancy. This does not require that death be imminent in the event of removal.
The QMLR covers developments in medical law in the broadest sense – clinical negligence, inquest, regulatory, judicial review and court of protection cases.
In Episode 109 we touch on some of the highlights from the most recent issue including articles from: John Whitting QC on causation, Suzanne Lambert on informed consent, Jeremy Hyam QC on gender reassignment in prison, Rajkiran Barhey on NICE Guidelines and the use of screens in inquests, and Jo Moore on the recent changes to statements of truth and witness statements.
The following cases are mentioned in this episode:
Clements v Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust [2018] EWHC 2064;
The world is reckoning this week with the human rights consequences of governmental efforts across the world to address the coronavirus pandemic. UN Secretary-General Antonio Gutierres has released a report on how the pandemic is becoming a ‘human rights crisis’. He highlights the disproportionate impact on minority communities, urging that national states of emergency must be proportionate, limited in scope, and alert to the risks of undue censorship and privacy violations. The report is available here.
Within the UK, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has been urging that more reasonable adjustments be made for the disabled and vulnerable in the handling of the pandemic.
In the sphere of criminal justice, the EHRC warns in an interim report that video hearings risk serious discrimination for people with learning disabilities, autism spectrum disorders, and mental health conditions. The report’s recommendations include ensuring disabled defendants have accessible information explaining their right to raise issues to do with participation, ensuring frontline professionals consider identifying people for whom video hearings may be unsuitable, and using registered intermediaries to support disabled defendants in video hearings. The report is available here.
Notably, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court’s view that the scheme does result in landlords discriminating against tenants without British passports on the basis of their actual or perceived nationality. However, the Court held that this discrimination was justified.
The Fisheries Bill 2020, part of the government’s core legislative program on post-Brexit environmental policy, is currently in the House of Lords at committee stage, and is expected to receive royal assent in the coming months (although exactly when is subject to how successfully the House of Lords can adapt to meeting via Microsoft Teams). It would establish Britain’s departure from the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) on January 1st 2021, and sets out how fishing rights would work post transition period and CFP.
Given the passion that fishing rights raise, you might be forgiven for thinking that they were absolutely essential to the functioning of the UK and EU economies. In fact, fishing accounts for around 0.1% of both. A joke going around environmental blogs is that green bills are like buses – none come when you need them, then they all arrive at once. Perhaps for the Environment and Agriculture Bills – discussed by me here and here. But the Fisheries Bill feels more like the Brexit Bus than a local routemaster. It promises the repatriation of sovereign powers and gains in the millions by taking back control of our waters, while hiding potential losses in the billions, if issues with fishing rights derail trade negotiations – a slim but real possibility.
Even the most entrenched remainer, however, would have to recognise the multiple failures of the CFP. It has been plagued by mismanaged quotas and outsized lobbying interests since its inception, and it has clearly favoured certain member states over others. The Fisheries Bill has as such been largely well received by environmental groups, such as Greener UK, who comment that the “focus on climate change and sustainability is very helpful”. I’ll start with what the bill actually says, then discuss the EU negotiation position and conclude with a few comments about what the legislation may mean for the future relations.
This is a summary of an article published here and inevitably simplifies the detailed arguments and considerations within it. The article represents the views of the author alone.
Note: This article involves examination of the legal provisions that accompany the restrictions on movement of individuals announced by the Government. The current Government guidance setting out these and other restrictions can be found here. Legal scrutiny is important but should not be taken to question the requirement to follow the Regulations.
The ‘lockdown’ imposed by the government to contain the coronavirus and Covid 19, the disease it causes has been enforced mainly through the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 (‘the Regulations’), imposed under powers delegated by the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 (‘the 1984 Act’).
Recently Lord Anderson QC, Robert Craig, Tom Hickman QC and others and Benet Brandreth QC and Lord Sandhurst QC have argued that the Regulations were or may have been ultra vires as secondary legislation beyond the delegated powers under Pt 2A of the 1984 Act. In turn, Prof Jeff King has argued that the delegated powers were exercised lawfully. It is the view of the author that the arguments against the vires of the legislation on that ground are more convincing.
This article argues that the Regulations are also a disproportionate interference with the rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’); and that, were they challenged by judicial review, should be disapplied if necessary to avoid a breach of s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
In this latest episode we consider the probable attitude of the judiciary to any challenges regarding the government’s responsibility for providing sufficient PPE, the risk imposed on individuals, such as prisoners and mental health patients in detention during lockdown, their obligations under Articles 2 and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as Article 11. How are we as a society, and the government, going to regard the question of “judicial activism” in this unprecedented situation in a post-pandemic UK?
Here are the statutes, statutory instruments and cases referred to in the course of my interview with Dominic Ruck-Keene and Darragh Coffey:
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