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Readers of this blog as well as listeners to Law Pod UK may remember the European Court of Human Rights’ controversial ruling in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland. We have written about it on the UKHRB here, and it has come up in Law Pod UK epsiodes discussing the ECHR, both in our interview with Lord Sumption here and our discussion with Marina Wheeler KC and David Wolfson KC here.
In it, the authors criticise the Committee of Ministers’ conclusion that Switzerland has effectively complied with the Strasbourg’s judgment in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz case. It will be recalled that the ECtHR found that Switzerland had failed to meet its obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to respect for private and family life) by not taking adequate and timely measures to mitigate climate change. The ruling emphasised the role of national authorities, especially courts, in ensuring compliance with Convention obligations, clearly placing the onus on Switzerland to enhance its climate policy and implementation.
This ruling was reached despite the fact that Switzerland had held not one but two national referenda on what it its citizens expected the government to do in discharging the country’s obligations under the Paris agreement. The second referendum, in June 2021, rejected certain measures that would align national targets with the Paris Agreement.
On 23 July 2025, the International Court of Justice delivered an advisory Opinion on the “obligations of states in respect of climate change” from 15 judges, in 130+ pages. Its ruling was unanimous, with a strong closing flourish trailed in my title. There has been a great burst of favourable responses to the Opinion which was delivered yesterday, for instance the Center for International Environmental Law.
But what does the Opinion say, and does it matter?
The questions
The request for the Opinion had come from the UN General Assembly in March 2023. After a typically baggy “chapeau” of potentially relevant climate change and human rights treaties, the UN GA sought answers to the following questions
What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases for States and for present and future generations?
What are the legal consequences under these obligations for States where they, by their acts and omissions, have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment, with respect to:
States, including, in particular, small island developing States, which due to their geographical circumstances and level of development, are injured or specially affected by or are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change?
The peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse effects of climate change?”
In December 2014, the ICJ heard oral submissions from 96 states and 11 international organisations (including the EU, the African Union, WHO, and various organisations representing small island states). Major emitting states such as the UK, the US, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait made individual submissions. This response marks the importance that most UN states attached to this process.
Written transparency of the case is excellent: all those submissions, the written statements preceding them, and the underlying treaties and legal materials are to be found on the ICJ website here.
An ICJ advisory Opinion is just that – advisory. As the ICJ itself acknowledges, it has no binding force, but they may carry great weight and, as the ICJ hopes, “moral authority”. Such opinions are not for bruising fights between individual state parties. Their aim is that the ICJ contribute to the clarification and development of international law.
So how does this Opinion advance the sum of international law knowledge on climate change?
A detailed summary of the issues and the facts in this case can be found in the Supreme Court’s Press Release. The report below gives a very short account of these followed by a focus on the majority and dissenting judgments. I quote Lord Sales in some detail as the concerns expressed in his dissent will only prevail if Parliament were to legislate for them to do so.
Legal and factual background
In December 2018, the second respondent, Horse Hill Developments Ltd, sought planning permission from the first respondent, Surrey County Council (“the Council”), to retain and expand an existing onshore oil well site and to drill for four new wells, enabling the production of hydrocarbons from six wells over a period of 25 years. The environmental impact assessment for the project had to be carried out under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 (which implemented the Directive 2011/92 EU).
The Council considered the environmental impacts of “the direct releases of greenhouse gases from with the well site boundary resulting from the site’s construction, production, decommissioning and subsequent restoration over the lifetime of the proposed development.” However, it did not assess the environmental impacts of the downstream greenhouse gas emissions that would inevitably result when the oil extracted from the development site was later refined and then used, for example, as fuel. The developer argued that, as regards the impact of the project on climate, the scope of the EIA should be confined to the direct releases of greenhouse gases from within the well site boundary during the lifetime of the project; and that the EIA need not include an assessment of the greenhouse gas emissions that would occur when the oil extracted from the wells was ultimately burnt elsewhere as fuel. The council accepted this approach and granted planning permission for the development on 27 September 2019. The appellant, acting on behalf of a local action group, applied for judicial review of the Council’s decision. Her claim was unsuccessful before the High Court and the Court of Appeal. This was her appeal to the Supreme Court
The question that the Court had to decide was this. Was it unlawful for the Council not to require the environmental impact assessment for a project of crude oil extraction for commercial purposes to include an assessment of the impacts of downstream greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the eventual use of the refined products of the extracted oil?
This article was first published in Edition 33 of the Journal of Environmental Law and Management. It is reproduced here with the kind permission of the editors at Lawtext Publishing Limited
On Monday 9 April 2024 the Strasbourg Court handed down judgment in three cases involving climate change: Carême v France (ECHR no 7189/21), Duarte Agostinho v Portugal and 32 others ( ECHR no 39371/20), and Verein Klimaseniorinnen v Switzerland [2024] ECHR 304, no 53600/20.
Interestingly, shortly before the Strasbourg judges had reached their decision in these three cases, the New Zealand Supreme Court considered an application for strike-out of a challenge to a number of carbon-emitting businesses based on the tort of public nuisance as well as a new form of action, that involved a duty to cease materially contributing damage to the climate system: Michael John Smith (appellant) v Fronterra Co-operative group Ltd and Others [2024] NZSC 5. I will come back to this judgment later in this article.
First, we turn to the more recent Strasbourg cases. Each of these cases was examined by the same composition of the Grand Chamber, and each raised unprecedented issues before the Court.The particular nature of the problems arising from climate change in terms of the Convention issues has not so far been addressed in the Court’s case law. I will concentrate on the one successful application, Verein Klimaseniorinnen v Switzerland. Both Carême and Duarte Agostinho failed with their applications on procedural grounds; most notably, the Duarte Agostinho application was dismissed due to a failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
In Verein Klimaseniorinnen, some female senior citizens and a representative organisation (Klimaseniorinnen) argued that the impact of global warming on their health breached a number of Articles of the ECHR. The Strasbourg Court was satisfied in this instance that they had exhausted their local remedies, although it found that the individual applicants had not satisfied ‘victim status’ for the purposes of Article 34 ECHR; they had failed to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient link between the harm they had allegedly suffered (or would suffer in the future) and climate change. But the Court held, by 16 votes to one, that the applicant association did have locus standi in the present proceedings and that its com- plaint should be examined under Article 8 of the Convention.
Having admitted the association’s complaint, the Grand Chamber found that states are under a positive obligation under Article 8 to provide effective protection from ‘serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life’. In order to achieve this, states must enforce regulations that are capable of mitigating current and future impacts of climate change by having in place a plan for the reduction of greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions and achieving carbon neutrality over the decades leading to 2050. Switzerland had failed in this in that it had not quantified a carbon budget, nor had it set limits on greenhouse gas emissions. It had also exceeded its previous GHG emission reduction targets, which resulted in a violation of Article 8. There was ‘no doubt’, said the Court, that climate change-induced heatwaves had caused, were causing and would cause further deaths and illnesses to older people and particularly women (represented by the Klimaseniorinnen association).
There was one sole dissent from the majority’s findings on admissibility and the merits. Further on in this article I will explore the different opinion of the British representative on the panel, Judge Eicke. Before that, we will look at the main arguments before the Court.
The Swiss Government argued that global warming had not reached the necessary level to create a tangible effect on the private and family life of the individual applicants under Article 8, including on their mental well-being.
The respondent state party also maintained that the Court should not allow the applicant association to circumvent the mechanism established under the Paris Agreement by seeking to establish, under the Convention, an international judicial control mechanism to review the measures to limit GHG emissions.
Various other governments intervened in this application to say, in effect, that the response to climate change should be an effective global response and that the Court should not, indeed could not, engage in a form of law- making and regulation which would bypass the role of the democratic process and institutions in the response to climate change.
The Swiss Federation also had quite a forceful argument on the in limine question of jurisdiction: it submitted that GHG emissions generated abroad could not be considered as attracting the responsibility of Switzerland as those emissions could not be directly linked to any alleged omissions on the part of Switzerland, whose authorities did not have direct control over the sources of emissions. Moreover, the whole system established by the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement was based on the principle of territoriality and the responsibility of states for emissions on their territory.Thus, said the respondent, the applicants could not complain about certain imports containing ‘embedded emissions’ from other jurisdictions. The Court did not agree. Although ‘embedded emissions’ contained an extraterritorial aspect, it did not raise an issue of Switzerland’s jurisdiction in respect of the applicants, but rather one of Switzerland’s responsibility for the alleged effects of the ‘embedded emissions’ on the applicants’ Convention rights.
Michael John Smith (appellant) v Fronterra Co-operative group Ltd and others [2024] NZSC 5
This appeal to the New Zealand Supreme Court concerned strike out of a claim in tort (comprised of three causes of action) relating to damage caused by climate change. The question was whether the plaintiff’s claim should be allowed to proceed to trial, or whether, regardless of what might be proved at trial, it is bound to fail and should be struck out now.
The implications of this ruling could be enormous, particularly if the English courts decide to follow the New Zealand model. In its conclusion to this lengthy judgment, the New Zealand Court observed that “the principles governing public nuisance ought not to stand still in the face of massive environmental challenges attributable to human economic activity. The common law, where it is not clearly excluded, responds to challenge and change in a considered way, through trials involving the testing of evidence.”
The plaintiff was an elder of a Maori tribe and climate change spokesman for a national forum of tribal leaders. The defendants were all New Zealand companies involved in an industry that either emitted greenhouse gases or which released GHG when burned.
On 22 September 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee found that the Australian Government had violated the human rights of various Torres Strait islanders through climate change inaction.
The rights in issue arose under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of 1966, and in particular the right to life (Article 6), the right to be free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home (Article 17), the rights of the child (Article 24), and the right of indigenous minorities to enjoy their culture – all of which rights should be respected and ensured to all individuals (Article 2).
The claimant (FoE) applied for judicial review of the decision by the Secretary of State to provide export finance and support in relation to a liquified natural gas project in Mozambique.
The mission of the International Trade/Export Credits Guarantee Department (UKEF) is to ensure that no viable UK export fails for lack of finance or insurance from the private sector, while operating at no net cost to the taxpayer. It is afforded a significant margin of appreciation when considering factors when deciding whether to provide this finance and support. Indeed it has been the first UK Government Department to assess climate change impacts in the context of a long-term foreign project with many public interest considerations.
Background facts
The project comprised the development of offshore deepwater gas production facilities connected to an onshore gas receiving and liquefaction facility. It was to be operated by the first interested party (Total Mozambique) and funded via the second interested party (a financing company). UKEF acknowledged that climate change impacts and the Paris Climate Change Agreement were factors that ought to be taken into account alongside other factors in making its decision in relation to the project. A report was prepared summarising the climate change matters considered by UKEF, including that the potential Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions from the use of the project’s exported liquid natural gas would be very high, and that it was unlikely that Mozambique would attract significant international investment into the renewables sector without first being in receipt of financial resources from investment into sectors such as natural gas.
The latest episode of Law Pod UK features energy expert Thomas Muinzer of Aberdeen University and David Hart QC of 1 Crown Office Row. They discuss the complex provisions of the Climate Change Act 2008, the extent to which the UK has reached its own goals for carbon emission reduction, and two recent challenges in the courts to projects involving GHG emissions:
Airport expansion has taken a long and winding road, not least at Heathrow. But the proponents of the 3rd runway at Heathrow would have been heartened by the Secretary of State’s decision in June 2018 to set out a policy which preferred Heathrow over Gatwick and which was designed to steer planning processes thereafter in support of the new runway.
It is this decision which has just been declared unlawful by the Court of Appeal.
I am afraid this is where the planning jargon starts and the acronyms proliferate. The challenged decision was an Airports National Policy Statement (ANPS). Under planning legislation, an ANPS “sets the fundamental framework within which further decisions will be taken,” as the CA put it in [275]. Those further decisions include the grant of permission for the particular project, done through the Development Consent Order (DCO) process. But you cannot challenge that fundamental framework later in the DCO process; you cannot say later, for instance, that expansion is not necessary at all, or there is a better alternative, say, Gatwick, if the ANPS has decided otherwise.
Civil liberties groups have responded with opprobrium to the Metropolitan Police’s plan to begin using live facial recognition (LFR) cameras on London’s streets as of next month. Purportedly, the Met’s technology compares the structure of faces to those recorded in a database of suspects, and alerts officers on the scene if a match is found. If no alert is generated, the image is deleted. The Met has claimed that the system is 70% effective at spotting wanted suspects and only produced a false identification in one in a thousand cases. In addition, it claimed 80% of people surveyed backed the move.
Infinis Energy Holdings Ltd v HM Treasury and Anor [2016] EWCA Civ 1030 – read judgment
In July 2015 the government announced that it was removing a subsidy for renewable energy. Its decision in fact was to take away the exemption that renewable source electricity enjoyed from a tax known as the climate change levy. We have covered previous episodes in the renewables saga on the UKHRB in various posts.
The appellant, the largest landfill gas operator in the UK and one of the leading onshore wind generators, challenged the government’s removal of the subsidy on the basis of the EU law principles of foreseeability, legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations or proportionality. At first instance the judge upheld the Secretary of State’s decision, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against this finding.
Legal and Factual Background
The subsidy took the form of an exemption for renewable source electricity (RSE) such as that provided by the appellant’s company, from the climate change levy (CCL). (The judgment is replete with these acronyms so it’s worth getting to grips with them before reading.)
Jay J, the judge at first instance, summarised the government’s reasons for removing the exemption. The government wanted to move away from a system of indirect support to one of direct support, the latter being more efficient and cost-effective. The exemption, it was said, benefited foreign generators and there were incentives and support in place that would continue to support domestic generators of renewable energy. The government had considered the impact of this decision on companies such as Infinis, but it was decided that it was outweighed by the public interest. Continue reading →
R (o.t.a Joicey) v. Northumberland County Council , 7 November 2014, Cranston J read judgment
An interesting decision about a Council not supplying some key information about a wind turbine project to the public until very late in the day. Can an objector apply to set the grant of permission aside? Answer: yes, unless the Council can show that it would have inevitably have come to the same conclusion, even if the information had been made public earlier.
Mr Barber, a farmer, wanted to put up one turbine (47m to tip) on his land. The claimant was an objector, another farmer who lives 4km away, and who campaigns about subsidies for renewables – it is him in the pic. The planning application was complicated by the fact that an application for 6 turbines at Barmoor nearby had already been approved (where Mr Joicey is standing), and the rules on noise from wind turbines looks at the total noise affecting local people, not just from Mr Barber’s turbine.
Not too long ago, a friend of mine, Jem Stein, set up a brilliant social enterprise called the Bike Project. It has gone from strength to strength. The project is now loking for (i) new corporate clients for its very reasonable and professional bike repair service and/or bike training service, (ii) new bikes to repair. All details below and in this flier – Adam Wagner
The Bike Project was set up in late 2012 with the primary aim of refurbishing second hand bikes to give to destitute refugees and asylum seekers in London.
Many people come to this country with nothing, often escaping persecution. Whilst a number are forced to live on as little as £35 per week and unable to work as their status as a refugee is approved, those who are able to work find getting around on public transport simply too expensive. The effect that a bike can have is underestimated. It provides access to all that London has to offer: reaching charities that help with food, healthcare, education, and even the lawyer who can aid their application process. Of course, a bike can aid employment, if they are lucky enough to receive refugee status.
North Norfolk District Council v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, [2014] EWHC 279 (Admin), Robin Purchas QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, 14 February 2014 – read judgment
In my last post, I explained how Chris Grayling’s proposed reforms might affect planning and environmental challenges, and, hey presto, within the week, a perfect illustration of one of the points which I was making – with implications for all judicial reviews.
One of the proposals in the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill (see here) is that a challenge to an unlawful decision should fail if it is highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different, had the public authority not acted unlawfully. This compares with the current test which is that the decision should be quashed unless it is inevitable that the decision would be the same.
Cue a proposed wind turbine (86.5m to blade tip) to be placed on one of the highest points of Norfolk and affecting the setting of two Grade I listed buildings (Baconsthorpe Hall and Barningham Hall) and a number of Grade II* churches. The Inspector allowed the turbine on appeal from the local planning authority, which decision the judge has now set aside. Continue reading →
Commission v. UK, Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, 12 September 2013 read opinion here
I did an initial post here summarising this opinion from the A-G to the CJEU saying that the UK was in breach of two EU Directives about environmental assessment and pollution control – the breaches concerned our system for litigation costs. It struck me that there was a lot in the opinion, and after some re-reads, I continue to think so. So I will deal in this post with one aspect, namely the finding that the UK is in breach, in requiring an undertaking as to damages by the claimant to back up the claimant’s interim injunction – in the jargon, a cross-undertaking.
We are back on the well-trodden path ofthe UN-ECE Aarhus Convention to which the EU has subscribed. Article 9(4) requires that there be review procedures in environmental cases which shall provide “adequate and effective remedies including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, timely and not prohibitively expensive.” And a requirement for a cross-undertaking, the A-G concluded, infringed that provision.
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