Search Results for: prisoners/page/40/ministers have been procrastinating on the issue, fearing that it will prove unpopular with the electorate.

Poppy burning, free speech and the £50 question

9 March 2011 by Adam Wagner

Updated | CPS -v- Mohammad Razaul Haque and Emdadur Choudhury – Read judgment

A man has  been found guilty of public order offences for burning poppies and chanting “British soldiers burn in hell” on Remembrance Day. He was fined £50.

The ruling, and in particular the fine, has led to public anger. The Sun called the fine “pathetic” and asked whether Britain is now “deep in a quicksand of political correctness and hand-wringing over human rights“. The Prime Minister has said that we should be “making a stronger statement that that sort of behaviour is completely out of order and has no place in a tolerant society”

The Sun is wrong that Emdadur Choudhury’s low fine had anything to do with human rights; Chief Magistrate Riddle made clear that “invoking the criminal law to interfere with freedom of expression is proportionate“. But two important questions do arise.  First, whether the conviction represents a disproportionate breach of Emdadur Choudhury’s right to freedom of speech. Secondly, if the £50 fine was adequate.

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Court of Appeal refuses anonymity for offender

25 October 2013 by Rosalind English

Fagan, R (on the application of) v Times Newspapers Ltd and others [2013] EWCA Civ 1275 – read judgment

Only “clear and cogent evidence” that it was strictly necessary to keep an offender’s identity confidential would lead a court to derogate from the principle of open justice. The possibility of a media campaign that might affect the offender’s resettlement could not work as a justification for banning reporting about that offender, even though a prominent and inaccurate report about him had already led to harassment of his family.

This was an appeal by a serving prisoner, SF, against the dismissal of his application for anonymity and reporting restrictions in judicial review proceedings.
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Scotland’s new prosecutorial guidance and refugees

21 December 2015 by Guest Contributor

Emily Baxter:  Earlier this month, Scotland’s Lord Advocate announced new prosecution guidelines designed to protect refugees fleeing persecution. These help give effect to the UK’s obligations under Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which states that:

 “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”

Section 31(1) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“the Act”) already provides a defence for refugees who commit certain offences in order to gain entry to the country. The new guidelines provide direction for Scottish prosecutors when considering cases in which this defence may arise. They reiterate the importance of the public interest test for prosecution when considering the particular vulnerabilities of refugees “even when the criteria of section 31 are not strictly met.”

The guidelines also potentially broaden the application of the defence in Scotland, both in terms of the offences to which it applies and the classes of people who may rely on it.

Section 31(4) of the Act states that in Scotland that defence applies to the following offences:

– Fraud

– Uttering a forged document

– Section 4 or 6 of the Identity Documents Act 2010

– Section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971 (deception)

– Section 26 (1)(d) of the Immigration Act 1971 (falsification of documents)and

– Any attempt to commit any of those offences

However, the guidelines state that “other offences may well be covered by the defence if committed to facilitate entry to the United Kingdom in connection with a flight from persecution”, such as charges involving giving false details to facilitate entry.

Additionally, while the Act only refers to a defence for refugees the guidelines suggest the protection afforded by section 31 can be extended to those who are not refugees or asylum seekers. Examples given are stateless persons or those who cannot are granted leave to remain on humanitarian grounds.

The full guidelines are available here: http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/Guidelines_and_Policy/COPFS%20Refugees%20Policy.pdf

Comment:

 The guidelines support and extend the application of the existing defence in section 31(1) of the Act.

However, they also reiterate that the following criteria should be met:

1. The person has come to the UK directly from a country where his or her life or freedom was threatened within the meaning of the Refugee Convention;
2. The person presented him or herself to the authorities in the United Kingdom without delay;
3. The person had good cause for his or her illegal entry or presence;
4. The person has made a claim for asylum as soon as reasonably practicable after arrival in the United Kingdom;
5. If the person stopped in another country outside the UK having left the country where his or her life or freedom was threatened, that he or she could not reasonably have expected to be given protection under the 1951 Convention in that country; and
6. The person claimed asylum after having committed the offence from which he or she seeks protection from conviction.

The first criterion may be particularly difficult for many refugees to prove on the balance of probabilities, and will be controversial in light of the growing “refugee crisis”. For example, in September the European Parliament overwhelmingly voted in favour of a Resolution on Migration and Refugees in Europe 2015/2833(RSP) calling in the European Commission to reform the “Dublin rules” which require refugees to claim asylum in the first EU state the reach. Time will tell as to whether the new guidance has a salutary impact on the practical ability for refugees to settle in Scotland.

Another Iranian bank released by the EU – Wikileaks here as well

7 February 2013 by David Hart KC

Bank Saderat Iran v Council of the European Union, EU General Court, 5 February 2013 read judgement

Last week I posted on the Bank Mellat case where an Iranian Bank succeeded in persuading the General Court to unfreeze its assets from orders made by EU institutions. The Bank Saderat case is virtually identical, and annulment was duly granted by the General Court. But it is troubling that the EU Council should go so wrong in wielding its draconian powers more than once. It does rather support the suspicions of the Bank (common to this and the Bank Mellat case) that pressure was brought to bear on the Council ultimately emanating from the US – hence the Wikileaks cables again – such that the EU did not robustly analyse the assertions made to them before making the orders. Basic errors were made again, and, as will emerge, the EU had no evidence for much of what it said.

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Freedom of expression and offensive political Emails: an important assertion of a fundamental right

8 February 2024 by Guest Contributor

In a significant ruling, the Court of Appeal has quashed the conviction of the appellant for an offence contrary to Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 based on an email written to local councillors in a political dispute. In R v Casserly [2024] EWCA Crim 25, The Court gave guidance on – and placed emphasis on the importance of – directing juries on the right to free speech under Article 10 ECHR. The appeal considered the interaction between s 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and Article 10.

Pigswill and public health: a load of EU bull

7 January 2011 by Rosalind English

[Updated] In the spirit of our coverage of environmental activism in one form or another, here is the website strapline for the  Campaign for Real Farming, which sets out to 

achieve nothing less than the people’s takeover of the food supply

Some of the initiatives for that takeover were being aired at the CRF’s “fringe” farming conference which took place in Oxford this week, voicing polite but forceful protest against the high production objectives of the mainstream Farming Conference in the Examination Schools next door.
According to CRF founder Colin Tudge,  if we are serious about feeding 9 bn people in a few decades’ time, the current food production system, which is designed to make money, has to be dismantled in favour of small scale, labour intensive farming, which is designed to feed people.  Like any reform movement, this “agrarian renaissance” is about wresting power away from existing authorities and it has set its sights on, amongst other things, the constellation of laws and regulations governing the cultivation of food.
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Application for fresh inquest refused

6 April 2021 by Caroline Cross

Farrell v HMC for North East Hampshire [2021] EWHC 778 (Admin)

Applying for a fresh inquest is not straightforward. First, the bereaved have to get permission from the Attorney General. Only once that authority has been granted will they be allowed to apply to the High Court to reopen the inquest (section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988). Often cases are reopened because new evidence has come to light or there has been insufficiency of inquiry, for example where a person is found guilty of the murder of the deceased or new scientific data is provided.[1] Further, it has to be necessary or desirable in the interests of justice that an investigation be (re)opened.

This case does not provide any new legal principles, but it is a strong statement about the importance of testing the evidence before granting the fiat: inquests should not be reopened just to allay the concerns of family members.

(1)   Facts and Judgment

This case has a tragic backstory brought about by a complete breakdown of relations between a mother and her daughter-in-law.

Ray Farrell died on 24 October 2016 aged 53 as a result of malignant mesothelioma, which he developed following asbestos exposure working as a mate’s fitter. He had settled a civil claim with his former employer prior to his death. The documentary-only inquest recorded the cause of death as mesothelioma. There was no post mortem or toxicology, as the histology of mesothelioma was considered sufficient.

Concerns were first raised by his daughter, Kelly, who had not been informed of her father’s illness and therefore was shocked to discover his illness and death. Her suspicions were raised by two matters: two carrier bags full of medicines awaiting disposal following his death and a response from the Senior Coroner to her email that there were no toxicology or blood samples because Mr Farrell’s wife, and her stepmother, was very anxious to avoid a post mortem. In fact, it was Mr Farrell who did not want a post mortem.

Her concerns were then taken up by Ray’s mother, Mrs Farrell. She applied for a fresh inquest on the basis that Mr Farrell’s wife, Amanda Burden, hastened his death by deliberately giving him inappropriate medication. Ms Burden and Mr Farrell had been married in February 2016, although they had been in a relationship for eight years. She was, Mrs Farrell alleged, motivated by financial gain. Mrs Farrell applied with the fiat of the Attorney General under s.13 of the Coroners Act 1988 for the quashing of the original inquest due to a lack of appropriate investigation. The Senior Coroner supported the fiat, although doubted whether the outcome would be any different.

Article 8: Test for Family Life arising out of Foster Care is no different to that of “Birth Families”

24 March 2020 by Charlotte Gilmartin

Uddin v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 338 – read judgment

On 12 March 2020 a unanimous Court of Appeal led by Sir Ernest Ryder (Senior President of the Tribunals), together with Lord Justice Bean and Lady Justice King, allowed the Appellant’s appeal against the First tier Tribunal (“FtT”) and Upper Tribunal (“UT”)’s decisions upholding the refusal of his application for leave to remain.

The case concerns the correct approach to the interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) in circumstances arising out of a foster care relationship where the person who had received or continued to receive that care is now an adult.

The Weekly Round-Up: Climate Inaction Breaches Human Rights, EU Asylum Pact Passed, & Arizona Reinstates 1864 Abortion Law

17 April 2024 by Catherine Churchill

In the News

Dr Hilary Cass, Chair of the Independent Review of gender identity services for children and young people, submitted her final report last Wednesday to NHS England.  The Cass Review was commissioned in 2020 to look into the effectiveness of the gender care services provided to young people by the NHS. The report stressed that gender-affirming care is an extremely poorly researched area, and that the “toxicity” of the conversation surrounding transgender identity was severely hampering competent medical care for trans youth. Further research studies commissioned by the review were “thwarted” by the lack of cooperation from NHS gender care services, and the little evidence already available was insufficient to suggest that, in their current state, NHS gender services are producing positive outcomes. The report has made a total of 32 recommendations to the NHS – notably, Cass argues for a more holistic approach to gender care for children, factoring in support for mental health and neurodiversity. Taking a non-partisan stance, Cass noted in her report that ‘for some, the best outcome will be transition, whereas others may resolve their distress in other ways. Some may transition and then de/retransition and/or experience regret. The NHS needs to care for all those seeking support.’ The report follows news last month that puberty blockers will no longer be a routinely available treatment option on the NHS for children with gender dysphoria.

The Government announced last week that they will be closing another 150 asylum hotels by the beginning of May, following the closure of 50 in January and a further 50 by March. Home Secretary James Cleverly stated that the process will ‘keep going until the last hotel is closed’. Concerns have been raised regarding the impact that the asylum hotel closures may have on housing services for local councils – Chair of the Local Government Association, Shaun Davies, has suggested that ‘councils are becoming increasingly concerned over the numbers of asylum seekers presenting as homeless, which is likely to dramatically increase when Home Office accommodation is withdrawn.’ Charity Refugee Council published a report last week revealing that official Government statistics show a 239% increase in the number of households requiring homelessness support from local authorities following eviction from Home Office asylum support accommodation. The Government statement from last week ends: ‘Ultimately, the best way to save money is by deterring people from coming to the UK illegally in the first place, and our partnership with Rwanda intends to do just that’.

The European Parliament voted to pass a new pact on migration and asylum last Thursday. The new laws brought in through the pact have been ten years in the making and are intended to provide a ‘robust legislative framework’ that ‘puts humanity first’. The pact, comprised of a series of 5 closely related laws, was passed by a narrow margin – the laws received an average of 300 votes for to 270 against. The laws cover a variety of issues including biometric data collection, detention regulations, and national security. The pact establishes a system of ‘mandatory solidarity’ between EU member states, seeking implement procedures which will divide responsibility for migration throughout the EU bloc. The pact has already been criticised on both sides of the political spectrum: Amnesty International have claimed the pact will cause a ‘surge in suffering’, while Jordan Bardella, President of France’s far-right party National Rally, called the pact ‘terrible’ and asked voters to give it the ‘worst possible defeat’ when France heads to the polls in June. The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, admitted that the pact ‘will not solve everything overnight’, but argued that ‘it is 10 giant leaps forward’.

In the Courts

Last Tuesday, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment that, for the first time, held that government climate inaction constituted a breach of human rights under the ECHR. A group of Swiss older women – as part of the activist group KlimaSeniorinnen, Senior Women for Climate Protection – brought the case to the Court. They alleged that Switzerland’s poor climate policies has put them at increased risk of death during heat waves caused by climate change. The judgment confirms that the convention places countries under positive obligations to take effective and timely measures to fight climate change; finding a breach of Article 8 by sixteen votes to one, the Court held that Article 8 confers a right upon citizens to be protected from the ‘serious adverse effects of climate change on lives, health, wellbeing, and quality of life’. The Court also found unanimously that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 (access to court) as domestic courts in Switzerland had not taken the complaints of the KlimaSeniorinnen sufficiently seriously. Though the Court also dismissed two other cases making similar arguments for issues of admissibility, six other climate cases previously adjourned can now be fully considered by the Court in light of this historic decision. The case was discussed in more detail earlier this week on the latest episode of Law Pod UK, available here.

The Supreme Court of Arizona ruled last Tuesday that a near-total ban on abortion can come back into force following the repeal of Roe v Wade. The law in question was originally established in 1864 and bans all abortions with no exceptions but to save a woman’s life. It was stated in judgment that the case is only one of ‘statutory interpretation – it does not rest on the justices’ morals or public policy views regarding abortion; nor does it rest on [the law’s] constitutionality, which is not before us’. The judges ruled that, in the absence of any legislation restricting the law or authorising abortion, and in light of the repeal of Roe v Wade, the law was enforceable. Despite this, the Supreme Court did delay enforcement for two weeks to allow the plaintiffs to commence further challenges against the law – in particular with regard to its constitutionality – in the lower courts. Katie Hobbs, Governor of Arizona, has come out against the judgment. In an official statement released after the ruling, she stated: ‘I will not let overzealous county attorneys take this as an opportunity to target any individual. As long as I am Governor, no Arizonan will be prosecuted by extremist county attorneys for seeking abortion care’. She has reiterated that an Executive Order she passed last year will continue to stand, which centralises all abortion-related prosecutions to Democrat Attorney General, Kris Mayes, and prohibits Arizona state agencies from assisting in abortion-related investigations.

In a judgment handed down by the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) last week, the Court held that Home Office decisions to refuse to grant family reunion visas to refugees feeling Gaza without biometric checks were ‘irrational and unreasonable’. The applicants had requested their applications be substantively decided in advance of the submission of biometric data, since, as a result of the ongoing conflict, the visa centre in Gaza is not functioning. The nearest centre conducting biometric checks is in Cairo, Egypt. The Home Office policy required that for visas to be approved without biometric data, applicants must prove they face a ‘personal risk of harm, which is separate to the level of risk faced by the wider population’. Jackson J stated that he does ‘not consider that in the context of the conflict in Gaza […] that it is necessary for a person to show that they are specifically targeted to be able to establish that they are at risk due to their personal circumstances.’ The Court thus held that the Home Office policy was a disproportionate infringement on the Palestinian families’ right to private and family life, and thus in breach of Article 8 ECHR.

The book that all family practitioners wish they had written

21 July 2011 by Guest Contributor

Review: Family Courts without a Lawyer: A Handbook for Litigants in Person – Lucy Reed – Buy book here

Family Courts without a Lawyer : A Handbook for Litigants in Person is written by Lucy Reed, barrister and author of the Pink Tape blog. A title that may, on its first reading, strike fear into the heart of family lawyers and, hopefully, give a sense of relief to many litigants in person. However, this is the book that all family practitioners wish they had written and which litigants in person may consider buying, its aim being to make any interaction with the Family Courts, for the uninitiated, as stress free as possible.

The book is described as providing “as practical tool to help you in court and a reference to help you understand what happens in family proceedings, whether or not you have a lawyer”. It does not suggest going to court as a litigant in person is to be preferred over attending at court with a lawyer, nor does it suggest the opposite; it allows the reader freedom of choice.

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NHS Nurse banned from wearing crucifix at work loses discrimination claim

7 April 2010 by Adam Wagner

Shirley Chaplin, an NHS nurse who was moved to a desk job for wearing a crucifix at work, has lost her employment discrimination claim against the NHS.

The Employment Tribunal judgment is not available at present, but The Times reports:

John Hollow, the tribunal chairman, ruled that the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital had acted reasonably in trying to reach a compromise. It had argued that the objection to the crucifix, which Mrs Chaplin, from Kenn, near Exeter, had worn for 30 years, was based on health and safety concerns about patients grabbing the necklace, not religion.

According to the Christian Legal Centre (CLC), which strongly supports Ms. Chaplin’s case, the Tribunal held that Mrs Chaplin had not been indirectly discriminated against by the application of the uniform policy because she could not prove she was part of a group affected by the policy.

The Tribunal applied the reasoning in the previous case of Nadia Eweida v British Airways [2009] EWCA Civ 1025. Ms Ewieda’s claim also involved her being banned from wearing a Christian cross at work, in that case at British Airways. The Court of Appeal made clear that in an indirect discrimination cases brought under Reg. 3(1) of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, it was necessary to show that there had to be evidence of a “group disadvantage”, i.e. that more than one person had been affected by the policy. Ms Eweida could not establish a ‘group’ and as such her case failed.

The CLC claim that “the Tribunal has now decided that a group must be more than two people as well—leaving the law in a ludicrous level of uncertainty”. Ms Chaplin has already said she plans to appeal the decision.

Read more:

• Nadia Eweida v British Airways [2009] EWCA Civ 1025
• Other posts on Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion)
• Coverage in The Guardian and The Times
• Shirley Chaplin on BBC Radio 4’s Today Program reacting to the judgment (Audio)

Joint Enterprise press release from the Appellant’s solicitors

18 February 2016 by Rosalind English

It is important to note that the draft judgment of the Supreme Court was embargoed from all apart from solicitors and counsel until today so our client, Ameen Jogee, and his family only found out about our success this morning. There are also no facilities for Ameen to attend court so his family have authorised us to release this statement: 

1. We are glad our arguments on the law were accepted by the court and very pleased that the court took this opportunity to correct a grossly erroneous tangent of law and remove “parasitic accessorial liability” (often referred to as “joint enterprise”) from our law.
   1. The law had incorrectly and unfairly developed to convict secondary parties on the basis of mere “foresight or contemplation” of what someone else might do. This over-criminalised secondary parties, particularly young people like Ameen Jogee.
   2. The consequence was that people were convicted of serious offences, committed by others, and imprisoned for lengthy periods. Primarily, we suggested to the Court that there should be a return to the foundational law encapsulated in cases before the tangent created by joint enterprise. Our primary submission at the hearing in October 2015 was that the true test for accessorial liability is knowledge of the essential matters of that offence or that type of offence and acts which demonstrate an intention to assist or encourage that offence or that type of offence. Such a formulation can adapt to individuals assisting each other or cases where there is evidence of a common plan. The Supreme Court judgment appears to adopt our submissions.

2. We are delighted for Ameen and his family and the many other families of those affected by joint enterprise who have been waiting on this judgment.
3. This judgment does not refer in detail to all the material placed before the court so future cases and appeals must take care to ensure that the errors are not repeated.
4. Internationally it is vital that the errors created by joint enterprise are also corrected.
5. We would like to thank our excellent staff, our team of counsel Felicity Gerry QC and Catarina Sjölin of 36, Bedford Row and Adam Wagner and Diarmuid Laffan of 1 Crown Office Row. We would also like to thank the teams for Mr Ruddock and the interveners (Just for Kids Law and JengBA). Many of the lawyers involved have worked pro bono for all or some of the time on this difficult case.
6. A special thank you to Dr Matt Dyson of Trinity College Cambridge whose meticulous research over 500 years of law enabled us to prove what the law was and how it went wrong. Also thank you to Beatrice Krebs from the University of Reading for her comparative work on authorisation which enabled us to place alternative options before the court, and to Professor Luke McNamara from the University of Wollongong whose 2014 paper identified the probability issues from an Australian perspective, which was an important part of this appeal.
7. We must now focus on the final orders which are not due for some weeks. The Court is yet to decide what effect its conclusions on the principles of joint enterprise will have on our client’s specific case.
8. If you want an easy read on the case, see these 2 blogs by Catarina Sjölin and Felicity Gerry QC for Nottingham Law School: http://blogs.ntu.ac.uk/nlsblog/tag/joint-enterprise/
9. In the words of Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG “To hold an accused liable for murder merely on the foresight of a possibility is fundamentally unjust. It may not be truly a fictitious or ‘constructive liability’. But it countenances what is ‘undoubtedly a lesser form of mens rea’. It is a form that is an exception to the normal requirements of criminal liability. And it introduces a serious disharmony in the law, particularly as that law affects the liability of secondary offenders to conviction for murder upon this basis”.
10. We started this case looking for an alternative probability test for those who were not accused of direct participation with shared intention, along the way we identified the legal errors which had been perpetuated over many years.

We are glad to have played a role in correcting this unjust law.

IVF Doctor not liable for failing to warn parents of genetic disorder in child – Australian Supreme Court

21 May 2013 by Rosalind English

Waller v James  [2013] NSWSC 497 (6 May 2013) – read judgment

So-called “wrongful birth” cases – where parents claim for the costs of bringing up a child that has been born as a result of the hospital’s alleged negligence – have long been the subject of heated debate.

Since 1999 (MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board) such damages have been refused on grounds of public policy – for the birth of a healthy baby, that is. As far as disabled children are concerned, parents can the additional costs attributable to the disability (Parkinson v St James and Seacroft NHS Trust).  Now that so much more can be predicted with a high level of certainty from pre-birth, even pre-conception genetic tests, where do we stand on public policy in wrongful birth cases where the negligence not so much in failure to treat (failed vasectomies etc) but failure to inform? This Australian case gives some indication of the way the courts may approach such questions.

Background facts

Keeden Waller was conceived by IVF using the Wallers’ own gametes. There was a fifty percent chance that he would inherit from his father a blood disorder called antithrombin deficiency (ATD), a condition that affects the body’s normal blood clotting ability and leads to an increased risk of thrombosis. Keeden suffered a stroke a few days after his birth resulting in severe disabilities, which his parents, Lawrence and Deborah Waller, alleged was the result of ATD. They brought a claim in damages against their doctor for the care of their disabled son and psychological harm to themselves.
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Mortier v. Belgium: A Landmark Decision on Euthanasia in the Case of Mental Illness

24 October 2022 by Guest Contributor

In this guest post, Dr Ilaria Bertini, Research Fellow at Bios Centre, examines the recent decision of a Chamber of the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights in Mortier v. Belgium, which examined Belgian law relating to euthanasia.

Introduction

The European Court of Human Rights recently delivered a landmark judgment, Mortier v. Belgium (78017/17), on a case of euthanasia.

The case concerns an adult Belgian citizen who underwent a euthanasia procedure at a time when she was suffering from severe depression, without her son or daughter being properly informed. Hence her son, Tom Mortier, claimed that the government failed to protect both her right to life (art. 2 ECHR) and her right to respect for private and family life (art. 8 ECHR).

According to the Belgian Act on Euthanasia (28^th May 2002) it is legal for a physician to perform euthanasia if the following three criteria are met: the patient is legally competent and conscious at the time of the request, the request is made autonomously without external pressure, and the patient is suffering from a “medically futile condition of constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that cannot be alleviated, resulting from a serious and incurable disorder caused by illness or accident.” An independent second opinion might be needed to assess the patient’s willingness to die. Once the euthanasia is approved, there is a cooling off period of one month before the act takes place. Afterwards a Commission of 16 persons seeks to check all the reports to make sure that the procedure has complied with the law. 

The Weekly Round-Up: UK’s wrongful imprisonment compensation scheme is legal and campaigners call for oversight of inquiries

17 June 2024 by Kate Litman

In UK News

A report published by the Runnymede Trust on Monday found that black people, and especially black children, are subject to disproportionate rates of strip search across all police forces in England and Wales. The report analysed Home Office data and concluded that black children are 6.5 times more likely to be subject to a strip search than white children, and black adults 4.7 times more likely than white adults. The report described how strip searching “can be severely traumatic and humiliating, particularly for children, with long lasting effects such as anxiety, depression and lower educational attainment”. The Home Office recently a conducted a consultation on proposed reforms to police codes of practice which would create additional protections for children subjected to strip searches, noting that “too often… safeguarding and child protection have not been sufficiently prioritised”. The government’s response is due to be published later this year.

It was the seventh anniversary of the Grenfell Tower fire on Friday.  Campaigners from the Infected Blood scandal and the COVID-19 Bereaved Families group joined Grenfell United to call for a national body to scrutinise the implementation of recommendations made following inquests and inquiries. Campaigners said that the lack of oversight prevents lessons being learnt that could prevent future deaths, and argued that if recommendations made by a coroner following the 2009 Lakanal House fire had been implemented, the Grenfell Tower fire might have been avoided. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Phase 2 Report will be published on 4 September. 

In international news

Lord Sumption warned that Hong Kong is “slowly becoming a totalitarian state” in an opinion piece explaining his decision to resign from the territory’s final court of appeal. Lord Sumption explained that the “oppressive atmosphere” and challenges such as the “illiberal” national security legislation meant he felt it was no longer realistic to hope that he could help sustain the rule of law as an overseas judge. The government of Hong Kong issued a statement refuting Lord Summation’s comments, stating that any claims of political pressure on judges were “totally baseless”. 

In the courts 

On Tuesday the European Court of Human Rights handed down judgment in Nealon and Hallam v United Kingdom. Nealon and Hallam spent 17 and 7 years in prison respectively before their convictions were quashed by the Court of Appeal. The two were denied compensation for the time they had spent in prison because they could not prove their innocence beyond all reasonable doubt. The pair argued that once their convictions had been overturned, they should be presumed innocent and that the compensation scheme therefore violated their Article 6 rights. The Court found that Article 6 was engaged, but a majority of 12 found that that the UK’s compensation rules did not breach the presumption of innocence in practice. The Court held that requiring an applicant to show beyond all reasonable doubt that they did not commit an offence was not tantamount to a positive finding that they did the commit the offence. Further, the majority commented that it was not the Court’s role to “determine how States should translate into material terms the moral obligation they might owe to persons who had been wrongfully convicted”. A dissenting judgment of five judges noted that the test in the UK was “virtually insurmountable” and revealed a “highly undesirable attitude towards the presumption of innocence”.