We use cookies to enhance your browsing experience. If you continue to use our website we will take this to mean that you agree to our use of cookies. If you want to find out more, please view our cookie policy. Accept and Hide [x]
Moore v British Waterways Board [2013] EWCA Civ 73 – read judgment
A boat owner has won his appeal against the British Waterways Board preventing him from mooring his boats alongside his land on a tidal stretch of the Grand Canal. Although he had no common law right to permanently moor the boats, he had committed no actionable wrong in doing so, and they were therefore not moored “without lawful authority” within the meaning of the British Waterways Act 1983. This judgment is an interesting and important endorsement of the principle in English law that everything is permitted except what is expressly forbidden.
This key “rule of law” principle applies as much to the BWB as it does to the police and other law enforcement agencies. Continue reading →
Demonstrators protest government deportation flights outside Downing Street. Credit: The Guardian.
The last week provided no shortage of legal controversy, and posed the author of this blog considerable difficulty when trying to identify which developments deserved the most prominence. In analysing this avalanche of legal news, however, certain key themes started to develop.
The Appellant, Harry Miller, succeeded in this appeal. Image: The Guardian
In R (Harry Miller) v The College of Policing [2021] EWCA Civ 1926, the Court of Appeal ruled that current police guidance on the recording of ‘hate incidents’ unlawfully interferes with the right to freedom of expression. The decision overturns a 2020 ruling by the High Court in which Mr Miller’s challenge to the lawfulness of the Hate Crime Operational Guidance was dismissed (discussed previously on this Blog here).
Facts
The central issue raised in the appeal is the lawfulness of certain parts of the Hate Crime Operational Guidance. The Guidance, issued in 2014 by the College of Policing, sets out the national policy in relation to the monitoring and recording of what are described as “non-crime hate incidents”. At the root of the challenge is the policy of “perception-based recording”, which states that non-crime hate incidents must be recorded by the police as such (against the named person allegedly responsible) if the incident is subjectively perceived by the “victim or any other person to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice against a person who is transgender or perceived to be transgender” and irrespective of any evidence of the “hate” element.
Mr Miller, who is described as having “gender critical” beliefs, was reported to Humberside Police by Mrs B in January 2019 for posting comments on his Twitter account, which she asserted were “designed to cause deep offence and show his hatred for the transgender community.” Whilst there was no evidence of a criminal offence, the incident was recorded as a “hate incident” and Mr Miller was visited at work by a police officer who told him to “check his thinking.” Mr Miller subsequently brought a claim for judicial review.
R (o.t.a P & others) v. Secretary of State for Home Department & others [2017] EWCA Civ 321, Court of Appeal, 3 May 2017 – read judgment
The Court of Appeal has upheld challenges to the system of the police retaining information about past misconduct. It held that the system, even after a re-boot in 2013 in response to an earlier successful challenge, remains non-compliant with Article 8.
The problem is well summarised by Leveson P in the first paragraph of the judgment, namely the interface between a system of rehabilitation of offenders and the minimisation of risk to the public caused by the employment of those with misconduct in their pasts.
R v Long, Bowers and Cole [2020] EWCA Crim 1729 (16 December 2020) — judgment here
The Court of Appeal held yesterday morning that the sentences of the three men responsible for the manslaughter of PC Harper in 2019 were neither ‘unduly lenient’ nor ‘manifestly excessive’. The Court rejected applications from both the Defendants and the Attorney General (AG), meaning there will be no substantive change to the manslaughter sentences passed at first instance. The Court also refused to grant permission to two of the co-defendants to appeal against their convictions.
BACKGROUND
The case concerned the killing of PC Andrew Harper which in August 2019. PC Harper was killed as he tried to apprehend the three defendants, all part of a group of thieves in the process of stealing a quad bike. As the defendants made off at speed in a car driven by the first Defendant (Henry Long), PC Harper was caught and dragged for more than a mile behind the car.
Long (18 at the time, now 19) alongside co-defendants Albert Bowers (17 now 18) and Jessie Cole (17 now 18), were jointly charged with conspiracy to steal, murder and manslaughter. In the lead-up to trial, all three pleaded guilty to the conspiracy to steal, and Long pleaded guilty to manslaughter. On 24 July 2020, after a 5-week trial at the Central Criminal Court, all three were acquitted of murder, but Bowers and Cole were found to be guilty of manslaughter.
The outcome means that, whilst the jury could be sure that PC Harper died as a consequence of the unlawful acts of the Defendants, they could not be sure that the Defendants actually intended to kill anyone, or to cause anyone really serious harm. In this instance, it means that the jury will have had at least some reasonable doubt as to whether the Defendants knew that they were dragging PC Harper behind them as they drove away.
On 31 July 2020, Long received an extended determinate sentence of 16 years with an extended licence period of 3 years. Bowers and Cole were sentenced to 13 years detention in a Young Offenders Institution. Concurrent sentences were imposed in respect of the conspiracy to steal (32 months for Long, and 38 months for Bowers and Cole).
THE COURT OF APPEAL
There were three applications before the Court of Appeal:
Bowers and Cole applied for leave to appeal against their convictions of the offence of manslaughter;
The Attorney-General (“AG”) applied for leave to refer the sentences arguing that all three were unduly lenient; and
All three defendants sought leave to appeal their respective sentences.
On 29/10/2020, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against an aggravated burglary conviction brought by a teenage victim of human trafficking.
The applicant’s personal circumstances, including as a victim of trafficking, were properly reflected by way of mitigation of sentence. But his culpability and criminality were not extinguished or so diminished as to lead to the conclusion that he would or might not have been prosecuted.
In a significant ruling, the Court of Appeal has quashed the conviction of the appellant for an offence contrary to Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 based on an email written to local councillors in a political dispute. In R v Casserly [2024] EWCA Crim 25, The Court gave guidance on – and placed emphasis on the importance of – directing juries on the right to free speech under Article 10 ECHR. The appeal considered the interaction between s 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and Article 10.
Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your weekly bulletin of human rights news. The full list of links can be found here. You can also find our table of human rights cases here and previous roundups here.
Same-sex marriage continued to dominate the news this week, with the Church making its views known on the government’s proposals. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has been making delicate decisions about the rights of young persons to anonymity in proceedings relating to allegations of abuse. It would not be a newsworthy week were there not some reference to prisoner voting, and this week the UK was given a pre-emptive warning by the Council of Europe on the matter. Finally, commentators have been anticipating the imminent publication of the findings of the Commission on a Bill of Rights.
Seton v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55287/10, 31 March 2016 – read judgment.
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has held that the use of telephone recordings as evidence in a criminal trial, despite the inability of the accused to challenge the caller, did not violate his rights under Article 6, ECHR. This judgment follows a number of Grand Chamber judgments on similar issues that have altered the ECtHR’s stance on the subject of absent witness evidence.
by Fraser Simpson
Background
The applicant, Mr Seton, was on trial for murder. Prior to the trial, he submitted a defence statement stating that he believed that the murder had been carried out by Mr Pearman. The applicant alleged that he had previously been involved in a drug deal with Mr Pearman and the victim.
Mr Pearman, who was at the time imprisoned for drug dealing, was interviewed by the police but he refused to cooperate and answered “no comment” to all questions. Following these interviews, Mr Pearman phoned his wife and son from the prison and stated that he had never heard of the applicant and had no knowledge of the murder. These calls were recorded – a standard practice that Mr Pearman would have been aware of.
During the applicant’s trial for murder, it was accepted that the primary issue to be determined by the jury was whether the applicant or Mr Pearman had committed the murder. Mr Pearman had refused to attend the trial or make a formal witness statement. Accordingly, the prosecution sought to rely upon these recordings to disprove the applicant’s version of events. The trial judge, in deciding whether the recordings could be admitted as evidence, referred to s.114, Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“CJA 2003″). After considering the relevant considerations – such as the probative value of the evidence, whether it was self-serving, the reliability of the recording, and the prejudice that the applicant would face if it were to be admitted – the judge decided that the recordings could be relied upon during the trial. In summing up, the trial judge outlined the limitations of the telephone recordings and stated that it was up to the jury, in light of these limitations, to decide the relevant weight to be attached to the recordings. The applicant was subsequently convicted by the jury and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The applicant unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal (see, Seton v. R., [2010] EWCA Crim 450). The Court of Appeal considered that compelling Mr Pearman to attend the trial, which was an option, would have “been a fruitless exercise”. Mr Pearman could have invoked the protection against self-incrimination and had consistently refused to cooperate so the “prospect of any sensible evidence being given by him was, on a realistic view, nil” (paragraph 22 of Court of Appeal judgment). The Court of Appeal would only interfere with the trial judge’s decision if the decision was “marred by legal error, or by a failure to take relevant matters into account or it is such that the judge could not sensibly have made”. The Court of Appeal held that the relevant consideration under s.114(2), CJA 2003 had been covered by the trial judge and there were no other grounds to overturn the conviction.
Further, the Court of Appeal commented on the safety of the conviction. Due to the “overwhelming” evidence against the applicant, including eye-witness accounts, telephone call records between the applicant and the victim and cell site location evidence placing the applicant in the vicinity of the murder, the conviction was deemed to be safe.
The Strasbourg Court
The applicant applied to the European Court of Human Rights and alleged that his right to a fair trial within Article 6(1) and 6(3)(d) had been violated. Article 6(1) includes the right to a fair hearing when facing criminal charges whilst Article 6(3)(d) ensures that the individual has the right:
“to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him”
The default position is that witness evidence should be provided during the trial and the accused should have the opportunity to challenge this evidence during this trial. However, the use of witness evidence when the witness does not attend the trial does not automatically result in a violation of Article 6(1) and 6(3)(d). The Grand Chamber has previously set out specific guidance in assessing whether the use of such evidence complies with Article 6. In Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom (GC), Application nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 15 December 2011 (see paragraphs 118-151), the Grand Chamber outlined a general three-part process:
Consider whether good reasons exist for the absence of the witness.
Consider whether the evidence was the “sole or decisive” decisive evidence against the accused.
Assess the existence of sufficient counterbalancing factors and procedural safeguards which allow the reliability of the evidence to be fairly and properly tested.
This process was clarified in Schatschaschwili v. Germany (GC), Application no. 9154/10, 15 December 2015. The Grand Chamber stated that the lack of good reasons for lack of attendance was not sufficient to result in a violation of Article 6, but it was a strong factor to be considered when assessing the overall fairness of the proceedings (paragraph 113). Additionally, the necessary extent of counterbalancing factors depends upon the weight of the evidence provided by the absent witness in the overall context of the proceedings (paragraph 116).
Were there good reasons for the non-attendance of Mr Pearman? (paragraphs 61-62)
The ECtHR has previously adopted a robust approach to assessing whether “good reasons” existed for the absence of the witness at the trial. Previously, even in situations where the witness was located in another country (Gabrielyan v. Armenia, Application no. 8088/05, 10 April 2012), or could not be located at all (Lučić v. Croatia, Application no. 5699/11, 27 February 2014), the ECtHR have held that the authorities have failed to satisfy their duty to secure attendance of the witness. In light of this, the ECtHR unsurprisingly concluded that no good reasons existed for Mr Pearman being absent from the trial. The trial court could have compelled Mr Pearman to attend the trial and whilst they could not compel him to give evidence, due to his right to silence, the jury would have at least been able to assess his demeanour when facing cross-examination.
Was the evidence of Mr Pearman the “sole or decisive” evidence? (Paragraphs 63-64)
The ECtHR considered that the recorded telephone calls could not be considered the “sole or decisive” evidence in the criminal trial. The Court of Appeal, in commenting on the safeness of the conviction, had listed the other “overwhelming” evidence against the applicant. However, the evidence had been described as “important” by the trial judge. Accordingly, following the Grand Chamber decision in Schatschaschwili, it was necessary to consider whether sufficient counterbalancing factors existed during the trial.
Did sufficient counterbalancing factors exist? (Paragraphs 65-68)
In the present case, the ECtHR highlighted the detailed legislative scheme intended to ensure that evidence from the absent witness could only be relied upon in limited circumstances. The need to assess the significance of the evidence, its reliability, and the prejudice that the applicant would face as a result of being unable to challenge the witness was an important procedural safeguard intended to uphold respect for the applicant’s rights. Additionally, the instruction of the judge as to the limitations of the evidence was another important counterbalancing factor.
As clarified by the Grand Chamber in Schatschaschwili, the assessment of counterbalancing factors is a relative one – fewer factors will be required if the evidence provided by the absent witness is not especially important. In light of the existence of separate “overwhelming” evidence against the accused, the counterbalancing factors in the present case were considered sufficient.
In conclusion, the ECtHR decided that the criminal proceedings as a whole had been fair. Having following the procedure outlined in Al-Khawaja, the ECtHR concluded that there had been no violation of Article 6.
Comment
This decision of the ECtHR is the consequence of previous Grand Chamber decisions tending to dilute the procedural protections contained within Article 6(3). The right to examine witnesses has slowly been weakened in favour of a more holistic approach that focusses upon the overall fairness of the proceedings instead of potential individual deficiencies.
When considering the three part test in Al-Khawaja, the first step – whether good reasons existed for the non-attendance of the witness – was previously considered determinative. If no good reasons existed, then Article 6 had been violated. Such a stance has even been adopted by the ECtHR following the judgment in Al-Khawaja and only months before the decision in Schatschaschwili (see Karpyuk and Others v. Ukraine, Application nos. 30582/04 and 32152/04, 6 October 2015, paragraph 123). Additionally, if such good reasons did exist but the evidence was the “sole or decisive” evidence in the case, then Article 6 had also been violated (Saïdi v. France, Application no. 14647/89, 20 September 1993, paragraph 44). Now, the position is that these considerations are merely factors that can be balanced away.
But the balancing process places an undue weight upon the existence of other incriminating evidence against the accused. The position appears to be that it is more acceptable to deny the accused the right to cross-examine a witness if the prosecution’s case against him/her is strong. This move towards focussing on the accuracy of the verdict, as opposed to upholding the rights of individuals, is a potentially worrying development. Indeed, the contemporary Strasbourg position appears, in effect, similar to the Court of Appeal’s consideration of the safety of the conviction.
It could be argued that the ECtHR may be surrendering its role as an upholder of fundamental human rights and moving towards that of an international criminal appeal court.
Regina v Budimir and another; Interfact Ltd v Liverpool City Council [2010] EWCA Crim 148; [2010] EWHC 1604 (Admin); [2010] WLR (D) 166
CA and DC: Lord Judge CJ, David Clarke, Lloyd Jones JJ: 29 June 2010 – read judgment
A new High Court decision has struck a blow for legal certainty and enforced the sometimes forgotten right under human rights law against retrospective criminal sanctions, which applies even in cases where the UK had failed to enact European Community legislation. In this case, the lack of retroactivity meant that a company and two men could not have their convictions for supplying videos illegally quashed.
The High Court held that where defendants had been convicted of criminal offences under national legislation which was unenforceable owing to a failure by the UK to comply with a pre-enactment procedural requirement imposed by EU law, it was not incumbent upon the Court of Appeal to re-open their cases out of time unless their convictions had given rise to any substantial injustice.
The Video Recordings Act 1984 made it an offence to supply pornographic videos “from” rather than “in” a licensed sex shop (Section 12); it was also an offence under the Act (Section 10 (1)) to supply videos with no classification certificate. The applicants had been convicted under these sections in 2004 and 2008 respectively.
R v M(L) and others [2010] EWCA Crim 2327; [2010] WLR(D) 266 – Read judgment
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has provided further guidance to prosecutors on whether or not they should bring charges against victims of human trafficking who go on to commit crimes. In the same judgment, the Court considered the extent of the obligation on the police to refer such victims to specialist agencies.
The New York Times reports that after years of promising leads gone cold, the final piece of evidence which led to Osama Bin Laden was found by interrogating detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Given the rough interrogation techniques which were in use at the prison camp, the killing has reopened the debate over torture, and whether it is ever justified.
Blogger David Allen Green, amongst others, asks whether the Bin Laden scenario may amount to an exception to the “otherwise absolute rule” that torture is wrong. I would like to pose a slightly different question: on the basis of current UK law, would it have been lawful for UK authorities to use information obtained under torture to capture or kill a known terrorist?
Oakes and others v R [2012] EWCA Crim 2435 – read judgment
The imposition of whole life orders for extremely serious crimes does not violate the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3.
Until relatively recently, the Secretary of State decided the minimum term to be served by a “lifer” – a defendant who subjected to a sentence of life imprisonment. This is now a matter for the sentencing judge whose jurisdiction is conferred by the 2003 Criminal Justice Act. Schedule 21 para 4 allows judges to order a whole life minimum term, a jurisdiction of last resort in cases of exceptional criminality.
It was submitted in these conjoined appeals that this provision contravenes Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Not so, said the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division.
I wrote about the launch of these proceedings earlier this year (Legal Challenge to Lockdown) where Mr Dolan was refused permission to appeal the refusal of his application for judicial review. (see Dominic Ruck Keene’s post on that decision). Since then UKHRB has been covering this and similar challenges closely: see here and here, as well as alerting our readers to cases in other countries: New Zealand, and South Africa. My recent post on “vaccine hesitancy” and proposals for mandatory Covid-19 vaccines has attracted a considerable number of readers and comments.
Getting back to the case in hand, this latest defeat for Dolan’s team is slightly more complicated. The Court of Appeal’s ruling can be summarised briefly, but anyone wanting to be reminded of the details will do well to go back to Emmet Coldrick’s enlightening series on the earlier stages of this case and the arguments raised by the appellants in Part 1 and Part 2.
Human trafficking is internationally recognised as threatening human rights and the fundamental values of democratic societies. States have taken action to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking and to provide support to victims of what is the third largest illicit money-making venture in the world. But what happens when the victims of trafficking commit a crime themselves? Should they be prosecuted? What factors are relevant in this assessment? And which arm of the State should the assessment of whether someone is a victim of trafficking be entrusted to? This is the first time the European Court of Human Rights has tackled these questions. The Court found that the UK had breached its obligations under articles 4 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights by prosecuting two Vietnamese children who were potential victims of trafficking.
Background
It was only at the turn of the century that the first comprehensive international instrument on human trafficking was adopted. The Palermo Protocol established a number of obligations to prevent trafficking, punish traffickers and protect victims of trafficking. It defines trafficking as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs
There are therefore three elements to trafficking: (i) action (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt); (ii) means (threat or use of force or other forms of coercion etc.); and (iii) purpose (exploitation). When trafficking involves a child, the ‘means’ element of the test does not apply.
This blog is maintained for information purposes only. It is not intended to be a source of legal advice and must not be relied upon as such. Blog posts reflect the views and opinions of their individual authors, not of chambers as a whole.
Our privacy policy can be found on our ‘subscribe’ page or by clicking here.
Moore v British Waterways Board [2013] EWCA Civ 73 – read judgment
Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your weekly bulletin of human rights news. The full list of links can be found 
The New York Times 
Recent comments