Search Results for: prisoner voting/page/45/ministers have been procrastinating on the issue, fearing that it will prove unpopular with the electorate.

The Weekly Round-up: Protest injunctions, EU law overhaul, and UN reviews human rights in UK

16 November 2022 by Matthew Johnson

In the news

The High Court has granted an injunction preventing M25 protests in response to Just Stop Oil activists gluing themselves to motorways in the past weeks. The injunction means that anyone fixing themselves to the road, or anyone assisting someone else in doing so, can be held in contempt of court and thus face imprisonment, an unlimited fine, and the seizure of assets. The decision follows a previous court order obtained against Insulate Britain who partook in similar protests earlier in the year. The existing injunctions now cover the M25, the M25 feeder roads, and major roads in Kent and around the Port of Dover until May 2023.

The proposed bill to overhaul EU law, the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill, could have devastating impacts on legal certainty in the UK, the Law Society have warned. The measures would allow ministers to overhaul laws without appropriate parliamentary scrutiny or public oversight, raising concerns over parliamentary sovereignty, legal certainty, and the rule of law, according to Society president Lubna Shuja. A clause in the bill would mean that many retained EU laws will expire at the end of 2023, with them going many basic protections. The Society has called for this ‘arbitrary and unrealistic’ 2023 deadline to be removed in order to allow a more measured review of the laws and what reform is necessary.

In other news

• A coroner has determined in a pre-inquest hearing that there was no evidence that Archie Battersbee partook in the TikTok blackout challenge. While Archie did access TikTok on the day of his tragic injuries, there was nothing to suggest his accident was connected to the trend in question. The finding was based on photographs and videos downloaded from his phone.

• The UN Human Rights Council have reminded that the UK’s treatment of asylum seekers must comply with international law in their review of the human rights situation in the UK. The statement came alongside a call on the Government to give some certainty to asylum seekers by speeding up approvals instead of housing people in motels, stating the temporary accommodation they are kept in is ‘grim’. The examination was against the backdrop of plans to send migrants to Rwanda.

• The Government have been accused of ‘rolling back’ on tackling modern slavery by the charity Anti-Slavery International. It is claimed that the UK has attempted to reclassify modern slavery as an immigration issue and that a rhetoric of ‘abusing the system’ diverts attention from the important issues. The charity says that the Rwanda scheme, for instance, fails to provide safeguards to prevent victims of modern slavery being targeted for relocation.

In the courts

• In Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis v A Police Conduct Panel [2022] EWHC 2857 (Admin), the High Court ordered that a new panel redetermine whether an officer’s behaviour amounted to gross misconduct in relation to the unauthorised use of firearms. The officer in question falsely stamped his personal firearms authorisation, meaning whenever a weapon was withdrawn by him, he used a false document authorising him to carry it. The Commissioner claimed judicial review of the panel assessing his conduct (who did not dismiss him) on 2 grounds: (i) the process by which his sanction was reached was unlawful; and (ii) the sanction awarded was irrational. Ground 1 was accepted on the basis that the Panel erred in law by considering testimonials when assessing the misconduct. Ground 2 was accepted on the basis that the only reasonable sanction was dismissal, whereas the panel only issued a written warning.

• In Modi v Government of India [2022] EWHC 2829 (Admin), the High Court dismissed an appeal against a ruling ordering the Claimant to be extradited to India, who seek him for criminal proceedings. The appeal submitted that the extradition was oppressive within the meaning of s91 of the Extradition Act 2003 by virtue of his physical or mental condition. The court determined that while the risk of suicide is high, there are suitable medical provisions and an appropriate plan in place to mitigate this risk. The risk therefore did not cross the high threshold required to satisfy that the claimant’s condition is such that it would be oppressive to extradite him.

• In AB v Chief Constable of British Transport Police [2022] EWHC 2749 (KB), the High Court dismissed an appeal against a judge’s declaration that the retention of records in relation to an incident involving the claimant was unlawful. The claimant has Asperger’s and experiences high levels of anxiety. Two women complained to the police that he had touched them inappropriately, but he was not charged with any offence. The police retain information about the complaints, which the claimant submits is unlawful on 2 grounds: (i) it is inaccurate, and the retention is therefore in breach of data protection; and (ii) it is a disproportionate interference with his Article 8 Convention rights. The appeal was dismissed for the fundamental reason that the records were intended to reflect the information provided to the police, rather than detailing the underlying facts of what happened.

Elsewhere on the UKHRB

• Rosalind English discusses the HS2 protest injunction here.

The Round-Up: constitutional concerns and the Queen’s Speech

26 December 2019 by Alethea Redfern

In the News

A year of disruption, disappointment, contention and uncertainty is finally drawing to a close. On 19 December, with Christmas around the corner, the country got a hint of what 2020 might bring. The Queen’s Speech, in which the new Conservative government laid out its legislative priorities for the year to come, included more than 30 bills the government hopes to turn into law. 

Australian judge lays down gauntlet for the angels of human rights

25 September 2013 by Rosalind English

J.D. Heydon: Are Bills of Rights necessary in common law systems?   – read lecture

Former Australian High Court Justice Heydon’s thought-provoking speech questioning the efficacy and indeed the very merits of the Human Rights Act deserves reading in full, but the following summary highlights its main features and should encourage readers to immerse themselves in the lecture.

Proponents of human rights instruments urge their necessity on society because they gesture toward a morality more capacious than the morality of our tribe, or association, or nationality. The forum of human rights is one in which our allegiances are not to persons or to wished-for outcomes but to abstract norms that are indifferent to those outcomes. That is why the Human Rights Act has around it what Heydon calls an “aura of virtue” that would make its repeal extremely difficult from a political point of view, even though it is legally and practically possible.
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The Round Up – locking up leakers for longer

20 February 2017 by Poppy Rimington-Pounder

Information leaks have led to some slippery situations for some in recent weeks. Not even David Beckham escaped unscathed, when his disappointment at being overlooked for a knighthood was revealed in a series of expletive-ridden emails by Football Leaks earlier this month, and saw him vilified by the British public for his attitude to charity, tax and Katherine Jenkins.

Donald Trump too found himself insisting at a press conference, and – as ever – on his trusty twitter account, that his former US national security adviser had been a victim of criminal and illegal leaks. Michael Flynn was forced to resign after allegations emerged that he had conducted meetings over diplomatic issues with the Russian ambassador before holding office at the White House, even though it is illegal for private citizens to engage in US diplomacy. These revelations have only increased concerns over the US’ relationship with Russia.

Back in the UK, the issue of intelligence leaks has been a hot topic this month since the Law Commission unveiled its latest consultation paper which seeks to reform the Official Secrets Act. The paper was conducted in an effort to modernise UK legislation, with the Official Secrets Act harking back to 1911. Many have argued that it is in dire need of reform in the technology age of the 21st century, and there has been particular pressure for this to occur since the disclosures by Edward Snowden.
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The Round Up: Prorogation, Kashmir, and Protests

2 September 2019 by Conor Monighan

Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law

Credit: The Guardian

In the News:

Last week, Boris Johnson decided to ask the Queen to prorogue (suspend) Parliament. The decision means that Parliament will be closed for 23 working days, reducing the amount of time MPs will have to pass legislation about Brexit.

Supporters of PM Johnson pointed out that Parliament has already been sitting for around two years. They have also suggested that proroguing Parliament is entirely proper because it is simply an exercise of a prerogative power. Finally, they argue that it will allow the government to hold a Queen’s Speech and outline its plans.

A number of figures spoke against the move:

• Tom Watson (Labour) stated proroguing Parliament was an “utterly scandalous affront to our democracy”.
• Nicola Sturgeon (SNP) has asked that MPs work together to stop Mr Johnson, or “today will go down in history as a dark one indeed for UK democracy”.
• Dominic Grieve (Conservative) described it as “an outrageous act”.
• Anna Soubry (Independent Group for Change) tweet that it was “outrageous that Parliament will be shut down at a moment of crisis as we face crashing out of the EU with no deal & for which there is no mandate”.

Ruth Davidson, who had been the leader of the Conservative Party in Scotland, quit. She said her decision was driven by political reasons and personal ones (she recently had a baby). The government whip, Lord Young, also resigned.

Demonstrations took place over the weekend. A judicial review, led by Gina Miller and her legal team, is also being launched.

Following the summer recess, MPs will return to Parliament on the 8^th October.

In Other News….

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Strong reaction to universal jurisdiction rule change

29 July 2010 by Adam Wagner

He can come now

The proposed change to the rules for bringing on who can apply for international war crimes arrest warrants has predictably generated some strong reactions

The changes will make it necessary to get the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions before an arrest warrant can be granted. The Ministry of Justice say they are changing the rules in order to prevent arrests happening after the presentation of “flimsy” evidence. Those who fear arrest under the current system range from Israeli ministers to the Pope.

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ALBA Summer Conference 2018: A Review (Part 3)

24 September 2018 by Conor Monighan

Conor Monighan reviews the Administrative Law Bar Association (ALBA) Summer Conference 2018

Brexit update – Chair: Mr Justice Lewis; Speakers: Professor Alison Young (Sir David Williams Professor of Public Law, University of Cambridge) and Richard Gordon QC

Professor Alison Young

Is it inevitable that domestic law will alter drastically after Brexit? According to Professor Young, it is entirely possible that little change will occur.

First, the CJEU will continue to have an influence on domestic law. This is because section 6(2) of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 states courts/ tribunals ‘may have regard’ to CJEU decisions (including those made after exit day) if they think it appropriate.

Second, the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights will probably not disappear. Although Section 5(4) of the Act states that the Charter will no longer be part of domestic law, paragraph 106 of the Explanatory Notes says “those underlying rights and principles will also be converted into UK law”. Arguably, this means lawyers will still be able to use case law in which these general principles were referred to. However, a limitation to reliance on fundamental principles is set out by s.3(1) of the Schedule to the Act. This states no court/ tribunal may disapply law because it is incompatible with any of the general principles of EU law.
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A Brit takes over at the European Court of Human Rights – The Human Rights Roundup

7 November 2011 by Melina Padron

Sir Nicolas Bratza

Welcome back to the human rights roundup. Our full list of links can be found here. You can also find our table of human rights cases here and previous roundups here.

by Melinda Padron

In the news

Family Justice Review

Last week the final report of the Family Justice Review (on Family Law) was published. The Family Lore blog has provided us with a summary of the key findings and a few comments on the review (so did Adam Wagner). See also the Pink Tape blog’s post on the topic.

Tackling the problem of delay seems to be the heart of the Family Justice Review’s proposals, evidenced by this piece, written by David Norgrove, who chaired the Family Justice Review, about the need to tackle the problem of delay in the family justice system when it comes to child protection cases. Norgrove says such delays are damaging to children and suggests, amongst other things, that children’s welfare should not be trumped by parents’ rights in these circumstances.

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The Weekly Round-up: Cop27 deals, advertising restrictions, and online safety

21 November 2022 by Lucy Stock

In the news:

• A historic deal has been agreed at the United Nation’s Cop27 summit which will provide funding to vulnerable countries to cope with the impact of climate change. The final cover document did not include commitments to reduce the use of fossil fuels. The deal also used new ambiguous language about “low emissions energy” which experts suggest could refer to fossil fuels including gas.

• There has been an investigation following the appearance of sexual abuse victims’ personal details on the Suffolk Police website. Police and crime commissioner Tim Passmore issued an “unreserved apology” for the breach. The published information included victims’ names, addresses, dates of birth and details of the offences committed against them.

• On Monday 14 November, the United Nations Human Rights Council released a report which including 302 recommendations demanding that the UK must tackle rising poverty. The report follows new figures revealing that four million children in households on universal credit face big cuts in income if benefits are not increased in line with inflation. Oxfam and the Healthcare Trade Unison, amongst other organisations, have said the UK is “failing to meet its international legal obligations”.

In other news:

• The Refugee Council called on ministers to introduce a range of measures to deal with the record delays in processing asylum claims. Currently, government spending is at around £6.8million for housing migrants in hotels. It has also been revealed that at least forty child asylum seekers were placed in a Home Office hotel designated for adults; last month, one child was the victim of a serious stabbing.

• The Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) has revised its guidance on age-restricted ads online. The new guidelines provide greater protection to children and young people by introducing content, media placement and audience targeting restrictions. The Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) provided a principles-based checklists to help limit the exposure of young people and children to age-restricted ads. Advertisers have ultimate responsibility for ensuring compliance with the rules.

• Analysts at the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) revealed they found nearly nine-hundred instances of Category A child sexual abuse material in just five days. The research revealed children as young as seven are being coerced by abusers into filming themselves carrying out the most severe forms of child sexual abuse material. The data publication has been used to highlight the need for the delayed Online Safety Bill.

In the courts

• In X, Re (Catastrophic Injury: Collection and Storage of Sperm) [2022] EWCOP 48, the Court of Protection dismissed an application by X’s parents, V and W, for a declaration that it would be lawful for a doctor to retrieve X’s gametes to be stored both before and after his death, and an order that V may sign the relevant consents in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (“The 1990 Act”). Schedule 3 of the 1990 Act deals with the use or storage of gametes, as does Section 4(1) of the 1990 Act; both stress the importance of consent in order that this activity be effectively regulated. X was potentially to be assessed as brain dead within 24 hours of the hearing. Citing Parrillo v. Italy (Application no. 46470/11) the Court held that the ability to give consent in regards to gametes or embryos constitutes a facet of private life. The Court relied upon  K v LBX and others [2012] EWCA Civ 79 in establishing that for an interference with X’s Article 8 rights to be lawful, it must be necessary and proportionate to achieve a legitimate aim. Having considered all the circumstances, and applying section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Court held that it would not be in X’s best interests to make the declarations sought. The Court was not persuaded that the significant interference with X’s Article 8 rights would be necessary or proportionate.

• On 18 November, judgement was handed down in AG (A Child), Re [2022] EWCA Civ 1505. The Court dismissed an appeal against the decision of the Divisional Court to refuse to make a declaration of incompatibility between certain provisions of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 (DPA) and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 (VCDR) with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The key issue in the appeal was whether the Divisional Court was right to decide that neither Article 3 nor ECtHR jurisprudence required the UK to breach the VCDR. The Appellant, AG, and her 5 siblings were subjected to abuse by both their parents. Their father was an accredited diplomat at the time and thus had immunity from the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state under DPA and the VCDR.  Barnet, the London Borough where the family lived, tried to intervene on the children’s behalf, and supported AG in the appeal. The Appellant contended, referencing Z v United Kingdom (Application no. 29392/95), that Article 3 includes a systems duty on the state to take effective measures to prevent private acts of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Court were unpersuaded by this. Relying upon Lord Reed’s judgement in R (AB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2022] AC 487, the Court held that they could not be confident that the ECtHR would regard the systems duty in Article 3 as overriding the long-established international law principles enshrined in the VCDR and it was not open to the court to declare Article 3 and the VCDR incompatible.

• A woman living with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”), absence epilepsy and learning difficulties succeeded in a claim for judicial review against the London Borough of Croydon after a deputy High Court judge ruled that the council had failed to meet her needs contrary to the requirements of the Care Act 2014. The claim in P, R (On the Application Of) v London Borough of Croydon [2022] EWHC 2886 (Admin) contended that the council’s decision to fund 35 hours per week of support was unlawful as it failed to meet her needs, and succeeded on three of four grounds. In relation to Ground 1, the Judge observed that it was arguably unlawful for the Defendant to have set a level of required care in an assessment, and then to have provided a Care and Support Plan making assumptions that the required care could be provided by her parents. Grounds 3 and 4 both concerned a failure to comply with The Care and Support Statutory Guidance. The Court held, referring to the standard of proof established in R (Cava Bien Ltd) v Milton Keynes Council [2021] EWHC 3003, that the Defendant’s apparent failure to asses the level of care which could and would be provided by the Claimant’s parents did make a substantial difference to the outcome of the Claimant’s care assessment. The Court ordered the quashing order of the Defendant’s February 2022 decision to provide or fund 35 hours of support per week, and the Defendant’s Care and Support Plan dated 14 February 2022. With reference to R (CP) v North East Lincolnshire Council [2019] EWCA Civ 1614, the Court maintained that it was not unconcerned with “historic” breaches and the Claimant was entitled to declaratory relief on this aspect of Ground 1.

CA declares Heathrow expansion decision unlawful on climate change grounds

27 February 2020 by David Hart KC

[2020] EWCA Civ 214 – read judgment

Airport expansion has taken a long and winding road, not least at Heathrow. But the proponents of the 3rd runway at Heathrow would have been heartened by the Secretary of State’s decision in June 2018 to set out a policy which preferred Heathrow over Gatwick and which was designed to steer planning processes thereafter in support of the new runway.

It is this decision which has just been declared unlawful by the Court of Appeal.

I am afraid this is where the planning jargon starts and the acronyms proliferate. The challenged decision was an Airports National Policy Statement (ANPS). Under planning legislation, an ANPS “sets the fundamental framework within which further decisions will be taken,” as the CA put it in [275]. Those further decisions include the grant of permission for the particular project, done through the Development Consent Order (DCO) process. But you cannot challenge that fundamental framework later in the DCO process; you cannot say later, for instance, that expansion is not necessary at all, or there is a better alternative, say, Gatwick, if the ANPS has decided otherwise.

Scots, Sumption and Secrets – The Human Rights Roundup

18 January 2012 by Melina Padron

Welcome back to the human rights roundup. Our full list of links can be found here. You can also find our table of human rights cases here and previous roundups here.

by Melinda Padron

In the news

3 European Court of Human Rights judgments

For the big news of yesterday from Strasbourg, see Adam Wagner’s post – L’Enfant terrible du Strasbourg

North of the border

Constitutional and international lawyers, behold! The issue of a referendum into whether Scotland should become independent from the UK is promising to give you plenty to read and talk about.

There are already a number of pieces on the subject matter, with some of the most interesting ones featuring in the UKCLG Blog and the UKSC Blog. For example, Nick Barber, writing for the UKCLG Blog, discussed whether it should be the UK Parliament or the Scottish Parliament who should hold the referendum, and what role should the UK Parliament play in the process to enable a negotiated transition into independence, should that be the outcome of the vote.

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David Miranda challenge dismissed in High Court

19 February 2014 by Rosalind English

David Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and three interveners [2014] EWHC 255 (Admin) – read judgment

The High Court has rejected all the arguments supporting David Miranda’s application for judicial review of his detention at Heathrow Airport in August last year. In a highly readable and pungent judgment, Laws LJ has some robust things to say about the vaunting of journalistic interests over public security in the guise of Article 10, and the ‘mission creep’ of requirements demanded by the courts for state action to be considered “proportionate”.

This is the long-awaited conclusion to the substantive hearing since judicial review proceedings were initiated seven months ago; see our posts on previous stages of this saga here, here and here.  It will be remembered that Mr Miranda was detained and questioned by police officers under the Terrorism Act 2000,  and various items in his possession, notably encrypted storage devices, were taken from him. Miranda claims that all this was done without any legal authority.

The claim, which was supported by numerous civil liberties interveners, raised three questions:

1. Did paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 empower the police to stop and question  the claimant for the purpose of determining whether he appeared to be “concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”?
2. Even if it did, was the use of the power proportionate to the legitimate aim?
3. Is the paragraph 2(1) power repugnant to the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR?

Laws LJ, giving judgment for the three judge panel, answered the first two in the affirmative, and said a firm “no” to last.

Factual background

The claimant is a Brazilian citizen and the spouse of Glenn Greenwald, a journalist who at the material time was working for the Guardian newspaper. Some months after an initial contact made in late 2012 Mr Greenwald met Edward Snowden, who provided him with encrypted data which had been stolen from the National Security Agency  of the United States. The data included UK intelligence material. Some of it formed the basis of articles in the Guardian on 6 and 7 June 2013 and on later dates. On 12 August 2013 the claimant travelled from Rio de Janeiro to Berlin in order to meet the other journalist involved, Laura Poitras. He was carrying encrypted material derived from the data obtained by Mr Snowden and he was travelling to collect computer drives containing further such material to assist in the journalistic activity of Mr Greenwald. He was stopped at 0805 on Sunday 18 August 2013 at Heathrow on his way back to Rio de Janeiro.

A series of Port Circulation Sheets (PCS) were circulated to counter-terrorism police alerting them that the claimant was  “likely to be involved in espionage activity which has the potential to act against the interests of UK national security”, and requesting them to establish the nature of his activity, assess the risk that he posed to UK national security and to mitigate as appropriate.  A PCS essentially triggers the powers of the police under certain circumstances to carry out a ports stop against a named individual.

The claimant was detained for approximately 9 hours.  According to a statement from the Intelligence, Security and Resilience in the Cabinet Office, the encrypted data contained in the external hard drive taken from the claimant contained approximately 58,000 highly classified UK intelligence documents. Many were classified SECRET or TOP SECRET.

Judicial review proceedings started shortly afterwards, and in November 2013, after various interlocutory hearings, the substantive hearing came before the High Court.

The Court’s Decision: Improper purpose

The Schedule 7 purpose – determining whether [the subject] appears to be a person who “has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism” – must be the purpose for which the officers execute the stop if it is to be lawful. It doesn’t make the stop unlawful if there is a subsidiary purpose – “killing two birds with one stone” – but the permitted purpose must be the “true and dominant purpose behind the act” (R v Southwark Crown Court ex p. Bowles [1998] AC 641, [1998] UKHL 16].

The fact that the police officers in question had not been given sufficient information about the intelligence did not mean that they had not executed their instructions in good faith:

Given the context – the possible apprehension of terrorism – Parliament must have enacted Schedule 7 in the knowledge that there might be very good reasons why the examining officers … should not be privy to the whole story. (para 21)

The purpose of the stop thus disclosed was to “ascertain the nature of the material which the claimant was carrying and if on examination it proved to be as was feared, to neutralise the effects of its release (or further release) or dissemination”. Moreover, the proper exercise of the Schedule 7 power did not require that the examining officer have any grounds whatever for suspecting that a person was connected with terrorism within Act’s definition. The Schedule 7 purpose was not to determine whether the subject is, but only whether he “appears to be” a terrorist.  The Schedule 7 power was created by Parliament in order to provide “a reasonable but limited opportunity for the ascertainment of a possibility: the possibility that a traveller at a port may be involved (“concerned” – s.40(1)(b)), directly or indirectly, in any of a range of activities enumerated in s.1(2)”.

Given the facts stated in the last PCS and the National Security Justification, Laws LJ for the Court concluded that the purpose of the stop – to ascertain the nature of the material which the claimant was carrying and if on examination it proved to be as was feared, to neutralise the effects of its release (or further release) or dissemination – “fell properly within Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act on the latter’s true construction.”

Proportionality

The classic three step proportionality test – was the objective important enough to justify limiting a right, was the measure connected to that objective, and was the measure no more intrusive than other necessary – has been elaborated over the past decade, most recently by Lord Sumption in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) 3 WLR 170, [2013] UKSC 39. This adds a fourth question, which is to ask whether,  even if the measure in question is not particularly intrusive, did it nevertheless fail to strike a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community? Laws LJ pondered on the implications of such a requirement, and found it not to his liking:

It appears to require the court, in a case where the impugned measure passes muster on points (i) – (iii), to decide whether the measure, though it has a justified purpose and is no more intrusive than necessary, is nevertheless offensive because it fails to strike the right balance between private right and public interest; and the court is the judge of where the balance should lie. I think there is real difficulty in distinguishing this from a political question to be decided by the elected arm of government. If it is properly within the judicial sphere, it must be on the footing that there is a plain case.

Free Speech and the Protection of Journalistic Expression

Laws LJ commenced his consideration of this element of the claim with a brisk dismissal of all the Strasbourg case law on the matter. The idea of free speech has received sufficient emphasis in the law of England –

I do not therefore think it necessary, on this part of the case, to place any reliance on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights; the common law is a sufficient arena for the debate.

In any event, much of the law on free speech in journalism was of no relevance here since it concerned protection of sources. No such issue arose here. The source was no secret: “Mr Snowden stole the material, and the claimant (however indirectly) got it from Mr Snowden.” (para 48).

Furthermore, the mistaken idea seems to have taken hold that the essential justification of free expression as a fundamental value is the promotion or betterment of democratic government. Freedom of speech may indeed be “the lifeblood of democracy”; but that is not the same thing.

The perception of free expression as a servant of democracy, however, would tend to devalue non-political speech and justify the prohibition or abridgement of speech advocating undemocratic government … This would fuel what is anyway one of exuberant democracy’s weaknesses, namely the intolerance of minorities. Everyone, even democracy’s enemy, must surely be allowed his say provided he advocates no crime nor violates the rights of others. The reason is that free thought, which is a condition of every man’s flourishing, needs free expression; and this is every person’s birthright, in whatever polity he has to live. There are of course undemocratic societies in which free speech is an idle hope. But free speech is not a creature of democracy; if anything, the converse. The critics of democracy may keep democracy on its toes. (para 45)

Turning to the matter in hand, Laws LJ observed that this privileging of political speech over other forms of expression has a distorting effect on the proportionality debate. The claimant, in other words, was seeking a heightened protection for himself, or at least the material he was carrying) on account of his association with the journalist Mr Greenwald. There was no basis for the court to extend such protection:

the application of requirement (iv) in the toll of proportionality – “whether… a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community” – needs at least to be modified. The contrast is not between private right and public interest. The journalist enjoys no heightened protection for his own sake, but only for the sake of his readers or his audience. If there is a balance to be struck, it is between two aspects of the public interest.

The sting of the claimant’s challenge was that the defendants did not believe that the claimant’s possession of the material presented any real danger to national security or risk of loss of life. Whilst acknowledging the limits of evidence not cross-examined, Laws LJ could find “no perceptible foundation” for such a suggestion. The truth of  it was that the claimant’s broader argument on proportionality – that the use of Schedule 7 was in any event unjustified – did not in fact depend on the categorisation of the GCHQ documents as journalistic material. The claimant was trying to make out a case that he had been assisting in the conduct of responsible journalism, and the law’s duty to protect that activity meant that interference with it by the summary and unsupervised process of Schedule 7 was disproportionate and unlawful whether or not any intercepted documents strictly fell within the statutory definition of “journalistic material”:

… given the substantial, often insuperable, difficulty a journalist faces in seeking to determine what classified material may be safely published and what may not (paragraph 58 above), the notion of “responsible journalism” throws little light on the proportionality issue.

The claimant’s essential argument rested on three propositions:

1. Journalists, “like judges”, have a role in a democratic State to scrutinise action by government.
2. The function of the free press is inhibited by an insistence that anything (in the security field) which the journalist seeks to publish must be stifled because it may be part of the “jigsaw” from which a knowing terrorist may draw harmful inferences.
3. There is a balance to be struck, again in the security field, between the responsibility of government and the responsibility of journalists.

But nobody had satisfied the court that there was any constitutional basis for any of these propositions, which would confer on the journalists’ profession a constitutional status which it does not possess:

They suggest … that journalists share with government the responsibility of measuring what is required by way of withholding publication for the protection of national security. Journalists have no such constitutional responsibility. They have, of course, a professional responsibility to take care so far as they are able to see that the public interest, including the security of the State and the lives of other people, is not endangered by what they publish. But that is not an adequate safeguard for lives and security, because of the “jigsaw” quality of intelligence information, and because the journalist will have his own take or focus on what serves the public interest, for which he is not answerable to the public through Parliament. The constitutional responsibility for the protection of national security lies with elected government: see, amongst much other authority, Binyam Mohamed[2011] QB 218per Lord Neuberger MR at paragraph 131.

He concluded, therefore, that the Schedule 7 stop was a proportionate measure in the circumstances. Its objective was not only legitimate, but “very pressing”.

In a press freedom case, the fourth requirement in the catalogue of proportionality involves as I have said the striking of a balance between two aspects of the public interest: press freedom itself on one hand, and on the other whatever is sought to justify the interference: here national security. On the facts of this case, the balance is plainly in favour of the latter. (para 73)

For similar reasons the Court rejected the claimant’s and intervenors’ related submission, that the Schedule 7 power is over-broad or arbitrary, and for that reason not “prescribed by law” under Article 10(2).

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Related posts

• David Miranda Special Edition – The Human Rights Roundup
• David Miranda – Remember his name.
• More developments under Schedule 7
• Miranda case shows we need more secrecy laws … or does it?

Strasbourg and why you must give reasons on domestic appeals

6 October 2014 by David Hart KC

Hansen v. Norway, ECtHR, 2 October, read judgment

In any system of appeals, there is always a tension between giving everyone a fair hearing and concentrating on the appeals which do stand a reasonable prospect of success. The UK, like many countries, has introduced some filters on civil appeals in relatively recent times, enabling unmeritorious appeals to be dismissed at the threshold. In doing so, it gives short (sometimes very short) reasons for refusing permission.

You might have thought that this was a classic area where Strasbourg would be wary about intervening in domestic practice and striking the balance between speed and fairness. Yet the Court was persuaded that the Norwegians got the balance wrong, and found a breach of Article 6(1). We therefore need to read it carefully to see whether the same could be said about our system.

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Sentences in PC Harper case upheld by Court of Appeal

17 December 2020 by Samuel March

R v Long, Bowers and Cole [2020] EWCA Crim 1729 (16 December 2020) — judgment here

The Court of Appeal held yesterday morning that the sentences of the three men responsible for the manslaughter of PC Harper in 2019 were neither ‘unduly lenient’ nor ‘manifestly excessive’. The Court rejected applications from both the Defendants and the Attorney General (AG), meaning there will be no substantive change to the manslaughter sentences passed at first instance. The Court also refused to grant permission to two of the co-defendants to appeal against their convictions.

BACKGROUND

The case concerned the killing of PC Andrew Harper which in August 2019. PC Harper was killed as he tried to apprehend the three defendants, all part of a group of thieves in the process of stealing a quad bike. As the defendants made off at speed in a car driven by the first Defendant (Henry Long), PC Harper was caught and dragged for more than a mile behind the car.

Long (18 at the time, now 19) alongside co-defendants Albert Bowers (17 now 18) and Jessie Cole (17 now 18), were jointly charged with conspiracy to steal, murder and manslaughter. In the lead-up to trial, all three pleaded guilty to the conspiracy to steal, and Long pleaded guilty to manslaughter. On 24 July 2020, after a 5-week trial at the Central Criminal Court, all three were acquitted of murder, but Bowers and Cole were found to be guilty of manslaughter.

The outcome means that, whilst the jury could be sure that PC Harper died as a consequence of the unlawful acts of the Defendants, they could not be sure that the Defendants actually intended to kill anyone, or to cause anyone really serious harm. In this instance, it means that the jury will have had at least some reasonable doubt as to whether the Defendants knew that they were dragging PC Harper behind them as they drove away.

On 31 July 2020, Long received an extended determinate sentence of 16 years with an extended licence period of 3 years. Bowers and Cole were sentenced to 13 years detention in a Young Offenders Institution. Concurrent sentences were imposed in respect of the conspiracy to steal (32 months for Long, and 38 months for Bowers and Cole).

THE COURT OF APPEAL

There were three applications before the Court of Appeal:

1. Bowers and Cole applied for leave to appeal against their convictions of the offence of manslaughter;
2. The Attorney-General (“AG”) applied for leave to refer the sentences arguing that all three were unduly lenient; and
3. All three defendants sought leave to appeal their respective sentences.

Myanmar’s Compliance with the ICJ Provisional Measures Order & the Road Ahead

3 September 2020 by Guest Contributor

In this article, Prachiti Venkatraman and Ashley Jordana of Global Rights Compliance analyse the case before the International Court of Justice relating to the persecution of the Rohingya people by the Myanmar authorities.

Readers are encouraged to read the previous articles about this topic published on the blog here and here.

To read more about Global Rights Compliance’s work with the Rohingya, please see: https://www.globalrightscompliance.com/en/projects/the-rohingya-accountability-project.

The perilous situation of the Rohingya in Myanmar continues – the recent UN policy brief on Covid-19 in South-East Asia highlighted the compounded effects of the nation’s weak healthcare system and an ongoing armed conflict that targets ethnic communities.

On 11 November 2019, The Gambia filed an Application to commence proceedings against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (‘the Court’). The Application alleged that Myanmar had violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by committing acts intended to destroy in whole or in part the Rohingya community, as well as attempting and conspiring to commit genocide, inciting genocide, being complicit in its commission, and failing to prevent and punish genocide. To demonstrate the validity of these allegations, The Gambia relied on the actions of the Burmese military (‘the Tatmadaw’) and individuals connected to the State of Myanmar during the ‘clearance operations’ in 2016 and 2017 which led to the mass murder, sexual violence, and destruction of Rohingya villages in Rakhine state.