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UK Human Rights Blog - 1 Crown Office Row
Search Results for: environmental/page/22/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)
Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu reaffirmed Israel’s rejection of Hamas’ offer for the return of all hostages in return for the end of the war in Gaza on Sunday, claiming such a deal would ‘leave Hamas intact’ and render ‘the next October 7th only a matter of time’. The main conflict at the peace negotiations underway in Cairo appears to remain whether a ceasefire would be temporary, allowing Israel’s recovery of hostages, or permanent, as Hamas insists it must be. The US State Department also announced this week that they have found five Israeli military units committed gross violations of human rights before October 7th. Israel claims corrective action has been taken against four of these units but has declined to give any details. A spokesperson for the Secretary of State declined to confirm whether the US would therefore impose sanctions in line with the Leahy Law, which prohibits the US from allocating funds to foreign forces in the light of evidence of gross human rights violations. Netanyahu has said that ‘to impose a sanction on a unit in the IDF [would be] the height of absurdity and a moral low’ at a time when Israeli soldiers ‘are fighting the monsters of terror’. Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice ruled in a 15-1 vote last week against imposing emergency measures to prevent military exports from Germany to Israel in a case brought by Nicaragua earlier this year. However, the Court also declined to throw out Nicaragua’s case in its entirety, taking the opportunity to ‘remind all states of their international obligations relating to the transfer of arms to parties to an armed conflict, in order to avoid the risk that such arms might be used’ to violate international law.
The debate about single-sex spaces has come back into the news this week after ministers have announced plans for transgender patients in hospital to be treated in separate wards. The Government argues that there is a legitimate basis for the segregation and that the measures are proportionate, thus preventing the policy from breaching the Equality Act 2010 or the ECHR. The proposals have received cross-party support; Sir Keir Starmer supported the proposition in an interview on ITV’s Good Morning Britain, stating that his views on gender ‘start with biology’. The plans were announced amongst other changes proposed to the NHS Constitution, including the right for patients to insist on having their care carried out by a doctor of their biological sex. Kemi Badenoch, Minister for Women and Equalities, has made a call for evidence of organisations who are ‘wrongly stating that people have a legal right to access single-sex spaces according to their self-identified gender’. The information will be used to ensure the Government’s ‘policymaking continues to tackle any confusion’ so that ‘single-sex spaces can be maintained’. Matthew Taylor, chief executive of the NHS Confederation, pleaded following the announcement that the NHS not be ‘dragged into a pre-election culture war’. Ministers should rather be ‘bringing forward detailed plans to improve NHS funding, tackle the decrepit state of many health facilities and get waiting times for A&E care and planned surgery back to the levels that existed when the constitution was first published in 2012.’
In the Courts
Several groups have announced legal challenges to the UK’s Rwanda Migrant Scheme in the wake of the passing of the Safety of Rwanda Bill in April. Asylum Aid announced last Friday their intent to challenge the legality of a Home Office policy document published last week on the grounds that it ‘fundamentally misunderstands the Act’. The policy requires caseworkers to consider Rwanda safe even in the face of compelling evidence that Rwanda would not be safe for the individual – ignoring Section 4 of the Act which provides a limited right to appeal against removal on the grounds that Rwanda would not be safe given the asylum seeker’s individual circumstances. The FDA Trade Union has also commenced proceedings on the grounds that the policy creates a conflict for civil servants between their obligations under the Civil Service Code and following the instructions of ministers. The Civil Service Code imposes a legal obligation upon civil servants to ‘uphold the rule of law’, which may not be possible if given instructions by a minister to ignore a Rule 39 Order from the ECHR – a breach of international law. Dave Penman, General Secretary for the FDA, has emphasised that the legal action is not a political decision nor about the policy itself, but about protecting civil servants and ‘the integrity of the Civil Service Code’. The case is to be heard the first week of June. In the meantime, detentions have begun for the first migrants set for removal to Rwanda, with more to come over the next few weeks. It has been suggested detentions have begun so far in advance – over nine weeks before the departures of the first flights – in anticipation of legal challenges. Earlier this week, a bus intended to remove asylum seekers from a South London hotel for transfer to the Bibby Stockholm barge had to leave empty after protestors surrounded the vehicle in a successful attempt to disrupt the removal. 45 protesters were arrested in total following the clash with over 100 Metropolitan police officers.
The Supreme Court has ruled unanimously that the lack of protection given to workers on strike constitutes a breach of their human rights. The right to strike is protected under Article 11 ECHR, which ensures freedom of assembly and association. However, UK domestic law provides workers with no protections against detriments short of dismissal for exercising that right. While s146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 protected workers from detriment for engaging in trade union activities, strike action has not been considered to qualify – a situation which the Supreme Court said ‘nullifies the right to take lawful strike action’. The Court found that the current legal position fell short of a fair balance between the interests of employers and Article 11 rights, and consequently has declared the relevant statute incompatible with human rights. A significant victory for worker’s rights, the Claimant, Fiona Mercer, has said: ‘I am delighted at today’s outcome. Although it won’t change the way I was treated, it means irresponsible employers will now think twice before behaving badly towards their unhappy staff.’ It remains to be seen whether legislation will now be amended to protect the rights of striking workers against detriment. While the government are under no legal duty to respond, Professor Alan Bogg, who was part of the Claimant’s legal team, has suggested not to do so would be ‘constitutionally surprising’.
The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland has ruled it is not a breach of human rights for schools to exclusively teach about Christianity in religious education classes. The Court upheld a previous finding that the curriculum is not taught in an ‘objective, critical, and pluralistic manner’ and stated that the finding was ‘capable of constituting evidence supporting an inference that the forbidden line (of indoctrination) had been crossed’. However, this did not breach Article 2 Protocol 1 of the ECHR – the right to education – as parents are granted an unfettered statutory right to withdraw their children from religious education and collective worship. The law in Northern Ireland demands that state-funded schools organise ‘collective worship’ in at least one assembly per day; while parents can withdraw their children from this activity, pupils are not granted the right to withdraw themselves. The Court recognised the ongoing review into teaching in Northern Ireland, suggesting that policymakers may soon implement a ‘refresh to the Northern Ireland curriculum that will inevitably include consideration of religious instruction to take into account the complexion and changing needs of our society’. The Claimant intends to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Protocol 1 Art.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:
(1) Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
(2) The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
The European Court of Human Rights has indicated that this Article contains three distinct rules ((1) Sporrong (2) Lonnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 85):
(1) The general principle of peaceful enjoyment of property (first sentence of the first paragraph);
(2) The rule that any deprivation of possessions should be subject to certain conditions (second sentence, first paragraph);
(3) The principle that States are entitled to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose (second paragraph).
Peaceful enjoyment of possessions include the right of property (Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330). “Possessions” are not limited to physical goods: in Gasus Dosier-und Fordertechnik GmbH v The Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403 it was considered immaterial that the property in issue was fully owned by the applicant, or whether it simply had a security right in it (retention of title). But to qualify under this Article the right or interest must have an economic value, or be of a pecuniary nature. In addition to property, possessions include:
Company shares: Bramelid & Malmstrom v Sweden, (1982) 29 DR 64.
Patents: Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v The Netherlands (1990) 66 DR 70;
Goodwill in business: Van Marle & Ors v The Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 483;
Licence to serve alcoholic beverages: Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag v Sweden (1989) 13 EHRR 309;
Ownership of a debt (where it has crystallised): Agneesens v Belgium (1998) 58 DR 63;
An award, of court or arbitration, which is final and enforceable with no right of appeal on the merits: (1) Stran Greek Refineries (2) Stratis Andreadis v Greece (1994) 19 EHRR 293 and Pressos Compania Naviera SA & 25 Ors v Belgium (1997) 21 EHRR 301;
Interests in a pension scheme Wessels-Begervoet v The Netherlands (1986) (Admissibility Decision Application No. 00034462/97 October 10 2000
An additional gloss has been given to the meaning of “possessions” under this Article by the Court of Appeal in Wilson v First Country Trust [2001] 3 WLR 42 2000 – these include the rights of a leader to enforce a regulated loan agreement under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
More recently, the Supreme Court has ruled that pension scheme regulations in Northern Ireland that required that unmarried co-habiting partners to be nominated in order to be eligible for a survivor’s pension, was interference with the appellant’s right under this provision. The requirement could not be “objectively justified” for the purposes of art 14. There was no similar nomination requirement for married or civil partner survivors (Re an application by Brewster for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2017] UKSC 8).
There is no possession in an item where the link between the applicant’s payment and the ultimate value of the thing is not established, so where an applicant has made contributions to a social security scheme but there is no link between the contributions and the ultimate share claimed by the applicant, this does not come within the scope of Protocol 1 Art.1 (G v Austria (1984) 38 DR 84); the same applies to contributions to pension schemes: (see X v Netherlands (1972) 38 CD 9.)
Expectation of an inheritance could not constitute a possession under Protocol 1 Art.1 : Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330.
A mere expectation that rates of fees would not be reduced by the law does not constitute a property right: Federal Republic of Germany Application No.00008410/78, (1979) 18 DR 170. Here the applicants, who were notaries, challenged regulations which obliged them to reduce fees for certain public bodies such as universities. The European Commission of Human Rights held that the claim for fees would only be considered as possessions when they came into existence on grounds of services rendered and on the basis of existing regulations.
In Matthews v MoD [2002] 3 All ER the Court of Appeal accepted that a right of action in tort was a possession.
As with the other qualified rights, most of the disputes in Article 1 Protocol 1 claims turn on the test of proportionality since the right to enjoyment of property is subject to many provisos and exceptions “in the public interest”. As a result the case law on A1P1 is a rich source of analysis on this question: see for example the Court of Appeal’s informative ruling in Sinclair Collis Ltd, R (o.t.a) v. The Secretary of State for Health [2011] EWCA Civ 437 and Lord Laws LJ’s important dissent, discussed here.
Bourgass and others v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWCA Civ 376 Read decision
The ability to interact with other prisoners is a major part of prison life, and not one many prisoners would give up willingly. But there are circumstances where prisoners have to be segregated from the rest of the prison population, such as where they are posing a violent threat to another prisoner or planning an escape. The Court of Appeal has recently looked into the question of how decisions to segregate are made, including the initial decision, the review of the decision and ultimately judicial review, in a human rights context.
George McGeogh for Judicial Review of the Compatibility with the Petitioner’s EU law rights of the Decision of the Electoral Registration Officer , Outer House, Court of Session [2011] CSOH 65, 08 April 2011 (Lord Tyre) – Read opinion
This was an attempt by a prisoner to argue that his disenfranchisement under Section 3 of the Representation of the People Act breached his human rights, not under the ECHR, but his rights under EU law. The case illustrates the widespread (and probably correct) perception that if you can bring your claim under European law by persuading the court that one or other of its principles and freedoms are involved, you have a better chance of getting home on the rights argument than if you are restricted to the weaker authority of the Council of Europe and its Convention. Continue reading →
NHS Trust v DE [2013] EWHC 2562 (Fam) 16 August 2013 –read judgment
For the first time a UK court has permitted non therapeutic sterilisation of a male individual who, through learning disabilities, was unable to consent to such a procedure.
The NHS Foundation Trust made an application in the Court of Protection for a raft of declarations in relation to a 37 man, DE, who suffers from a profound learning disability. After fifteen years of hard work and sensitive care by his parents and social workers he had achieved a modest measure of autonomy in his day to day life and had a long standing and loving relationship with a woman, PQ, who is also learning disabled.
But things changed dramatically for the worst in 2009, when PQ became pregnant and had a child. The consequences were profound for both families; legitimate concerns that DE may not have capacity to consent to sexual relations meant that protective measures had to be put in place to ensure that DE and PQ were not alone and DE became supervised at all times. As a result of the distress he felt following this event DE was clear that he did not want any more children. Evidence before the court suggested that his relationship “nearly broke under the strain.” Continue reading →
The European Court of Human Rights has refused permission to appeal in a challenge to the ban on gay marriage in Austria. The effect of the decision is to make the court’s rejection of the same-sex couple’s claim final.
The decision means that the European Court of Human Rights will not force states to allow same-sex couples to marry, for now at least. This has a potential bearing on the UK, where a number of same-sex and heterosexual couples are currently bringing claims against UK laws which permit civil partnerships for same-sex couples but prevents them from marrying.
The Government’s Consultation on Equal Civil Marriage ends on Thursday 14 June: you can fill in the brief online survey here if you haven’t already. In the meantime, the Church of England is on the front pages this morning with its own response, which amongst other things, warns that “it must be very doubtful whether limiting same-sex couples to non-religious forms and ceremonies could withstand a challenge under the European Convention on Human Rights”
The Church’s argument is set out on pages 10 to 13 of its response. It is interesting, and there might be something in it. However, it is clear from the rest of the document that the Church is, in its introduction, inflating the likelihood of a successful court challenge. This has of course made its way into the press coverage, where it is being suggested that a challenge would “probably” succeed. But even the Church’s own response, reading a little further, does not go this far.
Let’s consider the argument. The Church puts a number of propositions. First,
It remains the case that member states of the Council of Europe are not obliged to make legal provision for same-sex marriage.
Quila & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors [2010] EWCA Civ 1482 – Read judgment
A key part of the government’s strategy to combat forced marriages, preventing people under the age of 21 from entering the country to marry, has been heavily criticised by the Court of Appeal.
The decision shows that even policies which pursue a legitimate and laudable aim must still be a proportionate to the problem they seek to address, or risk breaching the human rights of those affected. But it also highlights how difficult it is to set effective policies to combat hazardous arrangements which can involve rape, child abuse and domestic violence, and affect thousands of UK residents annually.
On 19 May 2021 the Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether a Conclusive Grounds Decision made by the Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) that a person is a victim of modern slavery is admissible evidence in a criminal trial.
Respectfully disagreeing with the decision of the Administrative Court in DPP v M [2020] EWHC 3422 (Admin) (discussed on the Blog here), the Lord Chief Justice held that SCA caseworkers are not experts in human trafficking or modern slavery, further noting that their reports do not comply with the expert evidence requirements set out in CrimPR 19. Therefore, a decision by the SCA is not admissible in a criminal trial.
On 09 March 2026, following a seven-day trial and over nine hours of deliberation, a jury at Peterborough Crown Court acquitted five defendants involved in rescuing 18 beagle puppies from a facility that breeds them for animal testing.
The author of this blog post appeared as counsel for D1 and D2. It is prepared from rough notes taken in court and not an exact transcript.
Factual background
MBR Acres is a facility that breeds dogs. Most of these are sold to laboratories where they may be used in scientific, medical, pharmaceutical and veterinary research, as well as toxicology testing for household products, in the United Kingdom
As well as its establishment licence, MBR Acres is named on a project licence. As set out in the Agreed Facts of the case,
This licence allows the holder of the project licence to “harvest…bio-products” from either live dogs or from dogs following their “humane killing”. The licence also permits the “terminal blood sampling” of dogs, which is conducted under a “general anaesthetic from which the animals are not permitted to recover”.
Each defendant in the case had agreed to take part in an action which was carefully planned and executed by a group called Animal Rebellion (now known as Animal Rising). The action was coordinated and involved renting cars and multiple Airbnb’s, using burner phones, putting information barriers in place between different teams.
Some members of the group cut through the fence at MBR Acres or went over ladders. They took 20 puppies and were successful in taking 18 of them away. Two puppies were recovered from MBR Acres and returned to MBR Acres. Some members of the group acted as runners, some as drivers.
In total, 18 defendants were charged. Some of the group had been arrested as they carried dogs away, some waited at the scene to hand themselves in, some handed themselves in later to police stations explaining that they had been involved, and some were identified later by police.
Defendants were split into four trials for administrative purposes largely due to court space and the inability to fit them into a single dock. Since December 2025, these four trials have been heard with two at Cambridge Crown Court before HHJ Grey and two at Peterborough Crown Court before HHJ Enright.
The trial that finished on the 9th of March was the fourth and final trial arising out of the incidents of 20th December 2022. Significantly, it was the trial group which included the director of Animal Rising: the woman alleged by the prosecution (and candidly admitted in evidence) to be the organiser.
The trial indictment contained a single count of burglary. Although only one of the defendants in this trial group had entered the building, all agreed to playing a role in a joint mission in which the building was entered as a trespasser, property (beagle puppies) were taken which belonged to MBR Acres, and that the intention was to permanently deprive MBR Acres of that property.
R (Medical Justice) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] CO/543/2019, Walker J, 14 March 2019, written reasons here
The High Court delivered the latest in a series of blows to the Government’s ‘hostile environment’ immigration policy on Thursday.
Walker J granted Medical Justice an interim injunction which will prevent the Home Office from removing or deporting people from the country without notice.
Review of Fixed Recoverable Costs: Supplemental Report, 31 July 2017 – here
Jackson LJ is still toiling away at costs issues some 8 years after his main report. The original report changed the whole way in which the civil courts go about working how much, if anything, is due from one side to another at the end of a case – budgets being one key element. The main part of this new report concerns extending fixed costs further.
This post is about something different, judicial review. Rather different factors may come into play when you are challenging public authorities. You may have a direct financial or other interest in the outcome, or you may just think that the law needs properly enforcing against those authorities. It does not follow that the winner should recover costs on the same rules as elsewhere in the civil system. And Jackson LJ returns to the question of costs in this context in Chapter 10 of his report.
Since 2013, things have been different in the area of environmental judicial reviews. With substantial prods from the EU, things are now better off for claimants, though recent reforms have sought to put further obstacles in the way of claimants: see my post here.
So it is refreshing to read something from a very senior judge which recognises the true value of judicial review as a whole and why the costs rules need adjusting in this area for the benefit of claimants.
Morge (FC) (Appellant) v Hampshire County Council (Respondent) on appeal from [2010] EWCA Civ 608- Read judgment
We cannot drive a coach-and-horses through natural habitats without a bit of soul-searching, says the Supreme Court .
The UK has conservation obligations under EU law to avoid the deterioration of natural habitats and this goes beyond holding back only those developments that threaten significant disturbance to species. Detailed consideration must be given to the specific risks to the species in question. But this consideration can be left to the quangos; planning committees are not obliged to make their own enquiries.
Our guest post from Frances Aldson last week drew many and varied comments from our readers on this blog and elsewhere, including those at each end of a spectrum ranging from the enthusiastic to the choleric.
This follow-up post is designed for those who have no strong views but who want to muse on the implications of the proposal which is due to be raised, via one route or another, with the UN, either this year or next.
Ecocide is the extensive destruction, damage to or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished. Continue reading →
In November 2016, the Government responded in rather disappointing terms (here) to a consultation about amending its costs rules in civil cases to reflect the requirements of the Aarhus Convention.
Article 9 of this Convention says that members of the public should be able to challenge environmental decisions, and the procedures for doing so shall be adequate and effective and “not prohibitively expensive“. Aarhus starters may want to have a look at my bluffers guide to Aarhus – here.
First, the limited bit of good news in the governmental response.
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