Category: CONVENTION RIGHTS

The Begum Legacy: the Supreme Court further tightens the reins on citizenship deprivation appeals

27 June 2025 by Guest Contributor

By guest contributor Saira Turner

In U3 (AP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 19, the Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed an appeal against a decision taken by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”) relating to deprivation of citizenship and refusal of entry clearance on the basis of national security concerns.

Cheshire West revisited: deprivation of liberty and children

22 November 2024 by Esme Cairns

Introduction

Karsai v Hungary: little new on assisted dying

11 July 2024 by Guest Contributor

Introduction

Article 8

Regarding the potential violation of the applicant’s right to privacy, his primary argument centres on his desire to control the timing of his death. Due to his medical condition, he is condemned to a life of physical incapacity, pain, and existential dread. The applicant dismisses palliative care as a viable option: “While palliative care could provide relief with respect to certain aspects of his physical suffering, it could not provide relief from the experience of existential dread” (§91). Instead, he focuses on the fact that he cannot avail himself of assisted suicide provisions either in Hungary or abroad. Hungarian law prohibits assisting a patient in procuring their death, and even those aiding with arrangements for this purpose can face prosecution (§§135; 159).

The Court observed that, due to the lack of a uniform consensus among member states on assisted dying practices, each state is granted a considerable margin of appreciation in implementing policies on such sensitive issues. The court also noted, as the recent case of Mortier v. Belgium held, that the right to life (art. 2 ECHR) does not inherently exclude the decriminalisation of assisted dying. However, this decriminalisation must be accompanied by safeguards to prevent abuses of the right to life (§§126-128; 145).

The Court, finding no violation of art. 8, held that Mr Kasai’s suffering could not dismissed lightly. It noted that the applicant’s complaint mainly focused on “existential suffering” that “although it amounts to genuine and severe anguish, existential suffering relates essentially to a personal experience, which may be susceptible to change and does not lend itself to a straightforward objective assessment” (§158). Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that “existential suffering may be refractory to medical treatment […] and that the use of sedation to alleviate it might be contested or unwarranted in certain situations […]” (§157).  Professor Aubry, one of the experts consulted by the Court, emphasised two key points. First, he noted that patients suffering from the same condition as the applicant often exhibit ambivalence about their desire to die as the disease progresses. Second, he underscored the importance of palliative care for individuals affected by ALS, particularly in advanced stages, when they are typically permitted to receive palliative deep sedation and can die peacefully (§46).

Article 14

Regarding the violation of art. 8 ECHR and art. 14 ECHR the Mr Karsai argued that “Hungarian law accorded different treatment to those terminally ill persons with mental capacity who suffered from refractory symptoms but could hasten their death only by means of PAD [physician assisted dying], and those who could do so by having recourse to RWI [refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions” (§170).

In this case the Court held that the applicant’s clinical picture could not be compared to that of terminally ill patients who depend on life-sustaining medical treatments (§174). In fact, Mr Kasai’s diagnosis might lead to invasive life-sustaining interventions only towards the latest stages of his degenerative illness. Furthermore, the withholding or withdrawing of unwanted medical treatments falls within the right to informed medical consent and it is subjected to specific guidelines and safeguards in order to protect the patient’s autonomy (§175).

According to Professor Sandor, who produced an expert opinion for the Court, the right to informed consent is paramount in bioethics. On the other hand, “patients could refuse care, but could not ask for something specific” (§56). For these reasons the Court held that there has been no violation of art. 14 in conjunction with art. 8 of the Convention.

Separate opinions

Two judges’ separate opinions provide an opportunity to delve deeper into the reasoning of the Court’s majority, as they both address the fundamental principles underlying the final decision. Judge Wojtyczek in his separate concurring opinion disagreed with the majority that the applicant’s request to have access to physician assisted dying would fall under his right to respect his private life. The judge emphasised how the right to life – as the practical and effective basis for the enjoyment of all other rights – may hardly “encompass decisions about one’s own life and death” and for this reason, the right to private life, should not extend to the choice of death (§4, Judge Wojtyczek partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion). He noted that the suffering stemming from a personal feeling in relation to the absence of meaning of life may be exacerbated (or not properly tackled) if people can choose their own death.

Judge Felici, dissenting on both accounts with the Court’s majority, firstly emphasised his impression that “the applicant’s legitimate concerns were not taken into account, and that his legitimate request for help fell on deaf ears” (§7, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). In fact, according to Judge Felici, palliative care could not be considered a feasible option to ease the applicant’s suffering since “the expert consulted have indicated that there is currently no medical treatment capable of alleviating existential suffering” (§9, Judge Felici dissenting opinion, my emphasis). In other words, the dissenting Judge stressed an evident reality: so far medicine has not been able to offer a cure to the sentiment that life has lost its meaning. And, for this reason, assisted dying is envisaged as the only possible answer to the applicant existential cry for help. Consequently, the dissenting judge finds that the impossibility for the applicant to avail himself of assisted dying provisions both in his country and abroad would breach his right to privacy enshrined by art. 8 of the Convention.

Specifically, Hungary – compared to other member states which permit assisted dying or are paying great attention on the matter – would have failed to address the severe suffering of the applicant (§5, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). Therefore, Judge Felici dissented that in this instance the margin of appreciation doctrine (which applies on sensitive matters where there is no uniform agreement) should not be invoked. Giving that, “there are no insurmountable legal obstacles to affirming a positive obligation on the part of the State, having regard to all the characteristics of this case, in relation to the application of Article 8 of the Convention” (§6, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).

Secondly, the Judge disagreed with the Court majority’s decision according to which the applicant’s medical condition should be considered similar to the one endured by terminally-ill patients subjected to invasive life-sustaining medical treatments since Mr Kasai’s condition has made him dependant on others for all his personal needs. Hence Judge Felici argued that “the subordination of the decision to take one’s life to whether one is dependent on life-saving treatment represents an unnecessary reduction of the protection of the right to life and an interference in private life, understood as the individual’s capacity for self-determination” (§13, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).

Dr Ilaria Bertini is a Research Fellow at BIOS Centre

Double Feature: Article 6 and extradition in Bertino and Merticariu

4 April 2024 by Benjamin Seifert

Introduction

On 6 March 2024 the Supreme Court handed down two separate judgments in the cases of Bertino v Public Prosecutor’s Office, Italy [2024] UKSC 9 and Merticariu v Judecatoria Arad, Romania [2024] UKSC 10. The constitution of the Court for both cases was the same with the judgments written by Lord Stephens and Lord Burnett. Lords Hodge, Sales and Burrows completed the panel.

These two appeals both concern Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the Act”) which deals with convicted individuals who are subject to convictions in their absence. Trials in absentia are extremely common in civil law jurisdictions and it is sometimes said that there is the possibility of unfairness arising from a trial with an absent defendant

Section 20(3) requires an extradition judge to decide whether or not a person has deliberately absented themselves from their trial. In those circumstances they can be extradited to serve a sentence without an entitlement to a retrial.

If the Court determines that the person was not deliberately absent Section 20(5) must be addressed and it is necessary to decide if they would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) a review amounting to a retrial. The case of Bertino considered deliberate absence within Section 20(3) and Merticariu the right to a retrial within Section 20(5).

These issues are integral to the protection of Article 6 of the ECHR. It is plain that deliberately absenting oneself from a trial would not subject someone to a violation of Article 6 but the two basic principles of that Article are the right to be present and the right to be represented (Bertino §27).

Bertino: the facts

The Appellant’s extradition was sought pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) issued for his extradition to serve a year’s imprisonment after trial in his absence at the Italian Court of Pordenone. He was convicted for the offence of sexual activity with an under-age person.

The Appellant signed a document confirming that he was under investigation and he “elected domicile” in Italy. The document stipulated that he was obliged to notify the authorities of any change of address. Without such a notification service of any document would be executed by delivery to his lawyer. Mr Bertino elected his domicile by giving an address in Venetico, Messina and also indicated that he would be assisted by a court-appointed lawyer.

However he then left the country in November 2015 and came to the UK where he began to work. Meanwhile the prosecution in Italy commenced on 8 June 2017, a writ of summons for the court hearing was issued on 12 June 2017 and he was summoned to appeal at the Pordenone Court on 28 September 2017. The summons included a warning that his non-attendance without “lawful impediment” would lead to judgment in his absence. However he had never received the summons and by then the judicial authority knew that he was no longer at the address in Venetico. He had also failed to notify the authorities of any change of address.

There were then many unsuccessful attempts to trace him in Italy between 2016 and 2019. The Appellant did tell Westminster Magistrates’ Court that he had informed the authorities of his departure to the UK for family law purposes because, by then, his marriage was failing and arrangements were to be made for the children, but not the police in connection with the investigation.

The Council Framework Decision

EAWs must be drafted in a prescribed form according to the Council Framework Decision of 26 February 2009 2009/299/JHA, and there are various options which the issuing judicial authority is required to tick. In this case the EAW indicated that he was absent from his trial. There are a range of boxes for indicating, roughly, why this was; in Mr Bertino’s case none of those boxes was ticked and the evidence was that he was unaware of the date and place of his trial and even that there had been a decision to prosecute him.

The Deputy Senior District Judge ordering extradition found that, because the Appellant left his address without notifying a forwarding address and then came to the UK he had demonstrated a “manifest lack of diligence” [§10], a phrase echoing Court of Justice of the European Union case law.

On appeal Swift J found that there was no reason in principle to distinguish between a requested person’s awareness of the date and place of trial and the knowledge that if he does not attend trial he could be tried in absentia. This, he observed, is in accordance with Article 6 ECHR which guarantees a person’s right to be present at trial but that right, so he said, could be waived expressly or by inference.

Swift J certified the following point of law of general public importance:

For a requested person to have deliberately absented himself from trial for the purpose of Section 20(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 must the requesting authority prove that he has actual knowledge that he could be convicted and sentenced in absentia?

The Court’s conclusions on the law

If the EAW is used to convey information which demonstrates that one of the criteria from the 2009 Framework Decision is met that is normally determinative of whether or not the extraditee can be considered deliberately absent (§44). However the Framework Decision (§45) acknowledges that the question of whether or not to extradite is a matter of domestic law when none of the criteria has been satisfied. Consequently Section 20 falls to be analysed.

The phrase “deliberately absented himself from his trial” is the same, under Strasbourg jurisprudence, as the suggestion that an accused has unequivocally waived his right to be present at trial. If those circumstances lead to a finding of a breach of Article 6 then the judge must be required to consider retrial rights under Section 20(5).  However if the trial in absentia did not lead to a breach of Article 6 then the person will have deliberately absented himself from his trial.

It is also for the requesting judicial authority to prove to the criminal standard that an appellant has unequivocally waived his right to be present at his trial.

Application of the facts to the law

The Appellant was never arrested, charged or questioned. He was never informed that he was to be prosecuted and was never notified of the time and place of his trial (§50). He knew that he was suspected of a crime which was being investigated but there was no certainty that he would subsequently be prosecuted. When he left Italy, without giving the judicial police a new address, there were no criminal proceedings of which he could have been aware and definitely no trial from which he could have deliberately absented himself. This was the basis upon which the Supreme Court ruled that the Courts below had erred in finding that he had deliberately absented himself.

At paragraph 52 the Court stated that the Magistrates’ Court and the High Court had inferred that he had unequivocally and intentionally waived his right to be present at his trial by finding that he could reasonably foresee that the trial would proceed in his absence. The Supreme Court noted that the concepts of waiver and reasonable foreseeability were from Strasbourg case law and were not synonymous with the same concepts in English private law. The Strasbourg standard is that, in order for a waiver to be unequivocal and effective, knowing and intelligent, the accused must ordinarily be shown to have appreciated the consequences of their own behaviour and will usually require them to have been warned (§54).

The District Judge had described the Appellant’s “manifest lack of diligence” but the Supreme Court concluded (§55) that this would not have been a waiver by the fact that he could have avoided the situation which led to an impairment of his rights. It was on that basis that the Supreme Court found that the courts had previously overly broadened the definition by finding that deliberate absence is found where the person’s conduct led to him becoming unaware of the date and time of trial. However (§58) these cases are clearly to be considered on their individual facts and there may be circumstances where accused people knowingly and intelligently place themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the prosecuting and judicial authorities  so that a trial in their presence is impossible and they could be considered to appreciate that a trial in absentia is the only option.

The Court therefore ruled that Mr Bertino did not unequivocally waive his right to be present at his trial and was not deliberately absent. The appeal was therefore allowed.

Merticariu: the facts

The EAW was issued in 2019. District Judge Ezzat gave judgment on 26 August 2020 and found that Mr Merticariu had not deliberately absented himself from his trial but did have a right to a retrial in Romania and therefore, with this apparent guarantee, extradition was ordered.

On appeal (§6) to the High Court Chamberlain J dismissed the appeal, having found that he was bound by the authority of BP v Romania [2015] EWHC 3417 where the Divisional Court held that Section 20(5) of the Act will be satisfied even if the right to a retrial is conditional on a finding in the requesting state that the person was not deliberately absent from their trial.

The certified question

Chamberlain J certified the following question of general public importance arising from his decision. He refused leave to appeal.

In a case where the appropriate judge has decided the questions in section 20(1) and (3) of the Extradition Act 2003 in the negative, can the appropriate judge answer the question in section 20(5) in the affirmative if (a) the law of the requesting state confers a right to retrial which depends on a finding by a judicial authority of that state as to whether the requested person was deliberately absent from his trial; and (b) it is not possible to say that a finding of deliberate absence is ‘theoretical’ or ‘so remote that it can be discounted’? If so, in what circumstances?

The decision

As a Romanian extradition case the High Court considered Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provided that the person has a “right to ask for a retrial of the case”(§34). However this was not sufficient for the Supreme Court. The “natural and ordinary” meaning of the words in Section 20(5) were clear. It is not solely a question of being entitled to apply for a retrial. The answer to the question in Section 20(5) should not be “perhaps” or “in certain circumstances” (§51). The entitlement to a retrial therefore cannot be contingent on the court making a factual finding that the person was not present at or was not deliberately absent from their trial. The question is clear: are they entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial?

The decision in BP was therefore wrong at paragraph 44 where it stated that an application for a retrial was a procedural step contingent on the court determining whether the person had or had not instructed a lawyer to represent her at her trial (§52). The 2009 Framework Decision replaced “an opportunity to apply for a retrial” with “a right to a retrial.”

The Supreme Court also agreed that the right to a retrial was consistent with Strasbourg principles where there is a “duty to guarantee the right of a criminal defendant to be present in the courtroom” (§54). It is consistent with Article 6 obligations.

Furthermore the principle of mutual trust and confidence, which pervades extradition arrangements between the UK and EU (§60) runs both ways because the issuing judicial authority takes part and is represented in the proceedings in the UK court and it would be entirely in accordance with this principle that courts in requesting states respect the executing courts’ decisions in this country.

The answers to the certified questions

The Supreme Court found that an appropriate judge cannot answer Section 20(5) in the affirmative if the law confers a right to a retrial which depends on a finding by a judicial authority as to whether the person was deliberately absent from their trial.

In relation to (b) of the question the Court found that it is for the issuing judicial authority to provide information in the EAW or in response to a request for further information. The executing court should not take part in a “mini trial” as to whether, on the facts and law of the requesting state, a finding is theoretical or so remote that it can be discounted. The evidence should be clear. (§64)

The application to the case

Given that the judicial authority in this case was unable to confirm whether or not the Appellant had a right to a retrial and Article 466 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure demonstrated that he would not be regarded as having been tried in absentia he had no right to a retrial (§67).

Comments

In Bertino, This decision represents a pendulum swing from the past ten years of High Court authority where the concept of “manifest lack of diligence” had imposed a significant level of responsibility on a person who may not have fully understood the consequences of their decision to leave the country after they may have only been partly aware of a criminal prosecution. It provides a greater protection to those lay persons who assume that the authorities will contact them. It also now requires District Judges to exercise greater inquiry into the circumstances of an individuals departure from the country which requests their extradition.

In Merticariu, the Supreme Court has finally resolved what is a very short point. If the Court is required to consider Section 20(5) there can be no assumptions in these cases, in the absence of any clear evidence, that a right to a retrial exists. There was always a doubt that the requesting state’s s findings about deliberate absence would chime with those of the executing state and now they need to be considered together. These questions are fundamental to the fair carriage of extradition cases between the UK and EU. Whilst the earlier cases assumed compliance with Article 6 on the basis of mutual trust and confidence the UK courts now do not need to be so quick to reach the same conclusions and they will also offer greater protections to those who find themselves in our extradition courts.

Benjamin Seifert is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row Chambers.

Dillon and others’ applications for judicial review – a radically unradical analysis of the Legacy Act

18 March 2024 by anuragdeb

Anurag Deb & Colin Murray

In Dillon [2024] NIKB 11, the controversial Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 (Legacy Act) was challenged head on. The Court disapplied a number of provisions of the Act as being in breach of relevant aspects of EU law which continue to apply to Northern Ireland via the Windsor Framework. We have covered the precise EU law aspects of Dillon elsewhere and will only cover the ECHR elements of the judgment in this post. As will become clear, however, there is a critical link between these two main aspects of the judgment.

The disapplication of any part of an Act of the UK Parliament is infrequent enough to be notable. Given that Dillon marks not only some of the most extensive disapplication in history but also is the first such event after Brexit, the decision is significant. But, as we will demonstrate, the decision is not radical. Far from it, much of Mr Justice Colton’s 738-paragraph judgment is an orthodox application of the relevant law.

Unanimous Supreme Court: Rwanda removals are unlawful

15 November 2023 by Jonathan Metzer

R ((AAA) Syria and Ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42

The Government’s flagship policy of removing individual asylum seekers to Rwanda for their claims to be decided under the Rwandan asylum system that was announced on 14^th April 2022 has been found to be unlawful by a unanimous Supreme Court.

The Claimants were 10 individual asylum-seekers who entered the UK irregularly in small boats, together with one charity, Asylum Aid. There were also several interveners to the case, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (whose counsel team was led by Angus McCullough KC of 1 Crown Office Row). The Home Secretary (whose counsel included Neil Sheldon KC and Natasha Barnes of 1 Crown Office Row) was the Defendant.

In December 2022, the Divisional Court (Lewis LJ and Swift J) dismissed the general challenge to the policy, as discussed here. But in June, the Court of Appeal, by a 2-1 majority (Sir Geoffrey Vos MR and Underhill LJ) found that the policy was unlawful, as discussed here.

The Supreme Court (Lord Reed P, Lord Hodge DP, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Briggs and Lord Sales), in a judgment jointly authored by Lord Reed and Lord Lloyd-Jones, has now held unanimously that the policy is unlawful on the basis that there are substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers would face a real risk of ill-treatment by reason of refoulement (forcible return) to their country of origin if they are removed to Rwanda.

Court of Appeal upholds challenge to Rwanda removals policy – an extended look

19 July 2023 by Jonathan Metzer

R ((AAA) Syria and Ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 745

The Claimants in this case are 10 individual asylum-seekers from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, Sudan and Albania who entered the UK irregularly by crossing the English Channel in small boats, together with one charity, Asylum Aid.

Covid and Free Speech in the High Court

11 April 2023 by Thomas Hayes

Introduction

On 5 April 2023 the High Court handed down judgment in Adil v General Medical Council [2023] EWHC 797 (Admin). The case examined the extent to which a professional regulator can interfere with the right to freedom of expression of an individual subject to its regulation, as well as the circumstances in which the Court should accept challenges to decisions made by regulators in the performance of their duties. It is the first case decided by the High Court concerning anti-vaccination statements made by a doctor in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the actions of the General Medical Council (“GMC”) in response. 

Factual Background

Mr Adil is a consultant colorectal surgeon. Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, he posted multiple videos on social media in which he, amongst other things, made statements to the effect that:

1. COVID-19 did not exist;
2. the pandemic was a conspiracy brought about by the United Kingdom, Israel and America; 
3. the pandemic was a scam which was being manipulated for the benefit of Bill Gates and pharmaceutical companies;
4. Bill Gates infected the entire world with COVID-19 in order to sell vaccines; and 
5. COVID-19 vaccines would be given to everyone, by force if necessary, and could potentially contain microchips that affect the human body.

The Weekly Round-up: Scottish independence referendum, retained EU law and social media

30 November 2022 by Ruby Turok-Squire

In the News…

The Supreme Court has ruled unanimously that the Scottish parliament does not have the power to pass legislation that would allow for a second referendum on Scottish independence. Such legislation, the Supreme Court found, would touch on ‘reserved matters’, that is, matters affecting the United Kingdom as a whole. The Scottish government unsuccessfully argued that a referendum would be advisory, and as it would not have immediate impact on the existence of the UK, would not touch on reserved matters. Sturgeon, while respecting the ruling, commented that it confirmed that the UK can no longer be pictured as a voluntary partnership and noted that the next general election could serve as a ‘de facto referendum’.

Nurses are preparing to strike for the first time on the 15th and 20th of December. The issues in question include low pay and unsafe staffing levels. The Royal College of Nursing (RCN) has reported that experienced nurses are 20% worse off in real terms than in 2010, due to many pay increases below the rate of inflation, and that 25,000 nursing staff have left the Nursing and Midwifery Council register since last year. If ministers continue to refuse to engage in formal negotiations with the RCN, the strikes will go ahead across England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and are expected to have a severe impact on care.

The Weekly Round-up: Home Office deaths and Post Office “thefts”

26 April 2021 by Alethea Redfern

In the News:

The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) has found that Priti Patel breached her procedural obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR in respect of deaths in immigration detention.  

The application for judicial review arose following the death of Oscar Lucky Okwurime on 12 September 2019 in his cell at IRC Harmondsworth. Mr Okwurime had tried but failed to secure healthcare at the centre. He was not provided with his obligatory ‘Rule 34’ GP appointment within 24 hours of his arrival.

Priti Patel was subject to a legal requirement to assist the coronial inquest by identifying and securing evidence from potential witnesses. Instead, she elected to continue with her plans to remove a number of potential witnesses, including the Applicant, Mr Lawal, a close friend of Mr Okwurime.

Later, the Area Coroner for West London required Mr Lawal to attend the inquest on the basis that he was “an important witness of fact.” The jury later found that “multiple failures to adhere to healthcare policy” and “neglect” contributed to Mr Okwurime’s death from coronary heart disease.

The court found that Patel acted unlawfully in deciding to remove the Applicant in that she failed to take to take reasonable steps to secure the applicant’s evidence concerning the death of Oscar Okwurime. Aditionally, the absence of a policy directing caseworkers on how to exercise immigration powers in a case concerning a witness to a death in custody was unlawful. This was contrary to her Article 2 procedural obligations.

A Home Office spokesperson has said that, in light of the judgment, its processes were being refreshed and a checklist was being introduced to ensure all potential witnesses are identified.

The decision comes as Patel faces criticism for “serious mistakes” and “fundamental failures of leadership and planning” by the Home Office in managing former military sites as makeshift accommodation for asylum seekers. The Home Office is also being sued by a female asylum seeker who claims that staff at her asylum accommodation refused to call an ambulance for three hours after she told them she was pregnant, in pain and bleeding. When she was eventually taken to a nearby hospital, she learned that her baby had died.

In Other News:

• Helena Kennedy QC, a leading human rights barrister and author of Eve Was Framed, has been included on the list of those sanctioned by the Chinese government for criticism of the human rights abuses against Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province. Together with David Alton, a crossbencher, she helmed an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to persuade the UK government to create a procedure that would have enabled the English high court to make a determination on whether the evidence reached the threshold for genocide. China has imposed sanctions on 10 other UK organisations and individuals, including the former leader of the Conservative party Iain Duncan Smith, over what it called the spreading of “lies and disinformation” about human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
• The investigatory powers tribunal (IPT), which examines allegations that the state has misused its surveillance powers, has heard from an environmental activist who was deceived into a long-term sexual relationship by an undercover Metropolitan police officer that his managers knew about the deception and allowed it to continue. A judge-led public inquiry into the activities of undercover officers is ongoing; Phillipa Kaufmann QC, who represents women deceived into sexual relationships, has called the practice “endemic”.

In the Courts:

• Hamilton & Ors v Post Office Ltd [2021] EWCA Crim 577: the Court of Appeal quashed the convictions of thirty nine men and women employed by the Post Office as sub-postmasters, sub-postmistresses, managers or counter assistants; three other former employees’ appeals failed and were dismissed. All the appellants were prosecuted by their employer and convicted of crimes of dishonesty. The reliability of the computerised accounting system, “Horizon”, in use in branch post offices during the relevant period, was essential to the prosecutions. Despite repeated assertions by the Post Office that the system was robust and reliable, it has become clear that it was critically undermined by bugs and glitches which cause it to incorrectly record shortfalls. The court called the convictions “an affront to the public conscience.” A public inquiry chaired by Sir Wyn Williams, President of Welsh Tribunals, is currently trying to establish an account of the implementations and failings of the system.
• Howard, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 1023 (Admin): the High Court ruled that the Home Office’s handling of a Windrush citizenship application was irrational and unlawful. Hubert Howard was repeatedly denied British citizenship over the course of a decade, despite having lived in the UK since he arrived from Jamaica at the age of three in 1960, on the grounds that a number of minor convictions prevented him from meeting a “good character” requirement, which is an eligibility criteria for citizenship.
• Elkundi & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Birmingham City Council [2021] EWHC 1024 (Admin): the High Court has ruled that Birmingham City Council has been operating an unlawful system for the performance of its main housing duty under the Housing Act 1996. The Council had been operating on the basis that an applicant owed the main housing duty may be left in unsuitable accommodation while the Council takes a reasonable time to secure permanent suitable accommodation. Steyn J held that this was unlawful; the main housing duty is an “immediate, unqualified and non-deferrable” duty to secure suitable accommodation. Putting applicants on a waiting list was not a lawful means of performing that duty.

On the UKHRB:

• Caroline Cross covers a recent case in which the boundaries of causation in mesothelioma deaths were tested and clarified.
• Martin Forde QC summarises the High Court’s decision (set out briefly above) that the Home Office’s handling of a Windrush citizenship application was unlawful

General Warrants to Hack Computers Unlawful: Privacy International v IPT

1 February 2021 by Conor Monighan

In Privacy International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the Divisional Court held that s.5 Intelligence Services Act 1994 does not permit the government to issue general warrants to engage in computer network exploitation (“CNE”) – more commonly known as computer hacking. The court also offered valuable guidance on warrants and what is required to make them lawful.

The Issues

There were three issues:

1.     Does s.5 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) permit the Secretary of State to issue ‘thematic’ or ‘general’ warrants to hack computers? General warrants are those which purportedly authorise acts in respect of an entire class of people or an entire class of acts (e.g. ‘all mobile phones in London’).

2.     Should the court allow the claim to be amended to include a complaint that, prior to February 2015, the s.5 regime did not comply with Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights?

3.     If permission is given to amend the claim, should the new ground succeed?

International Human Rights, Public Interest Immunity, and Brook House – The Round Up

24 August 2020 by Conor Monighan

Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law

In the News:

Internationally there were a number of developments which have significant consequences for human rights. In Russia a prominent critic of Vladimir Putin has allegedly been poisoned. Alexei Navalny, who is known for exposing corruption within the country, suddenly fell ill last week after drinking tea.

Supporters claim the Russian state has tried to silence Mr Navalny’s criticism of President Putin, and then attempted to cover up its actions by stopping Mr Navalny from being treated abroad. Despite initial resistance from doctors, who said that Mr Navalny was too ill to be moved, the leader has now been flown out of Russia. Critics say the developments are part of a wider crackdown on freedom of speech within the country.

Changes to Policing, Consent, and Three Landmark Cases- the Round Up

15 June 2020 by Conor Monighan

Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law

In the News:

Anti-racism protests, sparked by the death of George Floyd, continued across the world. This week much of the focus has been on statues commemorating controversial historical figures. In Bristol, campaigners toppled the statue of a 17^th century slave trader called Edward Colston.

The move led to a debate about what ought to be done with such statues. The founder of the Scouts, Robert Baden-Powell, was accused of racism, homophobia, and anti-Semitism. Initially it seemed his statue would be put into storage, but following an outcry it has been boarded up instead. A number of other figures have received similar treatment, including Sir Winston Churchill.

In the US, it seems change is coming to policing. The Democratic Party is proposing a police reform bill which, if passed, would become the Justice in Policing Act of 2020. The Bill would ban chokeholds from being used, limit the use of military weapons, and restrict qualified immunity (the legal principle which has prevented many officers from being sued for alleged misconduct). President Trump confirmed that he ‘generally’ supported ending the use of chokeholds.

Continue reading →

Corona-vires: Has the Government exceeded its powers?

13 February 2020 by Jim Duffy

This Government’s key message has been its ability get things done, whether it be Brexit, HS2 or stopping the spread of Coronavirus.

Indeed, if the new high speed trains move as swiftly as the Health Secretary did on Monday, then they might break the sound barrier: the Health Protection (Coronavirus) Regulations 2020 were enacted at 6.50am on Monday and laid before Parliament by 2.30 that afternoon.  Their preamble states that

the Secretary of State is of the opinion that, by reason of urgency, it is necessary to make this instrument without a draft having been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.

One can appreciate the desire to bypass the cumbersome mechanics of Parliament to save the country from a potentially deadly virus. But in the fullness of time, the resulting Regulations might well be held up as an excellent advertisement for Parliamentary scrutiny.

Round Up- The Child Sexual Abuse Inquiry reports, Equal Pay, and waiving Article 6

13 January 2020 by Conor Monighan

Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law

In the News:

ICCSA, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, published its report into protecting children who live outside the UK.

It described how there has been “extensive” sexual abuse of children by British nationals whilst abroad. Between 2013 – 2017, 361 UK nationals requested consular assistance between 2013 – 2017 for being arrested for child sex offences. The inquiry suggested this was likely to be a small proportion of offenders committing crimes abroad.

The report highlights the case of Gary Glitter, who was able to travel abroad and abuse vulnerable children even after he had been convicted. Glitter was later sentenced again for abusing two girls, aged 10 and 11, in Vietnam.

ICCSA concluded that travel bans should be imposed more frequently to prevent this behaviour. It noted that Australia bans registered sex offenders from travelling overseas. ICCSA’s report also argued that the burden of proof for imposing travel bans should be reduced, saying that the need for evidence is often overstated by courts and the police.

The inquiry described the global exploitation of children as worth an estimated £27.7 billion, with developing countries being particularly at risk.

The full report can be read here. More from the BBC here.

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