Category: CONVENTION RIGHTS
23 September 2026 by Guest Contributor
The UK Human Rights Blog is moving to Substack.
From 19th October, all new articles will be published exclusively on our Substack, and no new content will appear on our current website.
To stay up to date with our latest articles and insights, please subscribe here: https://substack.com/@ukhumanrightsblog
The UK Human Rights Blog is grateful to Dr Lewis Graham, the author, and to the Administrative Court Blog (where this post first appeared) for permission to reproduce the below.
The Supreme Court has, once again, rejected a challenge to the compatibility of primary legislation with the ECHR. It has ruled that section 128(1) of the Police, Crime, Courts and Sentencing Act 2022 (amending the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997) is compatible with Articles 5, 7 and 14 of the Convention. The case is R (Quaye) v Secretary of State for Justice [2026] UKSC 34.
The legislation under challenge
Children who commit murder are not given the same life sentences as adults. Instead, they are sentenced to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure (DHMP). As part of the sentencing procedure, the trial judge sets a minimum term which must be served before the offender can apply to the Parole Board for release. Prior to changes made in 2021, the Secretary of State operated a policy whereby at a certain point (halfway through the minimum term) the offender could apply to them for a review of that term, with the possibility of achieving early release. This policy was amended in 2021, and was put on a statutory footing in 2022, via the Police, Crime, Courts and Sentencing Act 2022, section 128(1). The effect of this provision was to remove any opportunity for child offenders sentenced to DHMP to seek a review of the minimum term if the offender was sentenced after they became an adult (i.e. after their 18th birthday).
The result of the legislation, therefore, was to separate child offenders into two categories: firstly, those who committed a crime as a child (under the age of 18), and who were sentenced as a child; secondly, those who committed a crime as a child (under the age of 18) but who were sentenced after their 18th birthday. The former category remain entitled to seek review of the minimum term by the Secretary of State; the latter category, thanks to section 128(1), do not.
The claimant in this case fell into the latter category. He committed murder before his 18th birthday, but was sentenced after he turned 18; section 128(1) therefore applied, and he was not entitled to have his sentence reviewed. He sought to challenge the legislation via judicial review, arguing that section 128(1) breached his rights under Articles 5, 7 and 14 of the ECHR.
The courts below
The High Court (William Davis LJ and May LJ) upheld, in part, the claimant’s challenge: see [2024] EWHC 211 (Admin). It ruled that depriving child offenders of the opportunity to have their sentences reviewed by the Secretary of State gave rise to the possibility of arbitrary detention, contrary to Article 5 of the Convention. The Court noted, in this respect, that prior to the legislative change, some child offenders successfully convinced the Secretary of State to reduce their minimum term. To deny them the opportunity to show that their rehabilitation was complete, and that the sentence is no longer necessary, was to breach their Article 5 rights: see [59] of that case. The High Court also upheld the challenge based on Article 14 of the Convention. It found that the provisions treated two groups differently based on their age, and that the justifications put forward by the defendant – the protection of those under 18 at the time of sentence and the need to promote the interests of victim families – did not justify the arbitrary differentiation between those who were 18 at the time of sentencing and those who were not: see [46]-[58] of the High Court’s judgment. The High Court did not consider it necessary to rule on the legislation’s compatibility with Article 7: see [62] of its judgment.
The Court of Appeal (Sharp P, Lewis LJ and Cobb J) overturned the High Court’s judgment: see [2025] EWCA Civ 226. It found that section 128(1) of the 2022 Act did not breach Articles 5, 7 or Article 14 of the Convention. The claimant’s lack of opportunities for review of his sentence did not render the sentence arbitrary for the purposes of Article 5: see [87] of that judgment. The changes made by the 2022 Act were “concerned with the manner of execution or enforcement of the sentence” rather than changing the sentence itself, so Article 7 was not violated: see [102] of that judgment. Finally, emphasising the significant margin of appreciation applicable in this context, the Court concluded that the decision to treat offenders differently depending on their age at the time of sentence was not disproportionate, and that a fair balance had been struck between the rights of the offender and the interests of the victims’ families: see [118]-[143], and especially [142]-[143], of that judgment.
The Supreme Court’s judgment
The Supreme Court, in a judgment jointly written by Lord Stephens and Lady Simler (with which Lords Sales, Briggs and Hamblen expressed agreement), dismissed the claimant’s appeal. It ruled, like the Court of Appeal below it, that section 128(1) of the 2022 Act did not breach any Convention rights.
Article 5 ECHR
The Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the High Court’s findings relating to Article 5. The High Court fell into error, said the Supreme Court, by taking as its “starting point” the position that the 2022 legislation “did not change the essential nature of a sentence of [DHMP] and that an inherent element of the sentence was the requirement of continuing review”: [59]. Legislation had already governed the field since at least the year 2000 and, in any case, the combined effect of legislative intervention, up to and including section 128(1) of the 2022 Act, had created a complete code governing DHMP, or as the Court put it at [61]: “Since 2022 the scheme for sentencing persons who commit murder as children to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure is an entirely statutory one”.
The core question, then, was “whether by excluding any opportunity to review the minimum term for those aged 18 and over when sentenced to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure, section 27A(11) gives rise to a risk of arbitrary detention under article 5 ECHR”: [62]. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that Article 5 does not require there to be an opportunity for review in this sense, either for sentences in general or for DHMP: [64], [68], [69]. Article 5 simply required there to be a sufficient connection between the conviction and the sentence actually imposed; this test was clearly met on the facts: [67]. Being sentenced to a minimum term, without the opportunity to petition the Secretary of State to reduce that sentence, was not arbitrary: [69].
Article 7 ECHR
The Supreme Court drew upon the familiar distinction, in the context of Article 7, between the retrospective modification of a sentence (or “penalty”) and changes made to the “execution” or “enforcement” of a sentence. The former is prohibited under Article 7; the latter is not: [129]. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal in finding that the changes made by section 128(1) fell into the latter, rather than the former category: [144]. The changes related “exclusively to a change in the regime for early release on licence”: [143]. The sentence imposed on the claimant was DHMP, and it remained so after the changes made by the 2022 Act took effect: [142]. Article 7 was not breached by the relevant provisions of the 2022 Act: [144].
Article 14 ECHR
The Court also ruled that the provisions did not breach Article 14 of the Convention. Whilst the effect of section 128(1) was to create two categories of offender, which were treated differently based on a protected status (age) – see [114] – the Court found that the difference in treatment pursued a legitimate aim, the effect of which was to constitute a proportionate interference with the claimant’s rights.
The aim behind the legislation was the protection of the victim’s family members. In particular, the Court highlighted that victim families are contacted every time an application to vary the minimum term is made: [98]. Repeated engagement with this process caused “obvious and inevitable” distress for them: [100]. The desire to reduce this distress was “a consideration Parliament was entitled to regard as powerful”: [99]. The aim behind the legislation was therefore a legitimate one: [101]. There was a rational connection between the pursuit of that aim and the legislation in question: [115].
As to proportionality, the Court applied “low intensity of review” [79] for five reasons: first, the discrimination in this case was based on the ground of age, which is not a suspect category calling for heightened scrutiny: [80]; second, the provision under review is primary legislation: [88]; third, the legislation involves considerations of “social policy”: [89]; fourth, there is no European consensus on the issue at hand: [93]; fifth, the legislation in question involves consideration of “competing interests”: [94]. All of this meant that the legislature was in a stronger position than the court when it came to determining the proportionality of the measure, and the court should be slow to intervene in its judgment: [124]-[125]. The legislation did not breach Article 14: [126].
Comment
This judgment provides yet another instance of the Supreme Court rejecting a human rights challenge to legislation. In doing so, the Court applied a relatively orthodox understanding of what protection from arbitrariness requires in the context of Article 5, and was unwilling to recognise any wider principle that the needs of child prisoners to be protected from arbitrary detention mandates that their sentences be kept under review (at least in part because there existed no explicit Strasbourg authority to this effect: [64]).
The Court’s reasoning in relation to Article 14 is also noteworthy. By largely approving the reasoning of Sharp P in the Court of Appeal (see our blog on that judgment here) the Court once again applies a very deferential approach to discrimination issues in human rights law. Whilst the Court at least accepts that the intensity of review to be applied in Article 14 cases “varies according to the circumstances, the subject matter and the background” ([78]), the Court goes on to provide five reasons as to why a low intensity review is justified in the present case. These reasons are familiar and, as I have argued elsewhere, largely fail to convince. For example, almost all legislation – and certainly any legislation which involves differential treatment capable of engaging Article 14 issues – will involve “competing interests”. And the courts have interpreted “social policy” so widely that it has come to encompass almost any kind of legislative issue.
We also see in this judgment some now-expected language emanating from the case of SC: “the assessment of proportionality in this case ultimately depends on whether Parliament made the right judgement… this question cannot be answered by a process of legal reasoning because there are no legal standards by which a court can decide where the balance should be struck”: [124]. I have argued elsewhere that in some cases, this language has been used to justify an abdication of the duty of the courts to perform the required proportionality assessment (“there are no legal standards…”). This interpretation was rejected recently in the case of LMN, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that SC should not be treated as authority for the position that in some cases a proportionality assessment should not be carried out at all. Thankfully, the Supreme Court appears to confirm this in Quaye. After setting out the above passage, the Court confirms: “it follows that the court should be slow to substitute its own view for the political judgement of Parliament in this respect”. The message, therefore, is that courts should apply a low intensity review, rather than no review at all. This is a subtle but important difference, and a welcome clarification that SC is not to be treated as authorising the courts to abandon the proportionality test altogether in cases involving social and political controversy.
Dr Lewis Graham is a Lecturer in Human Rights Law at the University of Manchester and an editor of the Administrative Court Blog.
21 August 2026 by Guest Contributor
The UK Human Rights Blog is moving to Substack.
From 19th October, all new articles will be published exclusively on our Substack, and no new content will appear on our current website.
To stay up to date with our latest articles and insights, please subscribe here: https://substack.com/@ukhumanrightsblog
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Hirtie [2026] EWCA Civ 1000, handed down by the Court of Appeal on 30 July 2026, is a deportation appeal that turns less on the substance of Article 8 than on procedural discipline: whether a party who unequivocally withdraws a ground of appeal before the Upper Tribunal (”UT”) can resurrect it before the Court of Appeal. The Court’s answer, delivered by Stuart-Smith LJ, was a firm no, reinforcing a growing body of authority requiring parties to identify and narrow the issues in dispute at the earliest opportunity.
Background
Mr Hirtie, a Romanian national, was convicted of section 18 wounding with intent (the most serious form of assault) and sentenced to 39 months’ imprisonment, making him a “foreign criminal” under section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 and liable to automatic deportation.
The Secretary of State (”SSHD”) rejected his human rights claim in September 2023, finding that neither exception to deportation under section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 applied and that there were no “very compelling circumstances” outweighing the public interest in removal.
The decision letter was structured throughout on the assumption that Mr Hirtie’s partner and children would remain in the United Kingdom following his deportation — the “stay” scenario. As Hirtie records at §13: “The structure of the SSHD’s reasoning is clear beyond argument: the possibility of Mr Hirtie’s partner and children going to live in Romania was simply not in issue.”
The route through the tribunals
Mr Hirtie’s skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) expressly identified the “go” scenario as a matter not in dispute, and the SSHD never contradicted this. The FtT allowed the appeal, finding that separation from Mr Hirtie would have a “profound” impact on his partner — going “beyond undue hardship” — given her traumatic history of losing her parents young and being raised in an orphanage, and that this amounted to “very compelling circumstances” under section 117C(6).
On appeal to the UT, the SSHD raised the “go” scenario for the first time as Ground 1, drafted in terms the presiding judge, UTJ O’Callaghan, considered misleading. Hirtie records at §31: “The end result was that the Senior Presenting Officer who was appearing for the SSHD agreed that Ground 1 … should be withdrawn. The withdrawal was unequivocal, albeit in the face of a heavy judicial headwind.” The UT went on to reject the SSHD’s remaining ground and upheld the FtT’s decision.
Reviving a withdrawn ground
Before the Court of Appeal, the SSHD sought to resurrect the “go” scenario, arguing that section 117A(2)(b) of the 2002 Act obliged the tribunal to consider it regardless of whether either party had raised it. Warby LJ, granting permission, deliberately left open whether a party could revive an argument withdrawn below.
Stuart-Smith LJ rejected the attempt at §52: “She had been properly represented before the UT and was not forced to withdraw the ground. No good reason was offered for resurrecting it on appeal.”
Applying Singh v Dass [2019] EWCA Civ 360, decided 7 March 2019, the Court set out the governing test for admitting a new point on appeal. Haddon-Cave LJ held at §16-17 of that case: “An appellate court will be cautious about allowing a new point to be raised on appeal that was not raised before the first instance court… An appellate court will not, generally, permit a new point to be raised on appeal if that point is such that either (a) it would necessitate new evidence or (b), had it been run below, it would have resulted in the trial being conducted differently with regards to the evidence at the trial.”
Applying this in Hirtie, the Court held at §53 that admitting the “go” scenario would require fresh evidence about relocation difficulties, that the FtT hearing would have unfolded differently had the issue been live, and that this was not a pure point of law the Court of Appeal could resolve without remittal.
The deeper procedural principle
More fundamentally, the Court held that allowing the SSHD to raise the “go” scenario now would conflict with the case-management philosophy established in Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), decided 23 June 2023, and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in AL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 370, handed down 31 March 2026.
Lata’s headnote states at point 4: “It is a misconception that it is sufficient for a party to be silent upon, or not make an express consideration as to, an issue for a burden to then be placed upon a judge to consider all potential issues that may favourably arise, even if not expressly relied upon.”
In AL, Elisabeth Laing LJ endorsed this approach, explaining at §78 that upon proper engagement with the appeal skeleton process “a judge sitting in the First-tier Tribunal can properly expect clarity as to the remaining issues between the parties by the date of the substantive hearing.” She further held, applying the narrow Robinson-obvious exception (from R (Robinson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] QB 929), that a decision cannot be criticised for failing to address an issue neither party raised, unless it was “a point which has strong prospects of success if it is argued. Nothing less will do” (Robinson at 946B-D, cited in AL at §68).
Hirtie held at §54-55 that the SSHD was not exempt from this obligation. Having omitted any reasoned discussion of relocation difficulties from the decision letter, and having failed to challenge Mr Hirtie’s skeleton assertion that the “go” scenario was not in dispute, her silence was, per Stuart-Smith LJ, “consistent with the issue not forming part of her decision-making process and not being in dispute between the parties.”
The “very compelling circumstances” ground
The SSHD’s second ground argued that the FtT’s finding of “very compelling circumstances” was legally flawed, inadequately reasoned, and perverse — partly because the judge did not expressly cite section 117C, and partly for want of expert medical evidence about the partner’s mental health.
The Court disagreed. At §62-63, Stuart-Smith LJ held that although the FtT judge did not set out section 117C verbatim, he plainly understood and applied the correct “very high bar,” relying on Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, decided 16 November 2016 (also cited as Hesham Ali), for the proposition that the public interest in deporting foreign criminals must be accorded very significant weight. The absence of a concluding checklist recapping the relevant factors was immaterial (§64).
On perversity, the FtT judge had found the partner and Mr Hirtie’s brother “honest and credible” witnesses giving “sincere and heartfelt evidence” (§66-67), and the Court held that FtT judges are entitled to make findings about the psychological impact of separation on the basis of accepted witness evidence alone, without corroborating expert medical evidence. The judge’s conclusion, reached “by a narrow margin,” was nonetheless sufficient to withstand appellate scrutiny (§68).
Comment
Hirtie offers several practical lessons for immigration and public law practitioners handling deportation and Article 8 appeals:
- Withdrawal is generally final. A party that unequivocally withdraws a ground before the UT, while properly represented and without compulsion, should not expect the Court of Appeal to allow its resurrection absent compelling justification (Hirtie at §52).
- Case-management discipline applies to the Secretary of State too. Lata and AL are not confined to appellants; the SSHD is equally bound to identify and narrow issues at the earliest stage (Hirtie at §55).
- Silence has consequences. Failing to engage with an opponent’s stated “matters not in dispute” will be treated as acceptance, not oversight (Lata headnote, point 4).
- New points face a high bar. Singh v Dass remains the touchstone: a new point requiring fresh evidence, or one that would have changed how the hearing below was conducted, will not be entertained on appeal (Singh at §16-17).
- The FtT’s reasoning need not be exhaustive. Provided the tribunal identifies and applies the correct legal test in substance, a judgment will not be struck down merely for lacking a concluding checklist (Hirtie at §64).
- Witness credibility can suffice without expert evidence. Findings about the psychological impact of separation may properly rest on accepted witness testimony alone (Hirtie at §67).
The case is a useful, moderately short illustration of how tightly the appellate courts are now enforcing the “principal controversial issues” discipline established in Lata — a discipline that applies as much to the Home Office as to any other litigant.
Matthew Howarth is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row.
11 August 2026 by Lance Baynham
In Cherrington v University of Derby [2026] EAT 107, the Mr Justice Cavanagh in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) held that an Employment Tribunal (“ET”) was not obliged to consider the Appellant’s Article 10 ECHR right to freedom of expression of its own motion when deciding whether or not his dismissal was fair. His right to freedom of expression did not “shout out” from his case, and nor was the ET obliged to consider the ECHR “as a matter of course” in unfair dismissal complaints, or even particular species of unfair dismissal complaints.
This case note briefly sets out the background to the case and the judgment, and then offers some brief comments by way of conclusion. References in square brackets are to paragraphs of the judgment.
Continue reading →
5 August 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Matthew Howarth
In R (Al Hashimi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 943, the Court of Appeal held that a woman living in the United Arab Emirates could not invoke Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) to challenge sex discrimination in UK nationality legislation. The preliminary obstacle was Article 1: she was not within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction for Convention purposes (§1).
The decision is a clear restatement of the territorial limits on the ECHR. A decision taken in the UK, even one that substantially affects the interests of a person abroad, does not itself establish jurisdiction over that person (§§28-29, 39).
Continue reading →
16 June 2026 by Jonathan Metzer
Secretary of State for the Home Department v R (Ammori) [2026] EWCA Civ 721
A Court of Appeal panel of five Judges, including the Lady Chief Justice, Lady Carr LCJ, the Master of the Rolls, Sir Geoffrey Vos, the Vice President of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Edis LJ, and Lewis and Whipple LJJ has overturned the Divisional Court’s decision quashing the proscription of Palestine Action, holding that it erred in its approach both to the challenge brought under the Home Secretary’s relevant policy and to whether a fair balance had been struck with reference to the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
This article takes an extended look at the reasoning in this decision.
Continue reading →
9 April 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Emily Higlett and Sophia Pascoe
Introduction
The Court of Appeal in Re J, Re M and Re P (Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344 has provided authoritative guidance on a fundamental question in family law: whether a person who is not a child’s biological father can acquire parental responsibility by being named on the birth certificate. The court firmly answered that question in the negative, clarifying the meaning of “father” under the Children Act 1989 and resolving a line of inconsistent first instance decisions.
Continue reading →
24 March 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Kian Leong Tan
INTRODUCTION
In R (Ansari) v Chief Constable of North Wales Police [2026] EWHC 472 (Admin), the High Court (Chamberlain J) held that the heightened level of disclosure required under Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No. 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (“AF-disclosure”) does not apply in a challenge to the seizure, download, retention and inspection of the contents of a person’s mobile phone by an examining officer pursuant to Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“TA 2000“).
In addition to undertaking a comprehensive review of the AF-disclosure case law, Chamberlain J also rejected the notion of some form of an intermediate level of disclosure in closed material proceedings, where the AF-disclosure threshold is not met. The decision offers some much-needed clarity in this area of law.
Continue reading →
17 March 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Samuel Talalay
Introduction
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”) provides qualified protection for speech. Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) criminalises certain speech acts relating to proscribed organisations. In the case of R v ABJ; R v BDN [2026] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether these two things could be reconciled: is s 12(1A) of the 2000 Act compatible with the Convention?
In its judgment, given on 26 February 2026, the Court answered this question with an unequivocal ‘yes’. The offence introduced by s 12(1A) was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Crucially, conviction would always represent a proportionate interference with the defendant’s Article 10 right to free speech where the elements of the offence, properly understood, were made out.
In providing such a resounding answer, however, the Court risks setting the bar too high for legislative provisions to be compatible with the Convention.
Continue reading →
5 March 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Kian Leong Tan
INTRODUCTION
In Medmoune v France App no 55026/22 (ECHR, 5 February 2026), the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights considered the extent of a Member State’s obligation under Art. 2 ECHR (the right to life) when deciding to withdraw life support, in circumstances where the patient had explicitly asked for it to be continued.[1] The judgment helpfully illustrates the contentious boundary at which informed patient consent must give way to the expert opinion of medical professionals.
Continue reading →
3 March 2026 by Guest Contributor
By Georgina Pein
In a recent judgment, the High Court in AAA v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2026] EWHC 317 (Fam) (Morgan J) heard 15 applications from fertility clinic patients for declaratory relief. Those patients (the “Applicants”) had embryos or gametes which were stored at various fertility clinics. They sought declarations that it was lawful for those gametes or embryos to continue to be stored and used in circumstances where their written consent to storage had expired and had not been renewed (within the timeframes provided by legislation for renewal of consent).
Morgan J found that there were relevant administrative failures and oversights on behalf of the fertility clinics, and relief was granted in relation to 14 out of the 15 applications.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”), the fertility clinics, and the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (“SSHSC”) were Interested Parties to the applications.
Continue reading →
28 February 2026 by Jasper Gold
How should the Legal Aid Agency (LAA) respond when a person with anorexia, which has had a “severe and debilitating impact on her physical and mental health” for a long time, applies for legal aid to assist her with making an application to the Home Office for permission for her medical team to treat her with psilocybin (the main psychoactive component in various mushrooms commonly referred to as magic mushrooms)?
In R (EB) v Director of Legal Aid Casework [2026] EWHC 402, the High Court considered a challenge to the LAA’s refusal of legal aid for exactly that purpose. The Claimant had been a participant in a clinical trial at Imperial College London (a global leader in psychedelic research, and had found the treatment highly effective with no side effects ([4]). Psilocybin, though, is a controlled drug, and cannot be used even medically without authorisation from the Home Secretary under Section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 (the Regulations), which is far from straightforward.
Continue reading →
23 February 2026 by Jonathan Metzer
The Divisional Court in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin)(Dame Victoria Sharp P and Swift and Steyn JJ) has held that the proscription of Palestine Action should be quashed on the basis that the Home Secretary had failed to follow relevant policy guidance and had not struck a fair balance in respect of relevant rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Home Secretary has indicated that she intends to appeal.
This ‘extended look’ article will examine the grounds on which the claim succeeded and evaluate the Home Secretary’s potential prospects on appeal (permission for which has been granted).
Continue reading →
29 January 2026 by Matthew Leitch
In Suresh & Ors v General Medical Council [2025] EWHC 804 (KB), the High Court considered claims brought by the family of a doctor who died by suicide after receiving a letter from the General Medical Council (GMC). That letter stated that his Fitness to Practise was under investigation for allegedly sexually assaulting a 15-year-old patient.
It is important to emphasise that Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, recorded at the outset of his judgment that identification evidence provided to the police by the complainant was inconsistent with the perpetrator being Dr Suresh. The Crown Prosecution Service decided that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute. Dr Suresh has never been found to have committed the offence alleged [4].
Dr Suresh’s family brought claims against the GMC in negligence and under the Human Rights Act 1998. The Defendant successfully applied to have both claims struck out and/or summarily dismissed. This article considers the court’s analysis of the human rights claim.
Continue reading →
12 December 2025 by Peter Skelton KC
Introduction
In this case, the High Court considered the appropriate legal test for leaving findings of fact to juries in Article 2 inquests. Is it that such findings are arguable? Or is it that there is sufficient evidence to support them? The answer, quite firmly, is the latter.
Continue reading →
10 December 2025 by Guest Contributor
By Samuel Talalay
Introduction
In its judgment in the case of IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, handed down on 26 November 2025, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the correct test for establishing the existence of family life between non-core family members under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human rights (“ECHR”). It also clarified the proper conceptual framework for considering the subtle interaction between the rights of non-claimant family members and the UK’s Convention obligations to individuals outside its territory. Finally, it emphasised the centrality of the Government’s immigration policy to any exercise considering the proportionality of an interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights in the immigration context.
Continue reading →
Recent comments