Guest Post – Supreme Court: child sentencing legislation compatible with ECHR
23 September 2026
The UK Human Rights Blog is moving to Substack.
From 19th October, all new articles will be published exclusively on our Substack, and no new content will appear on our current website.
To stay up to date with our latest articles and insights, please subscribe here: https://substack.com/@ukhumanrightsblog
The UK Human Rights Blog is grateful to Dr Lewis Graham, the author, and to the Administrative Court Blog (where this post first appeared) for permission to reproduce the below.
The Supreme Court has, once again, rejected a challenge to the compatibility of primary legislation with the ECHR. It has ruled that section 128(1) of the Police, Crime, Courts and Sentencing Act 2022 (amending the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997) is compatible with Articles 5, 7 and 14 of the Convention. The case is R (Quaye) v Secretary of State for Justice [2026] UKSC 34.
The legislation under challenge
Children who commit murder are not given the same life sentences as adults. Instead, they are sentenced to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure (DHMP). As part of the sentencing procedure, the trial judge sets a minimum term which must be served before the offender can apply to the Parole Board for release. Prior to changes made in 2021, the Secretary of State operated a policy whereby at a certain point (halfway through the minimum term) the offender could apply to them for a review of that term, with the possibility of achieving early release. This policy was amended in 2021, and was put on a statutory footing in 2022, via the Police, Crime, Courts and Sentencing Act 2022, section 128(1). The effect of this provision was to remove any opportunity for child offenders sentenced to DHMP to seek a review of the minimum term if the offender was sentenced after they became an adult (i.e. after their 18th birthday).
The result of the legislation, therefore, was to separate child offenders into two categories: firstly, those who committed a crime as a child (under the age of 18), and who were sentenced as a child; secondly, those who committed a crime as a child (under the age of 18) but who were sentenced after their 18th birthday. The former category remain entitled to seek review of the minimum term by the Secretary of State; the latter category, thanks to section 128(1), do not.
The claimant in this case fell into the latter category. He committed murder before his 18th birthday, but was sentenced after he turned 18; section 128(1) therefore applied, and he was not entitled to have his sentence reviewed. He sought to challenge the legislation via judicial review, arguing that section 128(1) breached his rights under Articles 5, 7 and 14 of the ECHR.
The courts below
The High Court (William Davis LJ and May LJ) upheld, in part, the claimant’s challenge: see [2024] EWHC 211 (Admin). It ruled that depriving child offenders of the opportunity to have their sentences reviewed by the Secretary of State gave rise to the possibility of arbitrary detention, contrary to Article 5 of the Convention. The Court noted, in this respect, that prior to the legislative change, some child offenders successfully convinced the Secretary of State to reduce their minimum term. To deny them the opportunity to show that their rehabilitation was complete, and that the sentence is no longer necessary, was to breach their Article 5 rights: see [59] of that case. The High Court also upheld the challenge based on Article 14 of the Convention. It found that the provisions treated two groups differently based on their age, and that the justifications put forward by the defendant – the protection of those under 18 at the time of sentence and the need to promote the interests of victim families – did not justify the arbitrary differentiation between those who were 18 at the time of sentencing and those who were not: see [46]-[58] of the High Court’s judgment. The High Court did not consider it necessary to rule on the legislation’s compatibility with Article 7: see [62] of its judgment.
The Court of Appeal (Sharp P, Lewis LJ and Cobb J) overturned the High Court’s judgment: see [2025] EWCA Civ 226. It found that section 128(1) of the 2022 Act did not breach Articles 5, 7 or Article 14 of the Convention. The claimant’s lack of opportunities for review of his sentence did not render the sentence arbitrary for the purposes of Article 5: see [87] of that judgment. The changes made by the 2022 Act were “concerned with the manner of execution or enforcement of the sentence” rather than changing the sentence itself, so Article 7 was not violated: see [102] of that judgment. Finally, emphasising the significant margin of appreciation applicable in this context, the Court concluded that the decision to treat offenders differently depending on their age at the time of sentence was not disproportionate, and that a fair balance had been struck between the rights of the offender and the interests of the victims’ families: see [118]-[143], and especially [142]-[143], of that judgment.
The Supreme Court’s judgment
The Supreme Court, in a judgment jointly written by Lord Stephens and Lady Simler (with which Lords Sales, Briggs and Hamblen expressed agreement), dismissed the claimant’s appeal. It ruled, like the Court of Appeal below it, that section 128(1) of the 2022 Act did not breach any Convention rights.
Article 5 ECHR
The Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the High Court’s findings relating to Article 5. The High Court fell into error, said the Supreme Court, by taking as its “starting point” the position that the 2022 legislation “did not change the essential nature of a sentence of [DHMP] and that an inherent element of the sentence was the requirement of continuing review”: [59]. Legislation had already governed the field since at least the year 2000 and, in any case, the combined effect of legislative intervention, up to and including section 128(1) of the 2022 Act, had created a complete code governing DHMP, or as the Court put it at [61]: “Since 2022 the scheme for sentencing persons who commit murder as children to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure is an entirely statutory one”.
The core question, then, was “whether by excluding any opportunity to review the minimum term for those aged 18 and over when sentenced to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure, section 27A(11) gives rise to a risk of arbitrary detention under article 5 ECHR”: [62]. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that Article 5 does not require there to be an opportunity for review in this sense, either for sentences in general or for DHMP: [64], [68], [69]. Article 5 simply required there to be a sufficient connection between the conviction and the sentence actually imposed; this test was clearly met on the facts: [67]. Being sentenced to a minimum term, without the opportunity to petition the Secretary of State to reduce that sentence, was not arbitrary: [69].
Article 7 ECHR
The Supreme Court drew upon the familiar distinction, in the context of Article 7, between the retrospective modification of a sentence (or “penalty”) and changes made to the “execution” or “enforcement” of a sentence. The former is prohibited under Article 7; the latter is not: [129]. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal in finding that the changes made by section 128(1) fell into the latter, rather than the former category: [144]. The changes related “exclusively to a change in the regime for early release on licence”: [143]. The sentence imposed on the claimant was DHMP, and it remained so after the changes made by the 2022 Act took effect: [142]. Article 7 was not breached by the relevant provisions of the 2022 Act: [144].
Article 14 ECHR
The Court also ruled that the provisions did not breach Article 14 of the Convention. Whilst the effect of section 128(1) was to create two categories of offender, which were treated differently based on a protected status (age) – see [114] – the Court found that the difference in treatment pursued a legitimate aim, the effect of which was to constitute a proportionate interference with the claimant’s rights.
The aim behind the legislation was the protection of the victim’s family members. In particular, the Court highlighted that victim families are contacted every time an application to vary the minimum term is made: [98]. Repeated engagement with this process caused “obvious and inevitable” distress for them: [100]. The desire to reduce this distress was “a consideration Parliament was entitled to regard as powerful”: [99]. The aim behind the legislation was therefore a legitimate one: [101]. There was a rational connection between the pursuit of that aim and the legislation in question: [115].
As to proportionality, the Court applied “low intensity of review” [79] for five reasons: first, the discrimination in this case was based on the ground of age, which is not a suspect category calling for heightened scrutiny: [80]; second, the provision under review is primary legislation: [88]; third, the legislation involves considerations of “social policy”: [89]; fourth, there is no European consensus on the issue at hand: [93]; fifth, the legislation in question involves consideration of “competing interests”: [94]. All of this meant that the legislature was in a stronger position than the court when it came to determining the proportionality of the measure, and the court should be slow to intervene in its judgment: [124]-[125]. The legislation did not breach Article 14: [126].
Comment
This judgment provides yet another instance of the Supreme Court rejecting a human rights challenge to legislation. In doing so, the Court applied a relatively orthodox understanding of what protection from arbitrariness requires in the context of Article 5, and was unwilling to recognise any wider principle that the needs of child prisoners to be protected from arbitrary detention mandates that their sentences be kept under review (at least in part because there existed no explicit Strasbourg authority to this effect: [64]).
The Court’s reasoning in relation to Article 14 is also noteworthy. By largely approving the reasoning of Sharp P in the Court of Appeal (see our blog on that judgment here) the Court once again applies a very deferential approach to discrimination issues in human rights law. Whilst the Court at least accepts that the intensity of review to be applied in Article 14 cases “varies according to the circumstances, the subject matter and the background” ([78]), the Court goes on to provide five reasons as to why a low intensity review is justified in the present case. These reasons are familiar and, as I have argued elsewhere, largely fail to convince. For example, almost all legislation – and certainly any legislation which involves differential treatment capable of engaging Article 14 issues – will involve “competing interests”. And the courts have interpreted “social policy” so widely that it has come to encompass almost any kind of legislative issue.
We also see in this judgment some now-expected language emanating from the case of SC: “the assessment of proportionality in this case ultimately depends on whether Parliament made the right judgement… this question cannot be answered by a process of legal reasoning because there are no legal standards by which a court can decide where the balance should be struck”: [124]. I have argued elsewhere that in some cases, this language has been used to justify an abdication of the duty of the courts to perform the required proportionality assessment (“there are no legal standards…”). This interpretation was rejected recently in the case of LMN, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that SC should not be treated as authority for the position that in some cases a proportionality assessment should not be carried out at all. Thankfully, the Supreme Court appears to confirm this in Quaye. After setting out the above passage, the Court confirms: “it follows that the court should be slow to substitute its own view for the political judgement of Parliament in this respect”. The message, therefore, is that courts should apply a low intensity review, rather than no review at all. This is a subtle but important difference, and a welcome clarification that SC is not to be treated as authorising the courts to abandon the proportionality test altogether in cases involving social and political controversy.
Dr Lewis Graham is a Lecturer in Human Rights Law at the University of Manchester and an editor of the Administrative Court Blog.
