Divisional Court quashes Palestine Action proscription: an extended look
23 February 2026
The Divisional Court in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin)(Dame Victoria Sharp P and Swift and Steyn JJ) has held that the proscription of Palestine Action should be quashed on the basis that the Home Secretary had failed to follow relevant policy guidance and had not struck a fair balance in respect of relevant rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Home Secretary has indicated that she intends to appeal.
This ‘extended look’ article will examine the grounds on which the claim succeeded and evaluate the Home Secretary’s potential prospects on appeal (permission for which has been granted).
Factual Background
On 5th July 2025 Palestine Action was added to the list of proscribed organisations under Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000, following events on 20th June in which members of Palestine Action broke into RAF Brize Norton and sprayed red paint into the turbines of two Voyager military aircraft. This incident took place in a context of what the Home Secretary stated was “a nationwide campaign of direct criminal action against businesses and institutions, including key national infrastructure and defence firms”, which had “increased in frequency and severity since the start of 2024“, with methods that had become “more aggressive”, and included a recent attack against a Jewish-owned business in North London “where the glass-front of the building was smashed and the building and floor defaced with red paint including the slogan ‘drop Elbit’” (para 3). Elbit Systems UK Ltd is a defence technology company and a subsidy of Israel’s largest military manufacturer.
In an application for judicial review, the claimant, one of the co-founders of Palestine Action, challenged the decision of the Home Secretary to proscribe Palestine Action under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (the 2000 Act).
Under these provisions, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes the organisation is “concerned in terrorism”. “Terrorism” is defined at s. 1 as the “use or threat of action” when the use or threat is “designed to influence the government […] or to intimidate the public or a section of the public” and “is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause”. “Action” is defined as including “serious violence against a person” and “serious damage to property”.
The effect of an organisation being proscribed include it becoming an offence to belong to the organisation, invite support for it, arrange a meeting to support it or further its activities, wear clothing or display in public any article that would arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of it, or fundraise for it (see ss. 11 to 17 of the Terrorism Act 2000).
In her evidence, the Claimant stated that the aim of Palestine Action was to take “direct action against Israel’s arms trade in Britain and to stop the complicity of corporate actors in atrocity crimes”. The organisation’s own position on the attack on RAF Brize Norton was that it “interrupted Britain’s direct participation in the commission of genocide and war crimes across the Middle East”.
The Court stated that what Palestine Action refers to as “direct action” “comprises for the most part various types of criminality including acts of criminal damage such as spray painting, damaging buildings or other property and destroying or attempting to destroy property”,and rejected as “false” the Claimant’s contention that these were acts of protest in the tradition of Gandhi’s campaign against the Indian Salt Act 1882 or the civil rights movement in the United States in the 2950s and 60s (paras 21-22). Rather, the Court stated that the “core hallmarks of civil disobedience, namely the objective of seeking a change in the law or government policy, an approach to law breaking that is characterised by restraint and acceptance of the legal consequences of their actions, are emphatically not the hallmarks of Palestine Action’s campaign”, as its campaign had “not been pursued with restraint”, was “designed to intimidate the persons and businesses targeted so they end their commercial relationships with Elbit” and did not involve “the type of persuasion that is consistent with democratic values and the rule of law” (para 23). Overall, it was found that it was “not a sustainable proposition” that Palestine Action was a ‘non-violent’ organisation (para 29).
Failure to follow relevant policy
The Court stated that the Home Secretary has “a long-standing policy in respect of the exercise of the power” to proscribe, which provides guidance to the effect that if the threshold test for proscription is met, i.e. the Home Secretary believes that the organisation “is concerned in terrorism”, then consideration should be given to whether proscription would be “proportionate”. When considering this question, the Home Secretary would take into account “other factors including: [1] the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities; [2] the specific threat that it poses to the UK; [3] the specific threat that imposes to British Nationals overseas; [4] the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and [5] the need to support other members of the International community in the global fight against terrorism” (para 37).
The Court held that: (i) it had been “appropriate” for the Home Secretary to treat as pertinent the nature and scale of Palestine Action’s activities and the extent of the threat the organisation posed in the United Kingdom; (ii) “the Home Secretary’s assessment of those matters as weighing in favour of proscription was reasonably open to her”; and (iii) notwithstanding that only three of Palestine Action’s many actions had been assessed as reaching the threshold of acts of terrorism, the Home Secretary “was entitled to attach significant weight” to any act occurring in the United Kingdom that came within the definition of terrorism, and “was entitled to attach weight to the risk that Palestine Action’s activities would deter development of the United Kingdom defence industry and thereby cause prejudice to the United Kingdom’s strategic defence objectives” (para 88).
However, the Court held that the Home Secretary’s approach to “other factors” had not been consistent with the policy. In particular, the Home Secretary had considered that proscription would be advantageous because it would mean that relevant offences could be used against any person supporting Palestine Action, that the presumptions arising from the definitions of “terrorist property” and “for the purposes of terrorism” that adversely affect proscribed organisations could also be applied to Palestine Action, and that these consequences would provide significant disruptive benefits beyond the current policing powers being utilised to deal with Palestine Action (para 89). It was held that the consequences of proscription were “designed to disrupt proscribed organisations, and in the present case would have that effect on Palestine Action”, but that “so far as concerns the lawful application of the Home Secretary’s policy on the use of the discretion to proscribe, that is not a relevant consideration”, notwithstanding the latitude given to the Home Secretary to decide for herself which matters were appropriate “other factors” (para 90).
In this regard, the Court stated that the purpose of this policy was “to limit use of the discretionary power to proscribe” and that each of the five factors stated on the face of the policy “has that effect” and that any “other factor” considered when applying the policy “must be of the same nature” (para 91).
The Court noted that its conclusion “may appear to rest on a very narrow basis”, particularly where “the Home Secretary had, after all, formed the belief that Palestine Action is an organisation concerned in terrorism” (and that had not been challenged), but stated that “operational consequences and advantages of proscription is not a factor consistent with the policy for the obvious reason that such consequences and advantages will apply equally to any organisation that could be proscribed”, such that “notwithstanding the latitude that the policy provides, the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was not consistent with her policy” (paras 92 to 95).
Articles 10, 11 and/or 14 of the European Convention
On behalf of the Home Secretary, it was submitted that violent protest did not fall within the scope of Convention rights, and reliance was placed on Article 17 of the Convention, which makes clear that activity intended to destroy the rights and freedoms provided under the Convention cannot itself claim the protection of Convention rights.
The Court noted that it was settled law that Convention rights “do not afford any protection to violent or non-peaceful protest” (para 108). However, it held that
that does not provide the Home Secretary with the answer to the claimant’s claim. The interference with Convention rights that needs to be justified does not comprise the prohibitions so far as they affect Palestine Action’s ability to persist (for example) in its campaign of undertaking and encouraging damage to property. Rather, what needs to be justified is the restriction on actions comprising peaceful protest, consistent with Convention rights, under the Palestine Action banner.” (para 109)
“this case is primarily concerned with the rights of individuals who have not acted unlawfully either before or since proscription, who would have wanted to express support for and associate with Palestine Action – whose stated aim is “to stop genocide and other atrocity crimes by causing disruption to corporate actors who aid, abet, facilitate and profit from those crimes” – and who wished to engage in peaceful protests under the banner of Palestine Action, but are stopped from doing so. It cannot sensibly be said that such persons are seeking to deflect the article 10 and 11 rights from their real purpose by employing them for ends contrary to Convention values. Nor could that be suggested in respect of others, such as journalists, academics and civil society organisations who are conscientiously seeking to abide by the law, and whose rights are impacted. […]” (para 115)
This notwithstanding, the Court stated that the Claimant had overstated the impact of the proscription, as: (i) proscription would not prevent continuing expressions of support through peaceful protest in support of the Palestinian cause or in opposition to actions undertaken in Gaza by the government of Israel and/or the Israel Defence Forces; (ii) the proscription of Palestine Action would not prevent any or all demonstrations targeted at Elbit; and (iii) it was not considered that particular forms of protest action were so closely or uniquely associated with Palestine Action that either undertaking such actions or advocating them could properly be considered to be support for Palestine Action (para 117).
However, the Court held that the proscription would still give rise to a “very significant” interference with Article 10 and 11 rights, as it was reasonable to expect people to be risk averse and “exercise self-restraint in terms of what they say and what they do” in the context of the proscription, particularly among those who were very closely associated with Palestine Action (paras 121-124).
This was qualified by the Court’s view that “the adverse impacts are generally limited to those who have or would support Palestine Action and do not have any widespread or general impact on expressions of support for the general Palestinian cause” (para 124).
When considering proportionality, the Court considered putative less intrusive measures, and stated that: (i) taking measures against individuals involved in undertaking action for Palestine Action such as asset freezes or criminal behaviour orders or other similar orders was “not realistic”; (ii) relying on the existing criminal law was not an alternative measure but rather involved keeping to the status quo better considered when determining proportionality overall; and (iiii) encouraging those affected to seek civil remedies through the courts was not appropriate as “this type of self-help remedy may not be readily or reasonably available to many who might potentially be affected by Palestine Action’s campaign” (paras 130-134).
“[…] We do not consider that the proscription of Palestine Action is likely to result in any general impact on expressions of support for the Palestinian cause or even opposition to Elbit. This provides some support for a conclusion that the proscription was proportionate.” (para 136)
Further, the Court stated that real weight must attach to the fact that Palestine Action had organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism, and it was significant that “Palestine Action has not suggested that its actions that have been assessed to comprise terrorism were either a mistake or an aberration” but rather had “lauded those who took part in those actions”, and published an Underground Manual, which provided “good evidence of Palestine Action’s continuing intention to promote the use of violence regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public” (para 137).
Despite this, the Court held that a fair balance had not been struck:
“Deciding where the balance should be struck in this case is difficult. When striking the balance between issues such as these the court must permit some latitude to the Home Secretary given that she has both political and practical responsibility to secure public safety. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was disproportionate. At its core, Palestine Action is an organisation that promotes its political cause through criminality and encouragement of criminality. A very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act.” (para 138)
In this regard, it was held that the criminal law was available to prosecute those concerned and any convictions “would serve as a significant deterrent to others” (para 139), and that
“Considering in the round the evidence available to the Home Secretary when the decision to proscribe was made, the nature and scale of Palestine Action’s activities, so far as they comprise acts of terrorism, has not yet reached the level, scale and persistence that would justify the application of the criminal law measures that are the consequence of proscription, and the very significant interference with Convention rights consequent on those measures.” (para 140)
Comment
There has already been considerable comment on this decision, including by Adam Wagner KC, Dane Luo and Gabriel Tan and Professor Mark Elliott, and these pieces are worth reading.
The question of whether it was right or wrong to proscribe Palestine Action is a complex political one that is outside the scope of this article.
But as a matter of law, notwithstanding the strong credentials of the three members of this Court, I think that this decision is surprising, and vulnerable to a potential successful appeal.
In essence, having made a series of findings that seem to indicate that proscription was capable of being justified under relevant policy and under the European Convention, the Court then appears to undertake a volte face to find that proscription was nevertheless not justified.
On the first successful ground, it was uncontested that the threshold requirements for proscription were met. In this context, when assessing proportionality, the relevant policy states that the Home Secretary will consider “other factors including” the five listed factors. It is difficult to see why this means that the Home Secretary may not also consider other factors, such as those considered here.
Moreover, the Court’s characterisation of the five listed factors as all having the effect of limiting the use of the discretionary power to proscribe (at para 91) seems very doubtful. In particular, it might well be thought that the fifth factor (“the need to support other members of the International community in the global fight against terrorism”) is one that broadens rather than circumscribes when proscription might be justified – for example, this factor might, in principle, indicate in favour of proscribing an organisation that poses only a limited threat to the UK or British nationals and with only a very limited presence in the UK, if it does pose an important threat to the UK’s allies.
Overall, I think that on appeal there is a significant chance that the Court’s reasoning on this ground may be overturned on the basis that it took an unduly rigid approach to the policy, and, despite saying that it was giving proper latitude to the Home Secretary, failed to do so in practice.
On the second successful ground, the Court found that: (i) the adverse impact of proscription had been overstated, was generally limited to those who have or would support Palestine Action and did not have any widespread or general impact on expressions of support for the general Palestinian cause (paras 117, 124 and 136); (ii) Palestine Action had organised and undertaken actions amounting to terrorism (para 137); (iii) Palestine Action had not suggested that its actions that have been assessed to comprise terrorism were either a mistake or an aberration, but rather had “lauded those who took part in those actions” (para 137); and (iv) there was “good evidence of Palestine Action’s continuing intention to promote the use of violence regardless of the risk that this will result in serious damage to property or serious violence against members of the public” (para 137).
In this context, as a matter of law the conclusion that proscription was nevertheless disproportionate seems surprising. It is unclear to me why decisive weight should be attached to the rights of members of Palestine Action to demonstrate under this specific banner, rather than under another banner, in the context of the countervailing factors noted by the Court, including that Palestine Action had not disavowed the acts that constituted terrorism but rather had lauded those who took part in them.
Jonathan Metzer is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row.
Natasha Barnes was part of the team of counsel instructed on behalf of the Home Secretary. She was not involved in the writing of this post.
