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This article was first published on the UK Labour Law Blog ( @labour_blog). We repost it with the kind permission of Dr Philippa Collins (@DrPMCollins at Exeter University)and the editors of the Labour Law Blog
One of the lasting impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic upon the world of work is likely to be a move away from the traditional workplace. In some sectors, such as academia, IT, and administration, remote work or home working is an established working pattern, although a rare one given national statistics from 2019 which indicated only 5% of the workforce worked mainly from home. The need to prevent the spread of the coronavirus through contact in the workplace precipitated a rapid and widespread move to homeworking. In an ONS survey in early May, 44% of adults surveyed were working from home. As some businesses begin to transition back into their previous working patterns, several high-profile companies have announced that they will not expect their staff to return to the workplace and will support homeworking as a permanent option in the future.
This article was originally published on Serjeants’ Inn Chambers UK Police Law Blog. They have kindly given us permission to repost it here.
In Y v Bulgaria [2020] ECHR 163, the European Court of Human Rights set out the minimum requirements for criminal investigations where a person has been subjected to ill-treatment contrary to article 3 and held that those principles were properly derived from cases involving breaches of article 2, despite their different content and rationale. Here, the court found a breach of article 3 in respect of the authorities’ failure to pursue an obvious line of enquiry in a rape investigation and awarded €7,000. It is an example how an investigation can be satisfactory in several respects but still fail to comply with the minimum requirements of article 3. It is also worth comparing with the bands of damages that English cases have suggested.
On 10 July 2013 at 23.30, a woman was raped in a field by an unknown man with whom she had spoken at a bus stop and agreed to follow to a nearby train station. She called the police at around 00.05. The police recovered forensic material, the applicant’s clothes and, later that day, the applicant underwent medical examination and gave a description of the assailant.
The Russian political dissident Alexei Navalny is still in an induced coma in a hospital in Berlin after being poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok on a flight from Siberia to Moscow on the 20th of August. The last time we heard of this lethal organophosphate was two years ago when two Russian residents in Salsibury, Wiltshire, survived an assassination attempt. Dawn Sturgess, who lived eight miles away, was not so lucky. She died after spraying herself with a discarded bottle of the poison which she thought to contain perfume.
At her inquest, the senior coroner declined to extend the scope of his investigation to the involvement of the Russian state in her death as collateral damage to the assassination attempt. Her family took judicial review proceedings to challenge his conclusion. They were partially successful; the court said the although the coroner couldn’t state, in terms, that the Russian state was liable in civil or criminal law, he could still investigate that matter. They reverted the matter to him. Read the judgment of the Administrative Court on the 24th of July here.
The senior coroner, who must now ask if answering how Ms Sturgess died requires him to look at involvement of Russian state. In the latest episode of Law Pod UK Rosalind English discusses the broader implications of this case with Matt Hill of 1 Crown Office Row. (Apologies – due to a technical error, the wrong episode was posted under “The Salisbury Poisonings” yesterday. The correct episode is now in place.
In this article, Prachiti Venkatraman and Ashley Jordana of Global Rights Compliance analyse the case before the International Court of Justice relating to the persecution of the Rohingya people by the Myanmar authorities.
Readers are encouraged to read the previous articles about this topic published on the blog here and here.
The perilous situation of the Rohingya in Myanmar continues – the recent UN policy brief on Covid-19 in South-East Asia highlighted the compounded effects of the nation’s weak healthcare system and an ongoing armed conflict that targets ethnic communities.
On 11 November 2019, The Gambia filed an Application to commence proceedings against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (‘the Court’). The Application alleged that Myanmar had violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by committing acts intended to destroy in whole or in part the Rohingya community, as well as attempting and conspiring to commit genocide, inciting genocide, being complicit in its commission, and failing to prevent and punish genocide. To demonstrate the validity of these allegations, The Gambia relied on the actions of the Burmese military (‘the Tatmadaw’) and individuals connected to the State of Myanmar during the ‘clearance operations’ in 2016 and 2017 which led to the mass murder, sexual violence, and destruction of Rohingya villages in Rakhine state.
After a summer hiatus, Law Pod UK returns with an interview with Joshua Rozenberg who will be well known to listeners as a legal commentator, journalist, and presenter of the BBC’s Law in Action.
This interview was recorded the day after the Home Office released a post on social media suggesting that “activist lawyers” were abusing regulations by delaying and disrupting returns of migrants. The Law Society and Bar Council both condemned the video, and it has since been taken down by the Home Office, see here.
The recent New Zealand High Court decision concerning the lawfulness of the first 9 days of lockdown in New Zealand here (for an analysis, see UK Human Rights Blog article here.
Read more about Simon Dolan’s challenge to lockdown, represented by Philip Havers QC, here.
Listeners can avail of 20% discount on the retail price of Joshua Rozenberg’s book, linked onJoshua’s bloghere.
Image: Screenshot of the Home Office’s twitter feed (now deleted).
It was not an overly exerting bank holiday weekend for the author of this week’s round-up. The influence of the summer holiday appears to have resulted in relatively few judgments from the senior courts, with particularly little in the field of human rights law. However, the week was not wholly without incident…
In response to the growing numbers of migrants seeking to cross the English Channel in small boats, the Home Office tweeted a short video explaining that “current return regulations… (allow) activist lawyers to delay and disrupt returns”. The video was helpfully illustrated with little pictures of planes taking off from the English coast bound for Europe, although why the Home Office would seek to return migrants to Europe following the UK’s withdrawal from the Dublin Regulations was unclear.
In the interests of fairness, despite being removed from the Home Office’s twitter feed following numerous complaints, the video can still be viewed here. Readers will without doubt form their own opinions. It is submitted however, that the following statements are uncontroversial:
In this carefully nuanced judgment, the Court of Protection has ruled that although a patient with a chronic eating disorder would in all probability face death she did not gain weight, it would not be in her best interests to continue being subjected to forced feeding inpatient regimes.
AB is a 28 year-old woman who has over many years suffered from anorexia nervosa. She was first diagnosed when she was a teenager of 13 and now has a formal diagnosis of a Severe and Enduring Eating Disorder (‘SEED’).
The NHS Trust and the team of treating clinicians who have been responsible for providing care for AB applied to the COP for declaratory relief pursuant to ss 4 and 15 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in these terms: (i) it is in AB’s best interests not to receive any further active treatment for anorexia nervosa; and that (ii) AB lacks capacity to make decisions about treatment relating to anorexia nervosa.
Issues before the Court
Litigation capacity: it was not in issue that AB did have the capacity to instruct her solicitors.
General capacity: this was a more difficult question to be decided under Section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act. The key question was, did she have the mental capacity to make a decision about the specific medical treatment proposed. Roberts J had to decide one way or another on whether she should be tube fed, probably under sedation (otherwise she would remove the tube).
The Trust argued that she did not have this capacity, relying on evidence from AB’s treating psychiatrist Dr B. AB said she did have this capacity.
Best interests: was it in AB’s interests to discontinue any tube feeding? The unanimous professional view of her treating team was that palliative care and no further tube feeding was in her best interests. However, since the decision not to have any further forced feeding was a life-threatening one, the case had to be referred to the Court of Protection.
On Saturday morning, Russian opposition politician and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny was flown, in a coma, from a hospital in Siberia to Berlin for medical treatment. On Friday, the European Court of Human Rights had granted interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, requiring Russia to grant access to the patient in order to assess his fitness for transport. The Court also ordered the Russian government to inform the Court of the medical treatment Mr Navalny is receiving by noon on Saturday (22 August), and to submit a copy of Mr Navalny’s medical file by 2 p.m. on Monday 24 August.
Mr Navalny fell ill on a plane flight last Thursday, with suspected symptoms of poisoning. The plane made an emergency landing and Mr Navalny was taken to be treated at a hospital in Omsk, Siberia, where doctors said on Friday that he was too ill to be transported elsewhere. Permission for Mr Navalny’s transfer to Berlin came after increased international pressure (from France and Germany in particular), an appeal to President Putin by Mr Navalny’s wife and supporters, and an application to the European Court. Mr Navalny’s family asked the European Court for permission to transport him to the Charité hospital in Berlin for treatment, as otherwise he faced a risk to his life or health, in violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
In the News:
Internationally there were a number of developments which have significant consequences for human rights. In Russia a prominent critic of Vladimir Putin has allegedly been poisoned. Alexei Navalny, who is known for exposing corruption within the country, suddenly fell ill last week after drinking tea.
Supporters claim the Russian state has tried to silence Mr Navalny’s criticism of President Putin, and then attempted to cover up its actions by stopping Mr Navalny from being treated abroad. Despite initial resistance from doctors, who said that Mr Navalny was too ill to be moved, the leader has now been flown out of Russia. Critics say the developments are part of a wider crackdown on freedom of speech within the country.
Even in times of emergency, … and even when the merits of the Government response are not widely contested, the rule of law matters.
Thus commenced a lengthy judgment by the New Zealand High Court, Wellington Registry, ruling that the first nine days of New Zealand lockdown were unlawful. The three judge panel found that
While there is no question that the requirement was a necessary, reasonable and proportionate response to the Covid-19 crisis at the time, the requirement was not prescribed by law and was therefore contrary to section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
This recent judgment from the European Court of Human Rights arises from the 2012 transfer from Hungary to Azerbaijan of prisoner Ramil Safarov, a member of the Azerbaijani army, following his conviction in Hungary for the murder of an Armenian officer in 2004. In particular, the Court considered Article 2 ECHR (the right to life) in the context of (a) when a state can be held responsible for the actions of an individual carried out in a private capacity, and (b) the obligations on a state who transfers a prisoner to see out their sentence in their home state.
RS’s crimes, transfer and release
In February 2004, Azerbaijani army officer Ramil Safarov (RS) murdered Gurgen Margaryan (GM), one of two Armenian participants in a NATO-sponsored English language programme in Hungary, by decapitating him with an axe while he lay asleep. RS then tried to break down the door of the other Armenian participant, Hayk Makuchyan (HM), allegedly yelling, “Open the door, you Armenian! We will cut the throats of all of you!”, before he was stopped by the Hungarian police.
RS was tried and sentenced in Hungary to life imprisonment, with a possibility of conditional release after 30 years. During the criminal investigation in Hungary, RS gave evidence that he strongly disliked Armenians because he had lost relatives in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the two countries, and that on several occasions during the programme GM and HM had provoked him and mocked both him and the Azerbaijani flag.
A recent decision of the High Court concerning the Manchester Arena Inquiry highlights an interesting question about public inquiries, the role of survivors and the protections offered by the European Convention.
A succinct summary of the decision and its context is set out by Matthew Hill here. As he explains, permission was refused on a number of grounds, including that the challenge was brought late. But it is the Court’s analysis of the obligations imposed by Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) which is of interest to this article.
This week has been awash with controversy over an unexpectedly harsh set of A-level results, with GCSEs set to follow this Thursday. Because students could not sit exams this year due to COVID-19, results were calculated on the basis of an algorithm taking into account mock exam results, predicted grades, and schools’ past performance. As a result, 40% of students have had their predicted grades lowered, with many losing university places as a result. Yet in a tour-de-force of algorithmic elitism, the number of independent school students securing A* or A grades has increased by 4.7%, compared to only 2.2% at state schools, and 0.3% at further education colleges. Multiple legal challenges are in contemplation; Jolyon Maugham QC’s Good Law Project is supporting 7 students in a judicial review of the exam regulator Ofqual’s failings.
Algorithmic injustice has been in the courts this week too, as civil liberties campaigner Edward Bridges won an important victory in the Court of Appeal against the use of facial recognition technology by the police.
Mr Bridges had launched a judicial review against the use of ‘AFR Locate’ facial recognition technology by South Wales Police after being photographed by automated cameras when Christmas shopping and subsequently when involved in a peaceful protest. His challenge had been dismissed by a Divisional Court in September 2019. The original decision was covered on the blog by Sapan Maini-Thompson here.
The Court of Appeal, overturning a Divisional Court decision, has found the use of a facial recognition surveillance tool used by South Wales Police to be in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The case was brought by Liberty on behalf of privacy and civil liberties campaigner Ed Bridges. The appeal was upheld on the basis that the interference with Article 8 of the ECHR, which guarantees a right to privacy and family life, was not “in accordance with law” due to an insufficient legal framework. However, the court found that, had it been in accordance with law, the interference caused by the use of facial recognition technology would not have been disproportionate to the goal of preventing crime. The court also found that Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) was deficient, and that the South Wales Police (SWP), who operated the technology, had not fulfilled their Public Sector Equality Duty.
The High Court has struck out a claim that the disclosure of certain personal information made by a charity to the claimant’s GP was unlawful. Although only summary, this judgment goes to the heart of what we believe data protection to be about. As you will tell from my somewhat trenchant comments at the end of this post, I find it difficult to accept the main conclusion in this ruling.
The LGBT Foundation provides services including counselling and health advice. The claimant sought to access the charity’s services by completing a self-referral form in 2016. The form gave an option for the self-referring individual to consent to information being disclosed to their GP, and stated that the charity would break confidentiality without the individual’s consent if there was reason to be seriously concerned about their welfare. Mr Scott gave his GP’s details in the form. He also stated in the form that he no longer wished to be alive, detailed a previous suicide attempt, said that he had recently been self-harming and that he continued to suffer problems from drug use.
A sessional health and wellbeing officer at the charity conducted an intake assessment for Mr Scott to ascertain what support would be best for him. She told him of the confidentiality policy, including the provision that any information he disclosed would be passed on if the charity considered him to be at risk. In this interview he gave further details of drug use, self-harm and suicidal thoughts. The health officer paused the assessment and consulted a colleague, who advised her to inform Mr Scott that they would be contacting his GP because they had concerns about his welfare. The charity concluded it was at that time unable to provide him with the services he sought from them because of his ongoing drug use. They passed the information on to Mr Scott’s GP via a telephone call. This information was in due course recorded in his medical records.
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