Category: BLOG POSTS

Free to light up… for a little longer

15 March 2016 by Dominic Ruck Keene

Photo credit: The Guardian

In Secretary of State for Justice v Paul Black [2016] EWCA Civ 125 (read judgment) the Court of Appeal ruled that the Crown was not bound by Part 1 of the Health Act 2006 to ban smoking inside public prisons.

Paul Black, an inmate at HMP Wymott in Lancashire, complained that prison smoking rules were being flouted and should be made legally enforceable under Part 1. His lawyers told the hearings he suffered from a range of health problems due to frequent exposure to second-hand smoke, in particular on prison landings, in laundry rooms and in healthcare waiting rooms.

The Master of the Rolls, Lord Dyson, gave the only judgment. He identified the relevant issue as whether Part I of the Health Act 2006  applied to Crown premises, and in particular whether it applies to HMP Wymott. Part 1 made provision for the prohibition of smoking in certain defined ‘smoke-free’ premises and places, as well as for exceptions to the general prohibition. Section 3(2) enables ministers to make a special exemption for prisons.
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Vicarious liability: The Supreme Court speaks

8 March 2016 by Kate Richmond

Two important Supreme Court judgments concerning vicarious liability were handed down last week.

Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets [2016] UKSC 11 affirms the “close connection” test set out in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22 and rejects the formulation of a new test for vicarious liability based on “representative capacity”.

Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10 extends the sorts of relationships where a defendant can be made vicariously liable for the conduct of an individual and evaluates Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56 (the ‘Christian Brothers’ case)

The two judgments are intended to be complementary; Mohamud addresses the relationship between the defendant and the wrongdoer while Cox centres on the sufficiency of connection between that relationship and the wrongdoer’s act such that the defendant can be held vicariously liable.

Mohamud

The claimant was assaulted at a Morrisons petrol station by an employee, Mr Khan. The claimant had entered the petrol station and had enquired about using printing facilities. Mr Khan responded using foul, racist and threatening language before following the claimant out ino the forecourt where Mr Khan punched and kicked him.

The Court of Appeal found that there was not a sufficiently close connection between what Mr Khan was employed to do and his tortious conduct so as to give rise to vicarious liability on the part of Morrisons. The “close connection” test was applied as laid down by Lord Steyn in Lister.

Lord Toulson gave the leading judgment in Mohamud. He surveyed the origins and development of vicarious liability and explored the possibility of a new, broader test based on “representative capacity”. The new test was dismissed by the court, it being unclear whether the “representative capacity” approach was substantively different to the “close connection” test [46,53]. However, the judgment provides a clear exposition of the developments and shortcomings in the law on vicarious liability.

Lord Touslon draws together various authorities to identify the underlying public policy rationale for vicarious liability, first enunciated by Holt CJ in Boston v Sandford (1691) 2 Salk 440 [17]. It was described by Scarman LJ in Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141 at p148 as follows:

“But basically, as I understand it, the employer is made vicariously liable for the tort of his employee… because it is a case in which the employer, having put matters into motion, should be liable if the motion which he has originated leads to damage to another”

Lord Touslon examined the second limb of the Salmond definition of vicarious liability (Salmond, J.W (1907) The Law of Torts London: Stevens & Haynes). The second limb relates to “unauthorised modes of authorised acts” which was unsatisfactorily applied to cases such as the Lister case concerning sexual abuse.

The Supreme Court preferred a broader approach and endorsed the dicta of Lord Cullen in Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage and Motor Co (1925 SC 796, 802). Lord Cullen considered whether the tortious conduct was “within the field of activities” assigned to the employee.

The thrust of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Mohamud case was: 1) the nature of the employee’s job was to be considered broadly; and 2) the court ought to examine whether there is sufficient connection between the employee’s position and his wrongful conduct to make it just for the employer to be held liable [44].

Lord Toulson then addressed the imprecision of the close connection test quoting from Lord Nicholls in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, who pointed to:

‘…the lack of guidance on the type or degree of connection which will normally be regarded as sufficiently close to prompt the legal conclusion that the risk of the wrongful act occurring, and any loss flowing from the wrongful act, should fall on the firm or employer… this lack of precision is inevitable, given the infinite range of circumstance where the issue arises.’

Lord Touslon concluded that courts are required to make an evaluative judgement when applying the test and consider all of the circumstances. Lord Dyson agreed with the inevitability of imprecision, likening it to a ‘quest for a chimaera’ [54].

In the present case, the court found that Mr Khan had not “metaphorically taken off his uniform” when the tortious action occurred [47]. Lord Toulson considered it “a seemless episode” where Mr Khan also ordered the claimant to keep away from his employer’s premises. Taken together, Mr Khan’s actions were pursued in connection with the business in which he was employed and therefore Morrisons was vicariously liable.

Lord Dyson added that vicarious liability law is on the move but only in relation to the relationship between individual and defendant, not in regard to the circumstances when an employer may be held vicariously liable [55].

Cox

 This was a case about a prisoner working in the kitchen of HMP Swansea who negligently dropped a 25kg bag of rice on to the claimant, causing serious injuries. Ms Cox was working at the time as the prison’s catering manager. She claimed that the Ministry of Justice was vicariously liable for the prisoner’s actions.

Lord Reed gave the leading judgment. He noted that the Christian Brothers case identified five features which could be applied in situations where there is a contract of employment and where there is no such contract but the relationship bears all the hallmarks of a contractual employment relationship. In that case, Lord Phillips said [19]:

“…There is no difficulty in identifying a number of policy reasons that usually make it fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious liability on the employer when these criteria are satisfied:

1. i) The employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the employee and can be expected to have insured against that liability; (“means”)
2. ii) The tort will have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee on behalf of the employer;

iii) The employee’s activity is likely to be part of the business activity of the employer;

1. iv) The employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity will have created the risk of the tort committed by the employee;
2. v) The employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the control of the employer.” (“control”)

Lord Reed said that the five features are not all equally significant. He added that features relating to “means” or “control” are no longer independently significant or realistic in modern life [20,21]. Lord Phillips in Christian Brothers weaved together the remaining three features ((ii),(iii) and (iv) above). These are inter-related and can produce a situation whereby a relationship other than one of employment is in principle capable of giving rise to vicarious liability.

Lord Reed focused on the integration, of the employee’s activities with the employer’s business, citing with approval Lord Phillips’ summary of Ward LJ’s approach in E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938 where Ward LJ asked:

“whether the workman was working on behalf of an enterprise or on his own behalf and, if the former, how central the workman’s activities were to the enterprise and whether these activities were integrated into the organisational structure of the enterprise” [26]

Lord Reed confirmed that the scope of vicarious liability extends beyond acts or omissions during the course of the worker’s employment. However, it does not extend to where a tortfeasor’s activities are entirely attributable to his independent business or a third party’s business. The court considered that this new wider scope should protect victims whilst acknowledging changes in the legal relationships between enterprises and their workforces [29].

Applying the above analysis, the court considered (i) that prisoners are integrated into the operation of prisons and (ii) that prisoners’ activities are an integral part of the prison service’s activities. Consequently, the MoJ was vicariously liable in the present case.

In short, many will see these judgments as extending further the circumstances in which vicarious liability will be held to exist. The concept of workers acting ‘on a frolic of their own’ has perhaps never been so tightly circumscribed.

Are you a student interested in human rights? The JUSTICE Student Conference is for you!

8 March 2016 by Guest Contributor

The JUSTICE Student Conference 2016 is on 19 March 2016, at the University of Law in London. The full programme is available here and you can book online here.

Spend a Saturday talking human rights and the Human Rights Act with Dominic Grieve QC, Shami Chakrabarti of Liberty, and the JUSTICE team.

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RightsInfo: new look and new features

8 March 2016 by Adam Wagner

I wanted to let you know about the totally redesigned RightsInfo. As well as a new look, the site now has an explainers section, revamped issues pages (e.g. children, disability, equality, family… and so on), news, features, opinion… why not have a look? And if you want to sign up for email updates, you do it here.

Refugee crisis tests Europe on human rights – the Round-up

8 March 2016 by Hannah Lynes

Photo Credit: The Financial Times

In the news

Stemming migration flows from Turkey has been set as “a priority” at the 7 March emergency summit of EU and Turkish leaders in Brussels. EU officials are seeking to persuade Turkey to enforce the ‘action plan’ signed in November, under which Ankara agreed to curb the number of refugees crossing into Greece in return for three billion euros in aid and the speeding up of its EU membership bid.

However, human rights groups have been critical of the EU focus on ensuring refugees remain in Turkey. Amnesty International warned ahead of the meeting that is was “unacceptable” to expect that responsibility should be carried by a country already hosting three million refugees.

“Using Turkey as a ‘safe third country’ is absurd. Many refugees still live in terrible conditions, some have been deported back to Syria and security forces have even shot at Syrians trying to cross the border,” said Gauri van Gulik, Amnesty’s Deputy Director for Europe and Central Asia.
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The Round-up: companies off the hook for human rights abuses?

29 February 2016 by Charlotte Bellamy

In the news

The UK government is letting companies “off the hook” for human rights abuses, according to Amnesty International. In an 80-page report, Obstacle course: How the UK’s National Contact Point handles human rights complaints under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Amnesty claims that the National Contact Point (NCP) within the Department for Business Innovation and Skills – who is charged with handling complaints that private contracts may conflict with human rights commitments – is “unqualified to make complex human rights judgments”. The NCP is a non-judicial mechanism tasked with holding companies to account over breaches of the international standards set by the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – but has, it seems, rejected 60% of human rights complaints in the past five years without full investigation.

Amnesty describes the NCP as “totally failing in numerous ways”, with its complaint handling procedure being “inconsistent, unreliable and biased towards businesses” resulting in companies being let “off the hook”. The failures to investigate include allegations of serious abuse, such as claims that Vodafone, BT and others allowed GCHQ to access its networks for the mass interception of phone calls, emails and Facebook posts, which it shared with the US authorities under the Tempora program.

The all-party foreign affairs select committee is currently investigating whether the Foreign Office has downgraded its commitment to defending human rights in favour of trade. MPs on the committee decided to hold an enquiry after the permanent secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Simon McDonald, commented that human rights no longer had the same profile within his department that they had in the past.

A BIS spokesperson has said in response that their review process meets all the obligations under the OECD guidelines for trading and that there should be no suggestion the government is not committed to human rights.

Last week also saw David Cameron describe UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia as “brilliant” – on the same day that the European Parliament voted for an arms embargo on the country for its aerial bombings on Yemen.

Other news

• Last week a seven-judge Supreme Court heard a case on whether the minimum-income visa requirements for UK nationals to bring over a non-EU spouse are in contravention of the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, the Guardian reports.  Under the Family Migration Rules, which changed in July 2012, UK nationals must have available funds equivalent to a minimum gross income of £18,600 to bring over a non-EU spouse, rising to £22,400 if they have a child of non-British citizenship. Two of the appellants, Abdul Majid and Shabana Javed, are British and married to Pakistani nationals; another, MM, is a Lebanese refugee; and the fourth, AF (also MM’s nephew) is a refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The appellant counsel described the threshold as “completely unachievable” for many. Judgment is expected within six months.

• Proposals to replace the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights have been “put on ice”. Though it is claimed that the legislation is finished and “sitting on a desk inside No.10”, Downing Street is refusing to publish it, allegedly due to Gove’s decision to “defect to the Out camp” in the referendum. An unsurprised David Allen Green comments that the Human Rights Act is not likely to be repealed in this Parliament, saying that the hurdles to doing so still remain (such as the Good Friday Agreement), and suggests that the Conservatives may have begun to realise that its repeal and replacement “is not worth the time and effort”.

 In the Courts

• Civek v Turkey – The Court held unanimously that the Turkish authorities had violated Article 2 (right to life) by failing to protect the life of a woman who had been seriously threatened by her husband, HC. Ms Civek had made continued complaints of harassment to the Turkish authorities yet they had failed to take measures reasonably available to them to avoid her murder. Ms Civek had been subjected to sustained abuse from her husband culminating in 2010 in his remand in custody and a court order to refrain from being violent towards his wife. After his release in November 2010 (under judicial supervision), Ms Civek had complained that he was threatening to kill her. Again in December 2010 Ms Civek lodged a complaint, which led to HC being charged with threatening to kill her – but the State Prosecutor took no practical action, even though the husband could have been legitimately arrested for non-compliance with court orders. The Court found the authorities should have acted to protect Ms Civek’s life, and through their failure, her husband had been able to murder her on a street in January 2011, stabbing her 22 times.

• Société de Conception de Presse et d’Édition v. France – An order by the French domestic courts that an unauthorised photograph published by Choc magazine be blacked out was not a violation of freedom of expression under article 10. Choc magazine, published by the applicant company, had published photos of a young man, IH, taken whilst he was in captivity, wearing shackles, and showing visible signs of torture. He had later died from his injuries. The Court found that the photograph had never been intended for public viewing, permission had not been obtained from IH’s relatives, and that its publication showed a grave disregard for the grief of his family. It was therefore a serious interference with the private life of IH’s relatives. The Paris Court of Appeal had ordered that the photograph in question be blacked out in all magazines put on sale, rather than withdrawn completely. The European Court of Human Rights found that such a restriction on freedom of expression was proportionate, as the text of the report remained unchanged, and that in the circumstances the penalty imposed would not have a “chilling effect” on freedom of expression.

• Nasr and Ghali v Italy –  This case concerned the CIA abduction and extraordinary rendition (the transfer of a person without legal process to another country for interrogation where there is a risk they might be tortured) with the cooperation of the Italian authorities, of the Egyptian imam Abu Omar (also known as Osama Nasr), who had been granted political asylum in Italy. He was held in secret in Egypt for several months in cramped and unhygienic cells where he was periodically interrogated and tortured. An investigation into Mr Nasr’s disappearance had been carried out by the national authorities but this had been ineffective due to the executive’s invocation of ‘State secrecy’ – which resulted in those responsible being granted impunity.
• The Court found in respect of Mr Nasr violations of Article 3 prohibition on torture (in previous cases the Court had already held that the treatment of detainees under the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programme amounted to torture), Article 5 (right to liberty and security) – due to the unlawful nature of the detention; Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 13 (right to effective remedy) read together with Articles 3, 5 and 8. The Court also found in respect of Ms Ghali, Mr Nasr’s wife, violations of Article 3 (because she had suffered significant non-pecuniary damage as a result of her husband’s sudden disappearance), Article 8 and Article 13.

Previous Posts

• Abortion, Mental Incapacity and Prior Intentions: Court of Protection clarifies the law
• Paid Internships: entering the human rights NGO sector
• Court of Session rejects challenge to prosecution policy on assisted suicide

Abortion, mental incapacity and prior intentions: Court of Protection Clarifies the law

26 February 2016 by Matthew Hill

An NHS Trust v CS (By Her Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor) ] EWCOP Read the  judgement.

The Court of Protection does the work of Solomon on a daily basis. Matters of life and death are brought before it, and with them come a mass of conflicting rights, overlapping statutes, and an array of case law from which arguments can be drawn. At the end of it, an individual judge must make a stark decision, which may have the most profound impact on another human being. One of those charged with making such decisions once divided the advocates who appeared before him into those who complicate and those who clarify. There is no surprise as to which he preferred.

Baker J’s judgment in this disturbing case will boost the cause of the clarifiers. CS has two children and, before Christmas, became pregnant by her then partner. It was a relationship that, it is alleged, became “characterised by domestic violence” (a phrase that it somehow more chilling for its judicial restraint). CS told friends and families that, in the circumstances, she intended to terminate the pregnancy. Days later she was, allegedly, assaulted by her partner. She was hospitalised with serious head injuries comprising fractures, intracranial bleeding and brain damage. She has post-traumatic amnesia and her behaviour has become extremely unsettled, marked by agitation, restlessness and disruptive acts. Her prognosis is uncertain.

The Trust treating her brought an application to the Court, seeking an urgent order to allow them to perform a surgical abortion. The urgency arose because the window of time during which such a procedure could be performed was closing. With the urgency came a plethora of issues. CS’s condition may improve in the future, but by then it could be too late to terminate the pregnancy. In those circumstances, what weight should be given to the evidence from CS family and friends of her prior intention to have a termination? How should that be balanced against her current wishes, insofar as they can be ascertained? What significance should be attached to the fact that she had previously had a termination? And what, if any, attention should be paid to the views of her partner, now arrested and remanded in custody?
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Paid internships: Entering the human rights NGO sector

25 February 2016 by Guest Contributor

Ben Smith, Legal Research Intern at the Equal Rights Trust

I expected competition for jobs in human rights to be tough but it was only when I graduated that I realised quite how difficult it was to break into the sector. I had gained a lot academically – I had an undergraduate degree in Law from Oxford University and a Master of Laws from University College London – but this didn’t seem to be enough when applying for jobs with human rights NGOs. I tried to stay positive and kept putting in applications but the feedback I got again and again was that while I was well qualified, there was always someone with more experience. Though I had lots of pro bono experience and legal experience in other sectors, the organisations I was applying to wanted direct experience in the field.

The only options I saw to gain that experience were internships, which were generally unpaid. It was frustrating to devote so much time academically to human rights only to find that a career is out of reach unless you have the financial means to work in unpaid lengthy internships. Like many other graduates, and particularly as I didn’t have roots in London, this wasn’t an option for me.

In August 2015 I saw the position advertised for Legal Research Interns with the Equal Rights Trust which offered a needs-based grant for applicants. The Trust is an international organisation which focuses on advancing equality and non-discrimination worldwide – an area I had looked at extensively during my studies and a keen interest of mine. I jumped at the chance to apply as the internship seemed like the perfect next step – and one that was accessible to me. I was offered the post in August, after which I submitted an application for the grant (which was accepted) and I started working with the Trust in September.

What sets this internship apart from others is that the tasks I’ve carried out have been incredibly varied and I’ve had the opportunity to work across the full range of work the Trust does, including advocacy, litigation and fundraising. I’ve lost track of the number of countries I’ve been involved with, I think it must be over 20 already, which is testament to the breadth of work the Trust does. It has been an incredible chance to broaden my horizons and expand my knowledge of equality and non-discrimination law.

I’ve had the opportunity to take on genuine responsibility in my position and develop important skills – you’re not just making tea and doing photocopying, but carrying out work that has a real impact. Recently, I researched and prepared a first draft of the Trust’s submissions in a case we are intervening in before the European Court of Human Rights. This was a huge task and it was a privilege to be trusted with it.

I think the level of responsibility we are given is due in part to the Trust’s paid internship scheme – a lot of NGOs are keen to take on interns who will work for free but who aren’t always best placed to take on a high level of responsibility or work on technical outputs. This can also be problematic as interns will often leave before their placement ends. In this sense I think the scheme is a “win-win” for the Trust and for the interns.

It will be sad to leave the Trust in spring as my internship comes to an end, but I know that if my legal career takes me away from human rights work, I will be able to put the skills I’ve developed as an intern to good use.

On 23 February the Trust launched a campaign – the Bob Hepple Memorial Fund – to help others like me who would be struggling to enter the sector were it not for paid internship and fellowship placements. Through the campaign the Trust has set itself a minimum target to raise of £1,000 which could support a needs based grant for an intern for approximately six weeks. If it meets its desired target of £10,000 it could support four interns and a fellow for three months.

I’ve learned an enormous amount as an intern and it has given me a real career boost, so I hope the campaign is not only a great success but that it will be replicated elsewhere in the sector to help more people pursue their ambition.

• To support the Fund click here.
• To hear more from other interns, watch this video.

Court of Session rejects challenge to prosecution policy on assisted suicide

22 February 2016 by Thomas Raine

Ross v Lord Advocate [2016] CSIH 12, 19^th February 2016 – read judgment  

The Inner House of the Court of Session has rejected a reclaiming motion (appeal) from a decision of the Outer House in which it was held that the Lord Advocate’s refusal to publish specific guidance on the circumstances in which individuals would be prosecuted for assisted suicide did not violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Factual and Legal Background

The petitioner, Gordon Ross, suffers from Parkinson’s disease. He anticipates that there will come a time when he will not wish to continue living but, because of his physical state, he would require assistance to end his own life. Mr Ross was apprehensive that anyone who assisted him would be liable to criminal prosecution and therefore sought clarification from the Lord Advocate (the head of the prosecution service in Scotland) as to the factors that would be taken into account in deciding whether or not to prosecute.
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The right to privacy and medical records – Seonaid Stevenson

18 February 2016 by Guest Contributor

WF, Petitioner [2016] CSOH 27 – read judgment

The Outer House of the Court of Session has ruled that the right to privacy and medical confidentiality under Article 8 of the Convention entitles complainers to be heard and have legal representation before any orders are made for recovery of their medical records.

Factual circumstances and legal background

The petitioner, (‘WF’) was a complainer in domestic abuse proceedings against the accused. The accused sought to recover all medical, psychiatric and psychological records relating to WF from 2007 to 2014. WF sought legal aid to allow her to be represented at the hearing concerning the recovery of these documents, arguing that her rights under Article 8 of the Convention entitled her to participate. The application to the Scottish Legal Aid Board was refused as there was no provision in the relevant legislation or regulations for legal aid to be granted for such proceedings. A further application was then made to the Scottish Ministers, under s.4(2)(c) of the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, which allows legal aid to be granted in circumstances not covered by the rules. This application was also refused on the grounds that WF did not have the right to appear or be represented at the relevant hearing. The key issue which came before the Sheriff was therefore whether Article 8 gave the complainer the right to appear and be represented at the hearing concerning disclosure of her medical records.
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Joint Enterprise press release from the Appellant’s solicitors

18 February 2016 by Rosalind English

It is important to note that the draft judgment of the Supreme Court was embargoed from all apart from solicitors and counsel until today so our client, Ameen Jogee, and his family only found out about our success this morning. There are also no facilities for Ameen to attend court so his family have authorised us to release this statement: 

1. We are glad our arguments on the law were accepted by the court and very pleased that the court took this opportunity to correct a grossly erroneous tangent of law and remove “parasitic accessorial liability” (often referred to as “joint enterprise”) from our law.
   1. The law had incorrectly and unfairly developed to convict secondary parties on the basis of mere “foresight or contemplation” of what someone else might do. This over-criminalised secondary parties, particularly young people like Ameen Jogee.
   2. The consequence was that people were convicted of serious offences, committed by others, and imprisoned for lengthy periods. Primarily, we suggested to the Court that there should be a return to the foundational law encapsulated in cases before the tangent created by joint enterprise. Our primary submission at the hearing in October 2015 was that the true test for accessorial liability is knowledge of the essential matters of that offence or that type of offence and acts which demonstrate an intention to assist or encourage that offence or that type of offence. Such a formulation can adapt to individuals assisting each other or cases where there is evidence of a common plan. The Supreme Court judgment appears to adopt our submissions.

2. We are delighted for Ameen and his family and the many other families of those affected by joint enterprise who have been waiting on this judgment.
3. This judgment does not refer in detail to all the material placed before the court so future cases and appeals must take care to ensure that the errors are not repeated.
4. Internationally it is vital that the errors created by joint enterprise are also corrected.
5. We would like to thank our excellent staff, our team of counsel Felicity Gerry QC and Catarina Sjölin of 36, Bedford Row and Adam Wagner and Diarmuid Laffan of 1 Crown Office Row. We would also like to thank the teams for Mr Ruddock and the interveners (Just for Kids Law and JengBA). Many of the lawyers involved have worked pro bono for all or some of the time on this difficult case.
6. A special thank you to Dr Matt Dyson of Trinity College Cambridge whose meticulous research over 500 years of law enabled us to prove what the law was and how it went wrong. Also thank you to Beatrice Krebs from the University of Reading for her comparative work on authorisation which enabled us to place alternative options before the court, and to Professor Luke McNamara from the University of Wollongong whose 2014 paper identified the probability issues from an Australian perspective, which was an important part of this appeal.
7. We must now focus on the final orders which are not due for some weeks. The Court is yet to decide what effect its conclusions on the principles of joint enterprise will have on our client’s specific case.
8. If you want an easy read on the case, see these 2 blogs by Catarina Sjölin and Felicity Gerry QC for Nottingham Law School: http://blogs.ntu.ac.uk/nlsblog/tag/joint-enterprise/
9. In the words of Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG “To hold an accused liable for murder merely on the foresight of a possibility is fundamentally unjust. It may not be truly a fictitious or ‘constructive liability’. But it countenances what is ‘undoubtedly a lesser form of mens rea’. It is a form that is an exception to the normal requirements of criminal liability. And it introduces a serious disharmony in the law, particularly as that law affects the liability of secondary offenders to conviction for murder upon this basis”.
10. We started this case looking for an alternative probability test for those who were not accused of direct participation with shared intention, along the way we identified the legal errors which had been perpetuated over many years.

We are glad to have played a role in correcting this unjust law.

Supreme Court abolishes “wrong turn” Joint Enterprise law – Diarmaid Laffan

18 February 2016 by Guest Contributor

Adam Wagner and Diarmuid Laffan acted for the appellant Ameen Jogee in this case

Today the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in the conjoined appeals of R v Jogee and Ruddock v R [2016] UKSC 8, having heard the latter sitting as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Both cases were appeals against murder convictions founded on a discrete principle of secondary liability, sometimes referred to as ‘joint enterprise’, sometimes as ‘parasitic accessorial liability’ (‘PAL’). The Supreme Court’s judgment:

• Conducts a comprehensive review of the principles applicable to secondary liability for crime, and murder in particular [4]-[60];
• Analyses the leading Privy Council and House of Lords authorities on PAL [61]-[87]; and hence
• Overturns them, restating the law in the area [88]-[99].

PAL originated in the Privy Council’s judgment Chan Wing-Siu v R [1985] AC 168, and was approved by the House of Lords in R v Powell; R v English [1999] 1 AC 1. Those authorities were cited over 25 times at the highest level before today’s judgment, and abundantly in the Court of Appeal where appeals against convictions based on PAL have been a regular fixture. The PAL principle states that where someone (D2) jointly participates with another (D1) in committing Crime A, and in doing so foresees a possibility that D1 might commit Crime B, D2 can be tried jointly as principal for Crime B if D1 goes on to commit it.
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Freedom, Asylum Seekers, and Two Lots of European Human Rights – Michael Rhimes

17 February 2016 by Guest Contributor

C-601/15 JN (in French only) offers important insights into the detention of asylum seekers. It also somewhat of a double bill, involving not one but two sets of European Human Rights.

In this post I will set out the facts, give a quick refresher of the relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter). I will conclude with an overview of the decision itself.

The decision contains a number of important elements, but the one I would like to focus on is the “fit” between the ECHR and the Charter. This manifests itself on two levels. The first is the abstract relationship between the ECHR and the Charter (see Marina Wheeler’s recent post on this: A Charter too Far). This is quite straightforward (see below). The more interesting part is the relation between the different ways the ECHR and the Charter protect from unlawful detention. As shall be seen, the former lists narrow criteria for the lawfulness of detention, whereas the second effectively provides a broad protection against unlawful detention. Reconciling the two was at the heart of JN.

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NI Judge acquits Pastor of “gross offence” against Muslims

17 February 2016 by Rosalind English

DPP v McConnell [2016] NIMag (5 January 2016)

Silence is the language of God, all else is poor translation.

(Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī , 13th Century Persian Islamic scholar and poet)

These words were the last in the ruling by DJ McNally in the Belfast county court, acquitting Pastor McConnell of grossly offending Muslims in a sermon that had been delivered in church but also transmitted over the internet. The Pastor had declared from the pulpit the there were more and more Muslims “putting the Koran’s hatred of Christians and Jews alike into practice”, and the sermon had continued in a similar vein.
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Eight Trends and Eight Challenges to the European Court of Human Rights – Paul Harvey

16 February 2016 by Guest Contributor

Introduction

The opening of the Strasbourg Court’s judicial year every January always provides an opportunity for reflection on the themes and challenges which will define the Court’s jurisprudence for the coming year. This year, the theme of the seminar held at the Court to mark that opening was “International and national courts confronting large-scale violations of human rights””. I should like to offer eight predictions as to the other themes which will define the work of the Strasbourg Court this year. Given the Court’s pending caseload is still over 64,000 cases, these predictions are necessarily impressionistic. It will be for readers to judge whether, by this time next year, they have proven accurate.

(1) Security

The Court will continue to grapple with the security situation in Eastern Europe. Foremost on its docket are the inter-state cases involving Russia and Ukraine, but the Grand Chamber will also return to the issue of jurisdiction in Transdniestria in Mozer v. Moldova and Russia, in which it held a hearing on 4 February 2015.

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