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On Tuesday, the House of Commons approved an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill under which women convicted of historic abortion offences will be pardoned and have their criminal records expunged. The amendment was originally proposed in the House of Lords to complement the bill’s provision to decriminalise abortions by women acting in relation to their own pregnancies.
Bar Council publishes paper criticising jury curtailment proposals
As the Courts and Tribunals Bill continues its committee stage, the Bar Council has published a 31-page polemic by Geoffrey Robertson KC attacking the government’s proposals to limit jury trials.
Robertson argues that the proposals will not clear the criminal courts backlog and may worsen delays. He points to time being taken up on novel pre-trial allocation proceedings and on judges retiring to produce reasoned judgments.
Robertson also contends that the proposals overlook the constitutional significance of a jury’s power to show mercy and acquit on conscientious grounds. He positions this as a crucial safeguard against injustice and draconianism – a ‘proud boast of British justice’.
Concluding, he writes:
‘The proposed reforms take the axe to a substantial proportion of jury trials (half at a rough estimate), disadvantaging not only defendants but all who are proud of the way in which justice has been delivered, through majority deliberation of a dozen community representatives, more in touch with current values than judges or magistrates and able, in their own way, to show mercy when the law does not allow for it.’
In the courts
Assessing persecution under the Refugee Convention
Dismissing an appeal against refusal of a protection claim, the Court of Appeal has reiterated that the question whether an asylum-seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution is ‘acutely fact-sensitive’. The court also echoed previous cautions against overly ‘forensic’ reasons challenges. The case is MN (Vietnam) v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 485.
The appellant (MN) was a Vietnamese national. In 2014, he attended a demonstration in Ho Chi Minh. On his account, he was arrested by police, beaten, charged with attending an illegal demonstration, and returned to his home area. Once there, the authorities told him that he was on a blacklist and would be watched.
Later that year, MN entered the UK using a business visa and overstayed. He sought to avoid removal by claiming entitlement to refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention on the basis that he had a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ if returned to Vietnam. The Secretary of State rejected his claim. The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) and the Upper Tribunal (UT) rejected his appeals.
On his further appeal to the Court of Appeal, MN argued that the FTT judge, whose reasoning and conclusions were adopted by the UT, had: (i) failed to make proper findings about, and failed properly to assess, MN’s ill-treatment in 2014; and (ii) operated on the mistaken basis that ill-treatment must be ‘systematic’ to constitute persecution.
The court rejected both arguments. As to the first, the judge had clearly accepted all aspects of MN’s evidence about what happened to him in Vietnam and was not required to repeat every detail in his conclusions ([38]). The judge had also accepted evidence of intolerance of protests and action taken by the Vietnamese authorities to suppress state opposition ([41]).
As to the second argument, the court rejected the contention that, by using the word ‘systematic’, the judge had been applying an erroneous threshold test. This was an ‘overly forensic scrutiny or dissection’ of the judge’s language ([46]). Stating that MN would not be subjected to ‘persistent or systematic’ ill-treatment was simply a way of reiterating that MN was not likely to face adverse interest from the authorities upon his return.
Although it was true in law that a single episode of ill-treatment could amount to persecution, this was an ‘acutely fact-sensitive’ evaluation ([47]). Thus, despite the acknowledged possibility that MN might face a further beating, the judge was not prevented from concluding that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution, taking the circumstances in the round.
Determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking
In R (CGW) v SSHD [2026] EWHC 858 (Admin), the High Court has criticised an apparent understanding among Home Office officials about the level of detail required to meet the standard of proof as to whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking.
The claimant for judicial review (CGW) arrived in the UK on a small boat in 2021. His account was that, while in asylum accommodation, he was approached by some men who purported to offer him work. He was then transported to a series of indoor cannabis farms where he was held against his will, beaten, and forced to tend the cannabis plants. He was eventually found by police, who referred him to the Home Office to assess whether he was a victim of human trafficking.
The Home Office’s Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority eventually took a negative ‘conclusive grounds’ decision to the effect that CGW was not a victim of human trafficking. CGW challenged this decision from multiple angles, including that the decision-maker had failed to give legally adequate reasons.
The Deputy Judge accepted this ground of challenge, holding that the purported reasons were ‘plainly deficient’ ([24]) and simply did ‘not provide rational justification for the conclusions reached’ ([25]). There were two fatal problems:
the reasons were ultimately bare conclusions because they stated that there was ‘insufficient’ information for a positive decision but did not explain why; and
the reasons were non sequiturs because CGW’s account of what happened to him appeared sufficient and the decision did not say that his account was not credible.
The Deputy Judge also responded to his impression that Home Office officials were taking ‘conclusive grounds’ decisions on the understanding that a person will not meet the required standard of proof unless they have provided ‘detailed’ information about their exploitation.
This approach was ‘legally wrong’. The decision-maker was simply required to determine on the balance of probabilities whether the individual was a victim of human trafficking or slavery, basing that decision on the totality of the evidence available, including any circumstantial evidence. There was no minimum requirement as to the level of detail that an individual had to provide ([30(2)-(3)]).
Upcoming ICLQ Annual Lecture, 12th May 2026
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Annual Lecture will be taking place on Tuesday 12th May, at 17:30 to 19:30, followed by a reception or online via Zoom.
The lecture will be delivered by Dr Sofia Galani on ‘Human Rights Obligations in Maritime Search and Rescue’, based on her article which was recently published in ICLQ vol. 74(1).
On 6 and 7 April 2026, a selection of measures under the Employment Rights Act 2025 (“the Act”) took effect.
The measures include the removal of the Lower Earnings Limit for statutory sick pay (“SSP”), making over 1.2 million workers eligible. They will also remove the waiting period for SSP, meaning workers will be paid from the first day of becoming ill, rather than from day four. In addition, employees will now be entitled to paternity leave and unpaid parental leave from the first day in their job, as opposed to after 26 weeks (paternity leave) or a year (unpaid parental leave).
Moreover, the new measures have added sexual harassment to the list of wrongdoings that may count as the basis for a “qualified disclosure” under s.43B of the Act, meaning that workers who make such disclosures, and do so in the reasonable belief that their report is in the public interest, will be afforded the whistleblowing protections against adverse treatment and unfair dismissal within the Act. Alongside this, the measures include the establishment of the Fair Work Agency, an executive agency of the Department of Trade, which will have the power to inspect workplaces, bring civil proceedings and enforce penalties if they find breaches of employment law.
These measures follow the Act’s first tranche of reforms, relating to trade unions and industrial action, which came into effect on 18 February 2026.
In two weeks’ time my interview with Jacob Turner and Michael Workman on the Judicial Taskforce’s draft Statement and Consultation on AI and private law will come out on Law Pod UK. In the mean time, a short note of the guidance on this subect in Civil Procedure News, put out by The White Book Service (Issue 3/2026 11 March 2026).
The guidance quotes the notorious cases of (R) Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 and R (Munir) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (AI hallucinations[2026] UKUT 81. Both these cases involved the “incautious” use of AI in ways that could result in the loss of privilege through uploading information to an AI tool that is open to the public.
And of course there is the use of fake authorities. In the Ayinde case the UT issued a rare show cause notice, which required an explanation to be given to the question why grounds of appeal to the Tribunal had included citation of a Court of Appeal judgment that could be found nowhere on BAILII and why it also included citation of another Court of Appeal judgment, which while it was available was not authority for the proposition it was said to support.
Had the immigration adviser in question not referred himself to the Immigration Advice Authority, the Tribunal would have so referred Mr Mohammed in order to “stop false material coming before the Tribunal which leads to considerable public expense due to the need to address the problem”.
With regard to the second case, the Tribunal observed that it would be
“easy to think that this is a case about the naïve use of generative AI, but it is not merely that: it is principally about supervision and the obligation to ensure that the tribunal is not misled. It matters not how citation errors come about. Whether they are inserted by a hapless trainee or by ChatGPT is really neither here nor there; the point is that the qualified legal professional with conduct of the matter is expected to ensure that such documents are checked, that errors are identified, and that only accurate documents are sent to the tribunal…. Failure to check is also wasteful of an opponent’s time, thereby potentially leading (in judicial review proceedings) to large awards of costs.”
As the authors at Civil Procedure note,
“This case raises continuing concerns about the use of fake authorities, notwithstanding the Divisional Court’s guidance in Ayinde. It also, apparently for the first time, raises concerns about the use of open AI tools by lawyers in ways that can result in breaches of client confidentiality and loss of legal professional privilege concerning information uploaded to such tools. It ought to be apparent that the risk of such breaches is not confined to lawers but might also arise through the use of AI tools by, for instance, expert witnesses”.
Tune in for our next epiosde on AI and Private Law, and the proposals for circumventing problems of liability and causation thrown up by autonomy, capacity and the self-teaching capacity of generative AI.
On Monday, the House of Commons International Development Committee (IDC) published a report which found that the Government had failed to deliver on its Women, Peace and Security (WPS) policy commitments.
According to the Peace under pressure: Protecting WPS report, the UK’s willingness or ability to facilitate high-level discussion within the UN on WPS appears weak, despite commitments to the WPS agenda [24]. The report also raised concerns that the UK Government is “at risk of inflicting damage to its reputation as a WPS penholder and convenor” [27].
The Committee further pointed to the reduction in development and gender expertise within the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) as a significant hindrance to the WPS agenda [3]. Additionally, the Government was found to have reduced funding and resourcing for WPS initiatives [4].
The publication of the report comes at a time of the highest number of conflicts since 1946 [11] coupled with a growing global “anti-gender” movement and backlash against gender equality [13].
In other news:
In a landmark ruling, the California Superior Court ruled that Meta and Google were liable for creating addictive products that caused the deterioration of a young woman’s mental health. The social media companies were ordered to pay $3 million in compensatory damages.
The European Parliament plenary endorsed the opening of negotiations with the Council on a new legal framework for the return of people without the right to stay in the UK. The proposed Return Regulation would enable Member States to deport people to countries with no prior ties and require Member States to put in place measures to detect people staying irregularly in their territory.
The Metropolitan Police revised their enforcement approach in response to displays of support for Palestine Action, reversing their interim position – adopted after the High Court ruling that its proscription was unlawful – not to arrest its supporters.
The High Court ruled that the Home Secretary was in breach of her statutory duty to provide “adequate” initial accommodation (IA) for asylum seeking families [82] and [102].
Although IA is intended as a “stopgap” [2], asylum seeking people, including the Claimants, have been accommodated in IA for as long as 3 years, often in hotel rooms or hostels [3].
Bates J held that a hotel room provided for an asylum seeker and her family is not a “dwelling” for the purposes of Part X of the Housing Act 1985 (HA), on the basis that the accommodation is a temporary interim measure [34].
However, Part X HA is not “entirely irrelevant” when considering whether hotel accommodation meets the “adequate” standard, as provided by ss. 95-96 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (IA) [42].
The case stemmed from an application for judicial review of the adequacy of IA provided for a prolonged period to two asylum seeking mothers, SH and BWO, with dependent children. Bates J described the accommodation arrangements for SH – who shared a hotel room with her husband, their young school-age child and a newborn baby – as “extraordinarily stressful” [82]. The Court held that BWO’s living circumstances were “incompatible with personal dignity” because she was accommodated in a two-bed hotel room with her two sons of sexually mature ages and had to share a bed with one of her sons [100].
Bates J also confirmed that where the Home Secretary refuses a request for accommodation in a particular geographical area, she has a duty to identify the asylum seeking person’s needs and ensure that the accommodation outside the requested area is adequate to meet those needs [95]. There is no requirement for asylum seeking people to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” to satisfy such a request [94].
Additionally, Bates J raised concerns that there was a lack of a specified minimum standards regarding the minimum amount of space that should be provided for families in hotel accommodation, prior to the Space Standards Paper circulated in June 2024. The Court held that the lack of policy or guidance had the potential to contribute to accommodation falling below the “adequate” standard [48].
Over 35,000 asylum seeking people – including 4,300 families – were being accommodated in hotels for IA purposes in September 2025 [3].
On Thursday, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that the deportation of an Afghan national would be a violation of the right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment as guaranteed by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights [199].
The case concerned an order by the Swedish authorities to remove an Afghan national, DM, from Sweden, following several unsuccessful applications for asylum since 2015 [5 – 59]. DM alleged that, if deported, he would risk being ill-treated in Afghanistan [132].
In the first ECHR judgment of this type since the Taliban takeover in 2021, the Court held that an assessment of whether there was a real risk of ill-treatment had to be made on the basis of all relevant factors, considered cumulatively. The Court found that the Swedish authorities had erred when separately considering the individual factors, including the “serious and fragile” security situation in Afghanistan, the deterioration of human-rights in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover and DM’s Hazara ethnicity [197].
Furthermore, the Court was not satisfied that the assessment undertaken by the Swedish authorities was “sufficiently and adequately” supported by domestic and international materials [157].
The Court observed that most European States had not carried out any involuntary returns to Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover [160].
The Court granted interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court, until the judgment becomes final [199 – 201].
In the first of a series of Law Pod UK episodes relating to investigations, Marina Wheeler KC speaks to Jim Duffy about the evolving role of barristers in this area.
Scottish assisted dying bill falls while Westminster proposals lag in the House of Lords
Tuesday evening saw the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill defeated at the last stage of the Holyrood legislative process. After a final debate, Members of the Scottish Parliament voted against the bill by 69 votes to 57, with one abstention. The bill would have allowed some terminally ill patients to be assisted to end their lives. Patients would have been required to make two declarations of their wish for assisted dying and to undergo assessment by two doctors as to their eligibility and freedom from coercion or pressure.
Meanwhile, the House of Lords continues to debate amendments to the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill for England and Wales. Owing to the 1,200+ amendments which have been tabled, the bill is now widely expected to run out of time – despite passing the Commons in June 2025. The bill’s proposer, Kim Leadbeater MP, is reported to have said that the House of Lords has ‘signed its own death warrant’ by stalling the legislation.
NHRI joint statement urges UK government not to dilute the ECHR
On Thursday, the UK’s three National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) issued an unusual joint statement urging the government to ‘commit to no reduction in rights protections’.
The NHRIs note that the UK government has expressed an intention to ‘re-balance’ and ‘clarify’ the position relating to migration by adopting political declarations on Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. They ask the government to explain how it will ensure that its proposals do not weaken ECHR protections. The statement continues:
‘The erosion of anyone’s rights puts us all at risk; it signals that these shared standards are not guaranteed and that any of our rights could be subject to debate.’
The UK’s NHRIs – the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Scottish Human Rights Commission, and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission – are required to abide by the Paris Principles. These call on them to promote and protect all human rights by acting independently from government.
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”) provides qualified protection for speech. Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) criminalises certain speech acts relating to proscribed organisations. In the case of R v ABJ; R v BDN[2026] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether these two things could be reconciled: is s 12(1A) of the 2000 Act compatible with the Convention?
In its judgment, given on 26 February 2026, the Court answered this question with an unequivocal ‘yes’. The offence introduced by s 12(1A) was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Crucially, conviction would always represent a proportionate interference with the defendant’s Article 10 right to free speech where the elements of the offence, properly understood, were made out.
In providing such a resounding answer, however, the Court risks setting the bar too high for legislative provisions to be compatible with the Convention.
The UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found that 1,205 children have been systematically deported and forcibly transferred from Russian-occupied areas in Ukraine to Russia. Of those cases, eight in ten children have not yet returned. According to the findings, Russian authorities have acted in contravention with international humanitarian law, under which evacuation can only be temporary and for the legally justifiable reasons of health, medical treatment or safety.
The Courts and Tribunals Bill passed its second reading in the House of Commons last week. The Bill introduces a range of reforms aimed at reducing court backlogs, including proposals to restrict jury trials and raising magistrates’ sentencing powers. The House of Commons Public Bill Committee has issued a call for evidence from experts in fields relevant to the Bill.
The Netherlands and Iceland sought permission to intervene in the International Criminal Court (ICJ) case initiated by South Africa against Israel’s actions in Gaza. The ICJ had previously received 16 requests to intervene, including from Palestine, Ireland and Colombia.
[* note from editor: The United States and other countries have also filed declarations of intervention in South Africa’s case of genocide against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Article 63 of the Statute of the Court allows countries to intervene in cases involving the interpretation of a convention to which they are parties, even if they are not parties to the dispute.
In its 11-page declaration the US rejected South Africa’s accusations of genocide against Israel.
“To avoid any doubt, the United States affirms, in the strongest terms possible, that the allegations of ‘genocide’ against Israel are false. They are also unfortunately nothing new,” it said.
The US said it considered it necessary to intervene in this case in order to offer its interpretations of the provisions of the Genocide Convention, informed by its role in drafting the 1948 text]
In the Courts:
On Wednesday, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) launched an inquiry into the recent changes to laws relating to protest. The inquiry will examine whether the Government has correctly balanced its duty to protect the public from disruption or fear, with its duty to protect the right to protest – described by JCHR chair, Lord David Alton, as “a cornerstone of our democracy”.
On Thursday, the High Court ruled that the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) refusal of an Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP) application was unlawful, on the grounds of an error of fact and a failure to publish related caseworker guidance. Although the MoD withdrew the decision shortly after the hearing, Saini J still handed down judgment, noting that the Court’s findings could affect other ARAP cases [1-2].
The judicial review challenge was brought by CHD, an Afghan national who was tortured by the Taliban and is currently in hiding in Afghanistan. For 13 years, until the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in 2021, CHD held a key public-facing role within a partly UK-funded organisation that promoted the rule of law and combatted the Taliban’s influence.
CHD’s application to re-locate to the UK was rejected by the MoD on the grounds that he failed to meet Condition 2 Category 4 of ARAP, which requires applicants to have made, in the course of their employment, “a substantive and positive contribution to the UK’s military objectives or national security objectives (which includes counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and anti-corruption objectives) with respect to Afghanistan” [15].
Saini J held that MoD decision makers had made an error of fact when determining that the objectives of CHD’s employer – the advancement of the rule of law and a functioning legal system – were not also part of the UK’s national security objectives at the time of CHD’s employment [75-77].
Saini J also noted that he would have been inclined to find the unpublished guidance and any decision made pursuant to it unlawful, had it been necessary to decide the issue [21]. Applying R (Lumba) v SSHD [2012] 1 AC 245, Saini J held that the MoD’s failure to publish interfered with the general rule of law that the publication of policies is necessary for applicants to make informed and meaningful representations [84].
On 09 March 2026, following a seven-day trial and over nine hours of deliberation, a jury at Peterborough Crown Court acquitted five defendants involved in rescuing 18 beagle puppies from a facility that breeds them for animal testing.
The author of this blog post appeared as counsel for D1 and D2. It is prepared from rough notes taken in court and not an exact transcript.
Factual background
MBR Acres is a facility that breeds dogs. Most of these are sold to laboratories where they may be used in scientific, medical, pharmaceutical and veterinary research, as well as toxicology testing for household products, in the United Kingdom
As well as its establishment licence, MBR Acres is named on a project licence. As set out in the Agreed Facts of the case,
This licence allows the holder of the project licence to “harvest…bio-products” from either live dogs or from dogs following their “humane killing”. The licence also permits the “terminal blood sampling” of dogs, which is conducted under a “general anaesthetic from which the animals are not permitted to recover”.
Each defendant in the case had agreed to take part in an action which was carefully planned and executed by a group called Animal Rebellion (now known as Animal Rising). The action was coordinated and involved renting cars and multiple Airbnb’s, using burner phones, putting information barriers in place between different teams.
Some members of the group cut through the fence at MBR Acres or went over ladders. They took 20 puppies and were successful in taking 18 of them away. Two puppies were recovered from MBR Acres and returned to MBR Acres. Some members of the group acted as runners, some as drivers.
In total, 18 defendants were charged. Some of the group had been arrested as they carried dogs away, some waited at the scene to hand themselves in, some handed themselves in later to police stations explaining that they had been involved, and some were identified later by police.
Defendants were split into four trials for administrative purposes largely due to court space and the inability to fit them into a single dock. Since December 2025, these four trials have been heard with two at Cambridge Crown Court before HHJ Grey and two at Peterborough Crown Court before HHJ Enright.
The trial that finished on the 9th of March was the fourth and final trial arising out of the incidents of 20th December 2022. Significantly, it was the trial group which included the director of Animal Rising: the woman alleged by the prosecution (and candidly admitted in evidence) to be the organiser.
The trial indictment contained a single count of burglary. Although only one of the defendants in this trial group had entered the building, all agreed to playing a role in a joint mission in which the building was entered as a trespasser, property (beagle puppies) were taken which belonged to MBR Acres, and that the intention was to permanently deprive MBR Acres of that property.
In a recent judgment, the High Court in AAA v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2026] EWHC 317 (Fam) (Morgan J) heard 15 applications from fertility clinic patients for declaratory relief. Those patients (the “Applicants”) had embryos or gametes which were stored at various fertility clinics. They sought declarations that it was lawful for those gametes or embryos to continue to be stored and used in circumstances where their written consent to storage had expired and had not been renewed (within the timeframes provided by legislation for renewal of consent).
Morgan J found that there were relevant administrative failures and oversights on behalf of the fertility clinics, and relief was granted in relation to 14 out of the 15 applications.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”), the fertility clinics, and the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (“SSHSC”) were Interested Parties to the applications.
The Bill includes the much-discussed proposal to restrict the availability of jury trial by removing the right to elect trial on indictment for either way offences that are likely to receive a custodial sentence of three years or less. The Bill also introduces judge-only trials for complex fraud or related financial offences, and replaces the automatic right of appeal to the Crown Court from the magistrates’ court with a permission stage. Assuming the reforms are implemented, the Ministry of Justice predicts it will take a decade for the criminal court’s backlog to fall below pre-Covid levels.
Separately, the Bill reforms evidential rules in sexual offence trials. A complainant’s previous false allegations will only be admissible where there is a “proper evidential basis” for concluding the allegation was false. The Bill also provides guidance on when evidence of a complainant’s sexual behaviour is admissible, and raises the threshold for the inclusion of evidence regarding a complainant’s previous compensation claims.
Rights groups criticise airlines for removals under ‘one in, one out’ scheme
The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants and 27 other human rights organisations have written letters to four airlines criticising them for providing removal flights under the UK and France’s ‘one in, one out’ pilot scheme.
Under the scheme, which became effective in August 2025, asylum-seekers arriving in the UK from France in small boats can be detained and removed to France for readmission. The UK has a reciprocal obligation to maintain a voluntary application route for qualifying individuals to be transferred legally from France to the UK.
The letters call on the airlines – Air France and three private charter companies – to cease participation in the scheme or face boycotts. They refer to correspondence published earlier in February, in which UN mandate-holders said that the scheme ‘may result in serious violations of international human rights law’ and urged the UK and French governments to end it.
The Divisional Court in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2026] EWHC 292 (Admin)(Dame Victoria Sharp P and Swift and Steyn JJ) has held that the proscription of Palestine Action should be quashed on the basis that the Home Secretary had failed to follow relevant policy guidance and had not struck a fair balance in respect of relevant rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
This ‘extended look’ article will examine the grounds on which the claim succeeded and evaluate the Home Secretary’s potential prospects on appeal (permission for which has been granted).
Those of us environmentally minded citizens have been dismayed in recent months when taking bags of unwanted textiles to our local recycling centres to be told that they no longer accept these as recyclable waste since they do not make a profit; into landfill they go. There are of course charity shops but they only accept a small fraction of textiles that households get rid of. And used clothing and shoes are in themselves a fraction of the bulk of textiles that go straight from manufacture to landfill/furnace without ever being worn – it will come as no surprise to readers of this blog that garmets bought online and returned for whatever reason are not resold but disposed of, that being the cheapest option.
At last the second element of this extremely wasteful industry has now been addressed by the EU.
On 9th of February this year the European Commission adopted new measures under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR) to prevent the destruction of unsold apparel, clothing accessories and footwear, including additional detail on mandatory disclosures. These rules will apply from 19 July 2026 and aim to reduce the practice of textiles being destroyed before they are sold and worn.
The ESPR addresses overproduction amid fast fashion’s 264,000-594,000 tonne annual waste.
Background
The ESPR – which entered into force on 19 July 2024 – introduced two key measures: a prohibition on the destruction of unsold apparel, clothing accessories and footwear, and mandatory disclosure requirements for unsold consumer products that are discarded. The Delegated Regulation and Implementing Regulation adopted on 9 February 2026 provide the detailed rules necessary for businesses to comply with these obligations.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 targets physical goods, excluding food, feed, medicines, living plants, animals, and vehicles, to promote durability, reusability, repairability, and resource efficiency while ensuring free movement of compliant products.
A core innovation is Chapter VI, which addresses the destruction of unsold consumer products, initially focusing on textiles (apparel, clothing accessories, and footwear). This responds to estimates that 4-9% of EU textiles—up to 594,000 tons annually, as mentioned above, are destroyed pre-use, contributing to waste and emissions. The regime prohibits destruction by economic operators, mandates preventive measures, and introduces disclosure requirements, supported by delegated and implementing acts adopted in February 2026.
The HM Inspectorate of Prisons has published a report which found that there was an “inadequate provision of interpretation” and “almost no information was available” to migrant people, during their removal to France under the ‘one in, one out’ pilot scheme. Almost all of those removed had arrived recently at the Kent coast and few were able to understand English.
Under the ‘Agreement on the Prevention of Dangeround Journeys’, ratified in August, any asylum seeker who has crossed the Channel unlawfully can be returned back to France. There is also a provision for “reciprocal admittance”, whereby an asylum seeker in France who has a genuine family link to someone in the UK and has not attempted to enter the UK unlawfully, will be allowed to enter the UK.
The report also raised concerns that migrant people did not have proper access to justice prior to their removal to France under the scheme. Although migrant people were signposted to legal firms while detained at Immigration Removal Centres, the report noted that many people’s cases were refused by solicitors and they were unable to access legal advice.
The publication of the report comes as a legal challenge against the removal of 16 migrant people under the ‘one in, one out’ scheme was heard at the High Court on Wednesday. The case centres on whether it was unlawful for the Homes Secretary to withdraw migrant people’s right to have rejected modern slavery claims reconsidered. The claimants also allege that French authorities do not adequately support trafficking victims. The Court heard that 40 per cent of migrant people detained under the scheme have made trafficking claims.
In international news
Last week, pro-democracy media tycoon Jimmy Lai was sentenced to 20 years in prison under Hong Kong’s National Security Law. The 78-year-old Apple Daily founder was found guilty last December of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces and publishing seditious materials. Thibaut Bruttin, the director of Reporters Without Borders, warned that “the court decision underscores the complete collapse of press freedom in Hong Kong”.
On 10 February, the European Parliament approved the amendments to the ‘safe third country’ concept in the EU Asylum Procedures Regulation and adopted an EU-wide list of “safe countries of origin”, making it easier for member states to reject asylum applications as inadmissible and to forcibly transfer people seeking safety to countries to which they have no connection. The new rules also remove the suspensive effect of appeals in asylum cases, meaning that a person could be removed while waiting for determination of their claim and any judicial review.
On Friday, the High Court ruled that the former home secretary Yvette Cooper had acted unlawfully when banning Palestine Action last year, under the Terrorism Act 2000. The Court concluded that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was “disproportionate” [138].
The judicial review proceedings were brought by Huda Ammori, Palestine Action’s co-founder.
The Court upheld the claimant’s challenge that the proscription breached the rights of freedom of expression and assembly as guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. The Court found that the offences under the Terroism Act 2000 “comprise a very significant interference with the right to free speech”. For example, a person cannot address a meeting to encourage support for Palestine Action [106]. The Court also concluded that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action had resulted in a “stark” interference with Article 11 rights, since the purpose of proscription is to put measures in place that prevent the organisation from continuing to exist [135].
Additionally, the Court concluded that the Home Secretary failed to properly apply her policy on the use of the discretion to proscribe [89 – 95]. The policy required the Home Secretary to approach the exercise of her discretion comprehensively, taking into account the consequences on Palestine Action members, the characteristics of the organisation, foreign policy and “other factors” [74]. Instead, the Home Secretary presented the “significant disruptive benefits” to “deal with” Palestine Action as a central reason for exercising the discretion to proscribe [89]. The Court clarified that Home Secretary’s policy did not include the expected significant disruptive benefits of proscription as a relevant consideration [90].
According to evidence submitted by the claimant, there have been many arrests since proscription referring to Palestine Action, including more than 2,000 people at protests immediately following the proscription decision [118].
In a statement after the judgement, the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, said the government intends to appeal the decision.
The High Court ruled that Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 (IMA) is “likely to have a more muted practical impact” [168]. The Court clarified for the first time that the right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR constrains the effect of IMA on the judicial oversight of immigration detention decisions.
The case stemmed from a claim alleging the unlawful detention of MXV, a Zimbabwean national, who was held under immigration powers for 101 days from 11 March 2024.
Section 12 of the IMA sought to “overturn” the Court’s role as primary decision maker when it comes to assessing limbs (ii) and (iii) of the Hardial Singh principles, which relate to the reasonableness of the period of detention and whether deportation can be effected within such a reasonable period. Instead, Section 12 requires the Court to assess whether the Secretary of State’s decision about the period was a reasonable assessment.
The Court ruled that Parliament had expressly restricted judicial oversight and Section 12 should be followed [166]. However, compliance with Article 5(1)(f) ECHR requires the Court to retain its role as primary decision maker. The Court confirmed that Article 5(1)(f) ECHR “mirrors” the domestic application of the Hardial Singh principles [144] and, where Article 5 is relied upon, the Court remains able, as primary decision maker, to assess the reasonableness of detention.
The court found that the detention of MXV was unlawful in the period from 1 June 2024 to 19 June 2024.
On the UKHRB
Dr Lewis Graham considers the potential far-reaching effects in Hall v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 124 (TC), where the First-Tier Tribunal ruled that it had the jurisdiction to consider public law grounds, despite the tribunal having no inherent public law jurisdiction.
Rosalind English explores the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dairy UK Ltd v Oatly AB UKSC 4, in which the Court held that Oatly’s registered trade mark “POST MILK GENERATION” cannot lawfully be used in relation to their oat-based food and drink products.
Rosalind English also reviews a letter about animal welfare from The Animal Law Foundation and the League against Cruel Sports, that was presented to the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs last week.
The Supreme Court has just come up with a ruling in an attempt to end a dispute over non-cow based milk products. In April 2021, plant-based company Oatly registered the trade mark “POST MILK GENERATION” for use in relation to certain categories of products. The issue on this appeal was the validity of that trade mark in relation to their popular oat-based food and drink products.
Lactose intolerant and vegetarian/vegan consumers, as well as those with an eye on the environment, have flocked to buy their cartons of “milk” in preference to the products of animal dairy farming. The photo accompanying this post is the one we are most familiar with, along with the “Wow no cow” slogan. Their “POST MILK GENERATION” mark, which was accompanied by an image of a stylised milk wave, was opposed by Dairy UK Ltd before the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO).
Background law and facts
Oatly is a Swedish company whose business involves the manufacture of oat based food and drink products as alternatives to dairy products. The respondent, Dairy UK Ltd, is the trade association for the UK dairy industry.
In November 2021, Dairy applied for a declaration that the registration of Oatly’s trade mark was invalid under the Trade Marks Act 1994. Under s.3(1)(c) of this Act, marks contrary to law or morality cannot be registered. Dairy also argued that Regulation (EU) No.1308/2013 (part of post-Brexit retained EU law) contained such a prohibition.
Oatly appealed successfully to the High Court, which found “POST MILK GENERATION” not a “designation of milk” due to its metaphorical nature. The Court of Appeal reversed this ruling, deeming it a prohibited “designation.” Oatly then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues before the Supreme Court The Court considered two key questions:
Whether “POST MILK GENERATION” constituted a “designation” of milk under Article 78(1), prohibiting trade mark registration for imitation dairy products.
If it did so, did it qualify for exemption under Article 78(2)(b) as a term “used to clearly… describe… a characteristic quality of the product,” like composition or production method.
Article 78 states: “Member States… shall ensure that… no designations of milk… are used… in respect of… products not obtained by the milking of animals… [except] where those products are used to clearly… describe… a characteristic quality of the product.” The Court interpreted “designation” broadly and exemptions narrowly.
Decision of the Court The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Oatly’s appeal on 11 February 2026, upholding the prohibition. Lords Hamblen and Burrows delivered the judgment, with Lords Hodge, Briggs and Stephens concurring. On issue one, “POST MILK GENERATION” was held a “designation” because it evokes “milk” imagery via “milk” and the milky wave device, positioning oat drinks as a successor generation to dairy milk. The Court rejected Oatly’s “metaphorical” argument, noting that trade mark law targets consumer perception, not literal meaning.
On issue two, no exemption applied. The slogan did not, in the Court’s view “clearly describe a characteristic quality” like oat composition or plant-based production. Instead, it aimed to market superiority over milk without factual clarity.
Reasoning behind the Court’s decision
Article 78(1) prohibits “designations of milk” (e.g., cream, butter) on non-animal products to protect the dairy sector. There is also a notion about protecting the consumer here, although arguably the consumer is all too aware that this “milk” does not come from a cow, which is why the product is popular in the first place.
The regulation’s use of the word “designation” is important. It encompasses evocative phrases, not just exact terms, per ordinary meaning and purpose. In the Court’s view, the “milky device” of Oatly’s TM functioned as an imitation evoking dairy fluidity.
According to the Court, even though this trade mark could be regarded as referring to a characteristic quality of the products (namely, the characteristic of being milk-free), it was doing so in an oblique and obscure way and was certainly not doing so “clearly” see para [40]. In particular, it did not make clear whether the product is entirely free of milk, or only that the milk content is low [41].
There are exemptions under Article 78(2), but only for terms which “clearly describe” inherent qualities of a product (e.g., “soya-based”) excluding vague or comparative claims. The Supreme Court found that Oatly’s slogan failed as promotional rhetoric, not descriptive elucidation.
Comment
This is the start of a very long battle of trade marks, food descriptions and labelling requirements. “Meat” and “dairy” products that are not derived from livestock are here to stay. Whilst plant-based claims are easy to dismiss on the basis of their origin, what about “beef”products grown from stem cells in a laboratory, fed by animal serum (so-called “clean meat” because of their drastically reduced carbon footprint?)
Plant based products fall within the Novel Foods Regulation, part of our EU retained law (Regulation (EU) 2015/2283). Because of its proximity to real livestock, cultivated meat is outside the NFR and comes within Regulation (EC) 853/2004 (the legislation that provides specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin). This is because these cell-cultivated products originate from a cell, or cells, taken from animals.
So whilst this decision lies in the way of claims to dairy and meat equivalence for plant-based products, industry lobbying is bound to ratchet up as alternatives to livestock farming gain traction.
Does this judgment stifle innovation? For the moment, perhaps. Oatly will have to rebrand their UK marketing (although for the author of this post, their slogan “Wow no cow” has always been reason to buy the product in full knowledge of its origin). Incidentally, the slogan “Wow No Cow” apparently evaded direct prohibition by avoiding exact dairy terms but fuelled Dairy UK’s opposition to Oatly’s trade marks. “It exemplified Oatly’s irreverent style, turning lawsuits into PR wins”.
Comment from one vegan barrister:
“It really is baffling, this run of appeals was about the phrase “POST MILK GENERATION” being used on oat milk cartons. At least by the time of the SC appeal hearing, both parties agreed that it was NOT the name of the product and that it was not confusing consumers, so the dairy lobby has really spent all this money just to stop Oatly using that phrase on their cartons.”
And another:
“In case anyone was misled into thinking that oats, unlike coconuts, had breasts”
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