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Court of Appeal hears Palestine Action proscription challenge
From Tuesday to Thursday, the Court of Appeal heard the Home Secretary’s appeal against the Divisional Court’s ruling in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) regarding the proscription of Palestine Action under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Two days of open hearings were followed by a closed hearing on 30 April. Judgment was reserved.
The Divisional Court below (whose decision was covered on this blog) had held the proscription unlawful on two grounds: first, that the Home Secretary had failed to follow her own published proscription policy; and second, the proscription was a disproportionate interference with the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR.
The Home Secretary now appeals both of those findings. Ms Ammori cross-appeals (on a rolled-up application) on the two grounds dismissed below: first, that the Home Secretary acted unlawfully in failing, before laying the Order, to give Palestine Action the opportunity to make representations; and second, in proscribing in a manner that was discriminatory contrary to Article 14 ECHR. The proceedings represent the most consequential test of the proscription regime in years: the Court below was told that, by November 2025, over 2,000 people had been arrested under section 13 of the 2000 Act for holding signs reading “I oppose genocide. I support Palestine Action”; of those, approximately 700 had been charged, and none yet convicted.
The Court of Appeal’s reserved judgment will shape both the lawfulness of the Home Secretary’s decision and the operational practice of the criminal courts.
On Monday, the Commons passed a carry-over motion in respect of the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, ensuring that the legislation will not fall on prorogation and may continue into the new session.
The Bill removes the conditional-immunity scheme, restores the right to bring civil claims for Troubles-related conduct, and reconstitutes the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery as a ‘Legacy Commission’ with a statutory oversight board, two Co-Directors of Investigations, a Victims and Survivors Advisory Group and conflict-of-interest safeguards. It implements the UK-Ireland Joint Framework on the Legacy of the Troubles, announced in September 2025.
The legislative process now runs in tandem with the Supreme Court’s pending judgment in the linked appeals of Martina Dillon, John McEvoy, Brigid Hughes and Lynda McManus, expected to be handed down on 7 May 2026. The Government’s appeal challenges the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland’s ruling that, first, Colton J was entitled to disapply provisions of the 2023 Act for incompatibility with Article 2(1) of the Windsor Framework; and second, the ICRIR could not, in its present form, comply with Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.
The respondents’ cross-appeal in turn challenges the Court of Appeal’s departure from Colton J’s further disapplication of provisions of the 2023 Act for breach of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Snowden LJ to the Supreme Court
On Thursday, His Majesty The King approved the appointment of Lord Justice Snowden as a Justice of the UK Supreme Court. Sir Richard Snowden, a chancery specialist promoted to the Court of Appeal in October 2021, was Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster and Supervising Judge of the Business and Property Courts for the Northern and North-Eastern Circuits, as well as Lead Judge for International Relations from March 2025. He will be sworn in on 15 June 2026, replacing Lord Richards of Camberwell on his retirement.
The Order amends section 9(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to add a further exception to the prohibition on damages for judicial acts done in good faith, allowing damages to be awarded where a judicial act is incompatible with Article 8 ECHR by reason of a procedural defect amounting to a breach of the requirements of procedural fairness.
The Order responds to the ECtHR’s judgment in SW v United Kingdom(Application no. 87/18, 22 June 2021), in which the Court found violations of Articles 8 and 13 ECHR arising from a Family Court judge’s adverse findings of fact made against a non-party social-worker witness without procedural protections, the Article 13 violation flowing from the inability under section 9(3) HRA to recover damages. The amendments will apply retrospectively as well as prospectively.
Sussex v Office for Students: a regulator with a ‘closed mind’
On Wednesday, the High Court quashed the Office for Students’ decision that the University of Sussex breached its registration conditions, and the £585,000 monetary penalty imposed on it. The case is The University of Sussex v The Office for Students [2026] EWHC 984 (Admin). The Free Speech Union intervened, contending – in support of the OfS’s position – that no proportionality assessment was required.
The University challenged the OfS’s Final Decision of 27 March 2025, which had held it in breach of registration conditions E1 (governing documents to uphold the public-interest governance principles, including freedom of speech and academic freedom) and E2(i) (governance arrangements) by reference to the 2018, 2022 and 2023 versions of the University’s Trans and Non-Binary Equality Policy Statement (‘TNBEPS’). The investigation was prompted by the October 2021 protests targeting Professor Kathleen Stock. Lieven J was emphatic that the Court was “not adjudicating on any issues relating to the events surrounding Professor Stock” ([17]).
The University’s grounds succeeded almost entirely across the board.
First, the OfS had no jurisdiction to find a breach of condition E1, because the TNBEPS was not a “governing document” within the meaning of section 14(1) of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017: the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase, supported by the legislative history, points to a narrow construction capturing instruments that “had some governing effect, rather than simply setting out a policy” ([150]).
Secondly, the OfS had misdirected itself on the meaning of “freedom of speech within the law”: it had treated any restriction on lawful speech as a breach despite the regulator’s own Regulatory Advice 24 acknowledging that lawful speech may, in appropriate circumstances, be lawfully restricted, and had failed to read the TNBEPS alongside the University’s Freedom of Speech Code of Practice ([246]).
Thirdly, the OfS had misdirected itself on academic freedom, wrongly treating the prospect of disciplinary proceedings as in itself jeopardising academic posts ([266]).
Fourthly, although the OfS did have jurisdiction in respect of condition E2(i) – which encroaches on the visitorial jurisdiction (a jurisdiction of ecclesiastical origin) of fourteen universities and colleges, including Sussex – it had been wrong in law not to consider whether the breaches had been remedied by the time of the Final Decision ([305]).
The Court held that the entire Final Decision was “vitiated by bias” ([455]) because the OfS had approached its decision-making “with a closed mind” and had unlawfully predetermined the outcome. The Court traced the institutional approach from the OfS Board’s resolution on 23 September 2021 to “[p]roactively seek cases to pursue using [their] investigatory powers” ([366]); the then Chief Executive Susan Lapworth’s witness-statement evidence that initiating investigatory work on a free-speech case would send “a strong signal” to the sector ([367]); the OfS’s settlement-stage approach (assuming a breach before the Provisional Decision was issued) ([433]); and the OfS’s writing to other higher education providers using identical Advance HE template policies only after the Final Decision had been published, in order to highlight the breach and the fine ([435]).
Notably, the Court rejected allegations of personal apparent bias against Dr Arif Ahmed, the OfS’s Director for Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom: he had not been the decision-maker and had joined the investigation team only after the Provisional Decision was issued ([420]-[426]). The unlawfulness lay with the institution, not the individual.
The OfS’s interim chief executive said the regulator would “carefully consider the consequences of the judgment before deciding on next steps”; the Free Speech Union described the decision as “disappointing”. The judgment is an unusually pointed criticism of a regulator’s procedural fairness, with sweeping consequences for OfS enforcement of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 regime. As recently confirmed by the Government, the Act’s substantive enforcement machinery – the complaints scheme and the new condition of registration – will not commence until 1 September 2026 and 1 April 2027 respectively.
R v Skinner: Crown Court allows Articles 9 and 10 appeal
A High Court judge sitting in the Crown Court at Bournemouth has quashed the conviction of an 80-year-old appellant under section 127(1) of the Communications Act 2003, holding that conviction would be a disproportionate interference with his rights under Articles 9 and 10 ECHR. The case is R v Skinner(Case Ref: 55CH0180823, Saini J sitting with Mr N. Butler JP and Mr J. Griffin JP, hearing 23 April 2026, oral judgment 24 April 2026, on appeal from Poole Magistrates’ Court).
The appellant, Mr David Skinner, had been convicted at Poole Magistrates’ Court on 1 May 2024 of two offences under section 127(1) and ordered to pay fines, compensation orders to the recipients, prosecution costs and a victim surcharge. The communications were two identical letters, attached as documents to emails sent on 28 April 2023, addressed to Temporary Inspector Fern Graham of Dorset Police and to the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (‘PCC’) for Dorset, David Sidwick: the latter opened by an employee in the PCC’s office, Ms Yvonne Fenwick.
The letters, entitled “Reporting mass murder in Ophir Road”, contained graphic photographs of aborted foetuses interleaved with photographs of victims of Nazi concentration camps, set in the context of Mr Skinner’s strenuous opposition to the abortion-clinic public spaces protection order (“buffer zone”) imposed in October 2022 around the BPAS clinic on Ophir Road, Bournemouth. The Court accepted that the elements of section 127(1) were technically made out: the images were “grossly offensive”, and Mr Skinner himself accepted in evidence that they were so. The decisive question was whether conviction was a proportionate interference with Convention rights.
Applying the principles set out in Cobban & Borders v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] EWHC 1908 (Admin) at [111] (reproduced at [17] of the present judgment), and focusing on the fourth limb of the Bank Mellatproportionality test, the Court held that the Crown had not met the demanding standard required to justify a conviction restricting political speech ([33]-[34]). Three reasons were given. First, the letters were political speech entitled to the highest form of Article 10 protection ([35]). Second, images – however shocking – may legitimately be used to make political points: the Court found persuasive Mr Skinner’s own evidential analogies of the open-casket photographs of Emmett Till during the US 1950s civil rights movement and the use of distressing medical images on cigarette packets ([36]). Third, the intended recipients were public officials: Inspector Fern “can be expected to have a higher tolerance”, the PCC was “plainly a political actor”, and as to Ms Fenwick, Mr Skinner had “no way of knowing that anyone other than the PCC would open this correspondence” and should not be held responsible for an administrator opening it ([37]).
The Court distinguished Connolly v DPP [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin), in which a section 1 Malicious Communications Act 1988 conviction had been upheld in respect of letters with similar imagery sent to pharmacy staff, those recipients having no role in the public debate on abortion. The present case is, by contrast, important Article 10 authority for protest correspondence with public-official recipients, and is being treated as a meaningful rebuke to the use of communications offences in protest contexts. It takes its place alongside the recent decision in DPP v Coskun [2026] EWHC 427 (Admin), referred to at [35] of the present judgment, in shaping the Article 10 jurisprudence on offensive expression in political and religious contexts.
Strasbourg: Article 8 violation in Kanev v Bulgaria; upcoming Yasak v Türkiye judgment
On Tuesday, the ECtHR held, by 5 votes to 2, that Bulgaria violated Article 8 ECHR in respect of the lack of effective oversight of personal data processed by its State Agency for National Security (“SANS”). The case is Kanev and Bulgarian Helsinki Committee v Bulgaria(45864/22, judgment of 28 April 2026, Third Section).
The first applicant – Mr Krasimir Kanev, chair of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee – sought to ascertain in 2021 whether SANS had gathered intelligence on him or the Committee, after the then caretaker Minister of Internal Affairs had publicly stated that SANS had conducted secret surveillance of civil-society activists during the 2020-21 protests. SANS refused to disclose; Mr Kanev’s domestic challenges failed.
The Chamber held that Bulgarian law contained insufficiently clear rules and effective safeguards governing SANS’s processing of personal data. None of the potential oversight mechanisms (the Commission for the Protection of Personal Data; reporting to Parliament or to government) appeared in practice to scrutinise how SANS processed operational data. The Court directed Bulgaria to bring its law into conformity with the Convention, in continuation of the line of authority running from Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria(62540/00, 28 June 2007), through Ekimdzhiev and Others v Bulgaria (70078/12, 11 January 2022), and most recently Green Alliance v Bulgaria(6580/22, 17 February 2026). A modest sum was awarded by way of just satisfaction.
Kanev is a notable restatement of the principle that the absence of effective independent oversight is fatal to the ‘quality of law’ requirement under Article 8. It is also an important case for practitioners working on the UK Investigatory Powers regime, intelligence-services subject access, and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.
Additionally, the Grand Chamber will hand down its judgment in Yasak v Türkiye (17389/20) on Tuesday 5 May 2026: a follow-on to Yalçınkaya v Türkiyeon the foreseeability of liability under Article 7 for membership of FETÖ/PDY, an armed terrorist organisation.
On the UKHRB
Rosalind English speaks with Edie Bowles of the Animal Law Foundation and Veronica Wiggins (Ad-Free Cities and Badvertising) about consumer-protection enforcement around misleading representations of farm-animal welfare, and the recent challenge to the labelling of Scottish farmed salmon, in Episode 237 of Law Pod UK: “Humane-washing” (28 April 2026).
In Episode 237 of Law Pod UK Rosalind English talks to animal protection solicitor Edie Bowles of the Animal Law Foundation and Veronica Wiggins who runs campaigns against misleading advertising via the groups Ad-Free Cities and Badvertising. The focus of our discussion is on the widespread and systemic misrepresentation of our food animals as leading happy and healthy lives in bucolic conditions in the English countryside whereas 85% of the meat, fish, dairy products and eggs that we eat come from cruel and abusive conditions in factory farms. If we as consumers were given a more honest picture in terms of labelling, advertising and media coverage we would probably make radically different decisions as to how animal products are sourced. How can we better enforce consumer protection laws, competition laws and trade standards to achieve this?
The case discussed in this interview is the challenge brought by WildFish Conservation and Animal Equality against DEFRA in respect of salmon from Scottish farms. The argument was that DEFRA should not have approved the description of Scottish farmed salmon Protected Geographical Indication as simply “Scottish Salmon”. The challenge failed, but the appeal is due to be heard by the Upper Tribunal in May. (Wildfish Conservation and another v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2025] UKFTT 00058
Roman Abramovich has filed an application against the United Kingdom before the European Court of Human Rights, alleging that an investigation into his financial accounts by the Attorney General of Jersey (“the AG”) breached his Article 6 and 8 rights. The investigation that gave rise to this claim began in March 2022 and resulted in a freezing order over assets valued at approximately £5.2 billion.
This action follows Abramovich’s judicial review proceedings against the AG’s decision to commence and continue the money laundering investigation, which were dismissed in the Royal Court of Jersey and Court of Appeal of Jersey in June/July 2024 and June 2025 respectively. Mr Abramovich was denied permission to appeal these decisions to the Privy Council on 17 November 2025.
Assisted Dying Bill runs out of time
On 24 April 2026, the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill ran out of time to become law. The proposed legislation could only be enacted if both Houses of Parliament agreed on its wording before the session of Parliament ended. While the House of Commons voted for the bill to progress to the House of Lords in June 2025, in the House of Lords, the bill received more than 1,200 amendments. Supporters of the bill have criticised the amount of amendments proposed, and the time taken to debate them, arguing that the volume of amendments intentionally frustrated the bill’s passage. Opponents have responded by stating that the bill required sufficient scrutiny to ensure vulnerable people are protected.
As the bill was proposed by a backbench MP, it cannot be carried over to the next session, and any renewed attempt to pass the bill will have to begin the parliamentary approval process from scratch. Lord Falconer has stated that he may push the bill using powers under the Parliament Act, “which, in certain circumstances, allows legislation passed by the House of Commons to become law without the consent of the House of Lords.
This case concerned an online gambling operator’s use of cookies, personal data processing, and direct marketing in relation to a vulnerable gambler anonymised as RTM. The central holding by the Court of Appeal is that consent is assessed objectively by reference to the data subject’s outward indication, not by inquiry into their subjective state of mind or vulnerability.
First Instance
The judge approached the issue of consent in stages, addressing in turn “Consent – the evidential background” and then “The standards for legally operative consent”, before applying her legal analysis to the facts about RTM’s “consenting behaviour” as she found them to be. She found that RTM had not given legally operative consent because his gambling problem impaired his autonomy and subjective consent. She reviewed all the legislative provisions relevant to data protection, some decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and a decision of the Upper Tribunal, Administrative Appeals Chamber (UT) and concluded that consent, in this context, was a “rather complex” idea with “three distinct strands” or criteria: (1) good quality subjective consent, depending on the individual’s actual state of mind; or (2) absent that, a fully autonomous choice by the individual about the grant of consent; and (3) some minimum evidential standards for proof of consent.
As to the facts, the judge accepted that RTM had taken deliberate actions that indicated consent, but held that none of the three criteria she had identified had been met. Accepting RTM’s evidence about the impact on him of his gambling problem, she found that he “lacked subjective consent”; that “the autonomous quality of his consenting behaviour was impaired to a real degree”; and that on the evidence “the quality of this Claimant’s consenting was rather lower than the standard required”, and “insufficiently freely given”, the reasons being “his gambling condition and his associated vulnerability and compromised autonomy”.
The central question on appeal was what must be proved to show that consent was given for cookies, data processing. The appellants and the ICO (intervening) both accepted that a gambling problem or similar vulnerability on the part of a data subject may be relevant if the data controller knew or ought to have known of the vulnerability.
On Tuesday, the House of Commons approved an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill under which women convicted of historic abortion offences will be pardoned and have their criminal records expunged. The amendment was originally proposed in the House of Lords to complement the bill’s provision to decriminalise abortions by women acting in relation to their own pregnancies.
Bar Council publishes paper criticising jury curtailment proposals
As the Courts and Tribunals Bill continues its committee stage, the Bar Council has published a 31-page polemic by Geoffrey Robertson KC attacking the government’s proposals to limit jury trials.
Robertson argues that the proposals will not clear the criminal courts backlog and may worsen delays. He points to time being taken up on novel pre-trial allocation proceedings and on judges retiring to produce reasoned judgments.
Robertson also contends that the proposals overlook the constitutional significance of a jury’s power to show mercy and acquit on conscientious grounds. He positions this as a crucial safeguard against injustice and draconianism – a ‘proud boast of British justice’.
Concluding, he writes:
‘The proposed reforms take the axe to a substantial proportion of jury trials (half at a rough estimate), disadvantaging not only defendants but all who are proud of the way in which justice has been delivered, through majority deliberation of a dozen community representatives, more in touch with current values than judges or magistrates and able, in their own way, to show mercy when the law does not allow for it.’
In the courts
Assessing persecution under the Refugee Convention
Dismissing an appeal against refusal of a protection claim, the Court of Appeal has reiterated that the question whether an asylum-seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution is ‘acutely fact-sensitive’. The court also echoed previous cautions against overly ‘forensic’ reasons challenges. The case is MN (Vietnam) v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 485.
The appellant (MN) was a Vietnamese national. In 2014, he attended a demonstration in Ho Chi Minh. On his account, he was arrested by police, beaten, charged with attending an illegal demonstration, and returned to his home area. Once there, the authorities told him that he was on a blacklist and would be watched.
Later that year, MN entered the UK using a business visa and overstayed. He sought to avoid removal by claiming entitlement to refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention on the basis that he had a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ if returned to Vietnam. The Secretary of State rejected his claim. The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) and the Upper Tribunal (UT) rejected his appeals.
On his further appeal to the Court of Appeal, MN argued that the FTT judge, whose reasoning and conclusions were adopted by the UT, had: (i) failed to make proper findings about, and failed properly to assess, MN’s ill-treatment in 2014; and (ii) operated on the mistaken basis that ill-treatment must be ‘systematic’ to constitute persecution.
The court rejected both arguments. As to the first, the judge had clearly accepted all aspects of MN’s evidence about what happened to him in Vietnam and was not required to repeat every detail in his conclusions ([38]). The judge had also accepted evidence of intolerance of protests and action taken by the Vietnamese authorities to suppress state opposition ([41]).
As to the second argument, the court rejected the contention that, by using the word ‘systematic’, the judge had been applying an erroneous threshold test. This was an ‘overly forensic scrutiny or dissection’ of the judge’s language ([46]). Stating that MN would not be subjected to ‘persistent or systematic’ ill-treatment was simply a way of reiterating that MN was not likely to face adverse interest from the authorities upon his return.
Although it was true in law that a single episode of ill-treatment could amount to persecution, this was an ‘acutely fact-sensitive’ evaluation ([47]). Thus, despite the acknowledged possibility that MN might face a further beating, the judge was not prevented from concluding that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution, taking the circumstances in the round.
Determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking
In R (CGW) v SSHD [2026] EWHC 858 (Admin), the High Court has criticised an apparent understanding among Home Office officials about the level of detail required to meet the standard of proof as to whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking.
The claimant for judicial review (CGW) arrived in the UK on a small boat in 2021. His account was that, while in asylum accommodation, he was approached by some men who purported to offer him work. He was then transported to a series of indoor cannabis farms where he was held against his will, beaten, and forced to tend the cannabis plants. He was eventually found by police, who referred him to the Home Office to assess whether he was a victim of human trafficking.
The Home Office’s Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority eventually took a negative ‘conclusive grounds’ decision to the effect that CGW was not a victim of human trafficking. CGW challenged this decision from multiple angles, including that the decision-maker had failed to give legally adequate reasons.
The Deputy Judge accepted this ground of challenge, holding that the purported reasons were ‘plainly deficient’ ([24]) and simply did ‘not provide rational justification for the conclusions reached’ ([25]). There were two fatal problems:
the reasons were ultimately bare conclusions because they stated that there was ‘insufficient’ information for a positive decision but did not explain why; and
the reasons were non sequiturs because CGW’s account of what happened to him appeared sufficient and the decision did not say that his account was not credible.
The Deputy Judge also responded to his impression that Home Office officials were taking ‘conclusive grounds’ decisions on the understanding that a person will not meet the required standard of proof unless they have provided ‘detailed’ information about their exploitation.
This approach was ‘legally wrong’. The decision-maker was simply required to determine on the balance of probabilities whether the individual was a victim of human trafficking or slavery, basing that decision on the totality of the evidence available, including any circumstantial evidence. There was no minimum requirement as to the level of detail that an individual had to provide ([30(2)-(3)]).
Upcoming ICLQ Annual Lecture, 12th May 2026
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Annual Lecture will be taking place on Tuesday 12th May, at 17:30 to 19:30, followed by a reception or online via Zoom.
The lecture will be delivered by Dr Sofia Galani on ‘Human Rights Obligations in Maritime Search and Rescue’, based on her article which was recently published in ICLQ vol. 74(1).
On 6 and 7 April 2026, a selection of measures under the Employment Rights Act 2025 (“the Act”) took effect.
The measures include the removal of the Lower Earnings Limit for statutory sick pay (“SSP”), making over 1.2 million workers eligible. They will also remove the waiting period for SSP, meaning workers will be paid from the first day of becoming ill, rather than from day four. In addition, employees will now be entitled to paternity leave and unpaid parental leave from the first day in their job, as opposed to after 26 weeks (paternity leave) or a year (unpaid parental leave).
Moreover, the new measures have added sexual harassment to the list of wrongdoings that may count as the basis for a “qualified disclosure” under s.43B of the Act, meaning that workers who make such disclosures, and do so in the reasonable belief that their report is in the public interest, will be afforded the whistleblowing protections against adverse treatment and unfair dismissal within the Act. Alongside this, the measures include the establishment of the Fair Work Agency, an executive agency of the Department of Trade, which will have the power to inspect workplaces, bring civil proceedings and enforce penalties if they find breaches of employment law.
These measures follow the Act’s first tranche of reforms, relating to trade unions and industrial action, which came into effect on 18 February 2026.
The Court of Appeal in Re J, Re M and Re P (Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344 has provided authoritative guidance on a fundamental question in family law: whether a person who is not a child’s biological father can acquire parental responsibility by being named on the birth certificate. The court firmly answered that question in the negative, clarifying the meaning of “father” under the Children Act 1989 and resolving a line of inconsistent first instance decisions.
In two weeks’ time my interview with Jacob Turner and Michael Workman on the Judicial Taskforce’s draft Statement and Consultation on AI and private law will come out on Law Pod UK. In the mean time, a short note of the guidance on this subect in Civil Procedure News, put out by The White Book Service (Issue 3/2026 11 March 2026).
The guidance quotes the notorious cases of (R) Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 and R (Munir) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (AI hallucinations[2026] UKUT 81. Both these cases involved the “incautious” use of AI in ways that could result in the loss of privilege through uploading information to an AI tool that is open to the public.
And of course there is the use of fake authorities. In the Ayinde case the UT issued a rare show cause notice, which required an explanation to be given to the question why grounds of appeal to the Tribunal had included citation of a Court of Appeal judgment that could be found nowhere on BAILII and why it also included citation of another Court of Appeal judgment, which while it was available was not authority for the proposition it was said to support.
Had the immigration adviser in question not referred himself to the Immigration Advice Authority, the Tribunal would have so referred Mr Mohammed in order to “stop false material coming before the Tribunal which leads to considerable public expense due to the need to address the problem”.
With regard to the second case, the Tribunal observed that it would be
“easy to think that this is a case about the naïve use of generative AI, but it is not merely that: it is principally about supervision and the obligation to ensure that the tribunal is not misled. It matters not how citation errors come about. Whether they are inserted by a hapless trainee or by ChatGPT is really neither here nor there; the point is that the qualified legal professional with conduct of the matter is expected to ensure that such documents are checked, that errors are identified, and that only accurate documents are sent to the tribunal…. Failure to check is also wasteful of an opponent’s time, thereby potentially leading (in judicial review proceedings) to large awards of costs.”
As the authors at Civil Procedure note,
“This case raises continuing concerns about the use of fake authorities, notwithstanding the Divisional Court’s guidance in Ayinde. It also, apparently for the first time, raises concerns about the use of open AI tools by lawyers in ways that can result in breaches of client confidentiality and loss of legal professional privilege concerning information uploaded to such tools. It ought to be apparent that the risk of such breaches is not confined to lawers but might also arise through the use of AI tools by, for instance, expert witnesses”.
Tune in for our next epiosde on AI and Private Law, and the proposals for circumventing problems of liability and causation thrown up by autonomy, capacity and the self-teaching capacity of generative AI.
On Monday, the House of Commons International Development Committee (IDC) published a report which found that the Government had failed to deliver on its Women, Peace and Security (WPS) policy commitments.
According to the Peace under pressure: Protecting WPS report, the UK’s willingness or ability to facilitate high-level discussion within the UN on WPS appears weak, despite commitments to the WPS agenda [24]. The report also raised concerns that the UK Government is “at risk of inflicting damage to its reputation as a WPS penholder and convenor” [27].
The Committee further pointed to the reduction in development and gender expertise within the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) as a significant hindrance to the WPS agenda [3]. Additionally, the Government was found to have reduced funding and resourcing for WPS initiatives [4].
The publication of the report comes at a time of the highest number of conflicts since 1946 [11] coupled with a growing global “anti-gender” movement and backlash against gender equality [13].
In other news:
In a landmark ruling, the California Superior Court ruled that Meta and Google were liable for creating addictive products that caused the deterioration of a young woman’s mental health. The social media companies were ordered to pay $3 million in compensatory damages.
The European Parliament plenary endorsed the opening of negotiations with the Council on a new legal framework for the return of people without the right to stay in the UK. The proposed Return Regulation would enable Member States to deport people to countries with no prior ties and require Member States to put in place measures to detect people staying irregularly in their territory.
The Metropolitan Police revised their enforcement approach in response to displays of support for Palestine Action, reversing their interim position – adopted after the High Court ruling that its proscription was unlawful – not to arrest its supporters.
The High Court ruled that the Home Secretary was in breach of her statutory duty to provide “adequate” initial accommodation (IA) for asylum seeking families [82] and [102].
Although IA is intended as a “stopgap” [2], asylum seeking people, including the Claimants, have been accommodated in IA for as long as 3 years, often in hotel rooms or hostels [3].
Bates J held that a hotel room provided for an asylum seeker and her family is not a “dwelling” for the purposes of Part X of the Housing Act 1985 (HA), on the basis that the accommodation is a temporary interim measure [34].
However, Part X HA is not “entirely irrelevant” when considering whether hotel accommodation meets the “adequate” standard, as provided by ss. 95-96 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (IA) [42].
The case stemmed from an application for judicial review of the adequacy of IA provided for a prolonged period to two asylum seeking mothers, SH and BWO, with dependent children. Bates J described the accommodation arrangements for SH – who shared a hotel room with her husband, their young school-age child and a newborn baby – as “extraordinarily stressful” [82]. The Court held that BWO’s living circumstances were “incompatible with personal dignity” because she was accommodated in a two-bed hotel room with her two sons of sexually mature ages and had to share a bed with one of her sons [100].
Bates J also confirmed that where the Home Secretary refuses a request for accommodation in a particular geographical area, she has a duty to identify the asylum seeking person’s needs and ensure that the accommodation outside the requested area is adequate to meet those needs [95]. There is no requirement for asylum seeking people to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” to satisfy such a request [94].
Additionally, Bates J raised concerns that there was a lack of a specified minimum standards regarding the minimum amount of space that should be provided for families in hotel accommodation, prior to the Space Standards Paper circulated in June 2024. The Court held that the lack of policy or guidance had the potential to contribute to accommodation falling below the “adequate” standard [48].
Over 35,000 asylum seeking people – including 4,300 families – were being accommodated in hotels for IA purposes in September 2025 [3].
On Thursday, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that the deportation of an Afghan national would be a violation of the right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment as guaranteed by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights [199].
The case concerned an order by the Swedish authorities to remove an Afghan national, DM, from Sweden, following several unsuccessful applications for asylum since 2015 [5 – 59]. DM alleged that, if deported, he would risk being ill-treated in Afghanistan [132].
In the first ECHR judgment of this type since the Taliban takeover in 2021, the Court held that an assessment of whether there was a real risk of ill-treatment had to be made on the basis of all relevant factors, considered cumulatively. The Court found that the Swedish authorities had erred when separately considering the individual factors, including the “serious and fragile” security situation in Afghanistan, the deterioration of human-rights in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover and DM’s Hazara ethnicity [197].
Furthermore, the Court was not satisfied that the assessment undertaken by the Swedish authorities was “sufficiently and adequately” supported by domestic and international materials [157].
The Court observed that most European States had not carried out any involuntary returns to Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover [160].
The Court granted interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court, until the judgment becomes final [199 – 201].
In the first of a series of Law Pod UK episodes relating to investigations, Marina Wheeler KC speaks to Jim Duffy about the evolving role of barristers in this area.
In addition to undertaking a comprehensive review of the AF-disclosure case law, Chamberlain J also rejected the notion of some form of an intermediate level of disclosure in closed material proceedings, where the AF-disclosure threshold is not met. The decision offers some much-needed clarity in this area of law.
Scottish assisted dying bill falls while Westminster proposals lag in the House of Lords
Tuesday evening saw the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill defeated at the last stage of the Holyrood legislative process. After a final debate, Members of the Scottish Parliament voted against the bill by 69 votes to 57, with one abstention. The bill would have allowed some terminally ill patients to be assisted to end their lives. Patients would have been required to make two declarations of their wish for assisted dying and to undergo assessment by two doctors as to their eligibility and freedom from coercion or pressure.
Meanwhile, the House of Lords continues to debate amendments to the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill for England and Wales. Owing to the 1,200+ amendments which have been tabled, the bill is now widely expected to run out of time – despite passing the Commons in June 2025. The bill’s proposer, Kim Leadbeater MP, is reported to have said that the House of Lords has ‘signed its own death warrant’ by stalling the legislation.
NHRI joint statement urges UK government not to dilute the ECHR
On Thursday, the UK’s three National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) issued an unusual joint statement urging the government to ‘commit to no reduction in rights protections’.
The NHRIs note that the UK government has expressed an intention to ‘re-balance’ and ‘clarify’ the position relating to migration by adopting political declarations on Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. They ask the government to explain how it will ensure that its proposals do not weaken ECHR protections. The statement continues:
‘The erosion of anyone’s rights puts us all at risk; it signals that these shared standards are not guaranteed and that any of our rights could be subject to debate.’
The UK’s NHRIs – the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Scottish Human Rights Commission, and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission – are required to abide by the Paris Principles. These call on them to promote and protect all human rights by acting independently from government.
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”) provides qualified protection for speech. Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) criminalises certain speech acts relating to proscribed organisations. In the case of R v ABJ; R v BDN[2026] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether these two things could be reconciled: is s 12(1A) of the 2000 Act compatible with the Convention?
In its judgment, given on 26 February 2026, the Court answered this question with an unequivocal ‘yes’. The offence introduced by s 12(1A) was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Crucially, conviction would always represent a proportionate interference with the defendant’s Article 10 right to free speech where the elements of the offence, properly understood, were made out.
In providing such a resounding answer, however, the Court risks setting the bar too high for legislative provisions to be compatible with the Convention.
The UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found that 1,205 children have been systematically deported and forcibly transferred from Russian-occupied areas in Ukraine to Russia. Of those cases, eight in ten children have not yet returned. According to the findings, Russian authorities have acted in contravention with international humanitarian law, under which evacuation can only be temporary and for the legally justifiable reasons of health, medical treatment or safety.
The Courts and Tribunals Bill passed its second reading in the House of Commons last week. The Bill introduces a range of reforms aimed at reducing court backlogs, including proposals to restrict jury trials and raising magistrates’ sentencing powers. The House of Commons Public Bill Committee has issued a call for evidence from experts in fields relevant to the Bill.
The Netherlands and Iceland sought permission to intervene in the International Criminal Court (ICJ) case initiated by South Africa against Israel’s actions in Gaza. The ICJ had previously received 16 requests to intervene, including from Palestine, Ireland and Colombia.
[* note from editor: The United States and other countries have also filed declarations of intervention in South Africa’s case of genocide against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Article 63 of the Statute of the Court allows countries to intervene in cases involving the interpretation of a convention to which they are parties, even if they are not parties to the dispute.
In its 11-page declaration the US rejected South Africa’s accusations of genocide against Israel.
“To avoid any doubt, the United States affirms, in the strongest terms possible, that the allegations of ‘genocide’ against Israel are false. They are also unfortunately nothing new,” it said.
The US said it considered it necessary to intervene in this case in order to offer its interpretations of the provisions of the Genocide Convention, informed by its role in drafting the 1948 text]
In the Courts:
On Wednesday, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) launched an inquiry into the recent changes to laws relating to protest. The inquiry will examine whether the Government has correctly balanced its duty to protect the public from disruption or fear, with its duty to protect the right to protest – described by JCHR chair, Lord David Alton, as “a cornerstone of our democracy”.
On Thursday, the High Court ruled that the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) refusal of an Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP) application was unlawful, on the grounds of an error of fact and a failure to publish related caseworker guidance. Although the MoD withdrew the decision shortly after the hearing, Saini J still handed down judgment, noting that the Court’s findings could affect other ARAP cases [1-2].
The judicial review challenge was brought by CHD, an Afghan national who was tortured by the Taliban and is currently in hiding in Afghanistan. For 13 years, until the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in 2021, CHD held a key public-facing role within a partly UK-funded organisation that promoted the rule of law and combatted the Taliban’s influence.
CHD’s application to re-locate to the UK was rejected by the MoD on the grounds that he failed to meet Condition 2 Category 4 of ARAP, which requires applicants to have made, in the course of their employment, “a substantive and positive contribution to the UK’s military objectives or national security objectives (which includes counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and anti-corruption objectives) with respect to Afghanistan” [15].
Saini J held that MoD decision makers had made an error of fact when determining that the objectives of CHD’s employer – the advancement of the rule of law and a functioning legal system – were not also part of the UK’s national security objectives at the time of CHD’s employment [75-77].
Saini J also noted that he would have been inclined to find the unpublished guidance and any decision made pursuant to it unlawful, had it been necessary to decide the issue [21]. Applying R (Lumba) v SSHD [2012] 1 AC 245, Saini J held that the MoD’s failure to publish interfered with the general rule of law that the publication of policies is necessary for applicants to make informed and meaningful representations [84].
On 09 March 2026, following a seven-day trial and over nine hours of deliberation, a jury at Peterborough Crown Court acquitted five defendants involved in rescuing 18 beagle puppies from a facility that breeds them for animal testing.
The author of this blog post appeared as counsel for D1 and D2. It is prepared from rough notes taken in court and not an exact transcript.
Factual background
MBR Acres is a facility that breeds dogs. Most of these are sold to laboratories where they may be used in scientific, medical, pharmaceutical and veterinary research, as well as toxicology testing for household products, in the United Kingdom
As well as its establishment licence, MBR Acres is named on a project licence. As set out in the Agreed Facts of the case,
This licence allows the holder of the project licence to “harvest…bio-products” from either live dogs or from dogs following their “humane killing”. The licence also permits the “terminal blood sampling” of dogs, which is conducted under a “general anaesthetic from which the animals are not permitted to recover”.
Each defendant in the case had agreed to take part in an action which was carefully planned and executed by a group called Animal Rebellion (now known as Animal Rising). The action was coordinated and involved renting cars and multiple Airbnb’s, using burner phones, putting information barriers in place between different teams.
Some members of the group cut through the fence at MBR Acres or went over ladders. They took 20 puppies and were successful in taking 18 of them away. Two puppies were recovered from MBR Acres and returned to MBR Acres. Some members of the group acted as runners, some as drivers.
In total, 18 defendants were charged. Some of the group had been arrested as they carried dogs away, some waited at the scene to hand themselves in, some handed themselves in later to police stations explaining that they had been involved, and some were identified later by police.
Defendants were split into four trials for administrative purposes largely due to court space and the inability to fit them into a single dock. Since December 2025, these four trials have been heard with two at Cambridge Crown Court before HHJ Grey and two at Peterborough Crown Court before HHJ Enright.
The trial that finished on the 9th of March was the fourth and final trial arising out of the incidents of 20th December 2022. Significantly, it was the trial group which included the director of Animal Rising: the woman alleged by the prosecution (and candidly admitted in evidence) to be the organiser.
The trial indictment contained a single count of burglary. Although only one of the defendants in this trial group had entered the building, all agreed to playing a role in a joint mission in which the building was entered as a trespasser, property (beagle puppies) were taken which belonged to MBR Acres, and that the intention was to permanently deprive MBR Acres of that property.
In Medmoune v France App no 55026/22 (ECHR, 5 February 2026), the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights considered the extent of a Member State’s obligation under Art. 2 ECHR (the right to life) when deciding to withdraw life support, in circumstances where the patient had explicitly asked for it to be continued.[1] The judgment helpfully illustrates the contentious boundary at which informed patient consent must give way to the expert opinion of medical professionals.
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