The Weekly Round Up: Abramovich ECHR Claim, Assisted Dying Bill Falls, Facial Recognition and Prisoner’s Segregation Appeal dismissed
27 April 2026
In the News
Roman Abramovich files claim in ECHR
Roman Abramovich has filed an application against the United Kingdom before the European Court of Human Rights, alleging that an investigation into his financial accounts by the Attorney General of Jersey (“the AG”) breached his Article 6 and 8 rights. The investigation that gave rise to this claim began in March 2022 and resulted in a freezing order over assets valued at approximately £5.2 billion.
This action follows Abramovich’s judicial review proceedings against the AG’s decision to commence and continue the money laundering investigation, which were dismissed in the Royal Court of Jersey and Court of Appeal of Jersey in June/July 2024 and June 2025 respectively. Mr Abramovich was denied permission to appeal these decisions to the Privy Council on 17 November 2025.
Assisted Dying Bill runs out of time
On 24 April 2026, the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill ran out of time to become law. The proposed legislation could only be enacted if both Houses of Parliament agreed on its wording before the session of Parliament ended. While the House of Commons voted for the bill to progress to the House of Lords in June 2025, in the House of Lords, the bill received more than 1,200 amendments. Supporters of the bill have criticised the amount of amendments proposed, and the time taken to debate them, arguing that the volume of amendments intentionally frustrated the bill’s passage. Opponents have responded by stating that the bill required sufficient scrutiny to ensure vulnerable people are protected.
As the bill was proposed by a backbench MP, it cannot be carried over to the next session, and any renewed attempt to pass the bill will have to begin the parliamentary approval process from scratch. Lord Falconer has stated that he may push the bill using powers under the Parliament Act, “which, in certain circumstances, allows legislation passed by the House of Commons to become law without the consent of the House of Lords.
In the Courts
Facial Recognition challenge dismissed
The High Court has dismissed a challenge to the Metropolitan Police’s adoption of live facial recognition technology (“LFR”) in London. The case is R (Thompson and Carlo) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2026] EWHC 915 (Admin).
The first claimant was detained in London after having been wrongfully identified as a person on a police watchlist ([17]). The second claimant is the director of a civil liberties organisation, Big Brother Watch ([18]). The claimants argued that the Met Police’s LFR policy violated Article 8, 10 and 11 ECHR, on the basis that it conferred overly broad discretion to individual police officers and therefore did not have the quality of being “in accordance with the law” (IAWL) ([6]-[9]).
The Court held that breadth of discretion alone does not render a measure unlawful; rather, the question is whether sufficient safeguards exist to prevent arbitrary decision-making ([60]). In this case, the LFR policy included the following constraints. LFR could only be used in three circumstances: to support policing of “hotspots” ([94]), for “protective security operations” ([103]), and to locate people based on specific intelligence ([106]). Moreover, LFR had to be used in a manner connected with a person on a watchlist ([109]), and those who authorise LFR were required to consider the proportionality of usage with Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 ECHR ([120]).
The claimants alleged that these policies were insufficient to prevent arbitrariness because, inter alia, the criteria for defining “hotspots” were subjective ([194]), and there was no restriction on the police using LFR even where there was no connection between the person sought and the location of deployment ([215]). On the former, the Court found that the criteria for hotspot designation reflected “evidence-based judgments” capturing specialist and corporate knowledge of the defendant ([197]). With regard to the latter, the Court concluded there were adequate and lawful constraints on where LFR may be deployed because the location of deployment was more linked to the watchlists than the claimants suggested, and taken together, the requirements of the policy were adequate safeguards against arbitrary decision-making ([217]). Finally, the mandatory requirement of proportionality provided a further ‘overarching constraint’ ([217]).
Prisoner’s appeal of continuing segregation dismissed
The Court of Appeal has affirmed the ongoing lawfulness of a prisoner’s segregation in the Long Term High Security Estate (“LTHSE”) within the Close Supervision Centre (“CSC”) since 2010. The case is R (Thakrar) v Secretary of State for Justice [2026] EWCA Civ 503.
The appellant is serving a life sentence after being convicted in 2008 of three murders, two attempted murders, and one count of possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life ([10]). He has been held in a CSC since a violent incident in 2010 ([12]-[14]). Per Prison Rule 46, prolonged detention in the CSC regime requires monthly renewed direction by the Secretary of State for Justice ([6]).
In 2022, the appellant issued a claim for judicial review alleging, inter alia, that his ongoing segregation breached his rights under Article 3, 8 and 14 ([18]). In the court below, the judge dismissed all the claimant’s grounds except the Article 8 ground. On this ground, the respondent made a concession that, in contravention of Prison Rule 46, the renewal directions had occasionally been taken by ‘acting governors’ instead of the Secretary of State himself ([33]). The judge held that declaratory relief was just satisfaction for the breach, as it was not argued that the Secretary of State would have reached a different decision ([33]).
On appeal, the appellant argued, inter alia, that the judge’s conclusion that the CSC Management Committee (“CSCMC”) had provided the appellant with genuine reasons for his segregation, was not supported by evidence ([37]). The Appellant also alleged the Judge misdirected herself with regard to his Article 3,8 and 14 claims ([37]).
In dismissing these grounds, the Court placed weight on the fact that the CSCMC required the appellant to engage with a psychologist in order to conduct a proper risk assessment and identify a suitable future placement for him. The appellant was aware of this requirement, and understood its importance, and as such, had been provided sufficient reasons for his prolonged segregation ([62]). The Court held that the appellant’s refusal to engage with psychological assessment also justified the continuing interference with his Article 8 rights. ([96]). Finally, on Article 3, the Court affirmed that the appellant’s segregation did not come “anywhere near the minimum level of severity necessary” to breach Article 3 ([86]).
On the UKHRB
Rosalind English analyses the Court of Appeal’s decision in RTM v Bonne Terre Ltd & Hestview Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 488, in which the Court held that consent to personal data processing is assessed objectively by reference to the data subject’s outward indication, not by inquiry into their subjective state of mind or vulnerability.
