French Constitutional Council rules that measures to protect minors from social media are unconstitutional
17 August 2026
Decision No. 2026-911 DC of 14 August 2026
Act to protect minors from the risks posed by their use of social networks
Partial non-conformity
Official reference: ECLI:FR:CC:2026:2026.911.DC; Press Release here
This decision is only available in French. The petitioner deputies (members of the French Assembly) referred to the Constitutional Council Article 1 and Articles 6 – 9 of the Act to protect minors from the risks posed by their use of social networks. The contested provisions of Article 6-9 of the Act of 21 June 2004 provide that access to an online social networking service provided by an online platform is, in principle, prohibited to minors under fifteen.
They challenged the conformity of this Act with the Constitution. criticising these provisions for instituting a general ban on access to social networks for all minors below a certain age threshold, without distinguishing between the services concerned, in particular according to their nature, their functionalities, the risks they generate, or the safeguards that could be put in place. In their view, such a ban would not be necessary, appropriate, and proportionate to the objective pursued, given that other, less restrictive measures could protect minors. They argued that these provisions therefore disregard minors’ freedom of expression and communication and are, moreover, tainted by negative incompetence (the legislature’s failure to exercise the full extent of its own jurisdiction). They further maintained that, through this ban, the legislature deprived holders of parental authority of the ability to assess whether it was appropriate for their child to access certain services, in violation of the protection of the best interests of the child.
In addition, the petitioning deputies noted that such a ban would necessarily entail the introduction of technical processes to verify the identity of social network users in order to confirm their age. They criticised the absence of any legislative provision governing the processing of this sensitive data and specifying who is responsible for it and the technical arrangements for such verification. In doing so, they argued, the legislature failed to exercise the full extent of its jurisdiction and deprived the right to respect for private life, as well as freedom of expression and communication, of legal safeguards.
Finally, the petitioners submitted that the scope of these provisions is too imprecise, since the legislature failed to define the scope of the penalties applicable in the event of a breach of the ban and failed to determine whether the ancillary social functionalities (“fonctionalités sociales accessoires) of certain platforms were also covered. They considered that this resulted in a failure to meet the constitutional objective of accessibility and intelligibility of the law.
They relied, inter alia, on Article 11 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which proclaims: “The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man: every citizen may therefore speak, write, and print freely, subject to accountability for abuse of that freedom in cases determined by law.” Given the current state of means of communication and the widespread development of online public communication services, as well as the importance these services have taken on for participation in democratic life and the expression of ideas and opinions, this right implies the freedom to access these services and to express oneself on them.
Article 34 of the Constitution provides: “Statutes shall determine the rules concerning … civic rights and the fundamental guarantees granted to citizens for the exercise of public freedoms.” On this basis, the legislature may enact rules concerning the exercise of the right to free communication and the freedom to speak, write, and print.
In adopting these provisions, the legislature sought to protect the youngest minors from the risks that certain functionalities of online social networking services pose to them, particularly in terms of addiction, isolation, and exposure to pornography, harassment, or fraud. In doing so, it intended to implement the constitutional requirement to protect the best interests of the child and pursued the constitutional objective of preventing infringements of public order. Such objectives are capable of justifying the legislature limiting minors’ freedom of access to these services.
While the ban does not apply to online encyclopedias, educational or scientific directories, or platforms for developing and sharing free/open-source software or open-source educational digital projects, the exceptions provided for by the contested provisions remain limited. In particular, these exemptions do not cover collaborative platforms for sharing leisure, information, or mutual-aid content, online communication applications, or online games with strong collaborative and social functionalities, nor online social networks that, while not themselves educational in nature, are created in connection with educational activities.
Thus, the ban established is liable to apply to online communication services whose risks to the health and safety of minors—arising in particular from their content or their mode of operation—have not been established. In the second place, under the contested provisions, all minors under the age of fifteen are deprived of free access to online social networking services.
Therefore neither the contested provisions nor any other provision set out the conditions under which holders of parental authority or the minor’s legal representative, duly informed of the potential risks and safeguards presented by the services concerned, may—in the interest of the child, in the exercise of the duties incumbent upon them under the law—decide to lift the ban, limit its scope, or authorise access to certain services.
Consequently, the legislature could not, without disregarding freedom of expression and communication, establish a ban of general scope having the effect of depriving minors of their freedom to access numerous online communication services, without regard either to the individual minor’s situation or to the risks specific to those services.
Under these conditions, the contested provisions infringe this freedom in a manner that is not appropriate, necessary, and proportionate to the objective pursued.
Furthermore, the freedom proclaimed by Article 2 of the 1789 Declaration implies the right to respect for private life. By prohibiting access by any minor under fifteen to certain online services, the contested provisions inherently require that any person, even an adult, prove their age before accessing them.
The Constitutional Council upheld the challenge to Article 1 of the contested legislation.
Note: legislative measures may only be referred to the Constitutional Council by members of the National Assembly, as in this case, or by the President, the Prime Mininster, the President of the Senate, and 60 deputies, acting together, and 60 senators, acting together. The latter two groups are how opposition parties typically bring challenges, since they don’t hold the top institutional offices. Ordinary citizens, companies, or NGOs cannot directly refer a bill to the Council the way the 60-signature groups can.
An ordinary litigant in an ongoing court case in France can argue that a law already in force violates their constitutional rights. That case gets filtered up through the Conseil d’État or Cour de cassation before it can reach the Constitutional Council — so it’s indirect, and it’s a citizen challenging an existing law rather than a pre-promulgation referral of a newly passed one.
