The Weekly Round Up: airlines criticised for ‘one in, one out’ scheme, UN report on Gaza and the West Bank, DPA anonymity, vulnerable witnesses, and restraining verbal abuse in proceedings
23 February 2026
In the news
Rights groups criticise airlines for removals under ‘one in, one out’ scheme
The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants and 27 other human rights organisations have written letters to four airlines criticising them for providing removal flights under the UK and France’s ‘one in, one out’ pilot scheme.
Under the scheme, which became effective in August 2025, asylum-seekers arriving in the UK from France in small boats can be detained and removed to France for readmission. The UK has a reciprocal obligation to maintain a voluntary application route for qualifying individuals to be transferred legally from France to the UK.
The letters call on the airlines – Air France and three private charter companies – to cease participation in the scheme or face boycotts. They refer to correspondence published earlier in February, in which UN mandate-holders said that the scheme ‘may result in serious violations of international human rights law’ and urged the UK and French governments to end it.
UN publishes human rights report on Gaza and the West Bank
A report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that there are ‘serious concerns of ethnic cleansing’ in Gaza and the West Bank and has questioned Israel’s compliance with the Genocide Convention. The report was published last week in advance of the Human Rights Council’s 61st session which begins today, 23 February.
The report accuses the Israeli military of conduct indicating recurrent violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, during the reporting period of 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025. These violations are described as occurring ‘amid a pervasive climate of impunity’.
In the courts
Open justice and deferred prosecution agreements
The High Court has held that the principle of open justice applies when determining whether individuals should be identified by name in connection with deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs). The case is Simms-Davies v Southwark Crown Court [2026] EWHC 337 (Admin).
The claimant was a director of two companies which entered into DPAs with the Serious Fraud Office for offences relating to bribery. The DPAs were granted court approval in a reasoned judgment pursuant to Schedule 17 para 8 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. At this time the claimant was involved in connected criminal proceedings in an individual capacity. The judgment was therefore barred from publication, and the claimant was not named. When those proceedings later concluded with the claimant’s acquittal, the DPA judgment was published and identified him by name.
Sitting in the High Court, Lewis LJ dismissed the claim for judicial review, which was argued on the basis that the judge should not have published the claimant’s name absent some necessity to do so. The court’s reasoning was that the process of approving a DPA fell within the scope of the ‘administration of justice’ and therefore the principle of open justice applied ([41]). This was not changed by the fact that the claimant was not a party to the DPA and was not involved in the pre-approval hearing ([45]).
The correct flow of analysis is that the court will include the names of individuals in a judgment approving a DPA unless it is shown to be necessary not to do so in order to protect the individuals’ rights – most obviously under Article 8 ECHR but equally under any applicable common law right ([42]).
Vulnerable appellants and witnesses in the First-tier Tribunal
The Court of Appeal has revisited the legal significance of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 on vulnerability in the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (FTT). The court has previously said that this guidance is ‘to be followed’ and that non-compliance will ‘most likely be a material error of law’: AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD (Lord Chancellor intervening) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 at [30] per Ryder LJ. It has now been clarified that the guidance does not create legal obligations. The case is Khan v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 148.
The appellant was a national of Bangladesh who challenged the respondent’s decision to refuse him leave to remain in the UK. On appeal from the Upper Tribunal (UT), he was permitted to advance the sole ground that the FTT had erred in law by failing to comply with the 2010 guidance when hearing his original challenge. It does not appear to have been disputed that the appellant was vulnerable in the relevant sense.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that non-compliance with the guidance was in itself sufficient to make the decision of the FTT wrong in law. Lewis LJ (with Yip and May LJJ concurring) rejected this submission. The guidance does not impose ‘free-standing’ legal obligations on tribunals and the fact of a breach does not necessarily mean that a tribunal’s decision is legally flawed. That will depend on whether, in the circumstances, there has been sufficient compliance with the underlying principle of procedural fairness ([37], [48]).
In this case, there was no evidence to suggest any actual procedural unfairness. There was no proper basis for concluding that the appellant’s vulnerability had, or might have, affected the decision-making process in any way ([49]-[52]).
Restraining verbal abuse of lawyers in proceedings
In a wide-ranging judgment, the Court of Appeal has confirmed the existence of a jurisdiction to make an order to restrain verbal abuse directed at a party’s legal team, despite holding that it would ultimately have been inappropriate to grant the order in the present case (see [79] et seq.). The case is Titan Wealth Holdings Ltd & Ors v Okunola [2026] EWCA Civ 138.
The appellants were companies within the Titan Wealth Group and two employees of the group. The defendant was a former employee who had launched a campaign of abuse against various individuals connected with Titan. The appeal arose from the decision of Hill J that there was no jurisdictional basis for her to grant Titan’s application for an injunction requiring the defendant, as a litigant-in-person (LIP), to stop verbally abusing its lawyers.
The Court of Appeal decided that the judge was wrong in this conclusion. Albeit qualified by human rights law and the immunity for statements made in the course of litigation, the court has an inherent discretionary power at common law to issue orders against parties to litigation to protect the integrity of its processes and proceedings in the interests of justice ([40]). This jurisdiction is not limited to dealing with conduct amounting to a criminal contempt of court ([27]).
The court held that it would be necessary to consider Article 10 ECHR and section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 where the verbal conduct complained of fell short of contempt. A careful and detailed examination of the conduct would be required, especially with regard to ‘mixed’ statements ([52]). If the conduct came to no more than mere ‘vulgar abuse’, it would certainly fall within the derogation under Article 10(2) and also be outside the scope of the immunity ([51]-[52], [62]).
On the UK Human Rights Blog
Rosalind English highlights the EU’s adoption of new measures to prevent the destruction of unsold apparel, clothing accessories and footwear, putting downward pressure on overproduction by fast fashion brands.
