The (inadvertent) perils of a strictly formal equality: Re Mediahuis and others’ applications for judicial review [2024] NIKB 45
4 September 2024
Introduction
The road to hell, so the saying goes, is paved with good intentions. While not quite as dire, well-intentioned laws can nevertheless sometimes have severe consequences. In Re Mediahuis and others’ applications for judicial review [2024] NIKB 45, the Northern Ireland High Court declared 5 sections of one such well-intentioned law, the Justice (Sexual Offences and Trafficking Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (the 2022 Act), invalid. This is the first invalidation of devolved Northern Ireland statutory provisions since the present devolution settlement (the Northern Ireland Act 1998) was enacted 26 years ago. On one level, the judgment is fairly unremarkable – courts are empowered to declare invalid any devolved statute (or statutory provision) which is found to be outwith devolved legislative competence (in this case because of incompatibility with Article 10 of the ECHR) and have done so without raising eyebrows since the advent of devolution in the UK. On a deeper level, however, the judgment and the justification for the relevant provisions of the 2022 Act show the limits of formal equality in addressing substantive injustice.
The judgment
The 2022 Act was a partial response to a wide-ranging review into the legal and policy measures around serious sexual offences in Northern Ireland. This review, carried out by retired Court of Appeal judge Sir John Gillen (the Gillen Review) made several recommendations. Among these, the relevant recommendations for this case were (1) an extension of anonymity for complainants of sexual offences beyond their lifetimes, (2) pre-charge anonymity for suspects of sexual offences and (3) a statutory prohibition on the publication of suspects’ identities pre-charge. The 2022 Act implements (1) (by extending complainant anonymity to 25 years after the complainant dies) but goes much further in implementing (2) and (3) than recommended in the Gillen Report. In respect of (2), the 2022 Act allows suspects to remain anonymous pre-charge on almost the same terms as complainants (during their lifetimes and up to 25 years after death), meaning that if a suspect is never charged, no identifying details may be published until after 25 years following their death. The reporting restriction can be lifted by a court on the application of the police, the suspect or (if the suspect has died) the suspect’s close family, personal representative or anyone interested in reporting any prohibited matters relating to the suspect. Importantly, the press may not apply to lift the reporting restriction during the suspect’s lifetime. On (3), the 2022 Act criminalises the unauthorised publication of suspect details and prescribes a custodial sentence or a fine (or both) for the offence.
Plainly, the 2022 Act represents a significant hurdle to public interest reporting. The pre-charge anonymity is just as extensive as complainant anonymity, and may only be lifted on the application of an extremely limited cohort of people. The justification offered by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice (DoJ), to put the matter mildly, lacked much (if any) persuasiveness. The DoJ pointed to the deleterious impact of publishing or reporting on a sexual offence suspect’s details before charge, with consequences ranging from reputational damage to a threat to life (Mediahuis, para 58). But the Act does not provide a general public interest defence to the offence of unauthorised publication. Such a defence would allow a court to carefully scrutinise two competing issues – any public interest in publishing a suspect’s details pre-charge and that suspect’s rights under the ECHR – and balance them. And nor does the process to lift reporting restrictions include the press as applicants. The rationale for this was virtually non-existent, with the DoJ simply saying:
“It was considered necessary to draw a distinction between who can apply before the death of the suspect and who can apply thereafter to reflect the very different circumstances that apply in those varying circumstances.“
But the Court was not provided with the reasons why this distinction was “considered necessary”. The DoJ further claimed that broadening the cohort of people who could apply to lift the reporting restriction (journalists, for example) during a suspect’s lifetime would “run contrary to the aims of key recommendation 10 [of the Gillen Report].” The relevant recommendation (in full) is:
“There should be no change in the current law concerning publication of the identity of the accused post charge. The identity of the accused should be anonymised pre-charge and the accused should have the right to apply for a judge-alone trial in the rare circumstances where the judge considers it to be in the interests of justice.“
Plainly, the DoJ’s claim about the recommendation was unsustainable.
It is therefore unsurprising that the High Court (Mr Justice Humphreys) should have found the relevant provisions to be a disproportionate interference with Article 10 of the ECHR (the freedom of speech and expression), creating a ‘chilling effect’ on public interest journalism (Mediahuis, para 102).
To be clear, laws with categorical exclusions like the 2022 Act are not, by their categorical exclusions alone, inconsistent with the ECHR. Another devolved Northern Ireland statute – the Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) Act (Northern Ireland) 2023 (which creates areas around abortion services providers for the safety of their users and staff by fining certain conduct within these areas) emerged from the Supreme Court entirely unscathed, despite containing clear categorical exclusions of certain behaviours (in the form of a strict liability offence in respect of those behaviours). But there are important differences between the 2022 Act and the Abortion Services Act. Chief among these is that fact that the former proscribes unauthorised publication with a custodial sentence, whereas the Abortion Services Act provided for a fine. Moreover, the banned behaviours in the Abortion Services Act are spatially limited to the defined safe access zones around abortion services providers; people are free to oppose such services elsewhere, so the limitations on Article 10 rights are themselves limited. By contrast, the pre-charge publication bar in the 2022 Act applies without distinction as to geography or other factor, and continues for a quarter of a century after a suspect’s death if the suspect is not charged. The limitation on Article 10 rights is thus extreme, and could only be justified (if at all) with the clearest and most compelling reasons. In this, the DoJ ultimately failed.
The erroneous focus on formal equality
The largely unsurprising ECHR assessment of the 2022 Act by the High Court aside, it is curious that pre-charge suspect anonymity and complainant anonymity should have been placed on the same formally equal plane. This is especially the case given that formal equality between complainant anonymity and (general) suspect anonymity was categorically rejected as ‘flawed’ by Sir John Gillen (Gillen Report, para 12.90). Sir John identified a number of reasons why complainants are entitled to greater anonymity – not least to encourage their participation in the criminal justice process. In the same vein, publishing or otherwise disclosing the identity of suspects of sexual offences encourages other potential complainants to come forward in a society where the conviction rate for such offences remains, in the words of Sir John ‘troublingly’, low (by the time Sir John had published his findings, the conviction rate for sexual offences in Northern Ireland had also been falling, see Gillen Report pg. 10).
Moreover, the social stigma associated with being a survivor of sexual violence or abuse acts as a further barrier. Within his Report, Sir John recognises the myriad ways in which different groups of survivors – women of colour (para 13.76), people with disabilities (e.g. paras 13.46 and 13.55) and men (para 13.148) – experience stigma.
All of these factors combine to highlight one of the main themes underlying the Gillen Report and the implementation of its recommendations by the DoJ over the years since the Report’s publication: the need to ensure that ‘one of the worst violations of human dignity’ – sexual crime – is not compounded by the very system designed to hold its perpetrators to account. This is not to discount the experiences of those whose details are published despite not being charged, and the indignities they suffer as a result. But fundamental to this complex and highly sensitive area is the recognition that different people experience different indignities. The formal equality which characterised the invalidated provisions of the 2022 Act, however, completely failed to recognise this reality. Instead, it effectively flattened the many accounts of survivors and suspects found in the 700-odd pages of the Gillen Report into a highly simplistic equation: whatever anonymity was conferred on complainants must also (mostly) be conferred on suspects while they remain uncharged.
This flat plane of formal equality ultimately imperilled the very provisions which were intended to protect the dignity of those people who, whether voluntarily or otherwise, come into contact with the criminal justice system for sexual offences. In the aftermath of the High Court’s judgment, the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice initially indicated that she was considering an appeal, before confirming that no appeal would be pursued. The resultant situation is that the relevant provisions of the 2022 Act – sections 12-16 – are invalid, so there is no bespoke statutory pathway to ensure suspect anonymity at the pre-charge stage (the UK Supreme Court judgment in Bloomberg LP v ZXC [2022] UKSC 5 recognises an ECHR-derived reasonable expectation of privacy at the pre-charge stage).
Without impugning the good intentions of the DoJ, the Assembly and the Northern Ireland Executive, Mediahuis and others should give Ministers and Departments pause for thought. Addressing the substantive (and sometimes life-altering) injustices which are experienced as a result of or in relation to sexual crime requires much greater sensitivity than a simple formal equality.
Anurag Deb is a PhD candidate at Queen’s University Belfast and a paralegal at KRW LAW LLP.
