Delaney v. Secretary of State for Transport, Court of Appeal, 9 March 2015 – read judgment
The Court of Appeal has recently upheld the decision of Jay J here that a drug-dealer was entitled to compensation against the Government for injuries in a car accident, even though at the time he and the negligent driver both had drugs on them.
The Government was involved because the driver’s insurance was invalidated because of his cannabis use, and because the Government had not made provision for these liabilities to be picked up by either by insurers or the Motor Insurers Bureau (MIB), as it should have done under EU Law.
Mr Delaney therefore recovered state liability damages – which lawyers know as Francovich damages – from the Government.
Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board  UKSC 11, 11 March 2015 – read judgments here
James Badenoch QC of 1COR was for the mother in this case. He played no part in the writing of this post.
An important new decision from a 7-Justice Supreme Court on informed consent in medical cases.
In the mid-1980s a majority of the House of Lords in Sidaway decided that it was on the whole a matter for doctors to decide how much to tell patients about the risks of treatment, and that therefore you could not sue your doctor in negligence for failing to inform you of a risk if other reasonable doctors would not have informed you of the risk. Thus the principle that the standard of medical care is to be determined by medical evidence (which all lawyers will know as the Bolam principle) was extended to the quality of information to be provided to a patient about a given treatment.
The Supreme Court, reversing the judgments at first instance and on appeal, has now unequivocally said that Sidaway should not be followed.
The Queen (on the application of Newhaven Port and Properties Limited) v East Sussex County Council and Newhaven Town Council  SC 7 25 February 2015- read judgment
Late February is not necessarily the best time of year for a bit of UK sea swimming. But the Supreme Court has just come out with interesting judgments about whether there is a right to go to the beach and swim from it. For reasons I shall explain, they were anxious not to decide the point, but there are some strong hints, particularly in the judgment of Lord Carnwath as to what the right answer is, though some hesitation as to how to arrive at that answer.
It arose in a most curious setting – East Sussex’s desire to register West Beach, Newhaven as a village green under the Commons Act 2006. But a beach cannot be a village green, you may say. But it is, said the Court of Appeal (see Rosalind English’s post here), and the Supreme Court did not hear argument on that point.
Now to the background for the present decision.
JX MX (by her mother and litigation friend AX MX) v. Dartford & Gravesham NHS Trust  EWCA Civ 96, 17 February 2015 – read judgment
Elizabeth Anne Gumbel QC and Henry Whitcomb of 1COR (instructed by Mark Bowman of Fieldfisher) all appeared pro bono for the successful appellant in this case. They have played no part in the writing of this post.
For some years there has been debate between the judges about whether anonymity orders should be made when very seriously injured people’s claims are settled and the court is asked to approve the settlement. This welcome decision of the Court of Appeal means that anonymity orders will normally be made in cases involving protected parties.
This is why the CA reached its decision.
A fascinating riff has been playing around the London Review of Books since Stephen Sedley (erstwhile Sedley LJ) reviewed a biography of the 18th century judge Lord Mansfield – here - part £, but the excellent letters of response are open access.
Mansfield is perhaps best known by commercial lawyers for injecting into the hitherto archaic English commercial law some element of rationality. But he also ended up trying cases involving the ownership of slaves, and had therefore to decide how ownership fitted in with things like habeas corpus.
But first a bit of historical background about our man, and some indications of the differing times in which he lived – much of it thanks to Sedley’s review.
Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill: reference by Counsel General for Wales  UKSC 3, 9 February 2015 – read judgment here
Sounds like a rather abstruse case, but the Supreme Court has had some important things to say about how the courts should approach an argument that Article 1 of Protocol 1 to ECHR (the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions) is breached by a legislative decision. The clash is always between public benefit and private impairment, and this is a good example.
The Welsh Bill in issue seeks to fix those responsible for compensating asbestos victims (say, employers) with a liability to pay the costs incurred by the Welsh NHS in treating those victims. It also places the liability to make such payments on the insurers of those employers.
In short, the Supreme Court found the Bill to be in breach of A1P1, as well as lying outside the legislative competence of the Welsh Assembly. Let’s see how they got there, and compare the conclusion with the failed A1P1 challenge brought in the AXA case (see  UKSC 46, and my post here) concerning Scottish legislative changes about respiratory disease.
Sebry v Companies House and The Registrar of Companies  EWHC 115 (QB) – read judgment
Paul Rees QC and Neil Sheldon of 1 Crown Office Row represented Companies House in this case. Neither has had anything to do with the writing of this post.
Cases about whether someone owes a duty of care in tort can be surprisingly difficult to decide. Kate Beattie has just posted on the Michael case here, where no duty was held to arise, despite (it appears) the police control room being told by the doomed Ms Michael that her ex-boyfriend had just told her that he was just about to “fucking kill you”. He was as good as his word, within 20 minutes, and the family now sues the police. How much more direct can you be than that? And yet the family lost 5-2 in the Supreme Court.
The facts of the present case are much less graphic. A muddle in Companies House meant that Mr Sebry’s long-established company (Taylor and Sons Limited) was marked on the official Registry as being in liquidation, whereas the true insolvent company was Taylor and Son Limited – just one Son. Companies House corrected the error quickly, but key creditors and suppliers had heard about the false information, and withdrew credit – such that within 2 months Mr Sebry’s company had gone into administration.