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In Episode 209, Jim Duffy is joined by fellow 1COR barristers Alasdair Henderson and Paula Kelly to examine recent judicial attempts to grapple with questions of gender in the workplace. How do the UK courts and tribunals distinguish legitimate and protected expressions of belief from harassment and transphobia?
The Divisional Court (Lady Justice Laing and Mrs Justice Heather Williams) confirmed in R (Castellucii) v The Gender Recognition Panel and the Minister for Women and Equalities [2024] EWHC 54 (Admin) that the Gender Recognition Panel has no power under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 to issue a Gender Recognition Certificate that records an applicant’s gender as ‘non-binary’. It also held that this did not breach any of the Claimant’s rights under Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
The Claimant is referred to as ‘them’ and ‘their’ in the judgment and the Court also refers to ‘male’ and ‘female’ as gender rather than sex for the purposes of the GRA. Both are adopted in this note.
In For Women Scotland Limited v The Scottish Ministers [2023] CSIH 37 (“For Women Scotland 2”), the Inner House of the Court of Session has confirmed (for Scotland, at least) the relationship between the Gender Recognition Act 2004(“GRA”) and Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”). In summary, it was held that the meaning of sex in s.11 EqA incorporated the GRA framework. The upshot is that, for transgender people, sex under the EqA is determined by possession of a GRC. Thus, for EqA purposes, the sex of a transgender person without a GRC is their natal sex. On the other hand, the sex of a transgender person with a GRC is their “acquired” (to use the language of the GRA) gender.
This case note briefly sets out some of the relevant law, explores the background to the case and the judgment, and then offers some brief comments by way of conclusion. References in square brackets are to paragraphs of the judgment.
We do not usually cover first-instance employment tribunal judgments on this blog, but two cases handed down in the last three weeks – Forstater v. CGD Europe and Bailey v. Stonewall Equality Ltd and Garden Court Chambers – have attracted so much attention that we feel an exception must be made. Both cases involved women with ‘gender critical’ beliefs who faced hostility in their workplaces after expressing them. Both succeeded in their claims of direct discrimination and victimisation on grounds of belief under the Equality Act 2010. Although neither of the cases sets a binding precedent for other courts or tribunals, they contain interesting legal analysis and comment about the importance of freedom of expression and freedom of belief in the context of work which is of wider significance.
The Appellant in R (on the application of Elan-Cane) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2021] UKSC 56 was assigned female at birth, however during and after puberty they felt revulsion at their body and underwent surgery in 1989 and 1990 to alleviate those feelings. The Appellant who identifies as non-gendered, is a campaigner for the legal and social recognition of this category. The provision of “X passports” are a focal point of the Appellant’s campaign.
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