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Put simply, intended parents should avoid embarking on a surrogacy arrangement where they do not meet, have any knowledge of or means of contacting the surrogate who carries their much wanted child. (Mrs Justice Theis DBE)
This case concerned an application by intended parents for a parental order in respect of an 18-month-old child following a surrogacy arrangement with a surrogate in Nigeria whom neither of the intended parents had met and about whom they had no information.
In Tickle & Anor v The BBC & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 4, the Court of Appeal considered the High Court’s decision to anonymise the names of several judges who had made decisions in historic care proceedings and private family law proceedings (“the historic proceedings”).
The historic proceedings related to Sara Sharif, who was murdered by her father and stepmother in August 2023. On 18 August 2023, the Local Authority made an application for a wardship in respect of Sara Sharif’s five siblings. On 8 September 2023, the journalists requested disclosure of documents relating to the historic proceedings.
Mr Justice Williams made the following order, which was appealed by the claimant journalists:
… no person may publish any information arising from the disclosure of the documents from these proceedings to the public, or a section of it, which includes: …
g. The name of any third parties referred to in the historic proceedings for the avoidance of doubt including social worker, guardian other named professionals and experts instructed in the proceedings and any Judge who heard the historic proceedings (save for Mr Justice Williams). …
including not repeating such information by reference to the disclosed documents even if it is already in the public domain
[emphasis added]
Notably, when Mr Justice Williams pronounced the Order in court, no party had asked for the names of the three circuit judges who had been involved in the historic proceedings (“the historic judges”) to be anonymised. The judge had heard no submissions on the point. He had not mentioned to the parties that he had in mind to make the order he did [5].
The grounds of appeal were as follows:
i) It was a serious procedural irregularity for the judge not to have given reasons before anonymising the historic judges.
ii) The judge adopted an unfair, biased and inappropriate approach to the journalists and the media generally (including relying on his own erroneous analysis of alleged media irresponsibility), thereby unacceptably encroaching on their rights under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This ground was added by amendment and permission has not yet been granted to allow it to be pursued.
iii) The judge ought to have held that the demands of open justice meant that anonymity for a judge could not be justified within the framework of balancing article 8 and article 10 of the ECHR.
iv) The part of the Order anonymising the historic judges could not be justified in the absence of any specific application or evidential foundation, and was inimical to the proper administration of justice.
The Judgment
The Court of Appeal considered that there were three main issues to determine:
i) Whether the court had jurisdiction to prohibit the publication of the names of judges, and if so how and in what circumstances.
ii) Whether the part of the Order anonymising the historic judges was irregular for lack of submissions, evidence or reasons.
iii) Whether the judge’s comments in his judgment demonstrated inappropriate bias against or unfairness towards the media.
The Court of Appeal considered that the statutory limitations contained in section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 and section 97 of the Children Act 1989 do not displace the open justice principle or create any separate “shielded justice” environment. They provide a degree of privacy for certain proceedings relating to children according to their terms [45]. Further, section 12 of the Administration of Justice 1960 makes clear that its provisions do not apply to judges hearing the case: “Court orders always name the judge, so, in that way, section 12 of the AJA 1960 expressly excludes anonymity for the judge” [51].
The Court of Appeal notably stated that:
In accepting office, all judges will or should be aware that that is the expectation, because public scrutiny of judges and the justice process is essential to the rule of law [55].
Issue 1: Was there jurisdiction to prohibit the publication of the names of judges?
The Court of Appeal considered whether Mr Justice Williams had jurisdiction to order the anonymity of the historic judges. In resolving this question, the Court of Appeal considered that, notionally, the names of the historic judges had been in the public domain as (a) the name of the judges appeared on public documents and on each of the orders that they made and (b) the names of the judges would have appeared in the public listings as sitting on the days in question at the courts in question.
The Court of Appeal considered the relevant rights under Articles 2, 3, and 8, which apply as much to judges as to any other person. However, there was no evidential basis on which the threshold for the application of Articles 2, 3, or 8 had been reached [64]. There was no need to undertake any balancing exercise between Articles 8 and 10 as there was no evidence about the risks to the historic judges [69].
The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no jurisdictional foundation for making the anonymity order.
The following comment from the Court of Appeal (at [66] will have wider application beyond the facts of this case:
The authorities that I have cited demonstrate that judges are in a special position as regards open justice. The integrity of the justice system depends on the judge sitting in public and being named, even if they sit in private. The justice system cannot otherwise be fully transparent and open to appropriate scrutiny.
Issue 2: Was there irregularity for lack of submissions, evidence or reasons?
The appeal was allowed on this ground, on the basis that the Mr Justice Williams ought to have asked for submissions and evidence prior to making his decision.
In the absence of specific evidence about risks or threats to the ECHR rights of the historic judges, Mr Justice Williams ought not to have taken any steps to anonymise the names of the historic judges.
Issue 3: Was there inappropriate bias against or unfairness towards the media?
The Court of Appeal noted Mr Justice Williams’s language when discussing media reporting as well as his decision to adjourn the journalists’ application for permission to appeal being akin to dismissing the application.
The appeal was also allowed on this ground.
Comment
This decision will have wider application beyond the facts of this case, and beyond family law. The Court of Appeal reiterated the necessity for open justice, and confirmed that transparency requires judges to be named, even if they sit in private.
The Court of Appeal did caveat the decision by clarifying that judges are not obliged to tolerate any form of abuse or threats. The requirements to consider in such cases are:
Evidence about the risks to the judges;
The court being satisfied that those risks could not be adequately addressed by other security measures;
The court concluding that the risks were so grave that they provided a justification for overriding the fundamental principle of open justice.
The historic judges were given 7 days before their names are published, to allow HMCTS to put in place measures to protect them.
Anogika Souresh is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row, Brighton
The road to hell, so the saying goes, is paved with good intentions. While not quite as dire, well-intentioned laws can nevertheless sometimes have severe consequences. In Re Mediahuis and others’ applications for judicial review [2024] NIKB 45, the Northern Ireland High Court declared 5 sections of one such well-intentioned law, the Justice (Sexual Offences and Trafficking Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (the 2022 Act), invalid. This is the first invalidation of devolved Northern Ireland statutory provisions since the present devolution settlement (the Northern Ireland Act 1998) was enacted 26 years ago. On one level, the judgment is fairly unremarkable – courts are empowered to declare invalid any devolved statute (or statutory provision) which is found to be outwith devolved legislative competence (in this case because of incompatibility with Article 10 of the ECHR) and have done so without raising eyebrows since the advent of devolution in the UK. On a deeper level, however, the judgment and the justification for the relevant provisions of the 2022 Act show the limits of formal equality in addressing substantive injustice.
The judgment
The 2022 Act was a partial response to a wide-ranging review into the legal and policy measures around serious sexual offences in Northern Ireland. This review, carried out by retired Court of Appeal judge Sir John Gillen (the Gillen Review) made several recommendations. Among these, the relevant recommendations for this case were (1) an extension of anonymity for complainants of sexual offences beyond their lifetimes, (2) pre-charge anonymity for suspects of sexual offences and (3) a statutory prohibition on the publication of suspects’ identities pre-charge. The 2022 Act implements (1) (by extending complainant anonymity to 25 years after the complainant dies) but goes much further in implementing (2) and (3) than recommended in the Gillen Report. In respect of (2), the 2022 Act allows suspects to remain anonymous pre-charge on almost the same terms as complainants (during their lifetimes and up to 25 years after death), meaning that if a suspect is never charged, no identifying details may be published until after 25 years following their death. The reporting restriction can be lifted by a court on the application of the police, the suspect or (if the suspect has died) the suspect’s close family, personal representative or anyone interested in reporting any prohibited matters relating to the suspect. Importantly, the press may not apply to lift the reporting restriction during the suspect’s lifetime. On (3), the 2022 Act criminalises the unauthorised publication of suspect details and prescribes a custodial sentence or a fine (or both) for the offence.
Plainly, the 2022 Act represents a significant hurdle to public interest reporting. The pre-charge anonymity is just as extensive as complainant anonymity, and may only be lifted on the application of an extremely limited cohort of people. The justification offered by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice (DoJ), to put the matter mildly, lacked much (if any) persuasiveness. The DoJ pointed to the deleterious impact of publishing or reporting on a sexual offence suspect’s details before charge, with consequences ranging from reputational damage to a threat to life (Mediahuis, para 58). But the Act does not provide a general public interest defence to the offence of unauthorised publication. Such a defence would allow a court to carefully scrutinise two competing issues – any public interest in publishing a suspect’s details pre-charge and that suspect’s rights under the ECHR – and balance them. And nor does the process to lift reporting restrictions include the press as applicants. The rationale for this was virtually non-existent, with the DoJ simply saying:
“It was considered necessary to draw a distinction between who can apply before the death of the suspect and who can apply thereafter to reflect the very different circumstances that apply in those varying circumstances.“
But the Court was not provided with the reasons why this distinction was “considered necessary”. The DoJ further claimed that broadening the cohort of people who could apply to lift the reporting restriction (journalists, for example) during a suspect’s lifetime would “run contrary to the aims of key recommendation 10 [of the Gillen Report].” The relevant recommendation (in full) is:
“There should be no change in the current law concerning publication of the identity of the accused post charge. The identity of the accused should be anonymised pre-charge and the accused should have the right to apply for a judge-alone trial in the rare circumstances where the judge considers it to be in the interests of justice.“
Plainly, the DoJ’s claim about the recommendation was unsustainable.
It is therefore unsurprising that the High Court (Mr Justice Humphreys) should have found the relevant provisions to be a disproportionate interference with Article 10 of the ECHR (the freedom of speech and expression), creating a ‘chilling effect’ on public interest journalism (Mediahuis, para 102).
To be clear, laws with categorical exclusions like the 2022 Act are not, by their categorical exclusions alone, inconsistent with the ECHR. Another devolved Northern Ireland statute – the Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) Act (Northern Ireland) 2023 (which creates areas around abortion services providers for the safety of their users and staff by fining certain conduct within these areas) emerged from the Supreme Court entirely unscathed, despite containing clear categorical exclusions of certain behaviours (in the form of a strict liability offence in respect of those behaviours). But there are important differences between the 2022 Act and the Abortion Services Act. Chief among these is that fact that the former proscribes unauthorised publication with a custodial sentence, whereas the Abortion Services Act provided for a fine. Moreover, the banned behaviours in the Abortion Services Act are spatially limited to the defined safe access zones around abortion services providers; people are free to oppose such services elsewhere, so the limitations on Article 10 rights are themselves limited. By contrast, the pre-charge publication bar in the 2022 Act applies without distinction as to geography or other factor, and continues for a quarter of a century after a suspect’s death if the suspect is not charged. The limitation on Article 10 rights is thus extreme, and could only be justified (if at all) with the clearest and most compelling reasons. In this, the DoJ ultimately failed.
The erroneous focus on formal equality
The largely unsurprising ECHR assessment of the 2022 Act by the High Court aside, it is curious that pre-charge suspect anonymity and complainant anonymity should have been placed on the same formally equal plane. This is especially the case given that formal equality between complainant anonymity and (general) suspect anonymity was categorically rejected as ‘flawed’ by Sir John Gillen (Gillen Report, para 12.90). Sir John identified a number of reasons why complainants are entitled to greater anonymity – not least to encourage their participation in the criminal justice process. In the same vein, publishing or otherwise disclosing the identity of suspects of sexual offences encourages other potential complainants to come forward in a society where the conviction rate for such offences remains, in the words of Sir John ‘troublingly’, low (by the time Sir John had published his findings, the conviction rate for sexual offences in Northern Ireland had also been falling, see Gillen Report pg. 10).
Moreover, the social stigma associated with being a survivor of sexual violence or abuse acts as a further barrier. Within his Report, Sir John recognises the myriad ways in which different groups of survivors – women of colour (para 13.76), people with disabilities (e.g. paras 13.46 and 13.55) and men (para 13.148) – experience stigma.
All of these factors combine to highlight one of the main themes underlying the Gillen Report and the implementation of its recommendations by the DoJ over the years since the Report’s publication: the need to ensure that ‘one of the worst violations of human dignity’ – sexual crime – is not compounded by the very system designed to hold its perpetrators to account. This is not to discount the experiences of those whose details are published despite not being charged, and the indignities they suffer as a result. But fundamental to this complex and highly sensitive area is the recognition that different people experience different indignities. The formal equality which characterised the invalidated provisions of the 2022 Act, however, completely failed to recognise this reality. Instead, it effectively flattened the many accounts of survivors and suspects found in the 700-odd pages of the Gillen Report into a highly simplistic equation: whatever anonymity was conferred on complainants must also (mostly) be conferred on suspects while they remain uncharged.
This flat plane of formal equality ultimately imperilled the very provisions which were intended to protect the dignity of those people who, whether voluntarily or otherwise, come into contact with the criminal justice system for sexual offences. In the aftermath of the High Court’s judgment, the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice initially indicated that she was considering an appeal, before confirming that no appeal would be pursued. The resultant situation is that the relevant provisions of the 2022 Act – sections 12-16 – are invalid, so there is no bespoke statutory pathway to ensure suspect anonymity at the pre-charge stage (the UK Supreme Court judgment in Bloomberg LP v ZXC [2022] UKSC 5 recognises an ECHR-derived reasonable expectation of privacy at the pre-charge stage).
Without impugning the good intentions of the DoJ, the Assembly and the Northern Ireland Executive, Mediahuisand others should give Ministers and Departments pause for thought. Addressing the substantive (and sometimes life-altering) injustices which are experienced as a result of or in relation to sexual crime requires much greater sensitivity than a simple formal equality.
Anurag Deb is a PhD candidate at Queen’s University Belfast and a paralegal at KRW LAW LLP.
Is anonymity incompatible with the public interest?
In the politically-charged and at times feverish aftermath of the Brexit referendum, Gina Miller became a “magnet for hatred” for exercising her right of access to courts and winning two landmark public law cases against the UK Government. The magnitude and ferocity of abuse directed at Gina Miller made those who followed in her footsteps wary enough to seek anonymity. In Yalland and others v Brexit Secretary, 4 claimants were granted anonymity in relation to a judicial review claim concerning UK participation in the European Economic Area Agreement.
Anonymity in Northern Ireland is not uncommon where some part of a claimant’s deeply personal life or history play a role in the determination of their claim. JR80 for example involved a claimant who had suffered egregious institutional abuse as a child, while JR123 involved a claimant with ancient convictions which disproportionately impacted his life.
In JR181(3)’s application for judicial review, however, anonymity was ordered to continue in the face of a politically-charged atmosphere reminiscent of the worst of the Brexit era.
In February 1993, two-year-old James Bulger was abducted, tortured and then murdered by two 10-year-olds, Jon Venables (JV) and Robert Thompson. As Sir Andrew McFarlane P says in the opening words ofVenables & Anor v News Group Papers Ltd & Ors [2019] EWHC 494 (Fam) (4 March 2019): ‘The family of young James Bulger were and are deserving of the greatest sympathy as the indirect victims of this most horrific crime.’ It was James’s father and his uncle who brought the question of publicity – or not – for JV back to court.
Their application was to vary a ‘confidentiality’ injunction. The application was made on the basis – said the applicants – that JV’s name and image are now freely available should any member of the public undertake an Internet search. Details of his identity, and locations with which he has been connected in the past, have therefore become ‘common knowledge’.
Brett Wilson LLP v Person(s) Unknown, Responsible for the Operation of the Website solicitorsfromhell.co.uk, 7 September (Warby J) [2015] EWHC 2628 (QB) – read judgment
This was a claim in libel by a firm of solicitors who acted for another firm which also claimed against the operators of SFHUK, causing the original site to be shut down (Law Society v Rick Kordowski [2011]). In this case the words complained of appeared on a new site, but despite efforts by the present claimants, it was not possible to find out who was operating it. The site alleged various aspects of mismanagement, including incompetence and fraud. It also quoted a client of the claimant firm who alleged overcharging and who refused to pay their fees. (It is worth noting that the site appears to have been taken down since default judgement was given in this case)
DL v SL [2015] EWHC 2621 (Fam) 27 July 2015 (Mostyn J) – read judgment
This was a simple, if contentious, divorce case in which the judge took the opportunity to make a point about balancing the principle of open judgment – allowing media coverage of cases – against the privacy of the parties involved. Whilst he was ready to acknowledge that publicity ensures not only the probity of the judge but the veracity of the witnesses, and that such publicity served promote understanding and debate about the legal process, in some cases privacy should trump the rights of the press.
There are many cases which are heard publicly, or privately with the media in attendance, but where, by a process of anonymisation, the privacy of the parties, and of their personal and other affairs, is sought to be preserved. This compromise, or balance, between open justice and the privacy of the individual has arisen for two reasons. First, the increased recognition that is given to the interests of children who are caught up in the dispute between the adult parties. And secondly, the rise of the idea that privacy is an independently enforceable right. Continue reading →
JX MX (by her mother and litigation friend AX MX) v. Dartford & Gravesham NHS Trust [2015] EWCA Civ 96, 17 February 2015 – read judgment
Elizabeth Anne Gumbel QC and Henry Whitcomb of 1COR (instructed by Mark Bowman of Fieldfisher) all appeared pro bono for the successful appellant in this case. They have played no part in the writing of this post.
For some years there has been debate between the judges about whether anonymity orders should be made when very seriously injured people’s claims are settled and the court is asked to approve the settlement. This welcome decision of the Court of Appeal means that anonymity orders will normally be made in cases involving protected parties.
Keynote speech by Lord Neuberger at 5 RB Conference on the Internet, 30 September 2014
The President of the Supreme Court has delivered a very interesting address on the protections that should be afforded to what might be termed the “new Fourth Estate” – journalism on the internet. The following summary does not do justice to his speech but is meant to act as a taster – download the full text of his talk here.
Lord Neuberger explores the interrelationship of privacy and freedom of expression, particularly in the light of developments in IT, and especially the internet. He recalls a colourful eighteenth century figure who contributed a series of letters to a widely disseminated journal under the pseudonym of “Junius”. He managed to make such effective attacks on public figures he brought about the resignation of the Prime Minister, the Duke of Grafton, in 1770. Because of his anonymity this character was able to make criticisms of the powerful for which others of his time faced prosecution.
Junius offered a voice of firm if sometimes scurrilous criticism, prompting both political and legal change. He is rightly remembered as one of the greatest political writers in an age dominated by great figures, yet his identity [still] remains a mystery.
And it is this lack of traceability that links Junius with today’s bloggers. Print journalists are – with the exception of writers for The Economist – known figures. But forty percent of the world’s population use the internet, and despite initial expectations that bloggers and tweeters could hide behind pseudonyms, it has turned out to be extremely difficult for internet writers to maintain their anonymity. The public and the courts increasingly recognise the press’ interest in publishing the names of individuals in appropriate circumstances. Continue reading →
A (Respondent) v British Broadcasting Corporation (Appellant) (Scotland)[2014] UKSC 25 – read judgment
This appeal related to whether the Scottish Courts took the correct approach to prohibit the publication of a name or other matter in connection with court proceedings under section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and whether the court’s discretion was properly exercised in this case. The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal by the BBC.
The following report is based on the Supreme Court’s Press Summary. References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment.
Background
A, a foreign national, arrived in the UK in 1991. He was later granted indefinite leave to remain, but in 1996 was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for sexual offences against a child. In 1998, he was served by the Home Secretary with a notice to make a deportation order [4]. He appealed against the decision and protracted proceedings followed in which A cited risks due to his status as a known sex offender of death or ill-treatment (contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights should he be deported. A’s identity was withheld in the proceedings from 2001 onwards [5]-[9]. Continue reading →
JXMX (A Child) v Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust [2013] EWHC 3956 (QB) – read judgment
Elizabeth-Anne Gumbel QC of 1 Crown Office Row represented the claimant in this case. She has nothing to do with the writing of this post.
In Part 1 on this subject, I discussed medical confidentiality and/or legal restrictions designed to protect the privacy of a mother and child. This case raises the question in a slightly different guise, namely whether the court should make an order that the claimant be identified by letters of the alphabet, and whether there should be other derogations from open justice in the guise of an anonymity order, in a claim for personal injuries by a child or protected party which comes before the court for the approval of a settlement. Continue reading →
Fagan, R (on the application of) v Times Newspapers Ltd and others [2013] EWCA Civ 1275 – read judgment
Only “clear and cogent evidence” that it was strictly necessary to keep an offender’s identity confidential would lead a court to derogate from the principle of open justice. The possibility of a media campaign that might affect the offender’s resettlement could not work as a justification for banning reporting about that offender, even though a prominent and inaccurate report about him had already led to harassment of his family.
This was an appeal by a serving prisoner, SF, against the dismissal of his application for anonymity and reporting restrictions in judicial review proceedings. Continue reading →
The permanent damage that internet publications can inflict is very much the focus of Tugendhat J’s assessment of damages in this case, encapsulated in the memorable description he quoted in an earlier judgment:
what is to be found on the internet may become like a tattoo.
Since the advent of internet search engines, information which in the past would have been forgotten (even if it had been received front page coverage) will today remain easily accessible indefinitely. So a libel claimant who has a judgment in his favour nevertheless risks having his name associated with the false allegations for an indefinite period.
This is just what had happened in the present case. The second defendant’s liability for libel had already been established. This hearing was to assess the appropriate level of damages for allegations he had published on the internet, in breach of restraining orders against him, suggesting the claimant was guilty of misappropriation of family funds and paedophilia. Continue reading →
X v Facebook Ireland Ltd [2012] NIQB 96 (30 November 2012) – read judgment
This fascinating case comes to light in the midst of general astonishment at the minimal attention paid in the Leveson Report to the “wild west” of the internet and the question of social media regulation.
This short judgement demonstrates that a careful step by step judicial approach – with the cooperation of the defendant of course – may be the route to a range of common law tools that protect individuals from the internet’s incursions in a way which no rigidly formulated statute is capable of doing. As the judge observed mildly,
The law develops incrementally and, as it does so, parallels may foreseeably materialise in factually different contexts.
Background to the case
The plaintiff (XY) sought an injunction requiring Facebook to remove from its site the page entitled “Keeping Our Kids Safe from Predators”, alternatively requiring Facebook to monitor the contents of the aforementioned page in order to prevent recurrence of publication of any further material relating to the Plaintiff and to remove such content from publication forthwith. Continue reading →
This non statutory arrangement has been in place since March 2010. It allows members of the public to seek details from the police of a person who has some form of contact with children with a view to ascertaining whether that person has had convictions for sexual offences against children or whether there is other “relevant information” about them which ought to be made available. This request could come from any third party such as a grandparent, neighbour or friend. The aim of the scheme is described thus:
This is to ensure any safeguarding concerns are thoroughly investigated. A third party making an application would not necessarily receive disclosure as a more appropriate person to receive disclosure may be a parent, guardian or carer. In the event that the subject has convictions for sexual offences against children, poses a risk of causing harm to the child concerned and disclosure is necessary to protect the child, there is a presumption that this information will be disclosed.
Anya Proops’ post on the Panopticon blog sets out a clear summary and analysis of the ruling by the President of the Queen’s Bench Division and Hickinbottom J. Here are a few more details about the judgment. Continue reading →
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