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In the matter of an application by ‘JR17’ for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2010] UKSC 27
The Supreme Court found that there was no breach of a pupil’s right to education, where he was unlawfully suspended from school but was provided with work to do and home tutoring – read judgment
A pupil was suspended from school after a complaint from a female pupil about the pupil’s alleged misconduct in school. His school fell within the area of the North Eastern Education and Library Board. The Board had prepared a Scheme governing the suspension and expulsion of pupils. It had done so pursuant to the requirement of the Education and Libraries (NI) Order 1986. The principal purported to suspend the pupil in accordance with the Scheme but in fact failed to comply with its requirements. The pupil brought proceedings for judicial review, claiming that the suspension was unlawful and breached his right to education pursuant to Article 2 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights, which the Human Rights Act 1998 protects. The Article provides:
No person shall be denied the right to education…
The Court of Appeal made a finding that, although the Scheme had not been complied with, the principal had lawfully exercised a common law power to suspend the appellant.The Supreme Court found that there was no such common law power but that the pupil’s right to education had not been breached by the suspension. During his suspension, work was provided to the boy to do at home and home tuition was arranged.
The Queen on the Application of MK(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
CA (Civ Div) (Sedley LJ, Carnwath LJ, Smith LJ) 25/2/2010 [2010] EWCA Civ 115
Directive 2004/83, which recognised the right to asylum as part of EU, did not alter the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights that asylum decisions did not constitute determinations of civil rights under Article 6 of the Convention, and consequently a foreign national had no right under Convention law to claim for damages for the delay in processing his asylum application.
This is the second of two posts by David Gollancz, a barrister at Keating Chambers and donor-conceived adult, about the UK system of birth registration and certification. The first post concerned the treatment of transgender parents. This second post deals with the position of the offspring of gamete donation.
In two recent claims by trans parents, JK and TT/McConnell, the court determined that the law requiring trans people to be registered as parents in their native gender interfered with their Article 8 ECHR rights to respect for their private and family life, but that the interference was justified under Article 8(2). A significant, possibly decisive, reason for the court’s decision was the right of the children concerned to identify their biological ascendants. – described by the judge in JK [109] as “an important element of his or her fundamental identity”.
This is nothing new. The ECtHR has repeatedly emphasised that Article 8 includes the right to establish identity and, accordingly, the right to know the identity of one’s biological ascendants (Mikulić [53], Jäggi [37 – 38], Godelli [52]). The domestic court, in Rose [45] held (on the preliminary issue of whether Article 8 ECHR was engaged) that
Respect for private and family life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings. This includes their origins and the opportunity to understand them.
But where a person is conceived in a UK licensed fertility clinic (a “clinic”) — like Mr McConnell’s son — their birth registration does not record, and their birth certificate does not disclose, the fact that they are donor-conceived, let alone the identity of their donor parent. Their donor’s identity is recorded by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”) (s31 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990). Since 1 April 2005, under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 2004 (the “disclosure regulations”), a person aged 18 or over can require the HFEA to disclose whether they are donor-conceived and the identity of their donor (if the donor provided the relevant information after 31 March 2005). But that right is unlikely to be exercised unless someone tells them the truth, or it is obvious because their legal parents are of the same sex.
Tchenguiz & Ors v Imerman [2010] EWCA Civ 908 (29 July 2010) – Read judgment
The Court of Appeal has ruled that secretly obtained documents can no longer copied and then used in divorce proceedings, overturning a rule dating back almost twenty years. The case will have a significant impact for divorcing couples, but has the court left itself open to a Supreme Court reversal on human rights grounds?
The appeal related to the divorce proceedings between Vivian and Elizabeth Imerman, in which Mrs Imerman’s brothers brothers had downloaded documents from Mr Imerman’s office computer in order to prove that he had more assets than he had disclosed to the court. Mr Justice Moylan ruled in the High Court that seven files of documents should be handed back to Mr Imerman for the purpose of enabling him to remove any material for which he claimed privilege. Mr Imerman appealed against the decision that he would then have to give the documents back, and Mrs Imerman argued that she should be given more control over the privilege process.
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that Swiss guidelines for doctors prescribing lethal drugs were too unclear and therefore breached article 8 ECHR, the right to private and family life. Ms Gross sought a prescription for a lethal drug to end her own life. She has no critical illness, but is elderly and feels that her quality of life is so low that she would like to commit suicide. The Swiss medical authorities refused to provide her with the prescription.
Assisted dying and the right to die have been firmly back in the spotlight this week, with the cases of Lamb and “Martin” going to the English and Wales Court of Appeal. Mr Lamb is taking up the point made by Tony Nicklinson in the High Court, before his death, that doctors should have a defence of necessity to murder charges in cases of assisted suicide. Mr Nicklinson’s widow, Jane, is continuing his fight too. The cases also challenge the current guidelines on when prosecution should be brought for assisting suicide. You can read more about the background to the right to die caselaw here.
Smith v Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust and another [2016] EWHC 2208 (QB) – read judgment
Under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 those who live together but are not married are not entitled to damages for bereavement. The High Court has found that though this did not directly engage the right to family life and privacy under Article 8, the difference in treatment between cohabitees and those who were married or in a civil partnership could not be justified and consideration should be given to reforming the law.
The issues before the Court
The claimant had cohabited with a man for over two years before he had died as a result of the first and second defendants’ negligence. She had made a dependency claim under s.1 of the 1976 Act, which by a 1982 amendment had been extended to people who had been cohabiting for more than two years, but the bereavement damages provisions in s.1A(2)(a) still applies only to spouses and civil partners. Continue reading →
Governers of X School v R(on the Application of G) (Claimant) & Y City Council and Secretary of State for Children and Schools and Families (Interveners) & Equality and Human Rights Commission (Interested Party)
Where an individual had a civil right being determined in one set of proceedings for the purposes of Article 6, he would be able to claim protection under that provision in any other proceeding involving him if the outcome of that other would have a substantial effect on the determination of that civil right.
SUMMARY
The claimant had been employed as a teaching assistant at the appellant school. As a result of alleged incident of a sexual nature with a pupil, disciplinary procedures were instigated against him which culminated in the hearing before the committee. He was told that in these hearings employees could be represented by a colleague or a trade union representative but that any other form of legal representation would not be permitted.
Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom – read judgment
The Strasbourg Court has today come up with something of a mixed message in relation to religion at work. They have voted that there is a right to manifest individual faith by wearing religious adornments but not by objecting to practices that are protected by anti-discrimination legislation.
All four applicants are practising Christians. Ms Eweida, a British Airways employee, and Ms Chaplin, a geriatrics nurse, complained that their employers placed restrictions on their visibly wearing Christian crosses around their necks while at work. Ms Ladele, a Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages, and Mr McFarlane, a Relate counsellor complained about their dismissal for refusing to carry out certain of their duties which they considered would condone homosexuality. Further details of all these cases can be found in our posts here, here, and here (as well as in the “related posts” section below).
R(on the application of Christopher Wilford) v The Financial Services Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 677 – Read judgment
This Court of Appeal judgment further reduces the scope for judicial review of a Decision Notice issued by the Financial Services Authority (“the FSA”, now the Financial Conduct Authority). Indeed it comes close to excluding judicial review of these Notices. This is because there is a statutory mechanism for challenging Decision Notices. This case sheds light on the very limited role of judicial review where there is such a statutory right.
The FSA regulates the financial services industry. Its Regulatory Decisions Committee (“the RDC”) decides whether or not a regulated person has breached the relevant rules and issues Decision Notices.
The Queen on the Application of Medical Justice v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1710 – read judgment
People who make unsuccessful claims to enter or remain in the United Kingdom cannot be removed without being given sufficient time for a lawyer to prepare a proper challenge to their claim. The government has failed in its appeal against the Administrative Court’s finding that government policy unlawfully provided for expedited removal procedures in certain pressing circumstances – for example where there was a risk that the person concerned, if given advanced notification of his removal, might attempt to frustrate those measures of removal. The policy was quashed because it interfered with people’s right of access to a lawyer.
The Home Secretary is responsible for granting or refusing leave to remain in the United Kingdom for those who do not have the right of abode in this country in accordance with the Immigration Rules. It is an important aspect of maintaining immigration control that a credible enforcement process is in force and that those with no right to remain in the United Kingdom are removed from the jurisdiction while not infringing the accepted rights of those about to be removed. Continue reading →
Poshteh v Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea S [2017] UKSC 36, 10 May 2017 – read judgment
For the last 15 years, whether the right of the homeless to suitable council accommodation is an Art.6(1) ECHR civil right has been argued over in the courts. And the question arose again in today’s judgment of the Supreme Court.
Ms Poshteh had been imprisoned and tortured in Iran, and asked her local council in London to house her as she was homeless in the UK. She then rejected the offer of a flat because she said its windows reminded her of those in her Iranian prison cell. This rejection was held fatal to her housing claim, as we shall see.
To understand the Art.6 point, we need to have a quick look at the council’s housing duties for the homeless.
Al Jedda V Secretary Of State For Defence[2010] EWCA Civ 758 – Read judgment
The Court of Appeal has found that there was no breach of the “essence” of a right guaranteed under the Iraqi Constitution to have a prisoner’s detention reviewed by a judicial authority when the reviewing authorities were not judges, but had the necessary judicial qualities.
Mr Al Jedda was detained in Iraq in 2004 by British forces on security grounds. He was suspected of being a member of a terrorist group said to be involved in weapons smuggling and explosive attacks in Iraq. He remained in detention until 30 December 2007 in Iraq but was at no time charged with any offence.
The case has had an interesting route through the courts which is worth summarising briefly. Continue reading →
The Divisional Court has recently handed down a novel decision in R (FNM) v DPP, considering the right of complainants to a fair opportunity to make representations to the Director for Public Prosecutions (“DPP”), and for those representations to be considered, when conducting a review under the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme (“the VRR Scheme”).
The Court held that in circumstances where the DPP had not waited to give the complaint an opportunity to make representations as to whether there should be a criminal prosecution, the decision not to prosecute was materially flawed.
On 22 September 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee found that the Australian Government had violated the human rights of various Torres Strait islanders through climate change inaction.
The rights in issue arose under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of 1966, and in particular the right to life (Article 6), the right to be free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home (Article 17), the rights of the child (Article 24), and the right of indigenous minorities to enjoy their culture – all of which rights should be respected and ensured to all individuals (Article 2).
The debate over the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is already mired with misunderstanding (see this and this), but amazingly Saturday’s Times (£) managed to up the stupid-quotient by another few notches.
The headline was “Ministers to block ‘right to marry’ in EU backlash“. Apparently the Government has “vowed to block a fresh push to introduce new EU human rights, such as the right to marry and the right to collective bargaining, into Britain“. And as the Times’ political editor Francis Elliot (not to be confused with the generally sound legal correspondent Frances Gibb) reported:
The charter enshrines a host of rights not found in other declarations, including personal, work and family relations. One of them is a proposed “right to marry and found a family”.
The only problem is that… the right to “marry and found a family” already exists in the European Convention on Human Rights. It’s in Article 12. It has been there since the UK signed up to the ECHR in 1953. Here it is:
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In the matter of an application by ‘JR17’ for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2010] UKSC 27 
The Queen on the Application of MK(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
GROSS v. SWITZERLAND – 67810/10 – Chamber Judgment [2013] ECHR 429 – 
Governers of X School v R(on the Application of G) (Claimant) & Y City Council and Secretary of State for Children and Schools and Families (Interveners) & Equality and Human Rights Commission (Interested Party) 
R(on the application of Christopher Wilford) v The Financial Services Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 677 – 
The debate over the European Union’s 
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