Search Results for: right to die

Refusal of sex on demand in marriage still considered “fault” in French divorce

27 January 2025 by Rosalind English

It may come as a surprise that there still exists a country or countries in the enlightened West which do not regard sexual intercourse without consent within marriage as rape – or at least sexual assault. After a long campaign in this country, the courts of England and Wales finally capitulated in October 1991, recognising marital rape as a crime in the landmark case of R v R [1991] UKHL 12. In his judgement, Lord Lane confirmed: “The idea that a wife consents in advance [i.e. by being married] to her husband having sexual intercourse with her whatever her state of health or however proper her objections, is no longer acceptable.”

This was a long cry from the position that had held before, best expressed by Justice Henry Hawkins in 1888, that
“The intercourse which takes place between husband and wife after marriage is not by virtue of any special consent on her part but is mere submission to an obligation imposed on her by law.”

Now comes a judgement against France that shows that in some pockets of the Council of Europe, the old rule still applies, even if the criminal law has established the possibility of rape within marriage.

H.W. c. FRANCE (Requête no 13805/21)

The judgment is presently only available in French, so I give a fairly detailed summary below.

Background facts

In July 2015, the applicant sued her husband for divorce on the grounds of fault. She claimed that he had prioritised his professional career over their family life and that he had been irascible, violent and hurtful. Her husband counterclaimed that the divorce be granted on the grounds of the applicant’s exclusive fault, arguing, among other things, that she had failed in her marital duties for several years. Alternatively, he requested a divorce on the grounds of permanent breakdown of the marital relationship.
In a judgment of July 2018, the family court judge of the high court considered that none of the spouses’ claims were substantiated and that the divorce could not be granted on the grounds of fault. He granted it on the grounds of permanent breakdown of the marital relationship.
The applicant appealed this judgment. In November 2019, the Court of Appeal granted a divorce for fault, the exclusive fault of the applicant, on the grounds that she had acknowledged having ceased all intimate relations with her husband since 2004, which constituted a serious and repeated violation of the duties and obligations of marriage, making the continuation of their life together intolerable. [my italics]
The applicant’s appeal on points of law was dismissed in September 2020.

Background law

The divorce was granted pursuant to the relevant articles of the French Civil Code, which provide that a divorce may be granted for fault when facts constituting a serious or repeated breach of the duties and obligations of marriage are attributable to one of the spouses and make the continuation of the common life intolerable.
It follows from the long-standing but consistent case law of the Court of Cassation that spouses are bound by a marital duty and that its failure to perform may constitute a fault justifying divorce. Although the high court has not reaffirmed this case law since then, it has never been reversed and continues to be applied by the lower courts.
French case law does not consider every refusal to have sexual relations to be wrongful. It leaves it to the lower courts to determine whether this refusal is sufficient to characterise a serious or repeated breach of the duties and obligations of marriage justifying divorce. It also acknowledges that certain circumstances such as the age, state of health or abusive or violent nature of the spouse are such as to justify the failure to perform the marital duty. Domestic law gives trial judges the power to assess whether or not the breach of a matrimonial obligation is serious enough to justify divorce.

In this case the Strasbourg Court upheld the wife’s application, finding a breach of her right to private life under Article 8 of the Convention.

EU’s non-disclosure of UK EU Charter “opt-out” documents is a breach of the EU Charter

13 January 2013 by David Hart KC

Decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint against the European Commission, 17 December 2012 – Read decision

The UK secured what Tony Blair described as an opt-out in respect of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights as part of the negotiations leading up to the Lisbon Treaty – which contains the Charter. Rosalind English has summarised here what the Charter involves, and whether the “opt-out” really changes anything. This recent EU Ombudsman’s decision concerns the attempts of an NGO to extract certain EU Commission documents in the run-up to the Lisbon Treaty. The EU Commission was taking its usual head-in-the-sand approach to disclosure (see various posts listed below), hence the complaint to the Ombudsman. And, as we shall see, the Ombudsman gave the Commission both barrels in this highly critical decision.

Continue reading →

Standing and discretion – who acts for ospreys?

19 October 2012 by David Hart KC

Walton v. The Scottish Ministers, Supreme Court, 17 October 2012 read judgment

The outcome of this challenge to a road scheme near Aberdeen turned on abstruse points about environmental assessment – but the speeches from the Justices go right to the heart of two big questions in public law.

1. When can someone challenge an unlawful act – when do they have “standing” to do so?

2. If an unlawfulness is established, when can the courts exercise their discretion not to quash the unlawful act, particularly where the unlawfulness arises under EU law?

In the course of the standing issue Lord Hope talks about ospreys – hence my title, but a bit more context first. And we shall also see the views of the Court that standing and discretion are linked questions.

Continue reading →

Article 11: Right to strike and insecure workers

22 April 2014 by Lauren Godfrey

By Lauren Godfrey 1COR

Two different bodies in the last week have reflected on issues concerning the fundamental imbalance in the employment relationship. This provides an opportunity to consider what, if any, role human rights principles have in redressing that imbalance:

(1)    The Article 11 Case of RMT -v- UK (Application No 31045/10): The European Court Human Rights (Fourth Section sitting as a Chamber) found that Article 11 (the right to freedom of association) was not infringed by the restrictions imposed on trade unions calling on their members to take strike action by the UK Government as part of the statutory scheme which provides for lawful strikes; that is strikes that attract statutory immunity from common law liability. According to the ECtHR, these restrictions on lawful striking were within the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the UK Government. The RMT’s case was that the restrictions impermissibly restricted their ability to protect and promote the interests of their members working in industries and for employers with complex corporate structures.

(2)    Zero Hour Contracts Consultation: The Government’s consultation on zero hours contract which appears to have been somewhat upstaged by the Parliament’s Scottish Affairs Committee publishing an interim report on zero-hours contracts which while recommending some changes, ultimately concludes that ‘in the majority of cases’ zero-hours contracts should not be used at all. The interim report contends that the lack of job security for workers engaged on zero hours contracts places a practical impediment to the majority of the workers surveyed from enforcing other basic rights including the minimum wage, part-time worker protections, and protection for those with caring responsibilities: see summary here.  
Continue reading →

Article 11: Right to strike and insecure workers – Lauren Godfrey

17 April 2014 by Lauren Godfrey

Two different bodies in the last week have reflected on issues concerning the fundamental imbalance in the employment relationship. This provides an opportunity to reflect on what, if any, role human rights principles have in redressing that imbalance:

(1)    The Article 11 Case of RMT -v- UK (Application No 31045/10): The European Court Human Rights (Fourth Section sitting as a Chamber) found that Article 11 (the right to freedom of association) was not infringed by the restrictions imposed on trade unions calling on their members to take strike action by the UK Government as part of the statutory scheme which provides for lawful strikes; that is strikes that attract statutory immunity from common law liability. According to the ECHR, these restrictions on lawful striking were within the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the UK Government. The RMT’s case was that the restrictions impermissibly restricted their ability to protect and promote the interests of their members working in industries and for employers with complex corporate structures.

(2)    Zero Hour Contracts Consultation: The Government’s consultation on zero hours contract which appears to have been somewhat upstaged by the Parliament’s Scottish Affairs Committee publishing an interim report on zero-hours contracts which while recommending some changes, ultimately concludes that ‘in the majority of cases’ zero-hours contracts should not be used at all. The interim report contends that the lack of job security for workers engaged on zero hours contracts places a practical impediment to the majority of the workers surveyed from enforcing other basic rights including the minimum wage, part-time worker protections, and protection for those with caring responsibilities: see summary here.
Continue reading →

The cat paradox

5 October 2011 by Rosalind English

Schrödinger would be rolling in his grave. The nation is abuzz with talk of a cat. A cat that is simultaneously there or not there. The speakers at yesterday’s seminar at Inner Temple hall on Strasbourg and the UK: Dialogue or Conflict, felt it incumbent to start each of their talks with a Cat Joke. But behind all this mirth about a supposedly “ridiculous” Article 8 decision, lie three serious points, some of which were touched on during the seminar though perhaps not with the detail they deserved.

First, it is not the cat that has toxified the debate about Article 8 and the vexed question of deportation. The right to respect under Article 8 is not only to family ties – however absurdly extended – but to private life itself.  Article 8 also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s social identity, (Niemietz v Germany (1992)). Therefore if a court wants to prevent the what it perceives as the unjust deportation of the individual before it, it has a much wider constellation of interests to turn to than the family circle, whether or not that involves companion animals. Some might even take the view that attachment to such an animal may evince a more genuine emotional tie than many that have been advanced to claim the protection of Article 8.
Continue reading →

Lost renewables subsidies successfully claimed as human rights damages

13 February 2013 by David Hart KC

Ofgem (Gas & Electricity Markets Authority) v. Infinis) [2013] EWCA  Civ 70, Court of Appeal 13 Feburary 2013 read judgment, on appeal from decision of Lindblom J Read judgment and my previous post

This decision upholding an award of damages for a claim under Article 1 Protocol 1 (right to possessions) may seem rather straightforward to a non-lawyer. Infinis lost out on some subsidies because the regulator misunderstood a complex legal document.  It could not claim those subsidies any more, so it claimed and got damages from the regulator. But the relatively novel thing is that English law does not generally allow claims for damage caused by unlawful action by the state. And yet the Court of Appeal found it easy to dismiss the regulator’s appeal on this point.

Continue reading →

Court of Appeal rules on police duty to suspects in detention – Diarmuid Laffan

27 February 2015 by Guest Contributor

Zenati v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and another [2015] EWCA Civ 80 – read judgment

Matthew Donmall appeared for the Crown Prosecution Service in this case. He had nothing to do with the writing of this post.

In a recent judgment, the Court of Appeal held that where a criminal suspect is remanded in custody, Article 5 of the Convention requires the police to notify the court as soon as possible if there is no longer a reasonable basis for suspecting them. It also held that the police and CPS must aid the court in observing its duty to show ‘special diligence’ in managing a suspect’s detention, by investigating the case conscientiously and by promptly bringing relevant material to the court’s attention.
Continue reading →

Children Act 1989 and a child’s rights thirty years later

6 November 2019 by Guest Contributor

Child rights in 2019

The Children Act 1989 (CA 1989) received Royal Assent on 23 November 1989 (30 years ago); and it was in force from October 1991. It was a major reform of children law which required everyone – parents, children (when of ‘understanding’), judges, social workers, health professionals and lawyers – to learn a new set of legal concepts and attitudes. But what about children’s rights? And what has happened to the law’s regard for those rights since 1989?

The Act required courts to consider a child’s ‘wishes and feelings’ when that child’s welfare was in issue in a court. In parallel with this, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 Art 12.1 – though not formally part of the Act – says:

States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

Court of Justice of the EU allows prohibition of religious symbols in the workplace

22 October 2021 by Tehreem Sultan

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) sparked controversy with its recent judgment passed down in IX v Wabe eV and MH Müller Handels GmbH v MJ. This case required the CJEU to again consider the right to freedom of religion. It ruled that employers can ban workers from observing religious symbols, including headscarves, to maintain a neutral image in front of its customers.

Case Background

This ruling was brought by two Muslim women in Germany who were suspended from their jobs because of wearing a headscarf. IX and MJ, were employed in companies governed by German law as a special needs caregiver and a sales assistant respectively. They both wore the Islamic headscarf at their workplaces. The employers held the view that wearing a headscarf for religious purposes did not correspond to the policy of political, philosophical, and religious neutrality pursued with regard to parents, children, and third parties, and asked the women to remove their headscarf and suspended them from their duties on their refusal to do so. MJ’s employer, MH Müller Handels GmbH, particularly instructed her to “attend her workplace without conspicuous, large-sized signs of any political, philosophical or religious beliefs.”

IX and MJ brought actions before the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg (Hamburg Labour Court, Germany) and the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court, Germany), respectively. The courts referred the questions to the CJEU concerning the interpretation of Directive 2000/78. This directive establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.

Twitter, trans rights and the role of the police — an extended look

21 February 2020 by Alice Irving

The case of R (Miller) v The College of Policing & The Chief Constable of Humberside [2020] EWHC 225 (Admin) is yet another decision arising out of an individual’s use of Twitter to share transphobic, or as they see it “gender critical”, views.

But it would be too narrow to characterise the case as being about trans rights only. At its core, it concerns the role of the police in responding to reports of hate incidents which do not amount to criminal behaviour. As such, the findings of Julian Knowles J have implications that extend beyond trans rights, impacting on how police should respond to reports of racism, antisemitism, Islamophobia, and other forms of discrimination that fall short of criminality. Clearly, the case raises extremely important questions. The Claimant already has permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal and a leapfrog certificate, allowing him to go directly to the Supreme Court to ask for permission to appeal there.

EU employment rights law trumps diplomatic immunity – what next?

15 October 2013 by Rosalind English

Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan (Jurisdictional Points: State Immunity) [2013] UKEAT 0401_12_0410 4 October 2013 – read judgment

These appeals, heard at the same time, raise the question whether someone employed in the UK by a foreign diplomatic mission as a member of its domestic staff may bring a claim to assert employment rights against the country whose mission it is, despite being met by an assertion of State Immunity under the State Immunity Act 1978. The EAT regarded itself bound by the supremacy of EU law to disapply the SIA, despite the fact that it had no jurisdiction to do so under the 1998 Human Rights Act.

This is the first time that the full force of the rights contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms has made itself felt in a domestic dispute between private parties (although the embassies themselves are state institutions, as an employment dispute the matter is one of private law only). If upheld on appeal, this ruling will have consequences that extend far beyond the somewhat esoteric area of the immunity of diplomatic missions, and will make the effect of the Human Rights Act look puny by comparison (as pointed out by Joshua Rozenberg  in his post on this case).
Continue reading →

The right of appeal against refusal of a residence card: the latest developments

24 October 2018 by Jonathan Metzer

As discussed previously on the Blog, the rights of the family members of EEA nationals to reside in the UK is currently in a state of flux. One important issue concerns the appeal rights of an “extended family member” of an EEA national.

At the moment, if a “family member” of an EEA national resident in the UK, that is, a spouse, direct descendant (including a stepchild) who is dependent or under 21, or a dependent in the direct ascending line, applies for a residence card under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 and is refused by the Home Office, they have a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal in the normal way.

However, if an “extended family member”, that is, a non-married partner or other dependent relative (e.g. grown-up child) of the EEA national applies for a residence card, but is refused, regulation 2 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 operates to preclude a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. Therefore, only judicial review is available to challenge such a decision.

In my last article, we saw that one such “extended family member”, Ms Rozanne Banger (I am reliably informed that her surname is pronounced “Banjer” with a soft “g”), fought a case at the Upper Tribunal in part concerning the issue of whether the denial of a right of appeal to a person in her position was compatible with EU law, specifically Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38 (known as the “Citizens Directive”). The Upper Tribunal decided that it needed to ask the Court of Justice of the European Union to clarify the matter.

But on 12th July 2018, the Court of Justice gave its decision.

Continue reading →

States Not Obliged to Assist Persons Wishing to Commit Suicide – Antoine Buyse

23 January 2011 by Guest Contributor

Last week, the European Court of Human Rights decided in the case of Haas v. Switzerland (judgment in French only) that the right to private life is not violated when a state refuses to help a person who wishes to commit suicide by enabling that person to obtain a lethal substance.

The applicant in the case, Ernst Haas, had for two decades been suffering from a serious bipolar affective disorder (more commonly known as manic depression). During that time he attempted to commit suicide twice. Later, he tried to obtain a medical prescription for a small amount of sodium pentobarbital, which would have allowed him to end his life without ain or suffering. Not a single psychiatrist, of the around 170 (sic!) he approached, was willing to give him such a prescription. This would have been necessary, under Swiss law, which allowed for assisted suicide if it was not done for selfish motives (in the opposite case, the person assisting could be prosecuted under the criminal code).

Continue reading →

Supreme Court rules on challenge to abortion ban in Northern Ireland

11 June 2018 by Jake Richards

In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 27

On 7th June 2018, the Supreme Court handed down judgment in the case of regarding the controversial issue of the legal framework regulating abortion in Northern Ireland.

The judgment could not have come at a more heated moment in the debate between pro-choice and pro-life campaigners in Northern Ireland. Only two days earlier, MPs at Westminster debated potential decriminalisation of abortion in Northern Ireland through repeal of sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Considering the recent result in the Irish referendum on abortion, where the abortion ban was overturned by a clear majority, the issue of abortion is prominent in our political conversation.

In a lengthy judgment, the court dismissed the appeal by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC), on the basis that, in the view of the 4-3 majority, it did not have standing to bring the proceedings.

Nevertheless, the justices went on to express the views that they would have come to in the event that the NIHRC had been found to have standing, with a differently constituted 4-3 majority considering that the general prohibition on abortion was incompatible with the right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR.

The Background

The Offences Against the Persons Act and the Criminal Justice Act (NI 1945) criminalise abortion in Northern Ireland. In conjunction, these Acts (of the UK and Northern Irish legislatures respectively) imposes an obligation upon a pregnant woman that, unless there is a risk to her life or of serious long-term or permanent injury to her physical or mental health, she must carry the pregnancy to term.

These proceedings were brought by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (“NIHRC”) challenging the compatibility of the law in the following respect:

The prohibition of abortion in cases of

• Serious malformation of the foetus;
• Pregnancy as a result of rape; and/or
• Pregnancy as a result of incest

was argued to be incompatible with

• Article 3 (the prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment);
• Article 8 (the right of everyone to respect for their private and family life); and/or
• Article 14 (the prohibition of discrimination)

In the High Court, it was held that the law was incompatible with Article 8 insofar as it criminalised abortion in the the following circumscribed cases:

• Fatal foetal abnormality
• Rape up to the date when the foetus is capable of being born alive
• Incest up to the date when the foetus is capable of being born alive

The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, however, concluded that the general prohibition on abortion gave rise to no incompatibility with any of the articles of the ECHR.

The NIHRC appealed to the Supreme Court in London.

Continue reading →