Search Results for: puberty blockers consent

Challenge to the registration of a private gender healthcare clinic fails- Court of Appeal

19 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

Alice Grant

In Evans v Care Quality Commission [2025] EWCA Civ 1556, the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Lewis) refused to grant permission to appeal against the High Court’s dismissal of a judicial review challenging two decisions by the Care Quality Commission (“CQC”). The Appellants, Ms Evans and a mother who wished to remain anonymous, contested (1) the CQC’s January 2024 decision to register Gender Plus Healthcare Ltd (“GPH”) pursuant to section 12 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (“the 2008 Act”), and (2) the December 2024 review of GPH’s services under section 46 of the same Act.

The case has attracted substantial public interest, engaging broader debates over the regulation of cross-sex hormone treatment for minors. The  widely-reported Cass Review, led by the British paediatrician Hilary Cass, together with concerns over the prevalence of ideological influences in this medical field, were raised. 

Background

In the High Court, acknowledging the “strongly held views about this treatment”, Mrs Justice Eady observed (R (OAO Evans and another) v Care Quality Commission [2025] EWHC 2015 (Admin) at [2]): 

“The hormone treatment in issue involves the prescription of masculinising or feminising hormones (oestrogen; testosterone), introducing irreversible changes to the patient’s body. There are strongly held views about this treatment and an expert panel is due to report to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care on its use for those under 18. At present, however, the treatment provided by [GPH] to 16 and 17 year olds is permitted by law, and the issue I am required to determine is not whether that is correct, but whether specific decisions made by the CQC are irrational and/or unlawful.”

Despite agreeing with the Claimants (at [97]), who contended a higher standard of review applies to the irrationality challenge in this case since “hormone treatment is often sought by vulnerable and emotionally distressed individuals” and “can have significant, irreversible, long-term physical and psychological consequences,” the claim was dismissed at first instance. 

Browser Generated Information: “loss of control” entitles search engine users to compensation

4 October 2019 by Rosalind English

Richard Lloyd v. Google LLC [2019] EWCA Civ 1599

The Court of Appeal has ruled that a claimant can recover damages for loss of control of their data under section 13 of Data Protection Act 1998 without proving pecuniary loss or distress. The first instance judge, Warby J, had dismissed Mr Lloyd’s application for permission to serve Google outside the jurisdiction in the USA, so preventing the claim getting under way.

The following paragraphs are based on the Court of Appeal’s own summary of the judgment.

The central question was whether the claimant, Mr Richard Lloyd, who is a champion of consumer protection, should be permitted to bring a representative action against Google LLC, the defendant, a corporation based in Delaware in the USA. Mr Lloyd made the claim on behalf of a class of more than 4 million Apple iPhone users. He alleged that Google secretly tracked some of their internet activity, for commercial purposes, between 9th August 2011 and 15th February 2012.

Germany HIV popstar conviction: what would happen in the UK?

26 August 2010 by Adam Wagner

Updated, 1 Sep | The high-profile criminal trial of a German popstar who caused her former partner to be infected with HIV has resulted in a 2-year suspended sentence. In other words, she has been convicted but escaped jail. What would happen in similar circumstances in the UK?

The facts of Nadja Benaissa’s case were relatively simple. She had been infected with HIV since the age of 16 and is 28 years old now. She had sex with three people without telling them she was infected, and as a result one of them became infected himself. She claimed that she did not intend to infect him, and that she had been told by doctors the risk of passing on the disease were “practically zero”.

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The Weekly Round-Up: are immigrants and asylum seekers getting their day in court?

19 April 2021 by Calla Randall

In the news:

The rights of immigrants and asylum seekers have been at the forefront of the news this week, with the Home Secretary coming under fire both in the courts and in the political arena. On Wednesday, a landmark court ruling held Ms Patel accountable for failures properly to investigate deaths among asylum seekers at detention centres. The case concerned two Nigerian nationals, one of whom was found dead in Harmondsworth immigration centre in 2019. His friend, Mr Lawal, was a key witness in the investigation of the death, but the Home Office sought to deport him before he could give evidence. The court held that the Home Secretary’s initial policy, which sought to remove Mr Lawal, its replacement, applied from August 2020, and the current policy, were unlawful and breached human rights because they failed to ensure that those who had relevant information would be able to give evidence before removal proceedings were commenced, thus frustrating inquiries into immigration centre deaths. Days later it was reported that this may be a widespread problem, with suggestions that scores of people had been prevented from giving key evidence to police investigations as a result of early deportation. While Ms Patel was warned that this practice must be curbed by a coroner in August, it is suggested that her response did little to address the problem.

Cheshire West revisited: deprivation of liberty and children

22 November 2024 by Esme Cairns

Introduction

Freemen of the dangerous nonsense

15 November 2011 by Adam Wagner

Updated x 2 | Today, guardian.co.uk’s Comment is Free (CIF) was “taken over” by the Occupy London movement. This has led to two particularly worrying articles being published. Both purport to offer legal advice which, if followed, could lead you straight to prison.

For that reason, Guardian CIF goes straight to the legal naughty step, where it can share a tent with the Occupy London movement. I understand that the Guardian’s online legal editors had nothing to do with the commissioning of the articles, and I also realise that “comment is free“. But there has to be a limit, and there is a huge difference between a controversial but plausible point of view and quackery. As C. P. Scott’s phrase continues “… comment is free but facts are sacred“.

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Fine tuning medical diagnoses to rare genetic disorders

9 March 2013 by Rosalind English

Meiklejohn v St George’s Healthcare Trust [2013] EWHC 469 (QB) – read judgment

Richard Booth of 1 Crown Office Row acted for the claimant in this case. He is not the author of this post.

There is no doubt that medical diagnosis and therapy are struggling to keep pace with the genetic information pouring out of the laboratories and sequencing centres. And the issue of medical liability is being stretched on the rack between conventional treatment and the potential for personalised therapy. Treatment of disease often turns out to be different, depending on which gene mutation has triggered the disorder. However fine tuned the diagnosis, it may turn out to be profoundly wrong in the light of  subsequent discoveries.

This is perhaps an oversimplified characterisation of what happened in this case, but it exemplifies the difficulties facing clinicians and the courts where things go wrong, against the backdrop of this fast-moving field of scientific endeavour.
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The Round Up: Lady Hale, Gayle Newland and Ian Paterson’s Sentencing

25 July 2017 by Sarah Ewart

The Law Pod UK podcast for this roundup is available on iTunes – Episode 7

In the news…

The Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme

Disgraced surgeon Ian Paterson’s sentence has been referred to the Court of Appeal under the Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme. Paterson was jailed for 15 years in May, having been found guilty of 17 counts of wounding with intent and three of unlawful wounding. The breast surgeon was accused of negligence in performing so-called ‘cleavage-sparing mastectomies’, an unapproved procedure leaving tissue behind for cosmetic reasons and for some women leading to the return of their cancer, and furthermore, of carrying out unnecessary operations where a simple biopsy would have sufficed.

The Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme was also in the news this week when the Ministry of Justice announced that 19 terror offences would be incorporated, including encouraging terrorism and sharing terrorist propaganda. The Scheme allows anyone to refer a sentence that they feel was lenient to the Attorney-General, who has the power to refer it to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration.
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High speed rail, Parliament, and the EU Courts

22 January 2014 by David Hart KC

R (o.t.a HS2AA, Buckingham County Council and others) v. Secretary of State for Transport, [2014] UKSC 3 – read judgments

So the challenge to the way in which the Government wished to push the HS2 project through Parliament has failed before the Supreme Court, though not without clarifying the way in which key EU environmental provisions are meant to work. And we will also see a further flexing of the Court’s muscles against a too straightforward reading of the supremacy of EU law when seen against our constitutional principles.  

The objectors said the command paper which preceded the Parliamentary hybrid bill, in which the Government set out its proposals for HS2, fell within the scope of the  Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive 2001/42/EC and that an SEA ought therefore to have been carried out. The directive applies to plans or programmes which set a “framework” (Art.3(2)(a)) for future decisions whether to grant development consent for projects, and it was said that the command paper set the framework for the decision whether to grant consent for HS2.

Secondly, the objectors said that the legislative procedure in Parliament does not meet the requirements of the  Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92/EU. The EU Court of Justice has interpreted that directive as imposing a number of requirements, including that the legislature must have available to it the information required by the directive, and a requirement that national courts must be able to verify that the requirements of the directive have been satisfied, taking account of the entire legislative process, including the preparatory documents and the parliamentary debates.
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Digital Contact Tracing Updates from the Human Rights Committee

11 May 2020 by Rafe Jennings

The Human Rights Committee, reviewing NHSX’s current digital contact tracing app architecture, has recommended that the government’s current privacy assurances are not sufficient to protect data privacy and that legislation must be passed to ensure that. This echoes Professor Lilian Edwards’ call for primary legislation to ensure privacy rights are protected. These recommendations are given special significance NHSX’s choice to adopt the controversial and arguably less secure “centralised” model (an explanation of the different contact tracing models and Prof Edwards’ suggested legislation can be found here). 

The Weekly Round-Up: Freedom Day, Tokyo 2020 and the Judicial Review and Courts Bill

26 July 2021 by Byul Ryan-Im

In the news:

Monday was England’s so-called ‘Freedom Day’, with the final coronavirus restrictions lifted.  This means nightclubs can reopen; bars are no longer table service only; there are no more limits on attendee numbers at large events; and it is no longer mandatory to wear face coverings in public spaces, although the recommendation to do so remains. It also remains a legal obligation to self-isolate if contacted to do so by NHS Test and Trace, although it is not mandatory to download the NHS Covid-19 app, or to self-isolated if ‘pinged’ by it (i.e. alerted by the app to self-isolate).  NHS Test and Trace contacts people who have been named by a positive-testing person as a close contact and are legally obliged to self-isolate or face fines from £1000 for failing to comply.  By contrast, the Covid-19 app works by using Bluetooth to ‘ping’ people who may have come into close contact with a covid-positive person.  A resulting ‘pingdimic’ has led to concerns about keyworker staff shortages leading to a hospital understaffing and potential supermarket food shortages.  Frontline health workers can be exempt from self-isolation in exceptional circumstances, as can other keyworkers if their employers apply for and receive government authorisation specific to a named worker.  From August 16^th anyone who has had both vaccination doses will not need to self-isolate as a close contact.

Civil liberties organisation Liberty has expressed concerns that so-called “Freedom Day” is in fact “a moment of fear and division”.  The organisation has criticised the Government for its “divisive, coercive strategies”, among which it includes “vaccine passports and mandatory vaccinations”.  Vaccine passports in particular are condemned as “a step towards a two-tier society”.  Despite these concerns, the organisation also expresses a worry that lifting restrictions has “serious implications” for the rights of frontline workers and the clinically vulnerable”.

In other news:

On Wednesday, the government published its Judicial Review and Courts Bill following an Independent Review of Administrative Law and a government consultation.  The Bill seeks to “reform the rules around Judicial Review and facilitate a number of procedural improvements across the court system”.  One of the reforms proposed is to remove Cart Judicial Reviews, which are High Court reviews of an Upper Tribunal’s refusal to grant permission to appeal.  An “unprecedented” coalition of over 220 organisations, including Amnesty International UK, Greenpeace, Refugee Action and Stonewall, has criticised the Bill and proposed changes to the Human Rights Act.

On Friday the 2020 Summer Olympics began with an opening ceremony of dancers and acrobats performing to a near-empty stadium.  Outside, protesters clashed with Tokyo police as Japanese citizens showed their anger at the games continuing to be held amidst the fourth declaration of an official state of emergency in Japan due to the coronavirus pandemic.  In nine prefectures including Tokyo and Osaka, residents have been asked to go out for essential reasons only.  In the week the Games began Japan saw numbers of Covid-19 cases not seen since January.

On Saturday the first ever “Reclaim Pride” march took place in London, with thousands taking to the streets to demand inclusive LGBTI+ rights.  The event was organised amidst concerns that traditional Pride events (like London Pride, this year postponed to 11 September) are becoming less like protests and more like “over-commercialised parties”. 

In the Courts:

• Royal Mail Group Ltd v Efobi [2021] UKSC 33 – the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from Mr Efobi, a postman for the Respondent, Royal Mail.  The Appellant’s claim in the employment tribunal for direct or indirect racial discrimination was dismissed but the decision was overturned on appeal to the EAT.  The Court of Appeal then reversed the decision in favour of Royal Mail and Mr Efobi was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.  Efobi argued (i) that a change in the wording of equality legislation from “where … the complainant proves facts” to “if there are facts from which the court could decide” removed the burden on the claimant to prove anything at the first stage of employment discrimination cases, and (ii) that the EAT should have drawn adverse inferences from the absence of a potential witnesses for the Respondent Royal Mail.  The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that (i) the new wording simply clarifies that evidence from both parties must be considered, not only that of the claimant and (ii) tribunals are free to draw or decline to draw inferences using common sense.  Furthermore, even if adverse inferences were drawn, the recruiter’s knowledge of Mr Efobi’s race was by itself insufficient evidence of racial discrimination.
• Secretary of State for the Home Department v GA & Ors [2021] EWCA Civ 1131 –the Respondent had applied for British passports for three of her children (British citizens living in Country X) from Her Majesty’s Passport Office (HMPO), for which the Appellant is responsible.  HMPO refused the applications for lack of evidence of the consent of a person with parental responsibility under the law of Country X.  HMPO considered that person to be the children’s father alone.  It was unsafe or impossible for the mother to obtain the father’s consent, as he had been arrested following “months of extremely serious physical and psychological abuse including torture of me.”  A declaration signed by the father that he had no objection to his children travelling abroad with their mother was not accepted by HMPO as permission to grant British passports.  HMPO’s passport refusal was quashed in a judicial review claim because: (i) there was no evidence to conclude that the father had to consent under the law of Country X; (ii) HMPO failed to consider the application of Article 22 of the 1996 Hague Convention; and (iii) Article 22 did apply and HMPO was entitled to refuse to apply the law of Country X.  Article 22 allows the dis-application of an applicable law provision if it would be contrary to public policy, considering the best interests of the child.    The Court of Appeal upheld the quashing order and refused the Appellant’s argument that HMPO was not obliged to consider, and should not have considered, Article 22.  It also rejected the argument that HMPO should have asked the father alone for his consent, on the basis that the Country Profile for Country X suggested it allocates sole parental responsibility to the father.  The Country Profile was insufficient evidence to conclude in this specific case that the mother had no authority to apply for British passports.  Furthermore, upholding this law of Country X would be contrary to ECHR Articles 14 and 8, as it discriminates based on sex.  Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and permission to appeal was refused.

• The High Court has ruled in McNally v Saunders that a retired solicitor’s ‘abrasive’ and ‘frequently puerile’ blog posts are entitled to the same level of protection as mainstream journalism. Chamberlain J struck out a harassment claim brought by a local government officer as having no reasonable prospect of success and has granted summary judgment for the defendant under CPR rule 24.2. The claim was brought under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 by Dr Lisa McNally, MBC Sandwell’s director of public health and a mental health campaigner. McNally was the subject of five blog posts, criticising her decision to post a two-minute video about her own struggle with mental health and questioning her qualifications. She said the posts had caused her ‘crippling’ anxiety about attending meetings and made her worry about her ability to do her job. Given that Saunder’s posts’ were ’frequently puerile tone and style, a casual reader… might be surprised to discover that they are the work of a semi-retired former solicitor,’ the judge said. However ’none of these features disentitles them to the protections afforded by the law to journalistic expression.’ The public interest in McNally being able to continue in her role was outweighed by Saunders’ Article 10 right to free expression.

On the UKHRB:

• Gabrielle Dunn discusses the Supreme Court’s dismissal of a solitary confinement appeal
• Euan Lynch brings us part 3 of the Forstater case on freedom of speech and gender critical beliefs

Compulsory vaccination – the next step for Covid-19?

5 November 2020 by Rosalind English

Would you be first in the queue for the Covid-19 vaccine if and when it is rolled out? Or would you prefer to wait and appraise its effects on more pioneering citizens? With nearly a year of widespread media coverage of the coronavirus, it would not be surprising if a large percentage of an already fearful population exercised its right not to be subjected to what would be an assault and battery under English law: medical treatment without consent.

This is a syndrome, and it has a name. It is called “vaccine hesitancy”. The WHO describes this as “the reluctance or refusal to vaccinate despite the availability of vaccines”. Our willingness to avail ourselves of a future COVID vaccine is very much in doubt, and it is in doubt in high places.

Should a Covid-19 vaccine become available at scale, we cannot expect sufficient voluntary uptake.

Update: on Tuesday 17 November the Danish government finished considering a new law giving the government extended powers to respond to epidemics. Parts of this law that propose that:

People infected with dangerous diseases can be forcibly given medical examination, hospitalised, treated and placed in isolation.
The Danish Health Authority would be able to define groups of people who must be vaccinated in order to contain and eliminate a dangerous disease.
People who refuse the above can – in some situations – be coerced through physical detainment, with police allowed to assist. See the Danish newsletter here. In this country, Health Secretary Matt Hancock has refused to rule out mandatory inoculation, telling talkRADIO the government would ‘have to watch what happens and… make judgments accordingly’.

In July 2020 a group of philosophy and law academics presented written evidence to Parliament proposing that individuals should undergo vaccination as a

condition of release from pandemic-related restrictions on liberty, including on movement and association

The authors of the report base this proposal on two “parity arguments”:

a. If Covid-19 ‘lockdown’ measures are compatible with human rights law, then it is
arguable that compulsory vaccination is too (lockdown parity argument);
b. If compulsory medical treatment under mental health law for personal and public protection purposes is compatible with human rights law, then it is arguable that compulsory vaccination is too (mental health parity argument).

They contend that there is “an arguable case” for the compatibility of compulsory vaccination with human rights law.

Weekly Round-up: Nature’s rights bill, deprivation of liberty safeguards at the Supreme Court.

27 October 2025 by Catherine Berus

In the news

A private member’s bill to enshrine the rights of nature was introduced in the House of Lords on October 23, 2025. The bill is supported by former Green Party Leader Baroness Natalie Bennett, and drafting was led by the organization Nature’s Rights. The objective of the nature’s bill of rights is to change the legal status of nature to that of a recognized legal entity with inherent, enforceable rights. The bill would create a duty of care for the government to protect nature. The proposal includes a governance structure, monitoring, and the creation of a nature’s rights tribunal for enforcement and dispute resolution.

According to Nature’s Rights, the purpose of the bill is to establish a legal framework for a more regenerative and sustainable society while aligning with realities of climate change science. If the bill passes, the UK will join a number of other states which recognize some degree of rights for nature in their constitutions, laws or regulations, including Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, New Zealand, Uganda, Canada and the US.

In the courts

The Supreme Court heard arguments last week in relation to the 2014 decision known as Cheshire West. The 2014 ruling established the ‘acid test’ for determining whether an individual has been deprived of their liberty. According to the test, if a person (1) is subject to continuous supervision and control and (2) is not free to leave, then they are deprived of their liberty. The ruling had implications for persons with disabilities where it had been concluded that where a person with a disability cannot consent to their care arrangements that involve confinement, they are being deprived of their liberty. Where a person cannot consent to their care, an independent individual is required to determine that the confinement is justified, lawful and in the person’s best interests. The ruling has resulted in a significant increase in deprivation of liberty safeguards (“DoLS”) applications: for 2023-24, 332K applications were made (an increase of 300K over 10 years), with a backlog of 124K.

The Attorney-General of Northern Ireland (“AGNI”) is asking the seven-judge panel to reconsider Cheshire West in order to change the current DoLS established in response to the Cheshire judgement. The AGNI is seeking for consent for care arrangements to be obtained through an expression of a person’s feelings and wishes where they lack capacity to consent.

The Department of Health and Social Care (“DHSC”), an intervener, argued Cheshire West was “wrongly decided” and created an unsustainable system. DHSC argued that the focus of safeguards should be on identifying a person’s wishes and feelings and avoid intruding upon individuals’ lives. Three charities, Mencap, Mind and the National Autistic Society, intervened in the case. They jointly expressed a serious concerns about the arguments put before the Supreme Court and argued that the current test applies to “highly restrictive settings” and is there to ensure individuals have advocates in the care process; changes would jeopardize the safety, freedom and rights of disabled persons.

The judgment date is yet to be announced.

The good Samaritan doctor and the Human Tissue Act

26 June 2013 by Rosalind English

CM v The Executor of the Estate of EJ (deceased) [2013] EWHC 1680 (Fam) – read judgment

You would have thought the law would be entirely behind a person who intervenes to help a stranger in distress. Indeed most civil law countries impose a positive duty to rescue, which means that if a person finds someone in need of medical help, he or she must take all reasonable steps to seek medical care and render best-effort first aid. A famous example of this was the investigation into the photographers at the scene of Lady Diana’s fatal car accident: they were suspected of violation of the French law of “non-assistance à personne en danger” (deliberately failing to provide assistance to a person in danger), which can be punished by up to 5 years imprisonment and a fine of up to 70,000 euros. But the position in common law countries like the UK and the United States is completely different: you can watch a child drown and not be held to account.

Of course no good citizen would do such a thing and in this case the claimant, a medical doctor, went out of her way to try to save the life of someone in extremis. She was driving home, off duty, in South East London, when she saw a body lying motionless on the pavement.
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Strict liability for offence of under-age sex does not offend presumption of innocence

28 September 2011 by Rosalind English

C v United Kingdom Application no. 37334/08 – read judgment

The Strasbourg Court has rejected as manifestly ill-founded a complaint that the offence of strict liability for rape of a child under 13 violated the right to a presumption if innocence under Article 6 and respect for private life under Article 8.

This admissibility decision touches a sensitive nerve in the relationship between Strasbourg and national authorities by exploring the extent to which the Convention rights should influence prosecutorial policy.  Section 5 of the 2003 Sexual Offences Act creates an offence of strict liability, which means that penile penetration of a child under the age of 13 is an offence whether or not the victim gave consent and irrespective of the belief of the perpetrator regarding the victim’s age. This is because the law regards the attitude of the victim of this behaviour as irrelevant to the commission of the offence;  even if a child under 13 is fully capable of understanding and freely agreeing to such sexual activity, the law says that it makes no difference. He or she is legally disabled from consenting. Although absence of consent is not an ingredient of the offence, presence of consent is, material in relation to sentence which under Section 5 of the 2003 Act can range from absolute discharge to life imprisonment.
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