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UK Human Rights Blog - 1 Crown Office Row
Search Results for: puberty blockers consent/page/45/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)
In the matter of proceedings brought by Kings College NHS Foundation Trust concerning C (who died on 28 November 2015) v The Applicant and Associated Newspapers Ltd and others [2016] EWCOP21 – read judgment
The Court of Protection has just ruled that where a court has restricted the publication of information during proceedings that were in existence during a person’s lifetime, it has not only the right but the duty to consider, when requested to do so, whether that information should continue to be protected following the person’s death.
I posted last year on the case of a woman who had suffered kidney failure as a result of a suicide attempt has been allowed to refuse continuing dialysis. The Court of Protection rejected the hospital’s argument that such refusal disclosed a state of mind that rendered her incapable under the Mental Capacity Act. An adult patient who suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment (King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C and another [2015] EWCOP 80). Continue reading →
Briggs v Briggs & Ors [2016] EWCOP 53 (20 December 2016) – read judgment
Apologies for starting the new year on such a sombre note, but there is a shaft of light in that this Court of Protection judgement is a clear indication that judges – or some of them – are prepared to favour an individual’s autonomy over the traditional emphasis on the sanctity of life above all else.
As Charles J points out, this case raises issues of life and death and so vitally important principles and strongly held views. The decision he had to make was whether a part of the current treatment of Mr Paul Briggs, namely clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH), should be continued. Mr Briggs was in a minimally conscious state (MCS) as the result of serious and permanent brain damage he suffered as the victim of a traffic accident eighteen months ago. He was not in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) and so the approach taken by the House of Lords in the Tony Bland case did not apply to him (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789). In that case, it will be remembered, their Lordships concluded that the continuation of life in such a state was futile. Problems arose with subsequent advancements in neurological diagnosis, where a less catastrophic condition known as MCS was established. In 2012 a court ruled that a patient in MCS could not be deemed to have made an advance directive regarding medical treatment even though during her lifetime she had made her position very clear that she would not want to continue living in such a reduced state (Re M (Adult Patient) (Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment) [2012] 1 WLR 1653). Her views did not, in their view, encapsulate the state of MCS. See my post on that decision here. Baker J’s refusal of the family’s application to allow treatment to be withdrawn came in for severe criticism in the British Medical Journal (see Richard Mumford’s post on that article). The author took Baker J to task for not according significant weight to the informally expressed views of M on life-sustaining treatment, expressed before she came ill. Charles J took a very different approach in this case. Continue reading →
On 6 April 2011, the European Commission announced that it has decided to refer the UK Government to the Court of Justice of the European Communities under Article 258 TFEU, for failing to provide affordable access to justice in environmental cases.
This blog has previouslycharted some of the twists and turns in the process of showing that environmental challenges are currently “prohibitively expensive” within the meaning of Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention – not the least of which was a complaint to the Aarhus Compliance Committee which was upheld by that Committee in October 2010. And the underlying concern is the state of the costs rules under which a claimant may be ordered to pay tens of thousands of pounds of costs if he loses, despite the developing case law on Protective Costs Orders designed to mitigate this. Continue reading →
The future of the UK response to COVID-19 remains uncertain. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has hinted that things will be ‘significantly normal’ by Christmas, and has emphasised his reluctance to impose a second national lockdown, comparing such a threat to a ‘nuclear deterrent’. Yet the government’s chief scientific adviser Sir Patrick Vallance says there is a risk we will need another national lockdown in the winter months. Mr Johnson has said the advice on working from home will change on 1st August to ‘go back to work if you can’; Sir Patrick Vallance says there is ‘no reason’ to change that advice. Confusion continues to reign.
Access to justice has been a major casualty of the pandemic, with jury trials suspended and a steady backlog of cases building up in the courts. To address that backlog, the government is now opening 10 temporary ‘Nightingale Courts’, which will hear civil, family, tribunal, and non-custodial criminal cases. Chair of the Criminal Bar Association Caroline Goodwin QC says that these courts are ‘just a start’, and that further buildings and a renewed focus on criminal trails will be needed to clear the backlog. Justice Minister Robert Buckland has already warned that the backlog may not be cleared until 2021.
The Court of Appeal has granted Shamima Begum leave to enter the UK in order to pursue her appeal against the Home Office’s decision to remove her British citizenship, overruling part of the decision made by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The court’s ruling is discussed in more detail below, and in an article by Marina Wheeler QC.
Conway, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 640 – read judgment
Noel Douglas Conway, 67, is a victim of motor neurone disease. He has just been refused permission to seek judicial review of the criminalisation of physician-assisted suicide under the Suicide Act 1961. The High Court considered that Parliament has recently examined the issue following the Supreme Court decision in the 2014 Nicklinson case , and two out of three judges concluded that it would be “institutionally inappropriate” for a court to declare that s.2(1) of the Suicide Act was incompatible with the right to privacy and autonomy under Article 8 of the ECHR. Charles J dissented (and those who are interested in his opinion might want to look at his ruling last year in the case of a minimally conscious patient).
Background facts and law
The claimant, whose condition worsens by the day, wishes to enlist the assistance of a medical professional or professionals to bring about his peaceful and dignified death. But Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act criminalises those who provide such assistance. The question of whether someone would be prosecuted for assisting suicide is governed by a detailed policy promulgated by the Director of Public Prosecutions. That policy was formulated in 2010 in response to the decision in R. (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45, and was refined in 2014 following the decision of the Supreme Court in Nicklinson. A similar declaration of incompatibility had been sought in Nicklinson, but by a majority of seven to two the court refused to make the declaration on the grounds that it was not “institutionally appropriate” to do so. The court, however, encouraged Parliament to reconsider the issue of assisted dying.
In the instant case, the court had to determine whether the circumstances which led the Supreme Court to refuse to grant the declaration in Nicklinson had changed so that a different outcome was now possible.
The Court concluded – with an interesting dissent from Charles J – that this was a matter for parliament. A declaration of incompatibility would be institutionally inappropriate in the light of the recent Parliamentary consideration of Nicklinson. The claim was unarguable and permission was refused.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
Credit: The Guardian
In the News:
The High Court has heard how MI5, which is responsible for domestic spying operations, may have unlawfully retained the data of innocent civilians for years.
Liberty’s challenge centres on the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which gives the security services the ability to access digital devices and electronic communications. It alleges that the system of information gathering used by the security services is illegal.
As part of a systemic judicial review, the High Court was told MI5 had realised that there were problems with their data handling in January 2016, but that the Prime Minister and Home Secretary were only informed in April. It was also alleged that MI5 has been holding sensitive data without proper safeguards. Liberty argued that the security services had submitted warrant applications which misled judges, because the agencies had incorrectly suggested sensitive data was being properly protected.
Much of the case will be heard in private over the next week.
Aranyosi and Căldăraru [C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU].
On 5 April 2016, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the execution of a European Arrest Warrant (‘EAW’) must be deferred if there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment because of the conditions of detention for the person concerned in the requesting state. If the existence of that risk cannot be discounted within a reasonable period, the authority responsible for the execution of the warrant must decide whether the surrender procedure should be deferred or brought to an end.
The cases concerned two totally unrelated and separate extradition requests: a Hungarian accusation warrant seeking the person for trial, the other a Romanian conviction warrant so the person sought could serve a prison sentence. The requested state in both cases was Germany. Continue reading →
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
Max Hill QC. Credit: The Guardian
In the News:
Max Hill QC, the new Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’), has said that rape victims’ mobile phones will no longer be seized “as a matter of course”.
His comments come in the wake of allegations that prosecutors are increasingly making demands to access victims’ personal data. The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners suggested that the CPS been pushing investigators to make more invasive searches, even if officers are satisfied that they have pursued all reasonable lines of inquiry. This may be part of an effort to improve conviction rates.
Big Brother Watch wrote to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) last week arguing against this trend. The campaigning group said it was becoming ‘routine’ to download the contents of sexual offence victims’ phones, and that the information could legally be stored for 100 years. In response, the ICO is considering widening its investigation into the use of victims’ information. It also spoke out against accessing rape victims’ mobile phone data and personal records.
Max Hill QC says that he aims to boost public confidence in the CPS and would improve the disclosure of evidence in criminal trials. The organisation has been struggling under 25% budget cuts and revelations of recent disclosure failings. Continue reading →
(1)Novartis Pharmaceuticals Uk Ltd (2) Andrew Roy Grantham v (1) Stop Huntingdon Aminal Cruelty (SHAC) by its representative Max Gastone (2) Greg Avery (3) Natasha Avery (4) Heather James [2009] EWHC 2716 (QBD)
Sweeney J 30 October 2009
An injunction against animal rights protesters could not be altered to increase the restriction on their protest without a disproportionate interference with the protesters’ rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
Click below for summary and comment by Rosalind English or here to read the full judgment
The relationship between women’s rights and the police has been at the forefront of the news again this week, with shocking new revelations in the Sarah Everard case increasing concerns about institutional sexism in the police force, in addition to a scathing judgement from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) condemning the sexual relationship carried out by a male undercover police officer as a human rights abuse.
Further details about the tactics used by the police officer Wayne Couzens to kidnap Sarah Everard before her rape and murder were released earlier this week after being presented in court. Couzens used his Metropolitan police-issued warrant card to convince Everard that she was being legitimately arrested for breaching Covid regulations. The new information has heightened debates about whether the Met has an internal culture which tolerates sexism, misogyny, and abuse, with many female police officers reporting inappropriate behaviour and sexual assaults. Towards the end of the week, it was revealed that two officers in a WhatsApp group with Couzens, which allegedly swapped misogynistic, racist, and homophobic messages, remain on duty. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Police’s response to Couzens’ sentencing hearing has been seen by many as completely inadequate, with Commissioner Cressida Dick suggesting that women approached by a plain clothes police officer should consider, inter alia, ‘waving a bus down’ to avoid kidnap. The Met has recently unveiled an action plan to restore trust, but campaigners argue that it is more concerned with changing women’s behaviour than addressing the underlying culture that enables misogynistic behaviour to thrive.
The police were also severely criticised in an IPT judgement handed down last week for violating the human rights of a woman, Kate Wilson, who was tricked into a relationship with undercover police officer Mark Kennedy. Kennedy is thought to have exploited his relationships with Wilson and numerous other women to ingratiate himself with the political organisations he infiltrated. The report found that Wilson’s treatment contravened five rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment (Art.3); respect for private and family life (Art.8); freedom of expression (Art.10); freedom of assembly and association (Art.11); and the right for convention rights to be applied without discrimination, in this case on the ground of sex (Art.14). The IPT asserted that the senior officers were either ‘… quite extraordinarily naïve, totally unquestioning, or chose to turn a blind eye’. While numerous women have brought civil suits against undercover officers who employed similar tactics, Wilson is the first to bring a claim to the IPT. The Met issued a statement responding to the judgement, accepting and apologising for the ‘damage caused’.
Johnson’s promise to support the LGBTQ+ community also came after the first meeting of the Ban Conversion Therapy Legal Forum, a group of lawyers, academics, cross-party MPs and campaigners, chaired by Baroness Helena Kennedy. The group released a statement advising the government that the “best way of banning conversion therapy is by using a combination of both civil and criminal remedies” and that the legislation “must be human rights compliant”, prioritising the rights of victims and potential victims. The Forum acknowledged a ban might impact certain other rights including freedom of religion and belief and freedom of expression, but said the harm caused to LGBTQ+ people, which “amounts to degrading and inhuman treatment”, justified a proportionate restriction of those rights.
In other news:
The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Democracy and the Constitution released a report on its independent inquiry into whether the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly were respected in the policing of the Clapham Common vigil for Sarah Everard on 13 March and the “Kill the Bill” protests in Bristol from 26-29 March. The report, published 1 July, found that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the Avon and Somerset Constabulary (A&SC) “failed to understand the nature of the right to protest and how it must be applied in practice” and that their use of power “exacerbated tensions and increased the risk of violence”. The APPG recommended a new statutory code for the right to protest and policing of protests; removing clauses 55-61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill; and a consultation on the creation of an Independent Protest Commission.
“This is, at its heart, a battle of ideas. On one side sit the extremists, with a deliberate strategy to infect public debate, divide our communities and advance their warped worldview,” announced David Cameron last Monday, when the government unveiled their new Counter Extremism Strategy. “On the other side,” he said, “must sit everyone else”.
The question is, how is ‘everyone else who sits on the other side’ to be protected under the proposals? Not without cost, it seems – although laudable in motive, the methods suggested with which to fight this ‘battle of ideas’ run the risk of infringing individuals’ right to freedom of expression. Joshua Rozenberg has called for careful attention to one section of the paper in particular which outlines new proposed powers to “ban extremist organisations”, “restrict harmful activites” and “restrict access to premises that are repeatedly used to support extremism”. The plan to ban extremists from mosques has drawn criticism from the Muslim Council of Britain, the UK’s largest Muslim group, who detected “McCarthyist undertones” in the proposal to compile blacklists. Would restricting access to premises used for extremist purposes restrict extremism itself? As Rozenberg wonders, “What would be the point of closing a hall? It’s not the hall’s fault. People would simply go elsewhere.” Continue reading →
This was an appeal by a doctor against a decision of the medical practitioners’ tribunal that he was guilty of misconduct. He also appealed against the tribunal’s decision to suspend his registration for six months.
Factual and legal background
The appellant (“A”) is a colorectal and breast surgeon who has been registered since 1990, having qualified in Pakistan. He had been working as a locum consultant surgeon at the North Manchester Hospital NHS Trust between April and October 2020. This was during the Covid-19 Pandemic and included the early stages of lockdown imposed by the Government. A appeared on a number of YouTube videos voicing his doubts about the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic. The gravamen of the allegations agains him was that he had used his position as a doctor to promote his opinions and that his actions were “contrary to widely accepted medical opinion” and had undermined public confidence in the medical profession.
This is what he is said to have alleged on the You Tube platform:
a. the Sars-CoV-2 virus and/or Covid-19 disease do not exist or words to that effect; b. the Covid 19 pandemic was a conspiracy brought by the United Kingdom, Israel and America or words to that effect; c. the Covid-19 pandemic was a multibillion scam which was being manipulated for the benefit of: i. Bill Gates; ii. pharmaceutical companies; iii. the John Hopkins Medical Institute of Massachusetts; iv. the World Health Organisation, or words to that effect; d. the Covid-19 pandemic was being used to impose a new world order or words to that effect; e. the Sars-CoV-2 virus was made as part of a wider global conspiracy or words to that effect.
a. undermined public health, and/or; b. were contrary to widely accepted medical opinion, and/or; c. undermined public confidence in the medical profession.
When criticised about these activities, A undertook to remove the videos, but failed to do so.
Importantly, the GMC and the Tribunal considered that A’s opinions on mask wearing and the discharge of elderly patients from hospital might have been controversial, but that they remained within the domain of freedom of expression for doctors as well as the wider public. (My italics. The jury is still out on mask wearing, and the doctor in this case was rightly free to opine on their efficacy).
The problem was his pronouncements on social media that the virus was a hoax and did not exist, and his promotion of conspiracy theories suggesting that vaccines were in development for the deliberate harm or manipulation of the public
The GMC considered that A was guilty of misconduct and demonstrated impairment of his fitness to practise. It referred to the GMC’s “Good Medical Practice” and its guidance on “Doctors’ use of social media” and concluded that immediate suspension of D’s registration was appropriate.
Before the Tribunal, the GMC argued that A had used his position as a doctor in the UK to promote his opinions.
The gravity of the impact of the coronavirus and Covid-19 on public health was being explained on a daily basis to the public and disseminated to medical professionals. The general public was required to comply with the restrictions and the messages were provided to set out the rationale for the restrictions and the reasons compliance was required. …In the Tribunal’s view they ran counter to the public health messages being disseminated at the time.”
…”In the Tribunal’s view, and in the context of the status of the pandemic at the time, hearing such opinions expressed by an NHS consultant surgeon would, on the balance of probabilities, have the effect of undermining public health. One of the key government messages at the time was that compliance with restrictions [were] required to ‘Protect the NHS’.
The Tribunal considered that an NHS consultant asserting as fact such statements of the kind as set out above undermined important public health messages.
A submitted that (1) the tribunal’s decisions did not meet the Article 10 tests of necessity or proportionality; (2) the GMC’s guidance did not meet the Article 10(2) “prescribed by law” condition; (3) suspension was disproportionate and inappropriate, particularly given the 18-month period of successive interim suspension orders.
Appeal to the High Court
The grounds of appeal focussed primarily on whether the Tribunal’s decisions were consistent with A’s article 10 rights. Ground 1 was that the conclusions on misconduct and impairment were contrary to article 10(1) because they give rise to an interference with article 10 rights that was not “prescribed by law” that, for that reason alone, did not meet the requirements laid down within article 10(2) and is unlawful.
Ground 2 was that, in any event, the conclusions on misconduct and impairment were a disproportionate interference with A’s rights under article 10(1). Grounds 3 and 4 were aspects of Ground 2. The former was that the Tribunal was wrong to conclude that expressing views “outside widely accepted medical opinion” either amounted to misconduct or was capable of providing justification for interference with A’s right to freedom of expression. The latter was that there was no evidence to support a conclusion that what A said damaged the reputation of the medical profession. This too, it was submitted, goes to whether the conclusions of misconduct, impairment, and the penalty imposed could be proportionate interferences with A’s Convention rights. Ground 5 was that the decisions to impose a final order for suspension and to make an immediate order suspending Mr Adil pending any appeal were disproportionate in that each failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating or compensating circumstances.
Paul Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 – Read judgment
The famous ‘Twitter joke’ conviction of Paul Chambers has been overturned on appeal, bringing welcome clarity to what is and what is not an offence of this type. On discovering a week before he was due to take a flight that the airport was closed due to adverse weather conditions, he tweeted that “I am blowing the airport sky high!!” unless the situation was resolved by the time of his flight. He was convicted of sending a message of a “menacing character”, but has had the conviction quashed on appeal, on the basis that, as it was a joke, it was not of a menacing character.
“I had decided to resort to terrorism”
Mr Chambers was intending to fly out of Robin Hood Airport on 15 January 2010 to meet a romantic partner he met on Twitter. On 6 January, via Twitter, he became aware that severe weather was causing problems at the airport, and engaged in a conversation on Twitter where he made the following comments:
“…I was thinking that if it does [close due to adverse weather] then I had
decided to resort to terrorism”
The Court of Appeal unanimously ruled that a nurse’s dismissal for improper proselytising was not unfair and that the hospital trust’s decision was not in contravention of the claimant’s rights as guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The claimant, a committed Christian, had been employed as a band 5 nurse by the Trust since 2007. Following a medication error, she had been given a final written warning and transferred to work in a pre-operative assessment role. In this role the claimant was required to go through a pre-operative form with the patients. The form required the claimant to make a simple inquiry into the patient’s religious beliefs; importantly “it did not open the door to further religious discussion.” [7]
In March and April 2016 several complaints were made by
patients about the over-zealous religious preaching of the claimant, with one
patient being told shortly before major bowel surgery that he had a better
chance of survival if he prayed to God.
Following these complaints the matron gave the claimant both oral and written warning that her proselytising was not acceptable. The claimant confirmed that she would not engage in religious discussion unless prompted by the patient.
Two further complaints were made in May and the claimant was
suspended. Whilst suspended a further complaint was made alleging that the
claimant had forced a patient to sing Psalm 23 out loud in what he described as
a “very bizarre” encounter that was “like a Monty Python skit.”
The trust investigated the claims and after a disciplinary hearing the claimant was dismissed for repeated and inappropriate misconduct, including a breach of paragraph 20.7 of the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) code which prohibits nurses from expressing their own personal views in an inappropriate way.
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In the matter of proceedings brought by Kings College NHS Foundation Trust concerning C (who died on 28 November 2015) v The Applicant and Associated Newspapers Ltd and others [2016] EWCOP21 – read judgment
Paul Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 – 
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