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UK Human Rights Blog - 1 Crown Office Row
Search Results for: puberty blockers consent/page/24/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)
Campaigners have warned that a loophole allowing children aged 16 or 17 to get married with their parents’ consent is enabling forced child marriages to take place across England. Current laws against forced marriage to do not specifically protect children, and there are no laws in the UK to prevent religious or customary child marriages. The organisation Girls Not Brides UK, who sent a letter to the Prime Minister warning of the impact of this loophole last week, have suggested that child marriages disproportionately affect girls, and often lead to fewer educational and employment opportunities and a higher risk of domestic violence. The government’s Forced Marriage Unit, which collects data on cases of forced marriage, shows that more than a quarter of cases involve children. The Conservative MP Pauline Latham is currently promoting a bill in Parliament aimed at criminalising child marriage completely.
Angus McCullough QC is a barrister at One Crown Office Row. Read Part 1 about Anonymity orders in Personal Injury proceedings here.
In Part 1 we looked at the circumstances in which a court may be prepared to grant anonymity in personal injury proceedings, and the applicable principles. In Part 2 I consider practical issues in the drafting of these orders, and problems encountered in this.
In particular, I will suggest that the standard Court Form PF10, that is now frequently being adopted, is generally inappropriate for anonymity orders in personal injury proceedings.
This time two years ago two obscure environmental groups, Clientearth and the Marine Conservation Society , took a step that may make more difference to the enforcement of environmental rights in this country than all the recent high-profile “green” NGO campaigns put together.
They submitted a complaint – euphemistically called a “communication” – to the enforcement body of the Aarhus Convention, a treaty which lays down baseline rules for proper environmental justice in the EU, alerting it to various shortcomings in the legal system of England and Wales (inelegantly but conveniently referred to in the report as E & W). Continue reading →
The Law Society of Scotland have sounded the alarm in relation to new Government powers to block an individual’s internet access, and argue that this is likely to amount to a breach of their Human Rights.
The Digital Economy Bill, which has now passed through Parliament and has royal assent, has attracted wide attention in the past few days for a number of reasons. Many have been concerned at the apparent lack of debate in relation to the wide-ranging Bill.
However, a pressing concern amongst internet users has been the proposed new powers for the Government to block an individual’s internet access as a punishment for internet piracy.
The Law Society of Scotland consider that blocking an individual’s internet access would be breach their human rights. They are concerned in particular with the lack of a requirement for a court order before access is cut off, which would amount to a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention. Jim McLean, convener of the Society’s Intellectual Property Committee says:
Harb v. HRH Prince Abdul Aziz Bin Fahd Abdul Aziz, Rose J, [2014] EWHC 1807 (Ch), 9 June 2014 – read judgment
Rosalind English posted in January 2014 (here) on Jones v. the United Kingdom ((judgment here), in which the Strasbourg Court decided that the inability of four men to bring torture compensation claims against Saudi Arabia in UK courts did not breach Article 6(1) of the Convention (access to court). The Court held that a grant of state immunity reflected generally recognised rules of public international law and so there had been no violation.
The current claim involves a Saudi Prince, and his late father, King Fahd, but its subject matter is very different. Mrs Harb, the claimant, says she married King Fahd secretly in 1969: see the photo of them in happier times. The King agreed to provide for her after their separation, Mrs Harb says, and the Prince was involved in agreeing the details of this. Mrs Harb then brought matrimonial proceedings against the King, whilst alive, which were dismissed on grounds of state immunity. On appeal, the CA (judgment here) decided that these proceedings had come to an end by virtue of the King’s intervening death in 2005.
The present proceedings consisted of a claim for breach of contract in respect of the agreement concluded by the Prince on behalf of his father – said to involve £12m and two large Central London properties. The Prince pleaded state immunity, but this plea was dismissed by Rose J in today’s judgement. Continue reading →
Derogation under the Convention is governed by Article 15 which states:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
A “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” is defined as “an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is composed” (Lawless v Ireland (No 3) App no 332/57 (A/3), [1961] ECHR 2).
Gaunt v OFCOM [2010] EWHC 1756 (QB) (13 July 2010) – Read judgment
The High Court has ruled that OFCOM did not breach a DJ’s freedom of expression rights by finding that he contravened the Broadcasting Code after calling a guest a “Nazi” during an interview on talkSPORT. The decision by the regulator led to the DJ’s sacking.
Jon Gaunt applied for judicial review of the decision by OFCOM that he had breached rules 2.1 and 2.3 of the Broadcasting Code. Liberty supported his claim. He argued that OFCOM’s decision amounted to a disproportionate interference with his freedom of expression and an infringement of his rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
I have a new project. The aim is to change the face of human rights.
As readers of this blog will know, I often complain about bad human rights journalism. But inadequate reporting is a symptom of a deeper problem: poor public understanding of human rights.
It is time to do something about it. Introducing the Human Rights Information Project (HRIP).
The UK Government has urged Supreme Court justices not to hear the Scottish government’s request for a ruling as to whether it has the power to hold ‘indyref2’ (a proposed second Scottish independence referendum). The request was referred to the UKSC by Lord Advocate Bain, who was not prepared to sign off on the independence referendum bill without a ruling which acknowledges the necessary power to do so. The UK Government has been expressive in its “clear view” that the bill would be beyond the competence of the Scottish Parliament, and that the matter is too “premature” for justices to rule on it. The case is currently in the hands of Lord Reed. If the Scottish Government wins the case, Nicola Sturgeon has indicated that the bill would be introduced promptly so as to allow the vote to take place before October 2023.
The Information Commissioner’s Office has reprimanded the Department of Health for the use of WhatsApp and private emails during the pandemic. The use of these cryptic platforms has meant that information regarding the handling of the pandemic has been lost. The issue was brought before the courts in April, where the claim was dismissed and the practice held to be lawful. This was because the use of such channels of communication did not in themselves breach the Freedom of Information or data protection rules, because sufficient controls were in place to allow the information to be retrieved upon request. The ICO investigation has discovered, however, that “such controls were lacking”. As a result, the Department of Health has been formally required to improve its communications operations so that “public authorities remain accountable to the people they serve”.
Free speech is under attack. Or so it seems. The last few weeks have been abuzz with stories to do with free speech: a Supreme Court ruling on the Reynolds defence to libel; contempt of court proceedings against an MP for comments made in a book and the latest in a growing line of criminal trials for Twitter offences. The diversity of media at the heart of these stories – print news, traditional books and online ‘micro-blogging’ – indicates the difficulty of the task for the legal system.
Flood v Times: how does this affect calls for libel reform?
On 21 March, the Supreme Court affirmed the Times newspaper’s reliance on the Reynolds defence to libel – often referred to as Reynolds privilege or the responsible journalism defence – to a claim by a detective sergeant in the Metropolitan Police.
Matthew Fisher is a doctor and aspiring barrister with an interest and experience in MedTech.
Josef. K the protagonist of Kafka’s novel ‘The Trial’ was an ambitious and successful banker prior to his unexpected arrest. The criminal charges brought against him were never explained because they were beyond the comprehension of all but the most senior judges. Attempting to understand his guilt, consumed K’s every thought – he was distracted at work, subservient to his lawyer and ultimately docile when led to his execution. ‘The Trial’ eloquently argued that transparency is a prerequisite of accountability. In the Age of the Algorithm, Kafka’s novel is now more relevant than ever.
Machine learning algorithms increasingly regulate our lives making decisions about us in finance, education, employment and justice. Ultimately, it will become pervasive in most, if not all aspects of decision making in the foreseeable future. But what is a machine learning algorithm? How does it decide? What rights do data subjects have? This article aims to answer all three of these questions.
There probably aren’t many people who want to know what ‘goes on’ in the Court of Protection more than me; it’s what I spend much of my time trying to fathom. An outsider would be forgiven for thinking that this branch of Her Majesty’s Court Service doesn’t feel that case law in this tangled and difficult area is anybody’s business but it’s own.
The reasons for this appearance are complex though, and not necessarily the fault of any individuals working within the courts. I think it’s important to draw a distinction between different ways that greater ‘transparency’ could be achieved; some might be more helpful than others.
The dust has settled since the government released its draft Online Safety Bill. Now is therefore a good time to evaluate its aims, methods, and potential impacts, which we will do so in this two-part post. The first post will have a look at the overall architecture of the bill, discussing what it is trying to do and how it is trying to do it. The second post will survey responses to the bill from academics and civil society campaigners, discussing whether the bill does too much or not enough.
The general strategy of the Online Harms Bill is to place duties on “regulated services”, requiring them to identify and mitigate system level risks of harm to their users. This post will focus on the meaning of “regulated services”, and the various duties that the Online Harms Bill places them under. As things stand, the bill would give significant powers to Ofcom, which would act as a regulator and enforcer of the various duties created under the bill. This first post will conclude with a look at the new powers that would be given to OFCOM under the bill.
Regulated Services
The bill would apply to “regulated services”. The definition of regulated services is found in section 3: regulated services are either “user-to-user services” or “search services” which “have links to the United Kingdom” and which are not exempt.
The first important thing to note is the broadness in the drafting of all these definitions. A service has links to the UK if it has a significant number of users in the UK, if UK users are a target market, or if there are “reasonable grounds to believe that there is a material risk of significant harm to individuals in the UK” using the service. Thus, territorially, a very wide number of online services could be caught.
A “user-to-user service” (since publication of the draft bill generally called a ‘U2U’ service in commentary), defined in section 2, is a service which allows users to share user generated content with other users. The definition excludes content generated by the site itself, and content shared by those employed by the service.
This is a widely defined provision. Obviously intended to catch large social media organisations like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and TikTok, it is nonetheless drafted broadly enough to also include smaller blogs, websites for shopping, online gaming sites and other categories of online platform which hosts user generated content.
However, the exact nature of how those sites will be regulated will be dependent on their classification by OFCOM as category 1 or 2A/2B services. Category 1 is reserved for services with greater functionality and larger user bases, and services classified as such are subject to stricter duties, which will be explained in the duties section; machinery for classification is currently found in Schedule 4 of the bill.
Some exceptions apply, but these are tightly drafted. Functions such as email and SMS/MMS services, limited functionality services (such as services where users can only comment on site generated content), internal services such as intranets, and public bodies in the exercise of a public function are exempt. Exemptions can be found in Schedule 1; per s.3(8), the Secretary of State can amend the exempt services found there.
“Search services” are defined as services providing an internet search engine that are not U2U services. Much of the same duties apply to search and U2U services, so these will be largely dealt with together.
I promised an analysis piece in my post on the Mosley judgment but there has been such an outpouring of comment and opinion on the case that a more useful exercise is to provide some sort of guide through the maze of material already out there.
The Court makes its disapproval of the conduct of the News of the World crystal clear and emphasises the need for a “narrow interpretation” of freedom of expression where sensational and titillating press reports are involved [114].
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
In the News:
Internationally there were a number of developments which have significant consequences for human rights. In Russia a prominent critic of Vladimir Putin has allegedly been poisoned. Alexei Navalny, who is known for exposing corruption within the country, suddenly fell ill last week after drinking tea.
Supporters claim the Russian state has tried to silence Mr Navalny’s criticism of President Putin, and then attempted to cover up its actions by stopping Mr Navalny from being treated abroad. Despite initial resistance from doctors, who said that Mr Navalny was too ill to be moved, the leader has now been flown out of Russia. Critics say the developments are part of a wider crackdown on freedom of speech within the country.
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Some exciting news.
Free speech is under attack. Or so it seems. The last few weeks have been abuzz with stories to do with free speech: a Supreme Court ruling on the Reynolds defence to libel; contempt of court proceedings against an MP for comments made in a book and the latest in a growing line of criminal trials for Twitter offences. The diversity of media at the heart of these stories – print news, traditional books and online ‘micro-blogging’ – indicates the difficulty of the task for the legal system.
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