Search Results for: puberty blockers consent/page/23/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)

Bailii needs money and Eady speaks – The Human Rights Roundup

13 June 2011 by Graeme Hall

It’s time for the human rights roundup, a regular bulletin of all the law we haven’t quite managed to feature in full blog posts. The full list of links, updated each day, can be found here.

by Graeme Hall

In the news:

The big UK Human Rights Blog news is the launch of our new Case Table. Click here to see it.

Writing for the UK Constitutional Law Group blog, Professor Gordon Anthony summarizes the Supreme Court’s decision in Re. McCaughey. Following developments in the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law, the Supreme Court ruled that under article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to life), the procedural obligation to investigate deaths possibly caused by State agents is “detachable” from the State’s substantive obligation to protect the right to life of its citizens.

Whilst concluding that the implications of the McCaughey judgment are probably straightforward, the post outlines the Supreme Court’s criticisms of the European Court’s reasoning, as well as some of the possible consequences of its poorly reasoned judgments. See also Matthew Hill’s post today on this blog.

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Introduction to Human Rights

15 January 2010 by Guest Contributor

Introduction to the Human Rights Act 1998

• Read The Human Rights Act
• Read the incorporated Rights
• Read the European Convention on Human Rights
• Read the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
• Read A bluffer’s guide to human rights courts (10 Sep 2012)
• Read Adam Wagner’s brief guide to journalists (10 Feb 2013)
• Read A cut out and keep guide to judicial review (1 Mar 2011)
• Read the invention of human rights (25 Aug 2010)

The Human Rights Act 1998 has been in force since October 2000. It incorporates into domestic law the rights and liberties enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty to which the United Kingdom is signatory but which until 2000 had no application in domestic law.

The 1950 Convention

The European Convention on Human Rights

When The European Convention on Human Rights was signed in 1951 the view was that the system should protect against only very serious human rights infringements. Many people maintain the Convention was never intended to become what it has today, its Court “sometimes acting like a type of Supreme Court for Europe in the field of human rights” (see “What was the point of the European Convention on Human Rights).

Whether one agrees or not with the way it has developed, the bottom line is that the Convention guarantees a range of political rights and freedoms of the individual against interference by the State. Signatory States to the Convention may not violate the right to life of their citizens, subject them to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, press them into enforced labour, deprive them of their liberty without due process and compensation, deprive them of access to justice or a fair trial or introduce laws that impose retrospective criminal liability for acts that were innocent at the time they were committed. Individuals’ rights to privacy, freedom of religion, expression, association and assembly, to marry and found a family, may not be infringed without proper justification. The rights enshrined in the Convention must be guaranteed to each individual irrespective of sex or race and a range of other grounds. Because some of the rights oblige the State to respect the interests of citizens by imposing positive obligations on governments, this sometimes has the effect of enabling individuals to claim Convention rights in relation to each other. consequently the State, via its courts and legislation, is bound to secure compliance with those rights.

Before the incorporation of the Convention, individuals in the United Kingdom could only complain of unlawful interference with their Convention rights by lodging a petition with the European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which itself only referred the case to the European Court of Human Rights for a full hearing if it considered that the complainant had exhausted all his or her local remedies and that a range of other admissibility criteria had been satisfied. This process took on average five years, from the lodging of a petition to the publication of the Court’s judgment.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

Although the Charter arose since the inception of the Human Rights Act, some commentators believe that it is a sharper weapon than the Convention because any of its provisions may be invoked as a point of EU law.  Indeed, a High Court judge has recently commented that

it would seem that the much wider Charter of Rights is now part of our domestic law. Moreover, that much wider Charter of Rights would remain part of our domestic law even if the Human Rights Act were repealed.  (R(AB) v Secretary of State [2013] EWHC 3453 (Admin), at [14])

This instrument, which was given legal effect by Article 6(1) TEU (the Lisbon Treaty), is controversial because it contains a range of rights some of which mimic those in the European Convention of Human Rights, others which go beyond the scope of the ECHR by appearing to grant social and economic rights to citizens of the EU, including the right to health care (Article 35), access to services (Article 36) and social security (Article 34).  These are aspirational “rights” whose effect on the EU legislature has yet to be played out.

Although it has full Treaty force, the Charter does not extend the competence or powers of the EU (Article 51(2) of the Charter and  Article 6(1) TEU).  The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice has long established the rule that the human rights aspect of Community law is only binding on member states when their actions engage EU law (Case 5/88 Wachauf and Case C-260/89 ERT ).  However, EU law reaches far into the relationship between state and citizen and as a result the UK has filed an “opt-out” protocol in respect of the Charter, Article 1 of which states that it

does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms (Protocol No 30 of 2007)

The precise effect of this Protocol continues to be debated (Poland is also a signatory). See the effect of Article 1 of the Protocol in NS v Secretary of State and ME and others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Another (Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10). Suffice it to say thus far the Charter does not apply to disputes between private individuals, nor does it  supersede the so-called ‘general principles of law’ which the CJEU has invoked to protect human rights for the past forty years. The Lisbon Treaty retains these ‘general principles’ as a distinct category according to the wording of Article 6(3):

Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.

The UKHRB follows closely developments in the application and scope of the EU Charter provisions, which are unconnected with the ultimate fate of the 1998 Human Rights Act. Each of our Convention Rights pages cross references the corresponding right in the EU Charter.

What can be challenged under the Human Rights Act 1998?

Primary legislation, secondary legislation and the common law can be made the subject of an action under the Act, in addition to decisions and actions of public authorities.

There are limitations. Secondary legislation is subject to the rights set out in the Convention (s.3) but such legislation may be protected from challenge if the primary legislation under which it was made prevents it from being interpreted in a way that is compatible with Convention rights.

If the court is unable to construe a statute in accordance with the Convention it has no power to set it aside. However, it can issue a declaration under s.4 of the Act that the relevant statutory provision is incompatible with the rights set out in the Convention. Furthermore, litigants and judges alike are now alert to the possibilities of the EU Charter whose provisions may prevail over primary legislation by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972.

There is no specific procedure for applying for a declaration of incompatibility, although Civil Procedure Rule 19.4A provides that a court may not make a declaration of incompatibility unless certain notice provisions have been fulfilled. In general the process is analogous to that used for declaration by originating summons. Such a declaration imposes no obligation on Ministers to respond but the Act provides in s.10 for a remedial order to be made whereby the minister may introduce a statutory instrument to amend or repeal the offending provision. There is a “fast track” procedure of 40 days during which the proposed statutory instrument is laid before both Houses of Parliament before passing into law.

Section 6 makes it unlawful for all public authorities to act in a way which is incompatible with the rights in the Convention. “An act” includes the failure to act but does not include a failure to introduce legislation or make a remedial order pursuant to a declaration of incompatibility.

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Who is liable under the Human Rights Act 1998?

In principle, the Act is only vertically effective, direct challenges may only be made to the actions of “public authorities”. However “public authority” is widely defined in s.6 to include central and local government, the courts, the police, immigration officers and “any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature”. A privatised utility such as Network Rail, for example, will be carrying out functions of a public nature in its role of regulating the railways and ensuring safety standards and in that capacity will be liable under the Act, whereas in its capacity as employer, it may not be liable. The dividing line between public and private functions is constantly being tested in the courts, as it has to be decided on a case by case basis. Both Houses of Parliament are excluded from the definition of public authority, a provision that was designed to exclude Acts of Parliament from direct attack under the incorporated Convention.

Although the Convention only applies directly to disputes between individuals and public authorities, the obligations it imposes on the State does colour the outcome of disputes between private parties. This is because “courts” are included in the definition of public authorities. Since it is unlawful under the Act for such public authorities to act in a way which is incompatible with the rights under the Convention, courts are under increasing pressure to interpret the common law in accordance with the Convention even in the determination of private disputes.

In addition, courts are bound by s.3 of the Act to construe primary and subordinate legislation in a way which is compatible with Convention rights. Even though the common law is not specified in this section, a judge adjudicating a dispute between private parties is often urged to interpret a rule of common law in accordance with Convention rights. The limitation of liability under the Act to “public authorities” does, however, mean that private parties are generally not able to take proceedings against each other on Convention grounds alone.

The inclusion of courts in the definition of public authority means that individuals are sometimes able to rely on Convention grounds in judicial review proceedings against the lower courts, such as magistrates’ courts and the immigration appeals tribunal. The decisions of the higher courts which cannot be judicially reviewed may be appealed on Convention grounds. However, it should be borne in mind that s.9 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that Convention challenges may not be brought in defiance of any rule of law which prevents a judicial decision being the object of judicial review.

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Strasbourg Case-Law

A court or tribunal deciding a question in respect of a Convention right must take account of “relevant judgments, decisions, declarations and opinions made or given by the … European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe” (Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act). This means that Strasbourg jurisprudence will be influential, although not binding, on national courts.

The anomolous situation is that although the rulings of the Court do not bind our own judiciary they create international law obligations for the government. As Adam Wagner has pointed out, by virtue of article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the government must “abide by”, that is, it must follow, final decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

The situation becomes more bizarre still, as the UK supreme court (along with all other courts) need only “take into account” judgments of the Strasbourg court. So the supreme court, which is subordinate to parliament in every other way, can do what parliament by its own choice cannot: namely, ignore decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. So the Strasbourg Court’s rulings on the legitimacy of any particular infringement will have an impact on the way domestic courts will approach the question. Strasbourg judgements provide non-binding guidance on the tests of necessity and proportionality, which means that any given limitation should achieve its aim without excessive impact on the rights of the individual.

Unpublished policy and unlawful detention: a case note on R (MXK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

29 June 2023 by Lance Baynham

In R (MXK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1272 (Admin), the Administrative Court held that:

1. the repeated detention of the claimants – foreign nationals with limited leave to remain – when they returned to the UK from travelling abroad, so that they could be questioned about their NHS debts, was unlawful;
2. the policy pursuant to which the claimants were detained (the “Policy”) was unlawful because it contained a positive statement of law which was wrong or, alternatively, because it failed to provide a full account of the legal position;
3. the Policy was unlawful because it was unpublished; and
4. the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) was in breach of the public sector equality duty (“PSED”) under s.149 of the Equality Act 2010.

In reality, the facts carried the day. This was true not only in relation to the unlawful detention issue, but also on some other points – for example, the SSHD failed to evidence any public interest in not publishing the Policy or any consideration given to the equality impacts of the exercise of the relevant powers of detention. Insofar as there are lessons to be learned, they are likely to be found in the criticisms levelled at the evidence (or lack thereof) provided by the SSHD.

Supreme confusion

26 January 2011 by Adam Wagner

As the UK Supreme Court Blog points out, our highest court of appeal has updated the “frequently asked questions” section of its website.

Of particular interest are the answers to two questions. The first is probably the most important question the public ever asks about the court, namely whether, once a case has wound its way through the expensive and long-winded English court system, the final decision of the court can overrule the UK Parliament. Appropriately, the question is the first on the list. The answer is no:

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Human Rights in the Supreme Court in 2020 – Lewis Graham

12 February 2020 by Guest Contributor

It is undeniable that the Human Rights Act has had a significant impact on the work of the Supreme Court. Just under a quarter (14 of 61) of cases decided during the Court’s 2018-19 term featured a determination on at least one issue relating to the Act or the European Convention on Human Rights. The UK Supreme Court is soon to begin Hilary Term 2020, and whilst the docket of cases it is set to hear this term seems to largely steer clear of controversial human rights issues we can nonetheless be confident that 2020 will feature its usual share of big human rights cases. What follows is a short preview of some of the more interesting and controversial of those cases, all of which the Court is due to hand down at some point this year. 

1. Article 3 and deportation

In the case of AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (on appeal from the Court of Appeal) the Court will have an opportunity to re-assess its approach to how Article 3 should apply in deportation cases.

It is well established that, under Article 3 ECHR, the United Kingdom cannot deport an individual to a country where, there is a “real risk” of them being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. This has been extended to include situations where the deportee would be placed in circumstances which might occasion a significant deterioration of health, including where they lack access to life-saving treatment. 

The question in this case is whether Article 3 prohibits deportation in AM’s situation. He is an HIV-positive individual, whose condition for many years was being managed by anti-retroviral drugs in the UK. If deported to Zimbabwe, he would be very unlikely to have access to the same treatment. Although some medical options would be available to him, they would likely be significantly less effective for the management of his condition. 

Previous authorities had restricted the application of Article 3 to ‘deathbed’ cases only, where the deportee would likely die quickly following their removal from the country.

Court of Protection: Anorexia nervosa is a condition which may render a patient without capacity to decide on treatment

27 August 2025 by Rosalind English

This judgment was handed down to parties via email at 3pm on 31st July 2025. A transparency order is in force. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of Patricia must be strictly preserved.

Patricia’s Father & Ors v Patricia & Ors [2025] EWCOP 30 (T3)

This application was brought by the parents and aunt of a woman who has previously been anonymised to “Patricia”. Patricia, aged 25, had lived with anorexia nervosa since childhood, and was extremely malnourished with a BMI as low as 7, unable to walk unaided, and suffering severe complications like bed sores and osteoporosis. Diagnosed also with autism and pathological demand avoidance (PDA), Patricia’s condition was refractory despite years of efforts; she persistently refused to eat enough to sustain herself, though she voiced a desire to live and to travel. In 2023, the Court (Moor J) had ordered—after hearing her strongly expressed wishes—that Patricia should not be force-fed or receive medical treatment against her will, emphasising her autonomy in treatment decisions.

Throughout these proceedings Patricia was an in-patient at Norfolk and Norwich University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust. She had said she wanted to go to a Specialist Eating Disorder Unit (SEDU) but when this case started she was not medically fit enough to go to one because of her low BMI and her lack of medical stability.

More major rule of law changes, more dodgy statistics used to justify them

5 May 2013 by Adam Wagner

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The (inadvertent) perils of a strictly formal equality: Re Mediahuis and others’ applications for judicial review [2024] NIKB 45

4 September 2024 by anuragdeb

Introduction

The road to hell, so the saying goes, is paved with good intentions. While not quite as dire, well-intentioned laws can nevertheless sometimes have severe consequences. In Re Mediahuis and others’ applications for judicial review [2024] NIKB 45, the Northern Ireland High Court declared 5 sections of one such well-intentioned law, the Justice (Sexual Offences and Trafficking Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (the 2022 Act), invalid. This is the first invalidation of devolved Northern Ireland statutory provisions since the present devolution settlement (the Northern Ireland Act 1998) was enacted 26 years ago. On one level, the judgment is fairly unremarkable – courts are empowered to declare invalid any devolved statute (or statutory provision) which is found to be outwith devolved legislative competence (in this case because of incompatibility with Article 10 of the ECHR) and have done so without raising eyebrows since the advent of devolution in the UK. On a deeper level, however, the judgment and the justification for the relevant provisions of the 2022 Act show the limits of formal equality in addressing substantive injustice.

The judgment

The 2022 Act was a partial response to a wide-ranging review into the legal and policy measures around serious sexual offences in Northern Ireland. This review, carried out by retired Court of Appeal judge Sir John Gillen (the Gillen Review) made several recommendations. Among these, the relevant recommendations for this case were (1) an extension of anonymity for complainants of sexual offences beyond their lifetimes, (2) pre-charge anonymity for suspects of sexual offences and (3) a statutory prohibition on the publication of suspects’ identities pre-charge. The 2022 Act implements (1) (by extending complainant anonymity to 25 years after the complainant dies) but goes much further in implementing (2) and (3) than recommended in the Gillen Report. In respect of (2), the 2022 Act allows suspects to remain anonymous pre-charge on almost the same terms as complainants (during their lifetimes and up to 25 years after death), meaning that if a suspect is never charged, no identifying details may be published until after 25 years following their death. The reporting restriction can be lifted by a court on the application of the police, the suspect or (if the suspect has died) the suspect’s close family, personal representative or anyone interested in reporting any prohibited matters relating to the suspect. Importantly, the press may not apply to lift the reporting restriction during the suspect’s lifetime. On (3), the 2022 Act criminalises the unauthorised publication of suspect details and prescribes a custodial sentence or a fine (or both) for the offence.

Plainly, the 2022 Act represents a significant hurdle to public interest reporting. The pre-charge anonymity is just as extensive as complainant anonymity, and may only be lifted on the application of an extremely limited cohort of people. The justification offered by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice (DoJ), to put the matter mildly, lacked much (if any) persuasiveness. The DoJ pointed to the deleterious impact of publishing or reporting on a sexual offence suspect’s details before charge, with consequences ranging from reputational damage to a threat to life (Mediahuis, para 58). But the Act does not provide a general public interest defence to the offence of unauthorised publication. Such a defence would allow a court to carefully scrutinise two competing issues – any public interest in publishing a suspect’s details pre-charge and that suspect’s rights under the ECHR – and balance them. And nor does the process to lift reporting restrictions include the press as applicants. The rationale for this was virtually non-existent, with the DoJ simply saying:

“It was considered necessary to draw a distinction between who can apply before the death of the suspect and who can apply thereafter to reflect the very different circumstances that apply in those varying circumstances.“

But the Court was not provided with the reasons why this distinction was “considered necessary”. The DoJ further claimed that broadening the cohort of people who could apply to lift the reporting restriction (journalists, for example) during a suspect’s lifetime would “run contrary to the aims of key recommendation 10 [of the Gillen Report].” The relevant recommendation (in full) is:

“There should be no change in the current law concerning publication of the identity of the accused post charge. The identity of the accused should be anonymised pre-charge and the accused should have the right to apply for a judge-alone trial in the rare circumstances where the judge considers it to be in the interests of justice.“

Plainly, the DoJ’s claim about the recommendation was unsustainable.

It is therefore unsurprising that the High Court (Mr Justice Humphreys) should have found the relevant provisions to be a disproportionate interference with Article 10 of the ECHR (the freedom of speech and expression), creating a ‘chilling effect’ on public interest journalism (Mediahuis, para 102).

To be clear, laws with categorical exclusions like the 2022 Act are not, by their categorical exclusions alone, inconsistent with the ECHR. Another devolved Northern Ireland statute – the Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) Act (Northern Ireland) 2023 (which creates areas around abortion services providers for the safety of their users and staff by fining certain conduct within these areas) emerged from the Supreme Court entirely unscathed, despite containing clear categorical exclusions of certain behaviours (in the form of a strict liability offence in respect of those behaviours). But there are important differences between the 2022 Act and the Abortion Services Act. Chief among these is that fact that the former proscribes unauthorised publication with a custodial sentence, whereas the Abortion Services Act provided for a fine. Moreover, the banned behaviours in the Abortion Services Act are spatially limited to the defined safe access zones around abortion services providers; people are free to oppose such services elsewhere, so the limitations on Article 10 rights are themselves limited. By contrast, the pre-charge publication bar in the 2022 Act applies without distinction as to geography or other factor, and continues for a quarter of a century after a suspect’s death if the suspect is not charged. The limitation on Article 10 rights is thus extreme, and could only be justified (if at all) with the clearest and most compelling reasons. In this, the DoJ ultimately failed.

The erroneous focus on formal equality

The largely unsurprising ECHR assessment of the 2022 Act by the High Court aside, it is curious that pre-charge suspect anonymity and complainant anonymity should have been placed on the same formally equal plane. This is especially the case given that formal equality between complainant anonymity and (general) suspect anonymity was categorically rejected as ‘flawed’ by Sir John Gillen (Gillen Report, para 12.90). Sir John identified a number of reasons why complainants are entitled to greater anonymity – not least to encourage their participation in the criminal justice process. In the same vein, publishing or otherwise disclosing the identity of suspects of sexual offences encourages other potential complainants to come forward in a society where the conviction rate for such offences remains, in the words of Sir John ‘troublingly’, low (by the time Sir John had published his findings, the conviction rate for sexual offences in Northern Ireland had also been falling, see Gillen Report pg. 10).

Moreover, the social stigma associated with being a survivor of sexual violence or abuse acts as a further barrier. Within his Report, Sir John recognises the myriad ways in which different groups of survivors – women of colour (para 13.76), people with disabilities (e.g. paras 13.46 and 13.55) and men (para 13.148) – experience stigma.

All of these factors combine to highlight one of the main themes underlying the Gillen Report and the implementation of its recommendations by the DoJ over the years since the Report’s publication: the need to ensure that ‘one of the worst violations of human dignity’ – sexual crime – is not compounded by the very system designed to hold its perpetrators to account. This is not to discount the experiences of those whose details are published despite not being charged, and the indignities they suffer as a result. But fundamental to this complex and highly sensitive area is the recognition that different people experience different indignities. The formal equality which characterised the invalidated provisions of the 2022 Act, however, completely failed to recognise this reality. Instead, it effectively flattened the many accounts of survivors and suspects found in the 700-odd pages of the Gillen Report into a highly simplistic equation: whatever anonymity was conferred on complainants must also (mostly) be conferred on suspects while they remain uncharged.

This flat plane of formal equality ultimately imperilled the very provisions which were intended to protect the dignity of those people who, whether voluntarily or otherwise, come into contact with the criminal justice system for sexual offences. In the aftermath of the High Court’s judgment, the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice initially indicated that she was considering an appeal, before confirming that no appeal would be pursued. The resultant situation is that the relevant provisions of the 2022 Act – sections 12-16 – are invalid, so there is no bespoke statutory pathway to ensure suspect anonymity at the pre-charge stage (the UK Supreme Court judgment in Bloomberg LP v ZXC [2022] UKSC 5 recognises an ECHR-derived reasonable expectation of privacy at the pre-charge stage).

Without impugning the good intentions of the DoJ, the Assembly and the Northern Ireland Executive, Mediahuis and others should give Ministers and Departments pause for thought. Addressing the substantive (and sometimes life-altering) injustices which are experienced as a result of or in relation to sexual crime requires much greater sensitivity than a simple formal equality.

Anurag Deb is a PhD candidate at Queen’s University Belfast and a paralegal at KRW LAW LLP.

Round UP 5.8.19: Principles of justice considered by the Supreme Court

5 August 2019 by Thomas Hayes

New President of the Supreme Court Lord Reed: Credit The Guardian.

In the week after the appointment of Lord Reed as the new President of the Supreme Court, the final week of July brought with it the end of the legal term and a flurry of judgements in the senior courts.

In the Supreme Court, the case of Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Dring (Asbestos Victims Support Groups Forum UK) [2019] UKSC 38 (29 July 2019) gave the court the opportunity to examine the principle of open justice, in particular how much of the written material made available to the court ought to be accessible by those not directly party to proceedings. The case came about after an asbestos victim support group, not party to the initial proceedings, made an application to have access to all the documents from a settled personal injury asbestos case. The defendant from the initial trial appealed against the granting of such an order under the common law and the provisions of CPR rule 5.4C. The Media Lawyers Association intervened, advancing arguments based on the importance of media reporting to maintaining open justice, and the reliance such reporters have on access to documents subsequent to the conclusion of proceedings. In deciding to remit the matter back to the High Court, the court provided a good summary of the principles concerning open justice laid down in R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court (Article 19 intervening) [2012] EWCA Civ 420; [2013] QB 618.

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Will the European Union be brought under the Human Rights Convention?

12 August 2010 by Adam Wagner

It is possible that the European Union will soon sign up to the European Convention on Human Rights. The change would have interesting implications for European human rights law, as well as for UK citizens seeking redress for alleged human rights violations.

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It may sound odd that whilst member states are signed up to the European Convention, the European Union as a corporate body is not. But negotiations began last month (see this Council of Europe press release) on the European Union’s accession to the European Convention. The Vice-President of the EU’s Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship said “We are now putting in place the missing link in Europe’s system of fundamental rights protection, guaranteeing coherence between the approaches of the Council of Europe and the European Union”.

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The Weekly Round-up: the Bill of Rights, Roe v Wade and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016

27 June 2022 by Tabitha Hutchison

In the news: 

On Wednesday, a new Bill of Rights was introduced to Parliament. While the Government claims that the Bill ‘will strengthen traditional UK rights’ which are ‘under attack’ from ‘stifling political correctness’, critics say the Bill dilutes domestic human rights protection and seeks to diminish the powers of domestic courts. Key aspects of the Bill are as follows: 

• it gets rid of the interpretive obligation under s3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, with no analogous replacement; 
• it prevents UK courts from adopting new interpretations of ECHR rights that would require a public authority to comply with a positive obligation and limits their ability to enforce existing positive obligations;
• it introduces a permission stage requiring people to show they have suffered a significant disadvantage before their claim can go ahead;
• it prevents domestic courts from finding legislative provisions concerning deportation to be incompatible with the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life unless the provision would require the relevant person to be treated in a way that would occasion ‘harm’ so ‘extreme’ that it would ‘override the otherwise paramount public interest’ in removal from the UK; and 
• it requires courts, when deciding ‘incompatibility questions’, to treat Parliament as having ‘decided’ that the Act strikes an appropriate balance between the relevant competing factors.

The Bill’s detractors have suggested that, despite its stated aim to ‘bring rights home’, the Bill will in fact result in the UK being in breach of its obligations under the ECHR more often, making it more vulnerable to adverse rulings by the ECtHR. 

On Friday, the US Supreme Court overturned Roe v Wade, holding that there is no longer a federal constitutional right to an abortion. Going forward, abortion rights will be determined by states, unless Congress acts. President Biden commented: “The Court has done what it has never done before: expressly take away a constitutional right that is so fundamental to so many Americans that had already been recognized.”

The Weekly Round-up: The Rwanda ruling, NHS strikes, asylum seeker cost-of-living claim, and victim-blaming

22 December 2022 by Lucy Stock

In the news:

• The Divisional Court has dismissed the claim for judicial review challenging decisions made by the Home Secretary that asylum claims made in the United Kingdom should not be determined here and that instead the persons who have made those claims should be removed to Rwanda to have their asylum claims determined there. Removal from the United Kingdom in these circumstances involves two decisions: first, a decision that the asylum claim is inadmissible – i.e., that the asylum claim should not be decided on its merits in the United Kingdom; and second a decision to remove the asylum claimant to a safe third country which in these cases is Rwanda. Lewis LJ and Swift J found that the Home Secretary was entitled to rely on assurances provided by the Rwandan government in a specific and detailed memorandum of understanding that Rwanda was a safe third country. They also rejected the argument that the policy was in breach of retained EU law, specifically, Directive 2005/85 art.27(2). Regardless of whether art.27(2) had been breached, there was no breach of retained EU law, by reason of the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 Sch.1 Pt 3 para.6, the Directive was not retained EU law. The judgment is also interesting on the question of standing. The claimants included individual asylum seekers, charities and a home office officials’ trade union. The Court concluded that neither the trade union nor the charities had standing. The union’s members were not directly affected by the policy in any sense relevant for the purposes of seeking judicial review, and it could not be said that any person working for a public authority had sufficient interest to challenge any decision taken by that authority. The charities claimed that they had surrogate standing in that they represented the interests of those who were not well-placed to bring an action themselves. However, that submission was undermined by the presence of the asylum-seeker claimants, who were better placed to bring the claim.

• A&E wards dealt with 2.2. million patients last month, while ambulance services attended 81,655 of the most serious incidents: the highest demand on record for November. Strikes are set for December 15 and 21, as Royal College of Nursing members at hospitals across England will strike over below-inflation pay increases. Paramedics and other ambulance staff in most parts of the country will strike a day later on December 21. Labour have indicated they are “willing to talk” about higher pay rises for NHS staff, and would revisit the pay deal handed to NHS staff.

• A Manchester High Court order was made on Friday 16 December by Fordham J, ruling that the Home Secretary acted unlawfully in failing to ensure an adequate rate of support for more than 50,000 asylum seekers. The case, brought by an asylum seeker “CB”, challenged the amount of financial support given to asylum seekers during the cost-of-living crisis. An estimated 58,148 asylum seekers in self-catering accommodation receive cash support for basic needs such as food and travel. The level of support is calculated to be the minimum required for day-to-day survival.  

Can you draw a line between this case and Anisminic?

25 November 2017 by David Hart KC

Privacy International v. Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2017] EWHC EWCA Civ 1868, Court of Appeal, 23 November 2017

Introduction

As all lawyers know, the great case about courts confronting a no-go area for them is the late 1960’s case of Anisminic.

A statutory Commission was given the job of deciding whether compensation should be awarded for property sequestrated, in the particular case as a result of the 1956 Suez crisis. The Act empowering it said that the

determination by the Commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called in question in any court of law.

The House of Lords, blasting aside arcane distinctions, said that this provision was not enough to oust judicial review for error of law.

Fast forward 50 years, and another Act which says

determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including decisions as to whether they have jurisdiction) shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in any court.

The Court of Appeal has just decided that, unlike Anisminic, this Act does exclude any judicial review.

Why?

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The Weekly Round-Up: Questions over Meta’s VR child protection policies, and the ethics of banning sexual entertainment venues

17 January 2022 by Calla Randall

In the news:

Mark Zuckerberg’s Meta platform is under pressure from the UK’s data watchdog, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), over reports that their latest virtual reality headset, the ‘Oculus Quest 2’, does not have adequate parental controls, exposing children to harmful content. The ICO said it will investigate whether it violates the so-called ‘Children’s Code’, a set of regulations introduced in the UK four months ago which seeks to protect children online. The campaign group, Centre of Countering Digital Hate (CCDH), conducted research on the device, finding frequent instances of inappropriate behaviour on the app often used by Oculus Quest 2 players, VRChat. This included two ‘heavily breathing’ men following a child’s avatar, and another man joking that he was ‘a convicted sex offender’. If Meta has breached the code, it could be fined up to £2.5bn. However, it is unclear whether the device will be found to have breached the Code even if insufficient parental controls are in place, given that the regulations largely focus on the misuse of data, rather than the content children are exposed to on apps.

In other news:

Freeman on the Land: Canadian lawyer responds

23 December 2020 by Guest Contributor

What’s a judge to do when the Magna Carta/Freeman on the Land crew threaten you with hanging and start menacing court clerks as well?

As Rosalind English noted in a previous post, Canada’s latest Freemen judicial decisions in AVI and MHVB and Jacqueline Robinson (I and II) have had to answer those pointed questions.

Rosalind’s note canvassed the first decision by Justice Robert Graesser of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench calling out the actions of Jacqueline Robinson who had inserted herself into a high-conflict child custody case with disastrous results for the mother she was ‘helping’.  Robinson’s efforts included invoking Article 61 of the 1215 Magna Carta despite it having been repealed some 800 years previous and a demand for the return of the mother’s “property” (read ‘child’).  With Robinson’s Magna Carta Lawful Rebellion help, the mother went from having shared child access to no access and being removed as a guardian.