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UK Human Rights Blog - 1 Crown Office Row
Search Results for: puberty blockers consent/page/23/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)
How far are the courts willing to go to intervene in matters of foreign affairs in order to protect human rights? Spoiler: they’re not. Continue reading →
The Conservative Party Conference began today. As has been the case in past years, human rights policy will have a prominent role to play, but much of which is said will be bluster. The Prime Minister has already said that all options are on the table, including withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Expect more tomorrow when Lord Chancellor Chris Grayling and Home Secretary Theresa May step up to the podium from 2:30pm to 4pm.
Judging from the Prime Minister’s comments as well as Chris Grayling’s in the Spectator, it appears likely that this party conference will be similar to previous ones. Government ministers will promise that a majority Conservative government will replace “Labour’s” Human Rights Act with a Bill of Rights – a longstanding Tory policy which also featured in the party’s 2010 manifesto (at p.79). The promise was scuppered after the 2010 election due to demands from coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats. And, the Tories will continue to make vague threats that “people want to see the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom being in the United Kingdom and not in Strasbourg” (Grayling, a self-described “staunch Eurosceptic”) and that ECHR withdrawal “may be… where we end up” (Cameron).
Re K and H [2015] EWCA Civ 543, Court of Appeal, 22 May 2015 – read judgment
Philippa Whipple QC and Matthew Donmall of 1 COR appeared for the Lord Chancellor in this case. They have played no part in the writing of this post.
Lord Dyson for the Court of Appeal has recently reversed the decision of HHJ Bellamy (see my post here) who had ordered legal aid to help an unrepresented father in family proceedings. The conundrum was that the father wanted contact with his children aged 5 and 4, but a 17-year old step-daughter, Y, told her teacher that the father sexually abused her – which the father denied.
That issue had to be decided first – and understandably the father felt unable to cross-examine Y himself. Hence the judge’s order that the Courts Service (HMCTS) should pay for legal representation for the father limited to that cross-examination of Y.
The UK has seen an increasingly falling rate in arrests and prosecutions for cannabis possession over recent years, as police forces no longer see the point in enforcement. The Liberal Democrats have campaigned for its legalisation since 2016, and the first medically-prescribed cannabis was permitted in the UK in 2018. However, crucial NHS cannabis-based medicines for epilepsy remained prohibitively difficult to access for another year, with the majority of self-reported ‘medicinal’ users still turning to the black market. With growing numbers of US states, alongside Canada and South Africa decriminalising recreational use over the past three years, some UK MPs believe that cannabis legalisation will occur in the UK within five to ten years.
In recent years direct challenges to the authority of the Court within a handful of member states have also become more explicit and vocal” and “the Convention system crumbles when one member state, and then the next, and then the next, cherry pick which judgments to implement.
So said Nils Muižnieks, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, last year. This raises the question of whether the Convention system is facing an implementation crisis and what more might be done by the Committee of Ministers, the regional body responsible for supervising the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.
Last month, the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and Leicester Law School convened a public event that asked an expert panel to consider these issues. Speakers included Merris Amos (Queen Mary University London); Dr Ed Bates (Leicester Law School); Eleanor Hourigan (Deputy Permanent Representative, UK Delegation to the Council of Europe); Nuala Mole (The AIRE Centre); and Prof Philip Leach (EHRAC, Middlesex University London and the European Implementation Network). Murray Hunt (Legal Adviser to the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights and incoming Director of the Bingham Centre) chaired the event.
Art.3 European Convention on Human Rights provides as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
This provision corresponds with Art.4 of the EU Charter which has the same wording.
Theoretically, treatment must reach an intense level of severity for a challenge under this provision to succeed. The Strasbourg authorities originally set a high threshold for treatment falling within the scope of Art.3 ; it must exceed “a certain roughness of treatment” (The Greek Case (1969) Application Nos 00003321-3/67, 11 YbK of the ECHR 501).
In principle the rule is that conditions in the home State, however appalling, do not engage the responsibility of the deporting country. However, Art. 3 is often cited in deportation and asylum cases and allegations of institutional “torture” and “degrading treatment” in the receiving states, advanced by intervening NGOs, are hard to disprove.
Following the judgment in D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423, that an HIV patient could not be returned to a state of origin where medical treatment was inadequate, Art. 3 has been extended to cover conditions of impoverishment and social decay in non-Convention states. In R(Adam, Limbuela and Tesema) v Home Secretary [2005] UKHL 66 the House of Lords applied this extended right to overrule legislation denying social support to asylum seekers who fail to submit their claims as soon as “reasonably practicable”. That the denial of social support was deemed to amount to torture and inhuman treatment shows how far the Convention has developed its reach as a social and economic rights instrument, where claims to social services, accommodation and a high standard of medical care can be made out under the prohibition that was drafted into the Convention in order to prevent the repeat of the sort of atrocities perpetrated in Nazi Germany. Indeed, in 2008 the Strasbourg Court stated in terms that the prohibtion on deportation extends to
the expulsion of any person afflicted with any serious, naturally occurring physical or mental illness which may cause suffering, pain and reduced life expectancy and require specialised medical treatment which may not be so readily available in the applicant’s country of origin or which may be available only at substantial cost.(N v UK, 27 May 2008)
The Strasbourg Court has recently started to distinguish “torture” from “inhuman and degrading treatment” as separate elements of Article 3 although the results in practice are the same. In the case of Gäfgen v. Germany (1 June 2010) the Grand Chamber considered that police officers threatening the applicant imminent pain for the purpose of extracting information constituted “inhuman treatment” falling within the scope of Article 3. But they also held that this method of interrogation did not reach the level of cruelty to attain the threshold of torture under that provision. On the other hand, the bar for offending treatment may being set somewhat lower according to more recent case law from Strasbourg. For example, the Court found degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 when a person was deprived of his spectacles (Slyusarev v Russia 20 April 2010) even though there was no evidence of impairment to the eyes caused by the delayed replacement. The fact that the applicant could not read or write normally was sufficient to amount to treatment in breach of Art.3. When riot police burst into schools used as shelters by G8 protestors and meted out punishment with riot sticks, this was found to have reached the level of torture under Art.3: Cesaro v Italy, 7 April 2015. Where a prisoner with chronic health conditions and a medical note recommending the avoidance of cigarettes was confined almost all day in overcrowded cells where the other occupants smoked, the passive smoking element was relevant in the finding of conditions incompatible with Art. 3 (Florea v Romania 14 September 2010). The Court has also stated that states are under an obligation to take measures to protect prisoners from passive smoking where their state of health so requires (Elefteriadis v Romania, 25 January 2011).
Article 3 imposes an obligation on the state to ensure the health and well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, although they are not expected to provide equivalent health care in prisons as compared with the outside world (Aleksanyan v Russia, 22 December 2008). In McGlinchey v UK the failure by the prison medical staff to properly monitor the state of the applicant, who was vomiting repeatedly under withdrawal symptoms, and suffering from dehydration, disclosed treatment in breach of Article 3 (29 April 2003). Outside the prison walls there is less case law, and the threshold is higher; for example lack of access by cancer patients to potentially life-saving experimental drugs which were not yet authorised did not amount to treatment in breach of Art.3 (Hristozov v Bulgaria, 13 November 2012). Leaving an asylum seeker to fend for himself on the street for over a year, without provision for shelter, food or other needs, breached Art.3 in MSS v Greece and Belgium (2011).
Domestic courts may be rowing back from their earlier generous approach to Article 3 claims – see R (on the application of EW) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] EWHC 2957 and our post on the case. More recently, the Court of Appeal has confirmed that foreign nationals may be removed from the UK even where their lives will be drastically shortened due to a lack of healthcare in their home states. Removal in those circumstances does not breach Articles 3 or 8 ECHR except in the most exceptional cases (GS (India) and Ors v SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 40. D v UK is rarely followed in current times, as signatory states’ medical and social services become more pressed and cash strapped.
However it remains the case that Article 3 has been interpreted to cover not only state sponsored persecution but the acts of private individuals as well, since it obliges governments not to return or deport anyone to a destination country where they might be exposed to danger, whether at the hands of state agents or rebel groups. This interpretation of Article 3 has prevented the deportation of a convicted armed robber to Somali because of the risk that he might get caught up in the civil war there – see Ahmed v Austria (1997) 24 EHRR 278.
Chahal v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413 set a strong precedent for preventing states from deporting individuals to countries where they risk treatment in breach of Article 3. In Saadi v Italy (2008) No. 37201/06 the Court emphasised that Art.3 imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to inhumane treatment. The conduct of the person concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account. The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if not returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment that the person may be subject to on return. In Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK [2012] ECHR 56 the Court accepted that the UK and the Jordanian governments had made genuine efforts to provide detailed assurances that the applicant would not be ill treated on his return to Jordan; although in fact the applicant won on the basis of Article 6, as the Court found that he faced a flagrant denial of his right to a fair trial if deported.
The Strasbourg Court has also attracted criticism from high places for applying Article 3 to the way Parliament regulates the “reasonable chastisement” of children by their parents in the home (A v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 611).
Macklin v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2015] UKSC 77, 16th December 2015 – read judgment
The Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed an appeal against a decision of Scotland’s High Court of Justiciary (available here) in which it refused to overturn a criminal conviction on the basis that the non-disclosure of evidence breached the appellant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Blood donation centres all over Europe are grateful for volunteers, but sometimes people don’t make it through the assessment process. Restrictions on male homosexual blood donors are particularly tricky, because they fly in the face of equality, whilst reflecting our current, no doubt inadequate, understanding of how infectious diseases are transmitted, and how long pathogens remain viable in human blood.
This case started when a French citizen, M. Léger, presented himself at his local blood donation centre. He was turned down after interview. The relevant law in France implements two EU Directives on blood donation which lay down specific conditions regarding eligibility.
Legal background
This was a request to the European Court (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling on Directive 2002/98/EC which imposes safety standing on the collection of blood for therapeutic use (the “Blood Directive”). It requires that blood should only be taken from individuals “whose health status is such that no detrimental effects will ensue as a result of the donation and that any risk of transmission of infectious diseases is minimised”. It also states that potential donors should be assessed by way of interview for their suitability. Continue reading →
Animal welfare groups and campaigners for humane farming have welcomed the latest ruling by the European Court of Justice upholding the refusal of German authorities to allow the export of live cattle to Kazakhstan, a 7,000 km journey involving insufficient rest stops and unloading. According to Compassion in World Farming,
Every year, over three million animals are exported from the European Union to non-EU countries. Hundreds of thousands are destined for countries in Russia, Turkey, The Middle East and North Africa. (Live exports from the EU)
This was a referral from German municipal authorities on just this question. It sought a ruling from the European Court of Justice (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations. Continue reading →
With the Supreme Court having ruled yesterday that Parliament must have a say in the triggering of Article 50 TEU, the ensuing debate regarding the process for exiting the EU will undoubtedly revolve around what is politically considered the most desirable ‘type’ of Brexit, and whether MPs can restrict the government’s negotiation position. This post puts forward the hypothesis that such debates may become irrelevant because, in the event that negotiations fail, the UK has no guaranteed input on the terms of its withdrawal from the EU. At the heart of this problem is the still unanswered question whether an Article 50 notification is revocable.
In R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s ruling that the royal prerogative cannot be relied on to trigger Article 50 (see yesterday’s post on this blog which summarised the court’s judgment). Rather than reliance on executive power, an Act of Parliament is required to authorise ministers to give notice of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. This is based on the premise that such notification under Article 50(2) would inevitably, and unavoidably, have a direct effect on UK citizens’ rights by ultimately withdrawing the UK from the EU. However, this assumption warrants exploration.
R (o.t.a. Dowley) v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWHC 2618 (Admin) Patterson J, 20 October 2016 – read judgment
This challenge was about a landowner not wishing to let those wishing to develop Sizewell C nuclear power station onto her land to carry out surveys and investigations. But it came down to a disagreement about the terms which such entry might occur. For s.53 Planning Act 2008 enables the Secretary of State to allow such entry, subject to conditions, and with the proviso that the landowner may claim compensation for “damage caused to lands or chattels” (s.53(7)) via a claim to the Upper Tribunal.
The entry in question was not insubstantial; the developer wished to have access to some 75 acres of the 420 acres of the claimant’s estate, for surveys relating for possible spoil storage, roads and builders accommodation if the project was to proceed.
The major fall-out was over the issue of the extent of compensation. And this, as we shall see, is where human rights came in, albeit in a topsy-turvy way.
The EU’s diplomatic service has warned of “indications” that Israel’s activities in Gaza and the occupied West Bank are “in breach of [its] human rights obligations” to the Union under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The report, due to be presented on 23 June to the foreign ministers of Member States by Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the EU’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is based on “facts verified by and assessments made by independent international institutions”. It follows an audit pushed forward last month by 17 Member States, led by the Netherlands. The Agreement, which came into force in 2000, provides for free trade arrangements between the two parties, currently worth over 42 billion euros a year in goods, and a further c. 35 billion euros in services: the EU is Israel’s top commercial partner. Article 2 of the Agreement states that “Relations between the Parties, as well as the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of the Agreement.” Suspending the Agreement would require the unanimous consent of the EU’s 27 Member States.
The UK Office for Students (OfS) has issued new “free speech” guidelines to universities in England, effectively prohibiting blanket bans on student protests, and putting substantial brakes on the penalisation of students and staff exercising lawful speech. The guidelines anticipate and purport to give clarity to the provisions of delayed Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023, now revised and due to come into force this August. The OfS’s new “three step” approach requires universities to take “reasonably practical steps” to “secure free speech” which is “within the law” (= Steps 1 and 2): where this is not possible, it must run a proportionality assessment on any interferences to free speech, following Article 10(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (= Step 3). The National Union for Students has dismissed the guidance as “just more nonsense playing into the so-called ‘culture wars’”, with the new regulations failing to the prioritise “protecting and supporting marginalised students.”
In the courts
The Court of Appeal has held that an asylum applicant’s fears of being returned to a jurisdiction which was not a “safe third country” or “safe third State” only affected his rights to appeal if the application were deemed inadmissible: it was “immaterial” to the assessment of an application once admitted. In AAZA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 705, a Yemeni national appealed against the Upper Tribunal’s decision to uphold the Home Secretary’s refusal of his asylum application. The appellant, who had lived in China since the age of one but did not have Chinese nationality, claimed that there had been an error of law in the Tribunal’s allowing his appeal on humanitarian protection grounds with regard to Yemen, but not on humanitarian protection and human rights grounds with regard to China. The appellant argued that, since China was not listed as a “safe third country” under Schedule 3 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, the UK was in breach of its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, and in contravention of his rights under ECHR Article 3 (prohibition of torture), following the provisions concerning return to a “safe third State” under Part 4A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Bean LJ held that these statutory provisions did not apply to the instant case: “whether a state is a “safe third State” within this new provision only affects rights of appeal”, something not disputed here. The applicant’s risk of ill-treatment if returned to China therefore had to be decided on the basis of evidence relating to his own circumstances. Bean LJ found that the First Tier Tribunal “gave entirely adequate reasons for finding that the test was not satisfied” by the evidence of AAZA, who had spent virtually his whole life in China before coming to the UK as a student: “there was no error of law.” However, the Court held that the appellant might still apply to have his application reconsidered by the Home Secretary, if he could submit fresh evidence that he was at a risk of refoulement from China to Yemen.
The Supreme Court ruled that the police have a positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation into crimes involving serious violence to victims, in line with Article 3 of the ECHR. In this case the obligation had been breached.
The case concerned the police’s investigation into the ‘black cab rapist’, John Worboys. Two of his victims brought a claim for damages against the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), on the basis of an alleged failure of the police to conduct an effective investigation into Worbys’ crimes. The victims were awarded compensation in the first instance. The Court of Appeal dismissed the MPS’ appeal, and the case came before the Supreme Court. Continue reading →
‘In peril’: Human Rights Watch publishes their World Report 2026
On Wednesday, Human Rights Watch published World Report 2026, the 36th edition of its annual review of human rights practices in over 100 countries.
Introducing the Report, Executive Director Philippe Bolopion describes 2025 as a potential ‘tipping point’: US hostility to multilateral institutions, he argues, now compounds longstanding efforts by China and Russia to erode the rules-based international order.
The Report’s UK chapter highlights restrictions on protest, including the proscription of Palestine Action, alongside rising absolute poverty, disability benefit cuts and far-right anti-migrant mobilisation. It criticised the Supreme Court’s ruling that ‘sex’ in the Equality Act 2010 refers to biological sex rather than legal gender identity (For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16). The same ruling forms part of a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, discussed further below.
The World Report also welcomed Parliament’s vote to decriminalise abortion. Although the Abortion Act 1967 permitted lawful terminations in specified circumstances, abortion itself remained a criminal offence. In June 2025, the House of Commons voted 379 to 137 to add Clause 191 to the Crime and Policing Bill, removing women from criminal liability in relation to their own pregnancies at any gestational stage. The provision, which represents the most significant reform of abortion law in England and Wales in nearly 60 years, is currently before the House of Lords.
Human Rights Watch’s full global report can be accessed here.
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