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Condliff, R (on the application of) v North Staffordshire Primary Care Trust [2011] EWCA Civ 910 – Read judgment
A morbidly obese man has lost his appeal against his local Primary Care Trust’s (PCT’s) refusal to fund his anti-obesity surgery. The Court of Appeal ruled that the PCT had no obligation under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to consider social or non-clinical factors when deciding whether to grant a request for exceptional funding.
In his discussion of the case, Lord Justice Toulson began by saying that “Human rights law is sometimes in danger of becoming over complicated“. Underlying this point is the fact that it is already complicated enough. This is a good example: how could a court find that this case, which clearly involves the dignity and family life of a man whose life is difficult and miserable, not engage the protection of human rights law? I will try to explain.
Begum v Special Immigration Appeals Commission and the Secretary of State for the Home Department[2020] EWCA Civ 918
Early last year, after ISIL was dislodged from Raqqah, Shamima Begum was discovered in a refugee camp in Syria. When she expressed a wish to return home to London’s Bethnal Green, Her Majesty’s Government wasn’t welcoming. She had left to join ISIL and HMG did not want her back. It considered her a serious risk to national security and removed her British citizenship. It then refused her leave to enter the UK to appeal that decision. But the Court of Appeal, in the latest legal ruling on the case, has held that fairness requires she be permitted to return to participate in her appeal.
The Court’s decision overturns some, but not all, of the Judgment of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) delivered in February (and reported here).
The Queen on the application of Totel Ltd v The First-Tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) and The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2012] EWCA Civ 1401 – read judgment
Tax litigation is not the most obvious hunting ground for human rights points but if claimants feel sufficiently pinched by what they perceive as unfair rules, there is nothing to stop them appealing to the courts’ scrutiny of the lawfulness of those rules.
Human rights were not raised per se in this appeal but constitutional principles which arguably play the same role made all the difference to the outcome.
This case concerned the removal of a right of appeal by an Order in Parliament that stopped the appellant company (T) in its tracks, so naturally it turned to judicial review to find a remedy that the tax tribunal was not prepared to grant. T prayed in aid a fundamental principle of our unwritten constitution set out in R (Spath Holme Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, the Environment and Regions [2000] 2 WLR 15:
Parliament does not lightly take the exceptional course of delegating to the executive the power to amend primary legislation. When it does so the enabling power should be scrutinised, should not receive anything but a narrow and strict construction and any doubts about its scope should be resolved by a restrictive approach.[35] Continue reading →
P (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 888 – read judgment here.
1 Crown Office Row’s Martin Downs represented the parents in this appeal (not at first instance), but is not the author of this blog post.
In this successful appeal against care and placement orders in respect of a young infant with Polish parents, the Court of Appeal were sharply critical of comments made by the first instance judge which made it clear he had closed his mind at an early stage to the possibility of the baby being looked after by her grandparents in Poland. The Court held that both the judge and the local authority had failed to give sufficient weight to their positive obligation under Article 8 to consider ways of retaining a child within the family.
The parents in this case were Polish nationals who moved to England in 2011. Their daughter was born in September 2012. For the first five-and-a-half months of the little girl’s life, there were no concerns about the care she was receiving from her parents. However, in February 2013 she was taken to her local hospital in Warrington with a head injury which was found to be non-accidental and probably inflicted by the father. On discharge from hospital the baby was taken into foster care. Proceedings were instituted and after several hearings before HHJ Dodds concluded in December 2013 with an adoption placement.
As the international media has become full of whispers as to just where Asia Bibi might be offered asylum, discrimination has once again been to the forefront of legal bulletins at home. Most notably, the story of Rehana Popal’s treatment at the hands of solicitors who requested that she return her papers after their client demanded a ‘white, male barrister’, has made waves in the news. Whilst this runs entirely against the solicitors’ code of conduct and, indeed, the Equality Act 2010, Ms Popal, the English Bar’s only Afghan-born female barrister, has stated that this has not been the first occasion upon which she has been subjected to such discriminatory treatment. Continue reading →
On Monday 23, the Russian tank commander Vadim Shishimarin was sentenced to life in prison by a court in Kyviv. He previously pleaded guilty to killing Oleksandr Shelypov, 62. Shishmarin’s trial has been closely watched by investigators collecting evidence of possible war crimes to bring before the international Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. International law experts will also scrutinise the verdict of the 21-year-old tank commander; a key question arose from the proceedings about how much scope the Kyviv court has now left itself for sentencing Russians for more heinous or numerous offences.
The Independent Review of Children’s Social Care, led by Josh MacAlister, was published on Monday 23 May. The report included more than 80 recommendations and suggested a windfall tax on the 15 largest children’s homes and fostering providers. Projections claim that by 2032 there could be approaching 100,000 children in care costing £15 billion per year. An investigation by The Timeshas demonstrated that many inexperienced or first-time owners of children’s home have opened residences in order to charge as much as £1,000 a day. MacAlister has also encouraged the government to consider adding those with care experience to the Equality Act.
The Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill has caused controversy in recent years, with opponents raising concerns about how it could affect the rights of women and girls. On Tuesday, Ellie Gomersall – the first trans person to be elected as the president of NUS Scotland – and Malcom Dingwall-Smith, Sportscotland’s strategic partnerships manager, both gave evidence to the qualities, human rights and civil justice committee concerning its effectiveness. The former, asserted the limited powers of the bill to reduce crime in single-sex spaces, and the latter highlighted that the bill would have no impact on a section of the 2010 Act that allows trans people to be barred from the sports of their acquired gender if the governing body deems it interferes with ‘fair competition or the safety of competitors’.
On Thursday, Britain’s equality regulator announced that it has launched a formal investigation into Pontins holiday parks due to continued concerns about discrimination against Gypsies and Travellers. Last year, Pontins owner, Britannia Jinky Jersey Limited, entered into a 12-month contract with the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), following allegations that the company operated a discriminatory booking policy. On the 18 February the EHRC terminated the contract, judging that Pontins had not taken the required steps to prevent unlawful race discrimination or honour its commitments under the agreements. The EHRC has now launched a formal investigation that will consider whether Pontins has committed unlawful acts under the Equality Act 2010.
The Court of Appeal in MR (Pakistan) and Anotherv Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 541 recently dealt with appeals regarding the absence of a process to assess the vulnerability of a person detained under immigration powers at Her Majesty’s Prisons (“HMPs”). This absence remains despite such a process existing for those detained under the same immigration powers in Immigration Removal Centres (“IRCs”) by virtue of Rules 34 and 35 of the Detention Centre Rules. These provisions enable a medical report to be prepared which is then considered by the SSHD when deciding on the management of the individual under relevant policy guidance.
The Court upheld the claim in part, holding that whilst this discrepancy did not give rise to systemic unfairness, in the individual two cases there was an irrational failure to obtain a Rule 35 report or equivalent. Despite this, however, it was held that these failures were not relevant to the decisions to detain the individuals in the particular cases.
Sinclair Collis Ltd, R (o.t.a) v. The Secretary of State for Health [2011] EWCA Civ 437 read judgment here
Sinclair Collis own cigarette machines, some 20,000 of them. So when cigarette machines were banned by law, there was nowhere for their owners to go, apart from the Courts. On Friday, the Court of Appeal dismissed their challenge to the ban, but there was a powerful dissent from Laws LJ on both the law and its application. This makes the prospect of an appeal to the Supreme Court all the more likely. Even that might not be the end of the line, if the SCt refer the case to Europe.
The case – all 70+ pages of the decision – is an object lesson in how to challenge a ban. But, hang on, some of you will say, how can you challenge a ban once it has become the law? Well, until 1973 you couldn’t. That is when we gained the first way of challenging a law, through joining the EEC and thus taking on the obligation to make our laws EEC-compliant. This was Sinclair Collis’s first string to its bow. In 2000, the second string arrived – the coming into force of the Human Rights Act. But there is still no third string – no purely domestic challenge to legislation once enacted – Parliament is still sovereign.
Any lawyer dealing with civil or criminal cases tends to think that, if there is a time limit for doing something in the case, then if that thing does not get done on time, the court may be lenient if there is good reason for extending time. The problem comes where the court is only given power to hear an appeal by a specific set of rules, and the rules say, for instance: you must appeal within 14 days of the decision. In the statutory context, that may mean precisely what it says. And the court, however sympathetically inclined, cannot do otherwise and allow a late appeal.
We see this from this mental health case. Ms Modaresi, who suffers from schizophrenia, was admitted to hospital on 20 December 2010 for assessment under section 2 of the Mental Health Act. Section 66 of the Act provides that where a patient is admitted to hospital in this way, “an application may be made to [the tribunal] within the relevant period” by the patient, and “the relevant period” means “14 days beginning with the day on which the patient is admitted”.
Omar, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 118 – read judgment
Angus McCullough QC of 1 Crown Office Row acted as a special advocate in this case. He is not the author of this post.
The contending principles in this case are encapsulated in the question put to the Court of Appeal:
In considering whether to allow an application for evidence in proceedings abroad, is the Court to “fill a justice gap” or “respect a sovereignty limit”?
This was an appeal from a decision by the Divisional Court decision in June last year. My post on that ruling sets out the salient facts. In sum, that court refused the claimants’ application for an order against the secretary of state for material for use in proceedings in Uganda. Continue reading →
LH, R (o.t.a) v. Shropshire Council [2014] EWCA 404 (Civ), Court of Appeal, 4 April 2014 – read judgment
Good advertisement for the flexibility of the common law, this case. This is because the duty to consult owed by a public body extends into all reaches of public law, from the regulation of a metal trading company (see my recent post here) to care centres and residential homes. Indeed it was in the context of residential home closures that the modern law got worked out. In the 1992 case of ex parte Baker, there had been a draft community care plan which had made no reference to the closure of individual homes, and which was followed up by a bolt from the blue – residents of one home only had 5 days’ notice that their home was to close.
In none of these cases is there a statutory duty to consult – it is an aspect of common law fairness.
The LH case concerns the closure of an adult care day centre. The question in LH was how to apply the principles in Baker to a rather more nuanced consultation approach, where closure of day centres in general was raised in consultation, but the closure of the specific day centre (Hartleys) was not.
Dunnage v. Randall & UK Insurance Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 673, 2 July 2015 – read judgment
This is an extraordinary case, and one which goes deep down into why the law of wrongs (or torts) makes people compensate others for injury and losses, whereas the criminal law may decide that a crime has not been committed.
Imagine this. Your uncle (Vince) arrives in your home. He is behaving very hyper. Unbeknownst to you he is in the middle of a florid paranoid schizophrenic episode. He suddenly announces that he will go and fetch a copy of Autotrader from his car. He returns without it, but with a petrol can and a lighter. He sits down and becomes all aggressive and paranoid about you and your partner. He knocks over the petrol can and starts rolling the lighter trigger. After more incoherent accusations by him (e.g. “Why have you got my Hoover?”), you try to drag him clear to save him, but he ignites the lighter. You are badly burned and jump off the balcony. You are very brave. Vince dies at the scene.
You (the man with the dog) sue Vince’s estate, except you don’t really, because you are really suing his household insurers.
You try to pursue a tightrope between arguments. Vince may have been mad-ish, but not that mad, so that he is still civilly responsible for his actions. But the household policy only applies to “accidental” injury, and excludes wilful or malicious actions. So he cannot have been too sane and capable of deliberate and malicious actions.
The judge disallows your claim, on the basis that Vince lacked volition. The Court of Appeal allows it. Why?
With the current turmoil in Westminster, attention to the government’s proposed Bill of Rights Bill has temporarily fallen away. But whatever the leadership contest throws up, the debate still rages: do we repeal and replace the Human Rights Act 1998? Leave it in place, or update it? Dominic Raab’s Bill will probably have to wait a while for its second reading in the Commons; in the mean time, Rosalind English combs through its provisions with Andrew Warnock QC, whose practice at 1 Chancery Chambers involves many cases involving claims based on the European Convention of Human Rights and the 1998 Act. Listen to Episode 167 for an in-depth survey of the new Bill’s proposals.
Here are the citations for the cases referred to in the interview:
R (On the application of Elan-Cane) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 56
Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4
On Thursday 28th July, the Supreme Court heard a “permission to appeal” argument in the British nuclear testing case. The judgment to be appealed is that of the Court of Appeal Civil Division in Ministry of Defence v AB and others[2010] EWCA Civ 1317 – (Smith and Leveson LJJ and Sir Mark Waller).
In terse legalese, the issue to be appealed is whether the Court of Appeal – (1) applied the wrong legal test for knowledge in section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980, and (2) adopted the wrong legal approach to the exercise of discretion under section 33 of the Act. The Supreme Court granted permission for the appeal – see BBC 28th July and The Independent 28th July.
The UK Home Office has begun a ten-week public consultation into the use of facial recognition and biometrics technologies by the police, with the view to expanding the rollout of live facial recognition policing (currently limited to ten forces) across the entire UK. Among the Government’s proposals is the creation of a regulator overseeing police implementation of the technology; any new legislation arising from the consultation is unlikely to be in force for at least another two years. The Government has invested over £15 million into facial recognition policing since 2024. Its currently unregulated use has drawn sharp criticism from human rights and civil liberties groups, and in August the Equality and Human Rights Commission warned that its present implementation was disproportionate in its infringement of human rights. Liberty director Akiko Hart responded positively to this week’s announcement of a consultation, but stressed that the Government “must halt the rapid rollout” of facial recognition and ensure that rights-prioritising safeguards are in place. Big Brother Watch director Silkie Carlo called the “consultation necessary but long overdue”, adding that police facial recognition should be paused immediately, pending the consultation’s outcome. Strong tendencies towards racial discrimination in the use of the technology have raised particular concerns, as the Home Office conceded this week: whereas white people are only wrongly identified by the technology at a rate of 0.04%, this occurs at a rate of 5.5% for black people and 4% for Asian people. Earlier this year the Metropolitan Police declined to adopt live facial recognition at September’s far-right ‘Unite the Kingdom’ rally, despite deploying it weeks earlier at the Notting Hill Carnival.
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