Search Results for: prisoners/page/36/ministers have been procrastinating on the issue, fearing that it will prove unpopular with the electorate.
22 April 2012 by Sam Murrant
Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your weekly bulletin of human rights news. The full list of links can be found here. You can also find our table of human rights cases here and previous roundups here.
In the news
This week saw the final Brighton Declaration, containing the Council of Europe states’ proposals for reform of the European Court of Human Rights, published, in extremely important news for the future of the Court. Other hot topics this week include perennial gems such as the deportation of terrorist suspects, the right to liberty, fears over the democratic legitimacy of judicial “lawmaking” and cameras in court.
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19 February 2011 by Rosalind English
Tovey & Ors v Ministry of Justice [2011] EWHC 271 (QB) (18 February 2011) – read judgment.
In a case heard the day before Parliament debated whether it should amend the law preventing prisoners from voting, the High Court struck out a claim for compensation by a prisoner in respect of his disenfranchisement.
Although it was “not part of the court’s function to express any view as to the nature of legislative change”, this ruling confirmed that as a matter of English law, including the Human Rights Act 1998, a prisoner will not succeed before a court in England and Wales in any claim for damages or a declaration based on his disenfranchisement while serving his sentence.
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5 October 2011 by Adam Wagner
Updated x 2 | What can we learn from yesterday’s gaff by the Home Secretary Theresa May involving Maya the cat?
First, when referring to a legal judgment in a speech make sure you get the outcome right. Particularly when prefaced by “I am not making this up”. Secondly, if said speech is being broadcast live, there are plenty of lawyers on Twitter who will enjoy nothing more than tracking down the judgment, reading it and exposing the fact that you have got it wrong.
These lessons are important. But they relate to any amusing but forgettable political gaff. There is, however, a third lesson. There has been for a number of years a trend of wilfully or recklessly misreporting human rights cases. This trend is not just mischievous; it threatens to do real damage to our legal system.
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20 June 2015 by Rosalind English
British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors and others, R(on the application of) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and another [2015] EWHC 1723 (Admin) – read judgment
An exception to copyright infringement for private use has failed to survive a challenge in the High Court. But this may not be the end of the story. Although he accepted part of the claimants’ contentions, Green J observed that
the Claimants’ argument does not sit well or easily with the very unusual and particular circumstances which have led to the decision to introduce the private use exception in the first place. These are that the advent of digitalisation has led to a market where device sellers and consumers assume they may copy and where rightholders have not sought private law remedies against infringers.[my italics]
It is a particular feature of this case that there is a widespread consensus that the law has signally failed to keep up with market reality and with reasonable consumer expectations and indeed has been brought into disrepute by its condemnation as illegal of activities which are now accepted by consumers as lawful and which in actual fact form the basic commercial premise upon which copying and storage devices are actively sold throughout Europe.
Having upheld a small part of the challenge, Green J will now hear submissions as to what flows from this conclusion and from the judgment generally. In particular he will hear submissions as to whether any issue of law that he had decided should be referred to the Court of Justice and if so as to the question(s) that should be asked.
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4 January 2020 by Samuel March
Casamitjana v The League Against Cruel Sports (judgment pending)
In what multiple commentators have hailed as a landmark legal case, Norwich Employment Tribunal found that the Claimant’s “ethical veganism” is a philosophical belief and therefore a protected characteristic for the purposes of section 10 of the Equality Act 2010 (“s.10”) following a preliminary hearing on 2nd and 3rd January 2020.
The judgment is unlikely to be available for some time, so it is not yet possible to analyse the Tribunal’s reasoning, but the Hearing Bundle and Claimant’s Written Submissions of Claimant’s Counsel have been made available online by his solicitors which gives a clear indication of how the issue may have been decided.
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17 December 2018 by Guest Contributor
David Burrows is a solicitor advocate, trainer and writer.
Human rights and English marriage
On 10 December 2018 responses were due to the government’s divorce reform proposals, Reducing family conflict Reform of the legal requirements for divorce (September 2018). A reply to responses is due from the Government, says the Ministry of Justice, by 8 March 2019.
My response to the proposals – as I saw things then – is on my blog here. Thoughts of divorce reform throw up two important human rights issues: one a direct Article 6 question; and the other – which it is surely time for law reformers and the government to confront? – is a discrimination point (Art 14).
But first a little history. The then Labour government, on Leo Abse MP’s private member’s bill, passed with (more or less) approval of the Church of England, the Divorce Reform Act 1969 (in force from 1 January 1971). It was consolidated into Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) which represents the modern law and the modern statutory underpinning for financial distribution on divorce or nullity. Mirror provisions apply for same gender couples: Civil Partnership Act 2004. Wholly different finance rules apply for unmarried cohabitants.
Matrimonial causes
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA) section 1 is very simple. There is one ground for divorce: irretrievable breakdown of marriage (s 1(1)). To prove that ground a petitioner (P) must prove one or more of five facts: adultery; behaviour making it unreasonable for P to live with the other spouse/partner (R); desertion for two years; living apart for two (with consent); or five years.
Reformers – including from their inception, the group of family law solicitors, now Resolution – have objected to the blame inherent in the first two facts, and the tendency which this may produce to leave a nastier taste, than need be, in the mouth of divorcees.
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4 May 2010 by Adam Wagner
Savage (Respondent) v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (Appellant) [2010] EWHC 865 (QB) – Read judgment
The High Court has ruled that a mental health trust was responsible for the death of a patient who threw herself in front of a train. The judgment marks the end of a long and complex case, and a significant shift in the law relating to public authorities’ responsibility to preserve life under the Human Rights Act. The trust must now pay Mrs Savage’s daughter £10,000 in compensation.
Carol Savage committed suicide on 5 July 2004 at age 50. At the time of her death, she was detained at Runwell Hospital under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. She had suffered from mental illness intermittently for many years.
After Mrs Savage’s death, her daughter Anna made a claim on the basis that the hospital owed her, as a victim of the death, a duty under the Human Rights Act 1998. The basis of her claim was that the hospital had failed in its duty to protect her mother under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to life. She also made a claim in her own right under Article 8 (right to family life).
Mental health patients and the right to life
Before making a decision on the liability of the trust, the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) was asked to decide a preliminary issue relating to it’s responsibility under Article 2 (read decision). The Trust argued that the reasoning in Osman v United Kingdom (23452/94) (1999) 1 FLR 193 ECHR was not applicable to the care of hospital patients. In Osman, the European Court of Human Rights held that there is a positive obligation for a State to take preventive measures to protect individuals whose life is at risk.
The trust argued that applying Osman to mental health care would conflict with other obligations of medical staff to their patients and encourage them to be too restrictive of patients’ liberty for fear that they might commit suicide.
The House of Lords threw out the Trust’s appeal. They held that Article 2 put health authorities under an overarching obligation to protect the lives of their patients. If members of staff know, or are in a position to know, that a particular patient presented a real and immediate risk of suicide, there as an additional “operational” obligation to do all that could reasonably be expected to prevent such an eventuality.
End of the saga
The case has now finally concluded, with Mr Justice Mackay finding that the trust could and should have done more to protect Mrs Savage. He said “all that was required to give her a real prospect or substantial chance of survival was the imposition of a raised level of observations, which would not have been an unreasonable or unduly onerous step to require of the defendant…”
Read more:
- A note by Philip Havers QC on the 2008 House of Lords judgment.
- See below (after the page break) for commentary on the House of Lords case by Rosalind English
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23 September 2013 by Daniel Isenberg
Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your regular fruit salad of human rights news and views. The full list of links can be found here. You can find previous roundups here. Post by Daniel Isenberg, edited and links compiled by Adam Wagner.
Judge Peter Murphy’s ruling on the niqaab in criminal proceedings dominates this week’s commentary. Some interesting pieces also on immigration detention following the outcry about abuse at one facility; and conflict between the IPCC and Metropolitan Police about internal investigations…
Human Rights Awards and Tour: Liberty has opened nominations for their 2013 Liberty Human Rights Awards – all details here. Meanwhile, the British Institute on Human Rights’ free Human Rights Tour is now in full swing – full programme here.
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1 January 2025 by Rosalind English
O v P and Q [2024] EWCA Civ 1577
(Jeremy Hyam KC and Alasdair Henderson of 1 Crown Office Row represented the mother in this case)
This was an appeal from a decision in the Divisional Court by Judd J in April 2024. The case raises a question at the core of the transgender debate involving young people: consent.
The young person at the centre of this litigation is now 16 years old. He was born female and started to identify as male in 2020 at the age of about 12.
His parents were estranged. In these circumstances his mother appealed against the refusal of her request for an adjournment of proceedings in which she sought a prohibited steps order and a best interests declaration in relation to her child, pending an assessment being undertaken by a private gender dysphoria clinic (Gender Plus), the first private gender dysphoria hormone clinic in the UK.
It was accepted that, now the young person was by now 16, no Gillick competence question arose (see Sir James Munby at [55] in An NHS Trust v. X [2021] EWHC 65 (Fam), [2021] 4 WLR 11, and MacDonald J at [48]-[49] in GK and LK v. EE [2023] EWCOP 49). It was also accepted that the young person was “impressive, hardworking and intelligent” and had no mental health problems.
Puberty Blockers and Cross-Sex Hormones: Policy Background
As Vos MR noted, a number of events coalesced to make this case a particularly sensitive one at the time of this appeal.
(i) the Cass Interim Review in 2022 led to the closure of the Tavistock clinic that had been in issue in Bell v. Tavistock;
(ii) on 12 March 2024, NHS England published a clinical policy concluding that there was not enough evidence to support the safety or clinical effectiveness of puberty blockers to make the treatment routinely available (outside a research protocol);
(iii) as the first instance judge recorded at [58], NHS Scotland had announced before the hearing that persons under 18 would not be prescribed cross-sex hormones;
(iv) on 21 March 2023, NHS England published a clinical commissioning policy laying down stringent eligibility and readiness requirements to be met before cross-sex hormones could be administered to those over 16;
(v) on 9 April 2024, NHS England wrote to all NHS gender dysphoria clinics asking them to defer offering first appointments to those under 18 “as an immediate response to Dr Cass’s advice that ‘extreme caution’ should be exercised before making a recommendation for [cross-sex hormones] in [children]”;
(vi) on 10 April 2024, the Cass Review was published*; and
(vii) on 11 December 2024 (the day before the hearing before the Court of Appeal), the government announced that the temporary embargo on the use of puberty blockers would be made indefinite (subject to a review in 2027).
* For the purposes of this case, the mother highlighted that the Cass Review had called into question the quality of the evidence on which hormone treatments for adolescents are based. Dr Cass says at page 13, for example, that “[t]he reality is that we have no good evidence on the long-term outcomes of interventions to manage gender-related distress”. Moreover, Dr Cass highlights new evidence about brain maturation continuing into the mid-20s, whilst it was originally thought to finish in adolescence. Dr Cass recommended that puberty blockers should only be available within a research protocol, and that recommendation has now been implemented.
The judge at first instance had said first that, whilst the findings of the Cass Review might turn out to be very significant, she did not think they justified her departure from Bell v. Tavistock and from Lieven J’s decision in AB v. CD and Tavistock [2021] EWHC 741 (Fam) (AB v. CD), which the Court of Appeal approved in Bell v. Tavistock.
Arguments before the Court
The father sought to terminate the proceedings begun by the mother on the ground that they were causing the young person significant distress.
The mother contended that the proceedings should be adjourned because the legal and regulatory landscape for gender dysphoria treatment was changing rapidly; the Cass review had only been published a week before the hearing before the judge; and Gender Plus was a private provider whose practices and procedures were diverging from the NHS approach. In these circumstances, it behoved the court to keep an eye on a case of this kind in a time of flux. The mother also argued, though not strenuously, that cases concerning treatment for gender dysphoria should be regarded as being in in a special category requiring judicial oversight wherever there was less than complete unanimity. If necessary, the mother submitted that the Court of Appeal should depart from its recent decision in R (Bell) v. Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 1363, [2022] 1 All ER 416.
The judge below had concluded that, while the Cass review might be significant, it did not justify a departure from the decision in Bell v Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 1363, [2022] 1 All E.R. 416, [2021] 9 WLUK 157, in which it was held that treatment with puberty blockers should not be distinguished from the consideration of contraception in Gillick, and that questions of Gillick competence were for doctors, not the courts. Judd J held there was no realistic basis upon which to override the young person’s consent to treatment by a regulated provider and that there was no legitimate purpose in adjourning the case.
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18 March 2019 by Dominic Ruck Keene
The Divisional Court in R (Chidlow) v HM Senior Coroner for Blackpool [2019] EWHC 581 has given a concise and authoritative judgment reiterating and summarising the current common law concerning causation in inquests. Given the ever increasing importance of inquests and their conclusions as preliminaries to civil litigation, as well the growing number of inquests being held into historical deaths, the judgment will doubtless be frequently cited over the coming months and years.
Mr Childlow brought the judicial review following the inquest into the death of his brother (Carl Bibby). Mr Bibby died from a cardiac arrest in circumstances where an ambulance had been called, but there were admitted delays in the ambulance attending. At the inquest, the jury heard evidence from a consultant in Critical Care & Emergency Medicine that had paramedics attended Mr Bibby before he suffered cardiac arrest, he would, on the balance of probabilities, have survived. Nevertheless, the coroner ruled that it was not safe to leave the issue of a causal link between the delay and Mr Bibby’s death to the jury. Mr Chidlow sought a declaration that the coroner acted unlawfully, an order quashing the record of inquest and an order that a fresh inquest be held before a different coroner.
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24 February 2022 by Guest Contributor
The UKHRB is grateful to Aileen McColgan QC for allowing us to republish her article, which originally appeared on Panoptican, a blog published by the barristers at 11KBW here.
The central question for the Supreme Court in Bloomberg v ZXC [2022] UKSC 5 was, as Lords Hamblen and Stephens put it (with Lord Reeds, Lloyd-Jones and Sales agreeing): “whether, in general, a person under criminal investigation has, prior to being charged, a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of information relating to that investigation”. The short answer was “yes”.
The decision has been greeted with howls of indignation from Bloomberg but more muted responses from other sections of the press; whereas Bloomberg’s editor in chief released an editorial entitled “U.K. Judges Are Helping the Next Robert Maxwell” which stated that the judgment should “frighten every decent journalist in Britain”, the Financial Times and Guardian were more restrained, pointing out respectively that the decision would have “far-reaching implications for the British media” and would “make it harder for British media outlets to publish information about individuals subject to criminal investigations”. This is no doubt the case, but it is worth noting that the publication which gave rise to this decision was based on a highly confidential letter leaked to Bloomberg and occurred apparently without any consideration of ZXC’s privacy interests.
ZXC, regional CEO of a publicly listed company which operated overseas (“X Ltd”), sued for misuse of private information because of an article concerning X Ltd’s activities in a country for which ZXC’s division was responsible. The activities had been subject to a criminal investigation by a UK law enforcement body (“the UKLEB”) since 2013 and the article was based almost completely on a confidential Letter of Request sent by the UKLEB to the foreign state. ZXC claimed that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in information published in the Article, in particular in the details of the UKLEB investigation into himself, its assessment of the evidence, the fact that it believed that ZXC had committed specified criminal offences and its explanation of how the evidence it sought would assist its investigation into that suspected offending. ZXC’s application for damages and injunctive relief was upheld at first instance by Nicklin J and £25,000 awarded: [2019] EWHC 970 (QB); [2019] EMLR 20. Bloomberg’s appear was dismissed (see Panopticon post by Robin Hopkins and [2020] EWCA Civ 611; [2021] QB 28.
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22 October 2021 by Tehreem Sultan
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) sparked controversy with its recent judgment passed down in IX v Wabe eV and MH Müller Handels GmbH v MJ. This case required the CJEU to again consider the right to freedom of religion. It ruled that employers can ban workers from observing religious symbols, including headscarves, to maintain a neutral image in front of its customers.
Case Background
This ruling was brought by two Muslim women in Germany who were suspended from their jobs because of wearing a headscarf. IX and MJ, were employed in companies governed by German law as a special needs caregiver and a sales assistant respectively. They both wore the Islamic headscarf at their workplaces. The employers held the view that wearing a headscarf for religious purposes did not correspond to the policy of political, philosophical, and religious neutrality pursued with regard to parents, children, and third parties, and asked the women to remove their headscarf and suspended them from their duties on their refusal to do so. MJ’s employer, MH Müller Handels GmbH, particularly instructed her to “attend her workplace without conspicuous, large-sized signs of any political, philosophical or religious beliefs.”
IX and MJ brought actions before the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg (Hamburg Labour Court, Germany) and the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court, Germany), respectively. The courts referred the questions to the CJEU concerning the interpretation of Directive 2000/78. This directive establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
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3 November 2016 by Guest Contributor
R (o.t.a. Johnson) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 56
19 October 2016 – read judgment
Summary
In Jamaica in 1985, a baby was born to British father and a Jamaican mother. The child’s parents never married, and at the age of four he moved to the UK with his father. Under the law in force at the time, as an ‘illegitimate’ child, he did not automatically acquire British citizenship. If his mother had been the British parent, if his parents had ever married each other, or if an application had been made while he was a child, he would have become a British citizen. But he did not.
Two decades pass and the Secretary of State attempts to deport that individual, Mr Johnson, following a string of very serious offences. He appeals on the ground that deportation would be unlawful discrimination. If only his parents had been married, he would be a citizen and not be liable for removal.
The Supreme Court agreed. It held that there was no justification for someone in his position being liable to deportation simply through being born out of wedlock, which was an accident of birth over which a child has no control.
The Court also declared that a “good character” requirement for acquiring citizenship which applied only to illegitimate children was unlawfully discriminatory and incompatible with the Convention.
This judgment represents a further step towards equal rights for children born out of wedlock.
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2 November 2011 by Adam Wagner
Julian Assange -v- Swedish Prosecution Authority – Read judgment / summary
Julian Assange, founder of the whistle-blowing website Wikileaks, has lost his High Court appeal against extradition to Sweden. He lost on all four grounds of appeal.
Unless he is granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 32 of the Extradition Act 2003, he must now face charges of sexual assault and rape in Sweden. Appeals to the Supreme Court will only be allowed in cases where there is a “point of law of general public importance involved in the decision”.
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14 January 2018 by David Hart KC
R (o.t.a. Western Sahara Campaign UK) v. HMRC and DEFRA, Court of Justice of the European Union, opinion of Advocate-General Wathelet, 10 January 2018 – read here
The A-G has just invited the CJEU to conclude that an EU agreement with Morocco about fishing is invalid on international law grounds. His opinion rolls up deep issues about NGO standing, ability to rely on international law principles, justiciability, and standard of review, into one case. It also touches on deeply political, and foreign political, issues, and he is unapologetic about this. That, he concludes, is a judge’s job, both at EU and international court level – if the issues are indeed legal.
The opinion is complex and I summarise it in the simplest terms. But here goes.
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