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UK Human Rights Blog - 1 Crown Office Row
Search Results for: prisoners/page/20/ministers have been procrastinating on the issue, fearing that it will prove unpopular with the electorate.
In response to a legal challenge brought by the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), the Home Office has scrapped an algorithm used for sorting visa applications. Represented by Foxglove, a legal non-profit specialising in data privacy law, JCWI launched judicial review proceedings,, arguing that the algorithmic tool was unlawful on the grounds that it was discriminatory under the Equality Act 2010 and irrational under common law.
In a letter to Foxglove from 3rd August on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD), the Government Legal Department stated that it would stop using the algorithm, known as the “streaming tool”, “pending a redesign of the process and way in which visa applications are allocated for decision making”. The Department denied that the tool was discriminatory. During the redesign, visa application decisions would be made “by reference to person-centric attributes… and nationality will not be taken into account”.
The new ‘gang injunctions’, or “gangbos”, which can be sought in the county courts against adults suspected of gang involvement, function in a similar way to ASBOs (anti-social behaviour orders), although they aim to target people involved in shootings, knife crime and other serious violence rather than low-level anti-social behaviour. But will they be a helpful measure to curb gang violence, or an unnecessary restriction on liberty?
Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2010] EWHC 1332(QB) Miity J 25/5/2010 – read judgment
A challenge to the imposition of a Financial Restrictions Order on an Iranian Bank alleged to have supported Iran’s nuclear program has been dismissed as the order was not considered disproportionate in the light of the importance of the public interested protected.
The order, which directed that anyone in the UK financial sector must not enter into or continue to participate in business with Bank Mellat, was maintained despite the Court of Appeal’s refusal to allow the government to rely upon secret evidence in order to prove the bank’s links with the nuclear program (see Court of Appeal launches offensive against secret justice with three linked judgments).
It is just over five years since the landmark United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Obergefell v Hodges (26 June 2015), and just over fifty-one years since the Stonewall riots (28 June 1969). To the many important dates in Pride Month must now be added 15 June 2020, the date of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v Clayton County, which confirmed that is, in fact, illegal to fire an employee because they are homosexual or transgender.
It might seem surprising to many readers of this blog that there was a question about this. In the United States. In 2020. Yet even here in the UK it can hardly be said that employment protections for gay and transgender people have existed since time immemorial. It was only in December 2003, for example, that the UK Government enacted the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, which prohibited employers from committing direct and indirect discrimination, victimisation and harassment “on grounds of sexual orientation” (for which thanks is owed to the European Union, which mandated such legislation pursuant to the Equal Treatment Framework Directive of November 2000).
It can be said, however, that the legislation in the UK is sufficiently clear to put the question beyond doubt. Since 2010, sexual orientation and gender reassignment have been “protected characteristics” for the purposes of general discrimination law, pursuant to sections 4, 7 and 12 of the Equality Act 2010.
The law in the United States is not so explicit. Rather, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 makes it “unlawful…for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual…because of such individual’s race, colour, religion, sex, or national origin.” The question for the Supreme Court in Bostock was whether the prohibition of discrimination because of an individual’s sex also entailed a prohibition of discrimination on the basis that an employee was gay or transgender.
Three cases were being appealed together, and the facts in each of them were simple, and stark:
Mr Gerald Bostock worked for his local authority (Clayton County) in Georgia as a child welfare advocate. After a decade of employment, during which time the County won national awards for its work, Mr Bostock made the fateful decision to start participation in a recreational gay softball league. He was promptly fired.
Mr Donald Zarda was a sky-diving instructor in New York. He tried to reassure a female customer who had concerns about a tandem skydive with a male instructor by confirming that he was “100% gay”. She complained, and he was dismissed days later.
Ms Aimee Stephens worked in a funeral home in Michigan. At the start of her employment she presented as male. Two years into her employment she underwent psychiatric treatment for “despair and loneliness” and was diagnosed with gender dysphoria. Her clinicians recommended that she start to live as a woman. Several years later, when she informed her employer that she would be returning to work as a woman after her vacation, she was fired because it was “not going to work out”.
In all three cases the employers openly acknowledged that their motive for dismissing their employees was that they were gay/transgender; but they said that was a wholly lawful thing to do. The plaintiffs argued that it was not, pursuant to a proper reading of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964.
The decision was hotly anticipated. In the United States, the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court is lamentably politicised, and after President Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland had been blocked by the Republican-controlled Senate in 2016, and the current occupant of the White House had apparently assured a 5-4 conservative majority by appointing two justices (most recently, following a harrowing confirmation process, Kavanaugh J), socially progressive groups could be forgiven for awaiting the judgment with some trepidation.These background issues are discussed further on the blog here.
On this occasion, they need not have worried. The split of votes was a refreshingly decisive and bipartisan 6-3, including Chief Justice Roberts. What’s more, the majority opinion was written by Gorsuch J, a “conservative justice” appointed in 2017.
The opinions make for a thoroughly enjoyable read (don’t be put off by the 172 pages — it is mostly appendices to Alito J’s dissenting opinion). As a student of English law, I am used to reading judgments which are characterised by temperate language, caveats, a degree of circumspection, or even consternation. In contrast, at least in this case, the opinions of the justices (particularly Gorsuch and Alito JJ) read like the most passionate of essays or written arguments — almost as if they were advocates rather than judges.
Baking takes up supreme court time on both sides of the Atlantic, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees makes an appearance in the Court of Appeal, Unexplained Wealth Orders make an entrance and more…
The biggest news of the week arguably came out of Northern Ireland. However, mercifully this blog can ignore the ongoing speculation regarding a Brexit settlement, the attitude of DUP MPs, the potential presence of border infrastructure and whether or not veterinary inspections and customs checks are of loose equivalence (well, at least for now…). Continue reading →
Tchenguiz & Ors v Imerman [2010] EWCA Civ 908 (29 July 2010) – Read judgment
The Court of Appeal has ruled that secretly obtained documents can no longer copied and then used in divorce proceedings, overturning a rule dating back almost twenty years. The case will have a significant impact for divorcing couples, but has the court left itself open to a Supreme Court reversal on human rights grounds?
The appeal related to the divorce proceedings between Vivian and Elizabeth Imerman, in which Mrs Imerman’s brothers brothers had downloaded documents from Mr Imerman’s office computer in order to prove that he had more assets than he had disclosed to the court. Mr Justice Moylan ruled in the High Court that seven files of documents should be handed back to Mr Imerman for the purpose of enabling him to remove any material for which he claimed privilege. Mr Imerman appealed against the decision that he would then have to give the documents back, and Mrs Imerman argued that she should be given more control over the privilege process.
2023 has already been a landmark year for nuisance, with the Supreme Court handing down its controversial decision in Fearn v Tate Gallery (as discussed on this blog).
The good news for those with a particular interest in the bothersome behaviour of neighbours is that Fearn is only the start.
This post focuses on one of the many fascinating points raised by these cases – namely, the slippery concept at the heart of both Davies and Jalla: continuing nuisance.
The Empire Windrush arrives at the Port of Tilbury on the River Thames on 22 June 1948. Image: The Guardian
R (On the Application of Hubert Howard (deceased, substituted by Maresha Howard Rose pursuant to CPR 19.2(4) and PD 19A)) vSecretary of State for the Home Department[2021] EWHC 1023 (Admin)— read judgment
Hubert Howard was born in 1956 and came to the United Kingdom in 1960, aged almost 4 from Jamaica. He was part of the Windrush Generation. No doubt like all West Indians of that time, including my parents, he thought he was a British Citizen.
In fact, he was a Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies on arrival, and, by sleight of hand, in the author’s view, he lost that status upon Jamaica gaining independence in 1962 and he became a Commonwealth citizen.
The same reduction in status happened to my father in 1966, when Barbados gained independence. Having arrived in 1953, believing he was fully British and having been conscripted for two years’ National Service, he had nobody write telling him that his status had changed and that he effectively became Barbadian, thirteen years after his arrival here.
Hubert should have applied to be registered to be a British citizen before 1 January 1988, when that right lapsed, but like many Commonwealth citizens, particularly from the Caribbean, he did not.
Hubert did apply for a British passport in 2007 and 2010 but on each occasion, he was told that his application failed because he was not a British citizen. In February 2012 he was told by the Home Office that he would first need to apply for indefinite leave to remain, 52 years after he had been resident, and could then, if granted ILTR, obtain a passport after the required period of lawful residence.
In 2012 Hubert lost his job with the Peabody Trust, a job that he had held since 2003, and whose Director of Human Resources was to describe him, in 2018, as “reliable, hardworking and diligent in carrying out his duties”. But due to “an inspection from Immigration Services in 2012 … [he] was unable to produce a passport and we had to let him go”.
In June 2014, Hubert’s solicitors made an application for a No Time Limit status granted to those who have ILTR so that they can be granted a biometric card, which at the time cost £1,300.
The Home Office then required, as was the case with many Windrush applicants, one piece of evidence demonstrating residence from 1960 within 14 days. His application fee was retained when he did not furnish the information.
In April 2018, the then Home Secretary, Amber Rudd made a Windrush Statement, which included the phrase
They are British in all but legal status, and this should never have been allowed to happen.
That sentence was to prove vital to the outcome of the case.
…..the graphic opening words of today’s decision by the Supreme Court in a defamation case. The next words are equally clear and arresting: ” What would those words convey to the “ordinary reasonable reader” of a Facebook Post?”
The context was a recently ended unhappy marriage between Mr Stocker (the Claimant) and Mrs Stocker (the Defendant), and a series of posts arising out of a Status Update by a Mrs Bligh (Mr Stocker’s new partner) in December 2015. Mrs Stocker and Mrs Bligh commented on each other’s posts for the next 2 hours 18 minutes. Mrs Stocker did not mince her words: “I hear you have been together 2 years? If so u might like to ask him who he was in bed with the last time he was arrested.”
This was quickly followed by “wouldn’t bring it up last time I accused him of cheating he spent a night in the cells, tried to strangle me..”. This was a reference to an incident which had happened some 12 years before.
Mr S did not take kindly to this attempt “to blacken [him] in the eyes of his current girlfriend and belittle her”: as the Court of Appeal put it.
He sued. He won before the judge, and before the Court of Appeal.
The British Chiropractic Association (BCA) has dropped its libel action against Simon Singh, in light of the stinging rebuke it received from the Court of Appeal earlier this month.
Dr Singh was being sued by the BCA in respect of an article he wrote in The Guardian (now reprinted) in April 2008, in which he said there was not enough evidence to prove that chiropractic treatment is effective against certain childhood conditions including colic and asthma.
We posted on April 1 on the preliminary decision. The Court of Appeal judges used their judgment on two preliminary issues (in particular, whether Dr Singh could use the defence of “fair comment”) to mount a robust and somewhat lyrical defence (quoting Milton, amongst other things) of the right to scientific freedom of expression.
Given the unusually strong tone of the Court of Appeal judgment, the BCA will have questioned their chances of success in the final hearing. The BCA say in their statement:
The Court of Appeal, in its recent judgment, has taken a very different view of the article [than Mr Justice Eady in the High Court]. On its interpretation, the article did not make any factual allegation against the BCA at all; it was no more than an expression of ‘honest opinion’ by Simon Singh. While it still considers that the article was defamatory of the BCA, the decision provides Dr Singh with a defence such that the BCA has taken the view that it should withdraw to avoid further legal costs being incurred by either side.
X & Anor v Z (Children) & Anor [2015] EWCA Civ 34 – read judgment
The Court of Appeal has ruled that it would not be lawful for DNA originally collected by the police to be used by a local authority for the purposes of a paternity test.
Factual and legal background
X’s wife had been found murdered. The police took DNA from the crime scene. Some of the DNA belonged to X’s wife and some was found to be X’s. X was tried and convicted of his wife’s murder.
X’s wife had young children and they were taken into the care of the local authority. During the care proceedings X asserted that he was the biological father of the children and said he wanted to have contact with them. He refused to take a DNA test to prove his alleged paternity. The local authority asked the police to make the DNA from the crime scene available so that it could be used in a paternity test. The police, with the support of the Home Secretary, refused on the grounds that they did not believe that it would be lawful to do so. Continue reading →
In Sleeper v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2025] EWHC 151 (KB) Mr Justice Sweeting dismissed an appeal against the decision of HHJ Saggerson to dismiss a claim against the Metropolitan Police by a street preacher arrested for displaying anti-Muslim signs.
The claim was both for the tort of false imprisonment (which involved a challenge to the legality of his arrest) and for a remedy breach of his rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 directly, though the latter was time barred and not resurrected on appeal.
Mr Justice Sweeting’s judgment provides insight into how the courts assess the interplay of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) and domestic criminal law.
Dumfries and Galloway -v- North [2013] UKSC 45 – Read judgment
Yesterday’s much heralded equal pay ‘victory’ in the Supreme Court (see BBC Report) undoubtedly will be good news for the specific female claimants in the case who seek to vindicate their European Union rights to equal pay.
The female claimants do so by comparing their pay with male colleagues working in entirely distinct parts of the same local authority (being Dumfries and Galloway Council) but arguably on common terms and conditions of employment (often referred to as the ‘same employment’ test).
In the Christian Brothers case Lord Phillips of famously declared that “the law of vicarious liability is on the move”. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Barclays Bank v. Various Claimants[2020] UKSC 13 has brought that movement to a juddering halt. The question posed by the appeal was a simple one. Is it possible to be vicariously liable for the acts of a self-employed ‘independent contractor’?The answer the Court gave in this case was ‘no’.
Factual Background
The group litigation concerned the vicarious liability of Barclays for sexual assaults in the 1970s and early 1980s. The alleged assaults were committed in the North East by a now deceased general practitioner: Dr Bates.
Dr Bates was a self-employed medical practitioner with a portfolio practice. His work included conducting medical assessments and examinations of prospective Barclays employees. Barclays required job applicants – many of them aged 16 or under – to pass pre-employment medical examinations as part of its recruitment procedures. Barclays arranged the appointments with Dr Bates and provided him with a pro forma report headed “Barclays Confidential Medical Report”. Dr Bates was paid a fee for each report. If the report was satisfactory, the applicant’s job offer would be confirmed, subject to satisfactory GCE examination results.
Dr Bates conducted the (unchaperoned) medical examinations in a consulting room at his home. It was alleged that Dr Bates sexually assaulted 126 claimants in the group action during their medical examinations. After Dr Bates died in 2009, the claimants sought damages from Barclays.
On Monday, the Independent reported on the words of the Minister for Brexit Opportunities and Government Efficiency of the United Kingdom, Jacob Rees-Mogg. Having earlier tweeted a graph demonstrating that the UK had sanctioned a higher amount of Russian-owned assets in pound-terms than the US or the EU, Labour and Lib Dem politicians responded by pointing out that the graph better demonstrated the UK’s role in storing and laundering money for highly questionable individuals from Russia and elsewhere. Despite the calls for transparency from, for instance, the president of Estonia long before the invasion of Ukraine, the UK and its territories have remained a bastion for billions of pounds of poorly identified foreign wealth, with large numbers of expensive houses in central London standing empty while house prices soar and the number of homeless grows.
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Dumfries and Galloway -v- North [2013] UKSC 45 – 
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