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Secret Justice:  a welcome to the new Attorney General, who has direct and extensive experience of these procedures and their long-standing unaddressed defects

8 July 2024 by Angus McCullough KC

One of the most striking appointments to Sir Keir Starmer’s administration has been that of Richard Hermer KC to the office of Attorney General.   In that capacity, as the Government’s senior Law Officer, Hermer will attend Cabinet.  He is a hugely respected senior barrister, who has never been a member of Parliament having spent his professional life in independent practice with a formidable and distinguished legal career.  He is extremely well placed to give the Government independent legal advice of the highest quality, as one would hope for from the AG.

Hermer’s appointment has been widely applauded, giving tangible reassurance of the new Prime Minister’s genuine commitment to the rule of law.  These plaudits include the following generous tribute from Lord Wolfson KC, a Conservative peer and former Justice Minster (as well as an eminent and respected barrister himself).

Hermer’s experience at the Bar includes many cases involving closed material procedures – CMPs, the controversial system of “secret justice” about which I have written extensively on this blog, from my perspective a Special Advocate operating within that system.  For readers with the stomach for it, the dismal story of their neglect can be charted through these articles.

• “Secret Justice”: An Oxymoron and the Overdue Review (28 January 2020)

• Secret Justice – The Insiders’ View (27 June 2021)

• Secret Justice Review: The Special Advocates respond to the Government’s submission (14 December 2021)

• The Special Advocate – Not Waving but Drowning (30 October 2023)

• Secret Justice:  the system for closed proceedings is in melt-down (8 May 2024)

• Washed-up:  Angus McCullough KC comments on the long-awaited HMG response to Ouseley on Closed Proceedings  (30 May 2024)

The new AG therefore knows at first hand the importance, challenges, and frustrations of cases that are subject to CMPs.  As Attorney General he is now responsible for the recruitment and formal appointment of Special Advocates, whilst the Secretary of State for Justice has the duty to provide an effective system in which we operate, to minimise the unfairness that is inherent in CMPs.

Together with other Special Advocates I had some positive – but ultimately unproductive – engagement with Hermer’s immediate predecessor as Attorney, Victoria Prentis, and her colleague as Lord Chancellor, Alex Chalk.  It was disappointing that between them they failed to implement any concrete steps to address the long-standing issues around CMPs, including since the Ouseley review was published in November 2022.  This has driven me, and many other Special Advocate colleagues, to decline to take any new appointments – a hard decision which we have each come to with reluctance.

On 1 July 2024 (a few days before the General Election) almost every individual on the current list of Special Advocates, including in Northern Ireland, wrote to the Attorney General to express our disappointment at the Government’s response to the Ouseley review, published on the last day before the dissolution of Parliament, in continuing failure to address these issues, including proper support for Special Advocates (most urgently in Northern Ireland) and a closed judgment database.  The Government did not consult the Special Advocates in formulating its response, despite repeated encouragement to do so. They rejected 4 out of 20 recommendations from the Ouseley report, including a significant one in relation to the attendance of Special Advocates at mediation and other ADR procedures, without which Ouseley indicated there was “potential for unfairness”. The Government’s rejection is on a basis that seems wrong and unjustifiable. Our recent letter to the AG concluded:

“All those of us who had felt driven to decline new appointments remain of that position and will keep that under review. Those of us who had not reached the point of refusing new appointments are also keeping our positions under close review in the light of further developments, including action or inaction by you and the Lord Chancellor (or your successors in Government) following the General Election. Only one of us signing this letter is not planning to keep their position under review, while fully sharing the concerns of all of us that are set out above.“

Our letter should be on the new Attorney’s desk.  Facing the new Government are many larger-scale and more intractable problems with the justice system than CMPs.  The proper support for these procedures. and the Special Advocates that are components essential to their functioning, should be one of the easiest issues, in both practical and financial terms, for the incoming regime to address without further delay.

I enthusiastically join in the warm congratulations to Hermer and his colleague in Cabinet, Secretary of State for Justice Shabana Mahmood MP, on their appointments.  I hope that they will re-visit their predecessors’ (long-delayed) response to the (long-delayed) Ouseley review to ensure that  effective action is now taken urgently.  I stand ready with other Special Advocates to help them to achieve that.

Angus McCulllough KC is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row Chambers.

From your US correspondent: the Supreme Court of the United States

31 January 2020 by Jonathan Metzer

Last autumn I was privileged to spend six weeks in the United States as a scholar on the Pegasus Programme. This gave me the opportunity to learn a great deal about the similarities and contrasts between our legal systems, as well as the latest developments across the Atlantic.

In this piece I will tell you about what I learned about the US Supreme Court — its history, its role and what the Presidency of Donald Trump may mean for its future.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court is the highest court in the United States and acts as guarantor and arbiter of the Constitution. It has the power to establish (and extend) the content of constitutional rights and to strike down not only government acts, but also primary legislation incompatible with those rights.

Lord Chief Justice bolsters right to trial by jury

26 July 2010 by Adam Wagner

KS v R [2010] EWCA Crim 1756 (23 July 2010) – Read judgment

J, S, M v R [2010] EWCA Crim 1755 – Read judgment

The Lord Chief Justice has emphasised in two Court of Appeal judgments that the jury-less trials must be a last resort and take place only in truly extreme cases. His comments are clearly aimed at putting the breakers on an accelerating trend of requests for jury-less trials in prosecutions of serious crime, following the ground-breaking but controversial ‘Heathrow heist’ trial.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 limited for the first time the right to trial by jury in the Crown Court, where trials for serious crimes take place. Section 44 provides for the option of judge-only trials if there is a “real and present danger” of jury tampering.

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Murder, miscarriage of justice and Scots judicial autonomy

27 May 2011 by Rosalind English

Fraser v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2011] UKSC 24 (25 May 2011)  – Read judgment

The Supreme Court has had to consider (for the second time in a month) the ticklish question of what constitutes a “miscarriage of justice”.

The business is rendered more ticklish because this was a case being handled by the High Court of Justiciary, the court of last resort in all criminal matters in Scotland.

Our previous post questioned whether the finding of a miscarriage of justice entitled the individual, whose conviction is quashed, to compensation for the slur on their innocence. Here the Court scrutinises the actual diagnosis of a miscarriage of justice. They had to do so in this case because their jurisdiction depended on it. This needs some explaining.

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New senior media judge to play important role in balancing of rights

15 September 2010 by Adam Wagner

Eady to go

The Lord Chief Justice has announced the appointment of Mr Justice Tugendhat as Judge in charge of the Jury and Non-Jury Lists with effect from 1 October 2010. This makes him the senior ‘media judge’ in England and Wales, and he will play an important role in balancing rights to privacy against freedom of expression.

The Jury and Non-Jury lists contains general civil law, including defamation and privacy. The Judge in charge has responsibility for managing the work in the lists and assigning judges to cases.

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Terrorist suspect BBC interview can be shown, rules High Court

15 January 2012 by Karwan Eskerie

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) & Anor, R (on the application of) v Ahmad (Rev 1) [2012] EWHC 13 (Admin) – Read judgment

The High Court  ruled  that the Justice Secretary’s refusal to grant the BBC permission to have and to broadcast a face-to-face interview with terrorism suspect Babar Ahmad was unlawful.

The BBC and one of its home affairs correspondents, Dominic Casciani, had applied for permission to conduct the interview with Mr Ahmad, who is currently detained at HMP Long Lartin, and is fighting extradition to the USA. The BBC also wished to broadcast the interview. The Justice Secretary refused the permission, which refusal the BBC challenged in a judicial review claim.

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Does a judge have to consider Article 8 in possession proceedings brought by a private landlord? – Millie Polimac

25 August 2016 by Guest Contributor

Photo credit: the Guardian

No, said the Supreme Court in McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 – read judgment.

Facts

Fiona McDonald was a private sector tenant.  The landlords were her parents who had purchased the property by obtaining a secured loan from a private company.  They fell into arrears of the monthly payments, and the company sought possession pursuant to a s.21(4) Housing Act 1988 (‘HA 1988’) notice. The arrears were not substantial, but they had persisted for some time.

An Article 8 defence was raised as Fiona had mental health problems in the form of psychiatric and behavioural issues.

The Supreme Court rejected her defence for the following reasons.

No Article 8 assessment

The appellant argued that the court, as a public authority under s.6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’), was required to carry out an Article 8 assessment in such circumstances.
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“Locked-in” sufferer’s challenge to ban on voluntary euthanasia fails in the high court

16 August 2012 by Rosalind English

The Queen(on the application of Tony Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381 (Admin) – read judgment

Lord Justice Toulson, sitting with Mrs Justice Royce and Mrs Justice Macur, has  handed down judgment in the case of Tony Nicklinson and that of another “locked-in” syndrome sufferer, “Martin”. On all the issues, they have deferred to parliament to take the necessary steps to address the problems created by the current law of murder and assisted suicide.

Philip Havers QC  of 1 Crown Office represented Martin in this case. 

Tony Nicklinson sought a declaration of immunity from prosecution for a doctor who would give him a fatal dose of painkillers to end his life in Britain. He also sought a declaration that the current law is incompatible with his right to respect for private life under article 8, contrary to s1 and 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, in so far as it criminalises voluntary active euthanasia and/or assisted suicide.

Martin’s claim was slightly different as his wife does not want to do anything which will hasten his death. He therefore asked for permission for volunteers to be able to help him get to the Dignitas clinic in Switzerland (under recent guidelines from the Director of Public Prosecutions only family members or close friends who are motivated by compassion are unlikely to be prosecuted for assisting a suicide). In the alternative he sought a declaration that section 2 of the Suicide Act is incompatible with the right to autonomy and private life under Article 8 of the European Convention. 
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Access to environmental justice

17 March 2017 by David Hart KC

On Monday 13 March, I went along to the latest Castle Debate, held in conjunction with the Environmental Law Foundation: see here for more of the same, all free debates, and fascinating topics for anyone interested in environmental law and policy.

It, and Tom Brenan’s talk in particular, reminded me that, despite it being not long after my last Aarhus post (on private law proceedings, here), it was time to set out the latest rules governing judicial reviews, which came into operation on 28 February. The bone of contention, as ever, is the concept that challenging environmental decisions should not be prohibitively expensive.  

Until last month, the rules were relatively simple, and were designed, for better or for worse, to minimise the amounts of arguments about costs in environmental challenges. If you were an individual, £5,000 capped the costs which you would have to pay the other side if you lost.

But Government had become obsessed that environmental challengers were somehow getting a free lunch, and the rules have now been spun into something so complicated that defendants who want to burn off claimants before the claim gets heard have been given a pretty broad licence to do so. For most individuals, committing yourself to paying £5,000 if you lose is a pretty sharp deterrent. But Government does not think so. 

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Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants: further blurring boundaries in employment status? – by Anna Williams

28 July 2020 by Guest Contributor

This article was first published here on the UK Labour Law Blog on 6^th July 2020 and is reproduced with the author and editors’ kind permission.

Introduction

In a judgment handed down on 1 April 2020, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of Nicola Davies J (as she then was) and a unanimous Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal on the ground that no vicarious liability can lie for the acts of an independent contractor: Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants (‘Barclays’). This was one of a pair of decisions, each concerned with a limb of the vicarious liability test: the requisite relationship (Barclays) and the necessary connection between that relationship and the wrongdoing (WM Morrisons Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants (‘Morrisons’)). While much could be said, to use the language of recent case-law, about whether this latest development means that vicarious liability is still ‘on the move’ (Various Claimants v Child Catholic Welfare Society (‘Christian Brothers’)), has ‘come to a stop’ (Cox v Ministry of Justice (‘Cox’)), or has even been thrown into reverse, this post will instead focus on the judgment’s implications for the test(s) for employment or worker status across various contexts. Although Barclays may bring a certain kind of clarity, or at least predictability, to future vicarious liability cases, it nonetheless blurs boundaries in several areas of law. Three of these will be addressed below.

High Court directs major overhaul of Iraq death and mistreatment allegations investigation

24 May 2013 by Adam Wagner

Mousa & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Defence [2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin) (24 May 2013) – Read judgment

Remember the Iraq War? Following the 2003 invasion Britain remained in control of Basra, a city in South Eastern Iraq, until withdrawal over six years later on 30 April 2009. 179 British troops died during that period. But despite there over four years having passed since withdrawal, the fallout from the war and occupation is still being resolved by the UK Government and courts.

Thousands of Iraqis died in the hostilities or were detained by the British. Thanks to two decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in July 2011 (Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda – our coverage here), the state’s duty under the Human Rights Act to investigate deaths and extreme mistreatment applied in Iraq at that time. It is fascinating to see how the UK authorities have been unravelling the extent of that duty. The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry has reported and the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry is ongoing (I acted in the former and still do in the latter). In this major judgment, which may yet be appealed, the High Court has ruled the manner in which the UK Government is investigating deaths and perhaps mistreatment is insufficient to satisfy its investigative duty.

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More on admissibility, the view from the Court – Paul Harvey and Pamela McCormick

19 September 2012 by Guest Contributor

Rosalind English’s excellent posts here and here provide a clear overview of the Court’s case law on and its approach to the admissibility criteria. As approximately 97 % of all UK applications to the Court are currently found to be inadmissible or are struck out (see the Court’s 2011 statistics and Andrew Tickell’s earlier post, it is important for applicants and especially practitioners to have a clear understanding of the admissibility criteria before lodging their applications. 

However, as the vast majority of inadmissible applications are declared inadmissible by a single judge in decisions which are never published, there is little information in the public domain about how these criteria are applied in practice.

Consequently, we would like to take this opportunity to supplement Rosalind’s overview by providing practitioners with some practical information on the application of the criteria to UK cases as well as other guidelines for submitting applications.

The Court’s general approach to admissibility

Many practitioners still incorrectly assume that for all applications there is an initial, “admissibility” stage of proceedings and a later “merits” stage. Instead, it is more helpful to distinguish between: (i) the procedure before an application is communicated to the respondent Government for their observations; and (ii) the procedure after communication. 
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Judicial Review: What is meant by “totally without merit”

15 February 2016 by Matthew Hill

Samia Wasif and another v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 82

Read judgment here

What is the difference between a case that is “totally without merit” and one that is “not arguable”? Are either of those more or less hopeless than a case that is “bound to fail”?
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Caesarean Escalation, Judges on Human Rights and Happy Birthday – the Human Rights Roundup

8 December 2013 by Sarina Kidd

Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your regular seasonal sack-load of human rights news and views.  The full list of links can be found here.  You can find previous roundups here.  Links compiled by Adam Wagner, post by Sarina Kidd. 

This week, bloggers tried to get to the bottom of the ‘forced caesarian’ case, a Supreme Court judge weighed in on the relationship between the UK and European law, and on Tuesday it’s the 65th birthday of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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Racism and the Rule of Law

18 June 2020 by Rosalind English

“In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends” said Martin Luther King in the context of White America’s silence with respect to the struggle for civil rights. The Prime Minister considers it relevant that the alleged murder of George Floyd occurred thousands of miles away – “in another jurisdiction” – yet the former colonies that now compose the United States of America is a jurisdiction which owes its common law legal system and heritage to the United Kingdom. St. George Tucker, in the appendix to his 1803 edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, wrote that

the common law of England, and every statute of that Kingdom, made for the security of the life, liberty, or property of the subject … were brought over to America, by the first settlers of the colonies, respectively; and remained in full force therein [1].

The Black Lives Matter movement illuminates an incontrovertible chasm in the application of the rule of law in liberal democracy. The basic premise of the rule of law, which in Joseph Raz’s conception is that it should be capable of guiding behaviour, includes the necessary restriction on crime-preventing agencies from perverting the law. A society in which those tasked with upholding and applying the law – under the powers of stop-and-search and arrest – are instead themselves regular perpetrators of racist discrimination and violence, is one in which the rule of law can become a randomised hope that is more or less likely to be realised depending on the race of the citizen in question.