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Round Up 6.7.20 – A quiet week in the courts but not in the news…

6 July 2020 by Thomas Hayes

Protesters in Hong Kong. Credit: The Guardian. 

It has been a quiet week in the courts from a human rights perspective. The Supreme Court gave judgment on a divorce case and a social security fraud, and whilst the Court of Appeal and High Court were more forthcoming in terms of the number of decisions made, family law and commercial cases dominated. Legal buffs may however be interested to note Scales v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2020] EWHC 1747 (QB), in which the High Court applied Spanish law in a road traffic accident case, whilst celebrity watchers and students revising for their civil litigation exams may appreciate seeing how the court applied the test from Denton to grant Johnny Christopher Depp II relief from sanctions (who knew there was a Johnny Christopher Depp I?) – Depp v News Group Newspapers Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 1734 (QB).

A quiet week in the courts did not however extend to a quiet week in the news…

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Water companies are public authorities and must therefore disclose environmental information

16 April 2015 by Rosalind English

Fish Legal v Information Commissioner and others (Information rights practice and procedure) [2015] UKUT 52 (AAC) Charles J – read judgment

Water and sewage utility companies are “public authorities” for the purposes of the environmental information regulations, and are bound by them accordingly, the Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal has ruled.

Fish Legal is the legal arm of the Angling Trust. In 2009 it asked United Utilities Water plc and Yorkshire Water Services Ltd for information relating to discharges, clean-up operations, and emergency overflow. Emily Shirley is a private individual. Again, she asked Southern Water Services Ltd for information relating to sewerage capacity for a planning proposal in her village. All three companies denied that they were under a duty to provide the information under Environmental Information Regulations. Both Fish Legal and Mrs Shirley complained to the Commissioner. In 2010 the Commissioner replied, explaining that as the companies were not public authorities for the purposes of EIR, he had no power to adjudicate the complaints.
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Human rights and judicial review in the past year – Part 3/4: Article 6, the right to a fair trial

25 October 2010 by Angus McCullough KC

This post is adapted from a presentation given at the Justice Human Rights Law Conference, and will be split into four parts.

This post is adapted from a presentation given at the Justice Human Rights Law Conference, and will be split into four parts. Part 1 can be found here and part 2 here.

Today I concentrate on Article 6: the right to a fair trial (click here for previous posts on Article 6).

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Richard III on the move again – pitched into the current judicial review debate

23 October 2013 by David Hart KC

The Plantagenet Alliance Ltd (R o.t.a) v. Secretary of State for Justice and others, Haddon-Cave J, 18 October 2013 (PCO) read judgment, and on permission, 15 August 2013  read judgment

I posted here on the original judgment giving the Plantagenet Alliance permission to seek judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to re-bury Richard III in Leicester. At the time, the judge had made a full Protective Costs Order in favour of the Alliance, so that it would not have to pay costs if it lost. The judge had also ordered what he envisaged to be a short hearing to determine in what sum the Alliance’s costs should be capped. if it won. 

The judge was then somewhat surprised to be faced by a full-blown attempt by MoJ (Chris Grayling) to discharge the PCO, and seek an order for security of costs against the Alliance. The written argument in support was signed by the top barrister doing work for the Government, and the hearing about it took a day (think of the costs of that).

The application was conspicuously unsuccessful, as we shall see, but what was all this about?  Something to do with proposed judicial review changes, I suspect – for reasons which will become evident.

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You win some, you lose some…Rahmatullah (No.2) in the Supreme Court

24 January 2017 by Dominic Ruck Keene

In Rahmatullah (No 2) v MOD; Mohammed v MOD [2017] UKSC 1, the Supreme Court gave a further important judgment in the litany of cases arising out of the UK’s intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Court held unanimously that the doctrine of Crown act of state defeated claims brought by non UK citizens seeking to sue the Government in the English courts in respect of alleged torts committed abroad.

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Twitter arrests, religion and the law, and Article 8 applications

5 August 2012 by Wessen Jazrawi

Another gratuitous Olympics pic

Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your weekly bulletin of human rights news. The full list of links can be found here. You can also find our table of human rights cases here and previous roundups here.

by Wessen Jazrawi

In the news

It has been a quiet week in the blogosphere which suggests that everyone else has been as glued to the Olympics as I have. This week has seen the arrest of a 17 year old following abusive tweets to Tom Daley and a case looking at the interesting question of whether a Jewish girl could be allowed to have herself baptised, as well as cases concerning Article 8 applications. This week also marks the start of Parliamentary recess and the end of the Trinity legal term. The next couple of months will be quiet as the courts and parliament take their summer breaks.

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What does Manchester City’s Champions League ban have to do with human rights?

23 March 2020 by Alex Ewing

Last month European football’s governing body, UEFA, announced that English champions Manchester City had been fined 30 million Euros and banned from the Champions League – the most illustrious competition in European football. The Adjudicatory Chamber of UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) handed down a two-year ban on the basis that Man City had breached Financial Fair Play Regulations. The club have responded fiercely, complaining of a ‘prejudicial process’ and alleging that the case was ‘initiated by UEFA, prosecuted by UEFA and judged by UEFA.’ Against this background it is thought likely that City will rely on human rights arguments in their appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (a somewhat ironic development in the view of some commentators given previous criticisms of the human rights records of the club’s backers). 

This blog post will set out the requirements of independence and impartiality under article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the context of sports disputes, particularly in light of the recent ruling in Ali Riza and Others v Turkey (no. 30226/10, ECHR 28 January 2020). See

The democratic legitimacy of human rights

28 February 2012 by Rachit Buch

Why should we bother with the European Convention on Human Rights? Many of those that would never contemplate leaving the ECHR still question whether we should abide by controversial decisions such as those on prisoners’ voting rights or deportation. UCL’s Professor Richard Bellamy attempted to answer this question at the Statute Law Society’s talk on Monday evening. He said that the UK should abide by the ECHR, which gains its legitimacy by being the best way for democratic states regulate their relationships and protect their citizens’ rights.

The talk was entitled ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions’ (IHRCs). Although perhaps not in such terms, this is a topic that exercises many every week: from those questioning who exactly decides which human rights are the ones that count, to those asking why ‘unelected judges’ in Europe can tell a democracy how to govern itself. Professor Bellamy started by noting that mature democracies are generally less keen on IHRCs; at the post-war inception of the ECHR, he said it was Germany and Italy showing most enthusiasm. Even now, many ‘democratising’ countries show less opposition to Europe’s human rights structures.

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When is the ECHR going to start watching the EU?

20 June 2012 by David Hart KC

In my post of today about checks on EU legality, I made the point that no institution formally monitors the EU apart from EU institutions. Moves are afoot to change that, though not in a form that diehard Eurosceptics are likely to relish. Article 6 of the Lisbon Treaty of European Union says that the EU shall accede to the ECHR. As and when that occurs, the European Court of Human Rights will assume a formal role in adjudicating upon the legality of EU measures. The details of accession could not be settled by the purely EU Treaty of Lisbon, hence the ongoing negotiations.

 However, things have been happening very recently. Yesterday, 19 June, a joint informal body of members of the European Parliament and Council of Europe parliamentarians welcomed the prospect of talks resuming on EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, and, last week, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided to pursue negotiations with the European Union with a view to finalising the legal instruments setting out the way in which the EU would accede to the ECHR.

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1940 Soviet massacre outside reach of European Convention, rules Strasbourg

29 October 2013 by Dominic Ruck Keene

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Facial Recognition Technology: High Court gives judgment

12 September 2019 by Sapan Maini-Thompson

R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 2341 (Admin)

The High Court has dismissed an application for judicial review regarding the use of Automated Facial Recognition Technology (AFR) and its implications for privacy rights and data protection.

Haddon-Cave LJ and Swift J decided that the current legal regime is adequate to ensure the appropriate and non-arbitrary use of AFR in a free and civilised society. The Court also held that South Wales Police’s (SWP) use to date of AFR by has been consistent with the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and data protection legislation.

Nonetheless, periodic review is likely to be necessary. This was the first time any court in the world had considered AFR. This article analyses the judgement and explores possible avenues for appeal.

The Round-Up: Gove’s Gallop to the Commons

19 October 2015 by Laura Profumo

Laura Profumo delves into the latest human rights happenings.

In the News:

In an “exclusive” last weekend, The Independent revealed that the government is planning to “fast-track” a British Bill of Rights into UK law. The report claimed a 12-week consultation will run from late this year, which will seek to clarify that the UK will not pull out of the ECHR. In an “unusual but not unique” move, a Bill will then proceed straight to the House of Commons, without a preliminary Green or White Paper. With the EU referendum due in 2017, ministers are anxious to extricate the ECHR question from that of EU membership, making the Bill law before the in/out campaigns begin. Yet the Bill’s Parliamentary passage will be far from seamless. A cabinet minister has cautioned that the short timescale is “aspirational”, as the Bill could be “really clogged up in the House of Lords”. The upper chamber, where the Conservatives fail to command a majority, hosts some “seasoned lawyers”, who are fearful of the fallout with Strasbourg. It is understood that Gove will visit Scotland before the consultation is published, to convince the SNP to back the proposal. Yet it is not yet clear whether Gove will visit Northern Ireland and Wales as well, where he must also secure support. If the Bill is to reach the statute books before the MPs’ summer recess, it will need to be propounded in the next Queen’s speech, due in May 2016.
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Trouble at the EHRC, Modern Slavery, and Gay Rights in Romania: The Weekly Round-Up

29 May 2023 by Orry Moore

In the news

The head of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Kishwer Faulkner, is facing an independent investigation into alleged misconduct. It is reported that around 40 complaints have been made by 12 members of staff against Faulkner, alleging harassment, bullying, and discrimination. It is also alleged that Faulkner described Emma Laslet, a trans contestant on ‘Brain of Britain’, as ‘a bloke in lipstick’  – leading to claims of discriminatory language. Her supporters claim that the investigation is a witch-hunt and coup d’etat, motivated by employees critical of Faulkner’s approach to trans rights after she proposed changes to the definition of sex in the Equality Act 2010. These changes would clarify that ‘sex’ means ‘biological sex’ – a move that would clarify the position of trans people in sport, and ensure that only ‘biological women’ can use single-sex spaces. Faulkner also wrote to the Scottish government early in 2022 urging them to pause their proposed reforms to gender recognition (which were ignored). The investigation has since been paused while the Commission seeks legal advice on the impact of leaked confidential information as a result of the original report on this investigation by Channel 4 News.

Karsai v Hungary: little new on assisted dying

11 July 2024 by Guest Contributor

Introduction

Article 8

Regarding the potential violation of the applicant’s right to privacy, his primary argument centres on his desire to control the timing of his death. Due to his medical condition, he is condemned to a life of physical incapacity, pain, and existential dread. The applicant dismisses palliative care as a viable option: “While palliative care could provide relief with respect to certain aspects of his physical suffering, it could not provide relief from the experience of existential dread” (§91). Instead, he focuses on the fact that he cannot avail himself of assisted suicide provisions either in Hungary or abroad. Hungarian law prohibits assisting a patient in procuring their death, and even those aiding with arrangements for this purpose can face prosecution (§§135; 159).

The Court observed that, due to the lack of a uniform consensus among member states on assisted dying practices, each state is granted a considerable margin of appreciation in implementing policies on such sensitive issues. The court also noted, as the recent case of Mortier v. Belgium held, that the right to life (art. 2 ECHR) does not inherently exclude the decriminalisation of assisted dying. However, this decriminalisation must be accompanied by safeguards to prevent abuses of the right to life (§§126-128; 145).

The Court, finding no violation of art. 8, held that Mr Kasai’s suffering could not dismissed lightly. It noted that the applicant’s complaint mainly focused on “existential suffering” that “although it amounts to genuine and severe anguish, existential suffering relates essentially to a personal experience, which may be susceptible to change and does not lend itself to a straightforward objective assessment” (§158). Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that “existential suffering may be refractory to medical treatment […] and that the use of sedation to alleviate it might be contested or unwarranted in certain situations […]” (§157).  Professor Aubry, one of the experts consulted by the Court, emphasised two key points. First, he noted that patients suffering from the same condition as the applicant often exhibit ambivalence about their desire to die as the disease progresses. Second, he underscored the importance of palliative care for individuals affected by ALS, particularly in advanced stages, when they are typically permitted to receive palliative deep sedation and can die peacefully (§46).

Article 14

Regarding the violation of art. 8 ECHR and art. 14 ECHR the Mr Karsai argued that “Hungarian law accorded different treatment to those terminally ill persons with mental capacity who suffered from refractory symptoms but could hasten their death only by means of PAD [physician assisted dying], and those who could do so by having recourse to RWI [refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions” (§170).

In this case the Court held that the applicant’s clinical picture could not be compared to that of terminally ill patients who depend on life-sustaining medical treatments (§174). In fact, Mr Kasai’s diagnosis might lead to invasive life-sustaining interventions only towards the latest stages of his degenerative illness. Furthermore, the withholding or withdrawing of unwanted medical treatments falls within the right to informed medical consent and it is subjected to specific guidelines and safeguards in order to protect the patient’s autonomy (§175).

According to Professor Sandor, who produced an expert opinion for the Court, the right to informed consent is paramount in bioethics. On the other hand, “patients could refuse care, but could not ask for something specific” (§56). For these reasons the Court held that there has been no violation of art. 14 in conjunction with art. 8 of the Convention.

Separate opinions

Two judges’ separate opinions provide an opportunity to delve deeper into the reasoning of the Court’s majority, as they both address the fundamental principles underlying the final decision. Judge Wojtyczek in his separate concurring opinion disagreed with the majority that the applicant’s request to have access to physician assisted dying would fall under his right to respect his private life. The judge emphasised how the right to life – as the practical and effective basis for the enjoyment of all other rights – may hardly “encompass decisions about one’s own life and death” and for this reason, the right to private life, should not extend to the choice of death (§4, Judge Wojtyczek partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion). He noted that the suffering stemming from a personal feeling in relation to the absence of meaning of life may be exacerbated (or not properly tackled) if people can choose their own death.

Judge Felici, dissenting on both accounts with the Court’s majority, firstly emphasised his impression that “the applicant’s legitimate concerns were not taken into account, and that his legitimate request for help fell on deaf ears” (§7, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). In fact, according to Judge Felici, palliative care could not be considered a feasible option to ease the applicant’s suffering since “the expert consulted have indicated that there is currently no medical treatment capable of alleviating existential suffering” (§9, Judge Felici dissenting opinion, my emphasis). In other words, the dissenting Judge stressed an evident reality: so far medicine has not been able to offer a cure to the sentiment that life has lost its meaning. And, for this reason, assisted dying is envisaged as the only possible answer to the applicant existential cry for help. Consequently, the dissenting judge finds that the impossibility for the applicant to avail himself of assisted dying provisions both in his country and abroad would breach his right to privacy enshrined by art. 8 of the Convention.

Specifically, Hungary – compared to other member states which permit assisted dying or are paying great attention on the matter – would have failed to address the severe suffering of the applicant (§5, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). Therefore, Judge Felici dissented that in this instance the margin of appreciation doctrine (which applies on sensitive matters where there is no uniform agreement) should not be invoked. Giving that, “there are no insurmountable legal obstacles to affirming a positive obligation on the part of the State, having regard to all the characteristics of this case, in relation to the application of Article 8 of the Convention” (§6, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).

Secondly, the Judge disagreed with the Court majority’s decision according to which the applicant’s medical condition should be considered similar to the one endured by terminally-ill patients subjected to invasive life-sustaining medical treatments since Mr Kasai’s condition has made him dependant on others for all his personal needs. Hence Judge Felici argued that “the subordination of the decision to take one’s life to whether one is dependent on life-saving treatment represents an unnecessary reduction of the protection of the right to life and an interference in private life, understood as the individual’s capacity for self-determination” (§13, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).

Dr Ilaria Bertini is a Research Fellow at BIOS Centre

Times can use leaked Police documents in libel defence

25 October 2011 by Rachit Buch

Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis & Anor v Times Newspapers Ltd & Anor [2011] EWHC 2705 (QB) (24 October 2011) – Read judgment.

Mr Justice Tugendhat has held that, with restrictions, The Times Newspapers Ltd (TNL)  should be allowed to use information from leaked documents in its defence to a libel claim brought by the Metropolitan Police Service and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). However, proportionality limited the reach of this judgment to the next stage in the libel claim, after which reassessment may be necessary.

It was held that restrictions in the order made did not interfere with TNL’s right to a fair trial in the libel case nor offend its right to freedom of expression. Decisions on specific documents was dealt with in a closed judgment because of the sensitivity of the subject matter.

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