Search Results for: environmental/page/38/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)

The right not to hold any belief is fundamental, says Supreme Court

25 July 2012 by Rosalind English

RT (Zimbabwe) and others (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38 – read judgment

It is no answer to a refugee claim to say that the individual concerned should avoid persecution by lying and feigning loyalty to a regime which he does not support.

So the Supreme Court has ruled today, considering the relevance to political beliefs of the so-called “HJ(Iran) principle” which was formulated in a case where it was held that it was no answer to an asylum claim by a gay man that he should conceal his sexual identity in order to avoid the persecution that would follow if he did not do so.
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10 cases that defined 2020

24 December 2020 by Jonathan Metzer

This time last year I wrote that 2019 had been “perhaps the most tumultuous period in British politics for decades”. Little did I know what 2020 would have in store.

The Covid-19 pandemic has caused loss, suffering and anxiety across not only the UK but almost all of the globe. At the UK Human Rights Blog, we feel deep gratitude to the doctors, nurses, carers and essential workers who have kept society going in what has been a deeply difficult year for so many of us.

In light of this, it is perhaps harder to summon the usual festive spirit that graces the approach of the holiday period — particularly as so many of us will be separated from our loved ones. And yet, perhaps it makes holding onto some spirit of joy all the more necessary.

Writing the article summing up the legal developments of the year is one of the highlights for me as commissioning editor of this blog. Let us embark together on a tour of what the courts had to say over the last 12 months. As ever, it has been a very interesting year.

High Court rules on preliminary issues in challenge relating to alleged UK involvement in torture

9 July 2020 by Sapan Maini-Thompson

In R (Reprieve & Ors) v Prime Minister [2020] EWHC 1695 (Admin), the High Court made a preliminary ruling that Article 6(1) of the ECHR does not apply to the forthcoming judicial review of the Government’s decision not to establish a public inquiry into allegations that the UK intelligence services were involved in the torture, mistreatment and rendition of detainees in the aftermath of 9/11. It was further held that the claimants are not entitled to the level of disclosure of open material outlined in SSHD v AF (No 3) [2009].

Angus McCullough QC of 1 Crown Office Row was instructed as a Special Advocate in this case.

‘Fairness’ in an unfair world

15 April 2011 by Rosalind English

Andrew Crosbie v Secretary of State for Defence [2011] EWHC 879 (Admin) – Read judgment

The Administrative Court has ruled that the employment of an army chaplain involves a “a special bond of trust and loyalty” between employee and state such that the full panoply of fair trial rights under Article 6 could not apply.

This interesting judgment by Nicol J provides an illuminating analysis of the role of Article 6 in military employment disputes, exploring the scope of the “civil rights” concept for the purposes of that provision, and the extent to which these kinds of disputes are excluded from its purview by Strasbourg case law.

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I have a right not to know Elena Ferrante’s real name* – George Szirtes

5 October 2016 by Guest Contributor

1

I have so many rights I am thinking of flogging some off on eBay. Though I have the right not to do so.

Access to environmental justice

17 March 2017 by David Hart KC

On Monday 13 March, I went along to the latest Castle Debate, held in conjunction with the Environmental Law Foundation: see here for more of the same, all free debates, and fascinating topics for anyone interested in environmental law and policy.

It, and Tom Brenan’s talk in particular, reminded me that, despite it being not long after my last Aarhus post (on private law proceedings, here), it was time to set out the latest rules governing judicial reviews, which came into operation on 28 February. The bone of contention, as ever, is the concept that challenging environmental decisions should not be prohibitively expensive.  

Until last month, the rules were relatively simple, and were designed, for better or for worse, to minimise the amounts of arguments about costs in environmental challenges. If you were an individual, £5,000 capped the costs which you would have to pay the other side if you lost.

But Government had become obsessed that environmental challengers were somehow getting a free lunch, and the rules have now been spun into something so complicated that defendants who want to burn off claimants before the claim gets heard have been given a pretty broad licence to do so. For most individuals, committing yourself to paying £5,000 if you lose is a pretty sharp deterrent. But Government does not think so. 

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Karsai v Hungary: little new on assisted dying

11 July 2024 by Guest Contributor

Introduction

Article 8

Regarding the potential violation of the applicant’s right to privacy, his primary argument centres on his desire to control the timing of his death. Due to his medical condition, he is condemned to a life of physical incapacity, pain, and existential dread. The applicant dismisses palliative care as a viable option: “While palliative care could provide relief with respect to certain aspects of his physical suffering, it could not provide relief from the experience of existential dread” (§91). Instead, he focuses on the fact that he cannot avail himself of assisted suicide provisions either in Hungary or abroad. Hungarian law prohibits assisting a patient in procuring their death, and even those aiding with arrangements for this purpose can face prosecution (§§135; 159).

The Court observed that, due to the lack of a uniform consensus among member states on assisted dying practices, each state is granted a considerable margin of appreciation in implementing policies on such sensitive issues. The court also noted, as the recent case of Mortier v. Belgium held, that the right to life (art. 2 ECHR) does not inherently exclude the decriminalisation of assisted dying. However, this decriminalisation must be accompanied by safeguards to prevent abuses of the right to life (§§126-128; 145).

The Court, finding no violation of art. 8, held that Mr Kasai’s suffering could not dismissed lightly. It noted that the applicant’s complaint mainly focused on “existential suffering” that “although it amounts to genuine and severe anguish, existential suffering relates essentially to a personal experience, which may be susceptible to change and does not lend itself to a straightforward objective assessment” (§158). Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that “existential suffering may be refractory to medical treatment […] and that the use of sedation to alleviate it might be contested or unwarranted in certain situations […]” (§157).  Professor Aubry, one of the experts consulted by the Court, emphasised two key points. First, he noted that patients suffering from the same condition as the applicant often exhibit ambivalence about their desire to die as the disease progresses. Second, he underscored the importance of palliative care for individuals affected by ALS, particularly in advanced stages, when they are typically permitted to receive palliative deep sedation and can die peacefully (§46).

Article 14

Regarding the violation of art. 8 ECHR and art. 14 ECHR the Mr Karsai argued that “Hungarian law accorded different treatment to those terminally ill persons with mental capacity who suffered from refractory symptoms but could hasten their death only by means of PAD [physician assisted dying], and those who could do so by having recourse to RWI [refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions” (§170).

In this case the Court held that the applicant’s clinical picture could not be compared to that of terminally ill patients who depend on life-sustaining medical treatments (§174). In fact, Mr Kasai’s diagnosis might lead to invasive life-sustaining interventions only towards the latest stages of his degenerative illness. Furthermore, the withholding or withdrawing of unwanted medical treatments falls within the right to informed medical consent and it is subjected to specific guidelines and safeguards in order to protect the patient’s autonomy (§175).

According to Professor Sandor, who produced an expert opinion for the Court, the right to informed consent is paramount in bioethics. On the other hand, “patients could refuse care, but could not ask for something specific” (§56). For these reasons the Court held that there has been no violation of art. 14 in conjunction with art. 8 of the Convention.

Separate opinions

Two judges’ separate opinions provide an opportunity to delve deeper into the reasoning of the Court’s majority, as they both address the fundamental principles underlying the final decision. Judge Wojtyczek in his separate concurring opinion disagreed with the majority that the applicant’s request to have access to physician assisted dying would fall under his right to respect his private life. The judge emphasised how the right to life – as the practical and effective basis for the enjoyment of all other rights – may hardly “encompass decisions about one’s own life and death” and for this reason, the right to private life, should not extend to the choice of death (§4, Judge Wojtyczek partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion). He noted that the suffering stemming from a personal feeling in relation to the absence of meaning of life may be exacerbated (or not properly tackled) if people can choose their own death.

Judge Felici, dissenting on both accounts with the Court’s majority, firstly emphasised his impression that “the applicant’s legitimate concerns were not taken into account, and that his legitimate request for help fell on deaf ears” (§7, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). In fact, according to Judge Felici, palliative care could not be considered a feasible option to ease the applicant’s suffering since “the expert consulted have indicated that there is currently no medical treatment capable of alleviating existential suffering” (§9, Judge Felici dissenting opinion, my emphasis). In other words, the dissenting Judge stressed an evident reality: so far medicine has not been able to offer a cure to the sentiment that life has lost its meaning. And, for this reason, assisted dying is envisaged as the only possible answer to the applicant existential cry for help. Consequently, the dissenting judge finds that the impossibility for the applicant to avail himself of assisted dying provisions both in his country and abroad would breach his right to privacy enshrined by art. 8 of the Convention.

Specifically, Hungary – compared to other member states which permit assisted dying or are paying great attention on the matter – would have failed to address the severe suffering of the applicant (§5, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). Therefore, Judge Felici dissented that in this instance the margin of appreciation doctrine (which applies on sensitive matters where there is no uniform agreement) should not be invoked. Giving that, “there are no insurmountable legal obstacles to affirming a positive obligation on the part of the State, having regard to all the characteristics of this case, in relation to the application of Article 8 of the Convention” (§6, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).

Secondly, the Judge disagreed with the Court majority’s decision according to which the applicant’s medical condition should be considered similar to the one endured by terminally-ill patients subjected to invasive life-sustaining medical treatments since Mr Kasai’s condition has made him dependant on others for all his personal needs. Hence Judge Felici argued that “the subordination of the decision to take one’s life to whether one is dependent on life-saving treatment represents an unnecessary reduction of the protection of the right to life and an interference in private life, understood as the individual’s capacity for self-determination” (§13, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).

Dr Ilaria Bertini is a Research Fellow at BIOS Centre

Enforcement of environmental law: what is not in the Brexit Bill

20 July 2017 by David Hart KC

I posted recently on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and its approach to rolling over EU-derived laws into our domestic law. But a law is only as good as its enforcement makes it, and so we all need to think how this is going to be done post-Brexit. 

NB: there is nothing in the Bill which touches on enforcement; that is for later, if at all.

The issue arises particularly starkly in the environmental field, where there are not so many players with direct legal and commercial interests around (as in, say, equal pay or competition law) to seek consistent enforcement.

A task force within the UK Environmental Law Association (chaired by Professor Richard Macrory and Andrew Bryce, left and right in the pic) has been applying its mind to this enforcement problem, and on 18 July 2017  published a short and powerful report on the issue – Brexit and Environment Law. Its main messages are these.

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High speed rail, Parliament, and the EU Courts

22 January 2014 by David Hart KC

R (o.t.a HS2AA, Buckingham County Council and others) v. Secretary of State for Transport, [2014] UKSC 3 – read judgments

So the challenge to the way in which the Government wished to push the HS2 project through Parliament has failed before the Supreme Court, though not without clarifying the way in which key EU environmental provisions are meant to work. And we will also see a further flexing of the Court’s muscles against a too straightforward reading of the supremacy of EU law when seen against our constitutional principles.  

The objectors said the command paper which preceded the Parliamentary hybrid bill, in which the Government set out its proposals for HS2, fell within the scope of the  Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive 2001/42/EC and that an SEA ought therefore to have been carried out. The directive applies to plans or programmes which set a “framework” (Art.3(2)(a)) for future decisions whether to grant development consent for projects, and it was said that the command paper set the framework for the decision whether to grant consent for HS2.

Secondly, the objectors said that the legislative procedure in Parliament does not meet the requirements of the  Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92/EU. The EU Court of Justice has interpreted that directive as imposing a number of requirements, including that the legislature must have available to it the information required by the directive, and a requirement that national courts must be able to verify that the requirements of the directive have been satisfied, taking account of the entire legislative process, including the preparatory documents and the parliamentary debates.
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The CJEU on “prohibitively expensive” and the new protective costs order regime

11 April 2013 by David Hart KC

R (Edwards & Pallikaropoulos) v. Environment Agency et al, 11 April 2013, read CJEU judgment, and read Opinion of A-G Kokott,

and the Civil Procedure Rules 45.41 to 45.44, in force from 1 April 2013, with Practice Direction 45

Twin developments, both of which are important for those involved in environmental cases. They emerge from the UK’s treaty obligations flowing from the Aarhus Convention under which it is obliged to ensure that environmental cases are not “prohibitively expensive” per Article 9(4) of the Convention.

The first development is a decision by the CJEU on the meaning of those words.

The second is a new set of rules providing for protective costs orders in environmental judicial review claims.
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Slow but steady on access to environmental justice from supreme court

20 December 2010 by Rosalind English

R (on the application of Edwards and another) (Appellant) v Environment Agency & others(Respondents) [2010] UKSC 57 – Read judgment

The development of the principles of access to justice in environmental cases moves on apace.

This case arose out of a failed attempt to seek judicial review of the Environment Agency’s decision to issue a permit for the operation of a cement works. The application was made under the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 85/337/EC and the Intergrated Pollution Prevention and control Directive 96/61/EC, both of which incorporate Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention, which requires that costs for environmental proceedings should not be prohibitively expensive.

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Aarhus shows its teeth to Belgium

31 October 2011 by David Hart KC

C-128/09 Boxus, CJEU, 18 October 2011

Belgium and its airports seem to have been skirmishing with the European Union Courts for some time now. First, in 2008, the ECJ in Abraham decided that a major and well-established expansion of Liege-Bierset airport required Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), contrary to the contentions of the airport and its operators. Our case, Boxus, concerns a raft of challenges to consents for that airport expansion, and to similar projects affecting Charleroi airport and railways. These challenges ended up in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union on more EIA issues.   This time, it appears that the Walloon Region of Belgium had become impatient with continuing court challenges – so it resorted to Parliamentary Decree, in which Parliament “ratified” the various planning consents.

Hey, presto, the Region thought, any defects in previous procedures are solved, and the court proceedings will fall away – or will they?  Enter, on a white charger, the Aarhus Convention to the aid of the challengers.

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Standing and discretion – who acts for ospreys?

19 October 2012 by David Hart KC

Walton v. The Scottish Ministers, Supreme Court, 17 October 2012 read judgment

The outcome of this challenge to a road scheme near Aberdeen turned on abstruse points about environmental assessment – but the speeches from the Justices go right to the heart of two big questions in public law.

1. When can someone challenge an unlawful act – when do they have “standing” to do so?

2. If an unlawfulness is established, when can the courts exercise their discretion not to quash the unlawful act, particularly where the unlawfulness arises under EU law?

In the course of the standing issue Lord Hope talks about ospreys – hence my title, but a bit more context first. And we shall also see the views of the Court that standing and discretion are linked questions.

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When is access to environmental justice “prohibitively expensive”?

22 September 2010 by Rachel Marcus

Coedbach Action Team Ltd v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2010] EWHC 2312 (Admin) – Read judgment

A recent decision of the High Court, relating to a challenge to planning permission for a power station, could significantly limit access to environmental justice for local community groups.

The Aarhus Convention requires that access to justice and effective remedies be provided to members of the public in environmental matters, and that the procedures be “fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.”

Both the UK and the EU are signatories to the Convention; the access to justice provisions are given effect in EU law in the Directive 85/377 EEC, which requires that such access be given to “members of the public concerned” who have a sufficient interest or  are maintaining the impairment of a right.

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New expenses rules for environmental litigation in Scotland: protective or defective? — Dr Ben Christman

22 November 2018 by Guest Contributor

The Scottish Government sets itself apart from its UK counterpart in its approach to protecting human rights. The SNP vocally opposed proposals to withdraw the UK from the ECHR and repeal the Human Rights Act. An expert group appointed by the First Minister Nicola Sturgeon will report this year with recommendations on how Scotland “can continue to lead by example in human rights”, and appears to be considering incorporating a range of rights from international human rights law into the Scottish legal system.

In environmental rights however, the lack of progress is conspicuous. As David Hart QC explained, the Aarhus Convention aims to protect the right to live in an environment adequate to health and wellbeing – the foundation on which other human rights are built. It recognises the rights of NGOs and members of the public to access information, participate in decision-making, and access justice. These rights encourage citizens to get involved in environmental decision-making. Article 9 requires that NGOs and members of the public must be able to challenge situations where their Convention rights are denied or national environmental laws are broken. Critically, access to justice must be “not prohibitively expensive”.

Yet environmental litigation (mainly judicial review) in Scotland is extortionate. Litigants face six figure bills if they lose. The Convention’s Meeting of the Parties and Compliance Committee (ACCC) have found Scotland to be non-compliant with the requirements of Article 9 (the latter has done so repeatedly). Instead of recognising this deficiency, recent Scottish Government consultation documents note Scotland’s “ongoing compliance” and disparage the Compliance Committee as “not a judicial body”.

2018 brings a new development. New protective expenses orders rules for environmental litigation in Scotland were created last week. This post examines these rules, and argues that they remain out of line with the Convention.

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