Search Results for: environmental/page/31/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)
8 November 2013 by Rosalind English
AB, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 3453 (Admin) – read judgment
Here unfolds a story of sophisticated abuse of the asylum system in this country by an individual skilfully shamming persecution. Nor did the security agents who escorted the claimant on his departure come up smelling of roses: it emerged during the course of these proceedings that they had falsified a room clearance certificate to boost the defence case.
The judgment also points up the potentially far-reaching effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and how this might render all the handwringing about the European Convention on Human Rights irrelevant, and a home grown Bill of Rights otiose.
Factual background
The claimant, whom Mostyn J describes as “a highly intelligent, manipulative, unscrupulous and deceitful person”, arrived in this country in 2005, was refused asylum and was deported in 2010. He sought judicial review of the Home Secretary’s decision to refuse his claim and return him to his state of embarkation, “Country A” (so designated because there was a reporting restriction order made in the original proceedings anonymising both the claimant, his country of origin, and the political organisation of which he claimed to be a member. Mostyn J “reluctantly” went along with that order in this proceedings, since neither of the parties applied to have it reviewed.)
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14 August 2023 by Ruby Peacock
In this two-part article, Maya Sikand KC, Tom Stoate and Ruby Peacock, explore two difficult questions arising from the inquest into the ‘harrowing circumstances’ of the death of a baby, Aisha Cleary, at HMP Bronzefield.
The first part explored whether coroners should have jurisdiction to investigate stillbirths.
This second part seeks to answer the question: should foetuses ever be protected by a ‘derivative’ right to life?
For a brief introduction to Aisha Cleary’s case, please see Part 1.
Article 2 ECHR rights in utero
Article 2, encapsulating the right to life under the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), does not provide temporal limitations on the right to life and does not define ‘everyone’ (‘toute personne’) whose life is protected by the Convention.[1] The European Court on Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has left it to the margin of appreciation of Convention states to decide when life begins for the purposes of Article 2. In England and Wales, ‘Coroners do not have jurisdiction to conduct an investigation concerning a foetus or a stillborn child, as where there has not been an independent life, there has not legally been a death’.[2]
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31 January 2016 by Adam Wagner
Steinfeld & Anor v The Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128 (Admin) – Read judgment
The High Court has ruled in the case of Steinfeld and Keidan v Secretary of State for Education, a human rights challenge to the law of Civil Partnerships. Mrs Justice Andrews ruled that the current law does not breach the human rights of opposite-sex couples who cannot obtain a Civil Partnership.
The case arises from the odd state the law was left in after same-sex couples were given the legal right to marry in 2014. Since 2005, same-sex couples had been allowed to form “Civil Partnerships” which give them essentially the same legal rights and protections as marriage without being able to actually marry. Only same-sex couples can have a civil partnership. Civil Partnerships were a kind of half-way house; the message they sent was that the (New Labour) government wanted to give same-sex couples legal protection akin to marriage but didn’t feel that society was quite ready for full marriage equality.
Once same-sex couples were given the right to marry in 2014, the law was left in a bit of a mess. Same-sex couples have dual means of recognising their partnerships (Civil Partnerships and Marriage) whereas opposite-sex couples could only marry. This is clearly an unintended consequence of the winding route to marriage equality rather than any well-thought out plan.
In 2014, it would have been open to the government to abolish civil partnerships altogether or permit everyone to enter into them. Instead, a “wait and see” approach was adopted.
Rebecca Steinfeld and Charles Keiden (full disclosure: they are friends of mine) wanted to enter into a civil partnership but were prevented because they were not of the same sex. They brought a human rights case against the government saying they were being discriminated against by the current law.
Mrs Justice Andrews rejected their case in strong terms. You can read the full judgment here. I recommend doing so – it is tightly argued and very clear.
In cases involving the right to family and private life, there are two basic stages a judge needs to consider. First, is there an interference with the right – in other words, does the thing that is being complained about interfere with family or private life as it is defined in the European Convention and court judgments. Let’s call that Gate 1. If you get through Gate 1, you then have to get through Gate 2, which is to show that the interference was not justified with reference to proportionality (did the end justify the means?) and other balancing factors which are the text of the right itself.
The claimants here didn’t get through the first gate. Mrs Justice Andrews accepted the government’s argument that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to family and private life) was not even engaged, let alone breached. Here’s a key bit of the judgment explaining why:
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The only obstacle to the Claimants obtaining the equivalent legal recognition of their status and the same rights and benefits as a same-sex couple is their conscience. That was the case both before and after the enactment of the 2013 Act. Whilst their views are of course to be afforded respect, it is their choice not to avail themselves of the means of state recognition that is open to them. The state has fulfilled its obligations under the Convention by making a means of formal recognition of their relationship available. The denial of a further means of formal recognition which is open to same- sex couples, does not amount to unlawful state interference with the Claimants’ right to family life or private life, any more than the denial of marriage to same-sex couples did prior to the enactment of the 2013 [Same-Sex Marriage] Act. There is no lack of respect afforded to any specific aspect of the Claimants’ private or family life on account of their orientation as a heterosexual couple. Thus the statutory restrictions complained of do not impinge upon the core values under either limb of Art 8 to the degree necessary to entitle the Claimants to rely upon Art 14. The link between the measures complained of, and their right to enjoy their family and private life, is a tenuous one.
See the powerful argument on UK Human Rights Blog (written before the judgment) about why this might be problematic.
As judges usually do, Mrs Justice Andrews went on to consider “Gate 2″ anyway, in case she was wrong about Gate 1. She accepted the government’s argument that their approach to the issue (“wait and see”) had been perfectly reasonable.
Where next? Potentially an appeal. The BBC reports the couple were given permission to appeal which means they can appeal to the Court of Appeal if they choose to do so. If they do appeal, they will have to convince the Court of Appeal that there has been an interference with the right to family life (Gate 1 – certainly arguable) but also that the interference was not justified. Gate 2 will be harder.
As things stand, the law is in a mess. Even if it is not a breach of human rights to refuse opposite sex couples the right to have civil partnerships, that doesn’t mean it is fair or right.
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20 January 2013 by David Hart KC
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami et al v. European Parliament opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 17 January 2013, read opinion, on appeal from the General Court read judgment & my post on it
The EU makes a rule. When can the ordinary person affected seek annulment of the rule on the basis that it is unlawful? This is the big issue tussled with in this important and informative Advocate General’s opinion. You might have thought that if the basic ground for challenge was unlawfulness (and that is a high hurdle in itself), then as long as you were in some way affected by the decision, then you should be able to complain about the decision. That is broadly how we do things here in our UK system of judicial review.
But when you get to the EU Courts very different rules of engagement apply – far fewer people can complain about the illegality directly.
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24 May 2010 by Adam Wagner
Under threat?
The Coalition Government has pledged to “protect” the right to trial by jury. It is often assumed that the a jury is needed to ensure a fair trial, but Sir Louis Blom-Cooper argues in an interesting article in the Guardian that juries may not always be essential, particularly in cases involving serious organised crime.
Blom-Cooper, an academic and barrister, argues that jury-less trials need not always be illiberal. He says “The experience in Northern Ireland over three decades suggests that serious organised crimes can effectively and efficiently be tried before a professional court ‑ a single judge or perhaps three judges.” He also suggests that defendants ought to be able to waive their right to trial by jury as is the case in many other jurisdictions.
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2 November 2020 by Samuel March
R v A [2020] EWCA Crim 1408
On 29/10/2020, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against an aggravated burglary conviction brought by a teenage victim of human trafficking.
The applicant’s personal circumstances, including as a victim of trafficking, were properly reflected by way of mitigation of sentence. But his culpability and criminality were not extinguished or so diminished as to lead to the conclusion that he would or might not have been prosecuted.
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5 March 2025 by Matthew Leitch
Background
In RTM v Bonne Terre Ltd [2025] EWHC 111 (KB), the High Court considered claims brought in data protection and the tort of misuse of private information. The Claimant described himself as a “recovering online gambling addict” [1]. He sought damages for harm, distress and financial loss, and a declaration that his rights under data protection legislation had been infringed, from the Defendant, who operate Sky Betting and Gaming (SBG). The relevant period of the Claimant’s gambling for the claim against SBG (restricted by limitation periods) was 2017 until the end of 2018 or the start of 2019 [15].
The Claimant’s case was that SBG harvested his data using cookies without his consent. SBG the processed his personal data for marketing purposes without lawful basis, and targeted him through direct marketing emails (also without his consent) sent on average twice a day [68]. Consequently, he alleged he suffered substantial losses.
Despite the claim having started in an almost inquisitorial fashion, with the Claimant undertaking a broad investigation into gambling laws when recovering from his addiction, the narrow issue at trial was “what, if anything, [the Claimant] consented to in the marketing part of the operation” [77].
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12 February 2012 by Sam Murrant
Welcome back to the human rights roundup, your recommended weekly intake of human rights news. The full list of links can be found here. You can also find our table of human rights cases here and previous roundups here.
In the news
Abu Qatada released on bail
Abu Qatada was released on “very restrictive” bail conditions this Monday in a decision by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission on the basis of both British legal precedent and Strasbourg human rights case-law. This also follows from the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that he should not be returned to his native Jordan, where torture-derived evidence may be used against him in trial.
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20 October 2011 by Melina Padron
Welcome back to the human rights roundup, a regular bulletin of everything we have not managed to feature in full blog posts. The full list of links can be found here. You can also find our table of human rights cases here and previous roundups here.
by Melinda Padron
In the news
The UK Supreme Court under the spotlight
Last week the UKSC’s constitutional status, message, work and composition were the focus of various articles.
Roger Masterman and Jo Murkens tried to establish what kind of court is the UK Supreme Court, with particular reference to its constitutional status. Amongst many interesting points, Masterman and Murkens believe that as a result of some of its own features, the Court has begun cementing its place as a constitutional actor of its own right.
Richard Cornes, for the Guardian, believes that the most interesting message the Supreme Court is sending has gone almost unheard. Cornes argues this is the result of a combination of the obstacles to the efforts to make the Court more transparent, and the quality of coverage of the Court’s work. In particular, Cornes believes readers of mainstream media (he cites the Daily Mail, the Times and the Guardian as examples) will not have the same impression of the Supreme Court as the person who follows the UK Human Rights blog’s Twitter feed or checks the Guardian Law or Times Law pages online.
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1 June 2021 by Rosalind English
On 28th of April I wrote up a judgment by Weimar District Court Judge Dettmar against masks and social distancing in schools, and his subsequent handling by the police and District Prosecutor. Judge Dettmar’s decision of the 8th of April was overturned last week and the proceedings were discontinued.
The same court had produced a similar judgment ( 6 OWi 583 Js 200030/21) in a “Corona trial” on the 15th of March 2021 published on the 6th of May 2021. This was a ruling from a judge with a different jurisdiction in the same court. Judge Güricke, unlike Judge Dettmar, is not a family judge. Part of his jurisdiction concerns the validity of subordinate legislation, particularly ordinances banning certain behaviour, on pain of a fine or even a prison sentence. All administrative offences that are not traffic offences fall into this jurisdiction; and the Corona fine cases fall into the Special Administrative Offences division of which Judge Güricke is part. This, his latest judgment, examines in great depth what the government actually knew and should have known about the situation prevailing when the government decided on lockdown in March 2020.
It is well worth reading. Despite the fact that the German media has barely picked up on it, it is being commented upon and read in legal circles.
Judge Güricke’s ruling on the constitutional point is final. The public prosecutor’s office have not been able to appeal because the Thuringian Constitutional Court handed down a ruling on 1 March 2021 that all Thuringian Corona decrees, starting with the first one issued in March 2020 until the beginning of June 2020, were unlawful and null and void due to an error in formalities.
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11 June 2024 by Rosalind English
This article was first published in Edition 33 of the Journal of Environmental Law and Management. It is reproduced here with the kind permission of the editors at Lawtext Publishing Limited
On Monday 9 April 2024 the Strasbourg Court handed down judgment in three cases involving climate change: Carême v France (ECHR no 7189/21), Duarte Agostinho v Portugal and 32 others ( ECHR no 39371/20), and Verein Klimaseniorinnen v Switzerland [2024] ECHR 304, no 53600/20.
Interestingly, shortly before the Strasbourg judges had reached their decision in these three cases, the New Zealand Supreme Court considered an application for strike-out of a challenge to a number of carbon-emitting businesses based on the tort of public nuisance as well as a new form of action, that involved a duty to cease materially contributing damage to the climate system: Michael John Smith (appellant) v Fronterra Co-operative group Ltd and Others [2024] NZSC 5. I will come back to this judgment later in this article.
First, we turn to the more recent Strasbourg cases. Each of these cases was examined by the same composition of the Grand Chamber, and each raised unprecedented issues before the Court.The particular nature of the problems arising from climate change in terms of the Convention issues has not so far been addressed in the Court’s case law. I will concentrate on the one successful application, Verein Klimaseniorinnen v Switzerland. Both Carême and Duarte Agostinho failed with their applications on procedural grounds; most notably, the Duarte Agostinho application was dismissed due to a failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
In Verein Klimaseniorinnen, some female senior citizens and a representative organisation (Klimaseniorinnen) argued that the impact of global warming on their health breached a number of Articles of the ECHR. The Strasbourg Court was satisfied in this instance that they had exhausted their local remedies, although it found that the individual applicants had not satisfied ‘victim status’ for the purposes of Article 34 ECHR; they had failed to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient link between the harm they had allegedly suffered (or would suffer in the future) and climate change. But the Court held, by 16 votes to one, that the applicant association did have locus standi in the present proceedings and that its com- plaint should be examined under Article 8 of the Convention.
Having admitted the association’s complaint, the Grand Chamber found that states are under a positive obligation under Article 8 to provide effective protection from ‘serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life’. In order to achieve this, states must enforce regulations that are capable of mitigating current and future impacts of climate change by having in place a plan for the reduction of greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions and achieving carbon neutrality over the decades leading to 2050. Switzerland had failed in this in that it had not quantified a carbon budget, nor had it set limits on greenhouse gas emissions. It had also exceeded its previous GHG emission reduction targets, which resulted in a violation of Article 8. There was ‘no doubt’, said the Court, that climate change-induced heatwaves had caused, were causing and would cause further deaths and illnesses to older people and particularly women (represented by the Klimaseniorinnen association).
There was one sole dissent from the majority’s findings on admissibility and the merits. Further on in this article I will explore the different opinion of the British representative on the panel, Judge Eicke. Before that, we will look at the main arguments before the Court.
The Swiss Government argued that global warming had not reached the necessary level to create a tangible effect on the private and family life of the individual applicants under Article 8, including on their mental well-being.
The respondent state party also maintained that the Court should not allow the applicant association to circumvent the mechanism established under the Paris Agreement by seeking to establish, under the Convention, an international judicial control mechanism to review the measures to limit GHG emissions.
Various other governments intervened in this application to say, in effect, that the response to climate change should be an effective global response and that the Court should not, indeed could not, engage in a form of law- making and regulation which would bypass the role of the democratic process and institutions in the response to climate change.
The Swiss Federation also had quite a forceful argument on the in limine question of jurisdiction: it submitted that GHG emissions generated abroad could not be considered as attracting the responsibility of Switzerland as those emissions could not be directly linked to any alleged omissions on the part of Switzerland, whose authorities did not have direct control over the sources of emissions. Moreover, the whole system established by the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement was based on the principle of territoriality and the responsibility of states for emissions on their territory.Thus, said the respondent, the applicants could not complain about certain imports containing ‘embedded emissions’ from other jurisdictions. The Court did not agree. Although ‘embedded emissions’ contained an extraterritorial aspect, it did not raise an issue of Switzerland’s jurisdiction in respect of the applicants, but rather one of Switzerland’s responsibility for the alleged effects of the ‘embedded emissions’ on the applicants’ Convention rights.
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30 March 2015 by Laura Profumo
Laura Profumo brings us up to speed with the latest human rights happenings.
In the News
“It seems hard to believe that Grayling will remain Lord Chancellor for long”. Joshua Rozenberg delivered a biting analysis of the minister’s future legacy in the Law Gazette last week. As the General Election looms, “perhaps Cameron has finally begun to realise how much anger and despair there is at the steady erosion in access to justice for which Grayling is held responsible”. If the Conservatives lead the next government, the Lord Chancellor will struggle to secure his place, Rozenberg warns.
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11 November 2011 by Adam Wagner
The Civil Justice Council (CJC) has just released a major new report: Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or self-represented litigants). The report attacks head-on the prospect of thousands more people having to represent themselves in court once civl legal aid is mostly taken away.
The 94-page report, written by a group including a QC and a High Court judge, is a major and ambitious attempt to make the justice system fairer and simpler for people who go to court without a lawyer. A huge amount of research and thought has gone into it, building on the process begun by Lord Woolf in 1997 with the Civil Procedure Act. The CJC was itself a creation of the 1997 Act, its function being to figure out how to make the civil justice system more accessible, fair and efficient.
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30 September 2010 by Adam Wagner
Some of this week’s human rights news, in bite-size form. The full list of our external links can be found on the right sidebar or here:Can an institution demand a CRB check from tutors visiting to train staff? – Anna Fairclough, Liberty: Another excellent answer to a human rights question via the Guardian’s Liberty Clinic. This edition addresses the overzealous use of Criminal Records Bureau checks by employers. I referred to this issue in a recent roundup, as Nacro, a crime reduction organisation, is campaigning to reform the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act so that ancient and trivial criminal offences would no longer be a bar to employment as they often are now.
Which Miliband is greenest? – Halsbury’s Law Exchange: Stephen Hockman QC, an environmental law expert, says that both Milibands have done more than the current government to promote green issues. Perhaps when David returns to front-line politics he will take up the environmental post his brother recently vacated. We have been featuring environmental law recently on the blog – see a list of recent posts here. Also, good to see the Halsbury’s Law Exchange are now blogging regularly!
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22 June 2016 by Jessica Elliott
R (Nigel Mott) v Environment Agency [2015] EWHC 314 (Admin) Read Judgment
An interesting Court of Appeal decision concerning the science of migratory salmon, and the circumstances in which compensation will be granted when an interference with Article 1 Protocol 1 is found.
For over forty years, Mr Nigel Mott has fished for salmon at Lydney on the River Severn with putcher ranks: rigs of conical baskets which trap adult salmon as they swim upstream in order to spawn.
Putchers had long enjoyed a privileged status as against other means of fishing. Owing to their designation as a “historic installation”, they were spared the controls and conditions which applied to rods and nets, and which have increasingly regulated fishing activity since the first Salmon Fisheries Acts in 1861.
Freedom to fish without restriction allowed Mr Mott to make his living from this ancient method: at £100 per salmon, his annual catch of 600 fish brought him a gross turnover of £60,000.
In 2011, new statutory powers enabled the Environment Agency (“the Agency”) to impose catch conditions on fishing licences granted in respect of historic installations “where it considers that it is necessary to do so for the protection of any fishery”.
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