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UK Human Rights Blog - 1 Crown Office Row
Search Results for: environmental/page/20/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)
Radovan Karadžić, the former Bosnian Serb leader, has been sentenced to 40 years in jail for genocide and war crimes committed during the 1992-95 Balkans war, including the massacre of more than 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo, during which 13,952 people were killed. Despite the 70-year-old former leader’s insistence that his actions were aimed at protecting Serbs during the conflict, he was found guilty of 10 out of the 11 charges he faced, in a verdict delivered 18 months after the end of his five-year trial.
Karadžić had been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) which was established by the UN in 1993. He was on the run for the next 13 years, during which time he assumed the identity of ‘Dr Dragon Dabic’, a bearded health guru who lived openly in the Serbian capital. He was finally arrested in 2008 and handed over to the Hague by the Serbian government. Continue reading →
This article was first published here on the UK Labour Law Blog on 6th July 2020 and is reproduced with the author and editors’ kind permission.
Introduction
In a judgment handed down on 1 April 2020, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of Nicola Davies J (as she then was) and a unanimous Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal on the ground that no vicarious liability can lie for the acts of an independent contractor: Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants (‘Barclays’). This was one of a pair of decisions, each concerned with a limb of the vicarious liability test: the requisite relationship (Barclays) and the necessary connection between that relationship and the wrongdoing (WM Morrisons Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants (‘Morrisons’)). While much could be said, to use the language of recent case-law, about whether this latest development means that vicarious liability is still ‘on the move’ (Various Claimants v Child Catholic Welfare Society (‘Christian Brothers’)), has ‘come to a stop’ (Cox v Ministry of Justice (‘Cox’)), or has even been thrown into reverse, this post will instead focus on the judgment’s implications for the test(s) for employment or worker status across various contexts. Although Barclays may bring a certain kind of clarity, or at least predictability, to future vicarious liability cases, it nonetheless blurs boundaries in several areas of law. Three of these will be addressed below.
A major argument offered in defence is the one focused on the supremacy of domestic law over its international counterpart (see HMG Legal Position: UKIM Bill And Northern Ireland Protocol). The argument goes something like this: where domestic law appears to conflict with international law, Parliament reigns supreme and the domestic legislation is to have effect.
Strictly speaking, this is true. In contexts like the UK, with a dualist system requiring international treaties to be incorporated by an Act of Parliament, any international agreement that is not incorporated into domestic law, but which conflicts with an Act of Parliament, must give way.
But when the dust settles and the reality sets in that UK, as a country, must operate alongside other countries, there is likely to be a host of adverse implications to flow from this decision. Primary among these is, of course, that international law is law and the rule of law necessitates that the UK complies with its international obligations. This is obvious and it is a remarkable state of affairs that the point even needs to be made. Nevertheless, beyond the obvious, there are a multitude of other reasons not to flout international law, only a few of which are touched upon below.
Laura Profumo considers the latest human rights headlines.
In the News
The High Court in Belfast today ruled that abortion legislation in Northern Ireland is in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHCR) brought the case to extend abortion to cases of serious foetal malformation, rape and incest.
The Abortion Act 1967 does not extend to Northern Ireland: abortion is only allowed there if a woman’s life is at risk, or if there is a permanent risk to her mental or physical health. In this judicial review, it was held that the grounds for abortion should be extended, though it is still to be determined whether new legislation will be required to give effect to the ruling.
The Home Secretary has launched a major attack on immigration judges in today’s Mail on Sunday, in language which even the Mail says is “highly emotive”. She finds it “depressing” that judges are consistently refusing to allow deportation of foreign criminals in “defiance of Parliament’s wishes”.
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change v. Friends of the Earth and others, CA, 25 January 2012, read judgment
So, after an anxious wait for the affected businesses, the Court of Appeal has confirmed today that the Minister was too hasty in the way he went about modifying the scheme for subsidising small solar power schemes. But, as often, the Court went about things differently from the judgment below (see my initial and follow-up posts on this)
The Court held that the Minister had no power to do what he did, which was to say he was going to modify the subsidy rules in respect of schemes which had become eligible prior to the modification coming into effect. The legislation and rules are characteristically impenetrable, but the Minister proposed in a consultation, which closed on 31 October 2011, to reduce the subsidies for schemes which became eligible after 12 December 2011. The key point is that he proposed that this modification should come into force on 1 April 2012, and that those who had signed up to such a scheme between December 2011 and April 2012 lost much of their subsidy from 1 April 2012. The original scheme paid participants 43.3p per kilowatt hour for 25 years. The proposed revised scheme for these new joiners would pay them that rate until April 2012, but thereafter 21p per kilowatt hour for the rest of the 25 years.
L.H. v Latvia [2014] ECHR 453 (29 April 2014) – read judgment
The release of confidential patient details to a state medical institution in the course of her negotiations with a hospital over a lawsuit was an unjustified interference with her right to respect for private life under Article 8.
Background
In 1997 the applicant gave birth at a state hospital in Cēsis. Caesarean section was used, with the applicant’s consent, because uterine rupture had occurred during labour. In the course of that surgery the surgeon performed tubal ligation (surgical contraception) without the applicant’s consent.
In 2005, after her attempt to achieve an out-of-court settlement with the hospital had failed, the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the hospital, seeking to recover damages for the unauthorised tubal ligation. In December of 2006 her claim was upheld and she was awarded compensation in the amount of 10,000 Latvian lati for the unlawful sterilisation. Continue reading →
Othman (Abu Qatada) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (appeal allowed) [2012] UKSIAC 15/2005_2 – read judgment
Angus McCullough QC appeared for Abu Qatada as his Special Advocate in these proceedings before SIAC. He is not the author of this post.
Earlier today, Abu Qatada was released from Long Lartin prison following his successful appeal before the Special Immigration Appeal’s Commission (SIAC). Qatada was challenging the decision to deport him to Jordan, where he faces a retrial for alleged terrorism offences.
For most of the last decade, Abu Qatada has been detained pending deportation to his home country. At his two original trials, he was convicted in absentia and sentenced to full life imprisonment with 15 years’ hard labour.
The Upper Tribunal decision in of C&C v Governing Body [2018] UKUT 269 (AAC) has provided important clarification to the scope of the Equality Act 2010 in an education context.
A 13-year-old boy, L, was excluded for physical violence at school. L suffered from autism, anxiety and Pathological Demand Avoidance; it was common ground that the episodes of violence were as a result of these conditions.
It was also common ground that, but for the effect of Reg. 4(1)(c) Equality Act 2010 (Disability) Regulations 2010 (‘the 2010 Regulations’), L would meet the definition of having a ‘disability’ found at section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 (‘EA 2010’), as he had physical or mental impairment which had a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.
But section 6 of the EA 2010 must be read in conjunction with the 2010 Regulations. The effect of Reg.4(1)(c) of the 2010 Regulations is to carve out from the definition of ‘disability’ those ‘impairments’ which manifest themselves in:
(a) a tendency to set fires,
(b) a tendency to steal,
(c) a tendency to physical or sexual abuse of other persons,
(d) exhibitionism, and
(e) voyeurism.
In C&C the school argued that L’s violent behaviour amounted to ‘a tendency to physical…abuse of other persons’ for the purposes of the 2010 Regulations, thereby removing the protection from discrimination that he would otherwise be afforded by the EA 2010.
The Law
Previous cases had decided that behaviour which amounted to a ‘tendency to physical…abuse’ was not protected under the Equality Act 2010 in the case of children with behavioural difficulties.
However, C&C reversed this line of authority.
The First Tier Tribunal had found, in line with the established case law, that L did not fulfil the definition of ‘disability’ under section 6 EA 2010 by virtue of the operation of Reg. 4(1)(c).
On appeal, Tribunal Judge Rowley was tasked with deciding whether the current interpretation of Reg. 4(1)(c) of the 2010 Regulations was compatible with Article 14 read with Article 2 of Protocol 1 (A2P1).
This week we welcome to the Blog our new team of commentators on Scottish human rights issues – Fraser Simpson, David Scott and Thomas Raine.
Khan v. The Advocate General for Scotland, [2015] CSIH 29 – read judgment.
A Pakistani national refused leave to remain in the UK after expiry of his visitor visa has had his successful challenge to that decision upheld by Scotland’s civil appeal court, the Inner House of the Court of Session.
The request for leave to remain was initially refused under the Immigration Rules due to a lack of “insurmountable obstacles” preventing Mr Khan from continuing his family life in Pakistan. That decision was reduced (quashed) by the Lord Ordinary – a first-instance judge in the Outer House of the Court of Session – as although the decision had been in accordance with the Immigration Rules, the decision-maker had failed to undertake a proportionality assessment of the decision as required under Article 8 ECHR (read the Outer House judgment here).
Human trafficking is internationally recognised as threatening human rights and the fundamental values of democratic societies. States have taken action to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking and to provide support to victims of what is the third largest illicit money-making venture in the world. But what happens when the victims of trafficking commit a crime themselves? Should they be prosecuted? What factors are relevant in this assessment? And which arm of the State should the assessment of whether someone is a victim of trafficking be entrusted to? This is the first time the European Court of Human Rights has tackled these questions. The Court found that the UK had breached its obligations under articles 4 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights by prosecuting two Vietnamese children who were potential victims of trafficking.
Background
It was only at the turn of the century that the first comprehensive international instrument on human trafficking was adopted. The Palermo Protocol established a number of obligations to prevent trafficking, punish traffickers and protect victims of trafficking. It defines trafficking as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs
There are therefore three elements to trafficking: (i) action (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt); (ii) means (threat or use of force or other forms of coercion etc.); and (iii) purpose (exploitation). When trafficking involves a child, the ‘means’ element of the test does not apply.
The Supreme Court has rejected a challenge against the two-child limit on the individual element of child tax credit payments. In a unanimous judgment delivered by Lord Reed, the Court held that the provision imposing the limit was not contrary to the appellants’ Convention rights.
The Court found that the rule was potentially indirectly discriminatory against women, as well as children living in households with more than two children. However, any such discrimination could be validly justified and was considered to be proportionate on the basis of ‘protecting the economic well-being of the country’.
Background
Child tax credit is a welfare benefit scheme designed to provide financial support to families with children. The individual element of child tax credit, which is the subject of this case, entitles an individual to £2,830 per annum in respect of each child they are responsible for.
In 2015, the Conservative Party announced as part of that year’s General Election manifesto that they intended to limit a person’s entitlement to child tax credit to just two children, unless one of a narrow range of prescribed exceptions applied. This was part of a wider policy pledge to substantially reduce the amount spent on welfare benefits.
In March 2016, a bill was passed to that effect, and the limit came into force in April 2017.
As a matter of policy, the UK government is committed to improving the welfare of all animals, or so we are given to understand. In this little-covered ruling, we see that the responsible authorities are trying to do what they can to alleviate the suffering of farm animals enduring transport for slaughter:
[The government] would prefer to see animals slaughtered as near as possible to their point of production and thus trade in meat is preferable to a trade based on the transport of live animals. Whilst it recognises the United Kingdom’s responsibilities whilst remaining a member of the EU, it will be looking to take early steps to control the export of live animals for slaughter as the UK moves towards a new relationship with Europe.
Livestock transport has been a controversial subject in the UK for many years. Efforts by public authorities to reduce or mitigate the movement or export of live animals have hitherto foundered on the rocks of free movement of goods (see my post on TFEU Article 35). Despite the ethical controversy, the current position is that long distance transport of nonhuman animals for slaughter is lawful (Barco de Vapor BV v Thanet District Council[2015] Bus LR 593.)
In two weeks’ time my interview with Jacob Turner and Michael Workman on the Judicial Taskforce’s draft Statement and Consultation on AI and private law will come out on Law Pod UK. In the mean time, a short note of the guidance on this subect in Civil Procedure News, put out by The White Book Service (Issue 3/2026 11 March 2026).
The guidance quotes the notorious cases of (R) Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 and R (Munir) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (AI hallucinations[2026] UKUT 81. Both these cases involved the “incautious” use of AI in ways that could result in the loss of privilege through uploading information to an AI tool that is open to the public.
And of course there is the use of fake authorities. In the Ayinde case the UT issued a rare show cause notice, which required an explanation to be given to the question why grounds of appeal to the Tribunal had included citation of a Court of Appeal judgment that could be found nowhere on BAILII and why it also included citation of another Court of Appeal judgment, which while it was available was not authority for the proposition it was said to support.
Had the immigration adviser in question not referred himself to the Immigration Advice Authority, the Tribunal would have so referred Mr Mohammed in order to “stop false material coming before the Tribunal which leads to considerable public expense due to the need to address the problem”.
With regard to the second case, the Tribunal observed that it would be
“easy to think that this is a case about the naïve use of generative AI, but it is not merely that: it is principally about supervision and the obligation to ensure that the tribunal is not misled. It matters not how citation errors come about. Whether they are inserted by a hapless trainee or by ChatGPT is really neither here nor there; the point is that the qualified legal professional with conduct of the matter is expected to ensure that such documents are checked, that errors are identified, and that only accurate documents are sent to the tribunal…. Failure to check is also wasteful of an opponent’s time, thereby potentially leading (in judicial review proceedings) to large awards of costs.”
As the authors at Civil Procedure note,
“This case raises continuing concerns about the use of fake authorities, notwithstanding the Divisional Court’s guidance in Ayinde. It also, apparently for the first time, raises concerns about the use of open AI tools by lawyers in ways that can result in breaches of client confidentiality and loss of legal professional privilege concerning information uploaded to such tools. It ought to be apparent that the risk of such breaches is not confined to lawers but might also arise through the use of AI tools by, for instance, expert witnesses”.
Tune in for our next epiosde on AI and Private Law, and the proposals for circumventing problems of liability and causation thrown up by autonomy, capacity and the self-teaching capacity of generative AI.
Updated | One of the many points of interest from yesterday’s announcement that legal aid is to be cut by £350m per year was the underlying justification, put by Ken Clarke in his announcement, that England and Wales spend more on legal aid than other countries.
The Justice Secretary said that “we currently have one of the most expensive legal aid systems in the world“. But where does this often-quoted statistic arise from?
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The Home Secretary has 
Othman (Abu Qatada) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (appeal allowed) [2012] UKSIAC 15/2005_2 – 
The Upper Tribunal decision in of 
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