Search Results for: environmental/page/15/Freedom of information - right of access) [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC) (30 March 2015)
20 May 2010 by Isabel McArdle
R (on the application of Dennis Gill) v Secretary of State for Justice – Read judgment
The Secretary of State for Justice should have done more to enable a prisoner with learning difficulties to participate in programmes which could have helped him gain an earlier release. In finding that the prisoner was discriminated against, the High Court has set down a precedent which will affect many other learning disabled prisoners.
Mr Justice Cranston held that participation in offender behaviour programmes would have made it easier for Mr Gill to persuade a Parole Board that he was suitable for release. His participation in them had been recommended but his learning difficulties had prevented him from taking part, and as such the Secretary of State for Justice had discriminated against him contrary to the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
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18 January 2014 by Rosalind English
Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom (application nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06) – read judgement
The Strasbourg Court has ruled that the inability of four men to bring torture compensation claims against Saudi Arabia in UK courts did not breach the Convention. The Court held that a “grant of immunity to the state officials in the present case reflected generally recognised rules of public international law” and that there had been no violation of Article 6 (right of access to court).
The claimants argued that there there was emerging support for a special exception to this immunity in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials. But the Court took the view that the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State’s right to immunity may not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead. The fact that conduct was unlawful or objectionable was not, of itself, a ground for refusing immunity.
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10 September 2024 by Edward Waldegrave
In The Commissioner for the British Indian Ocean Territory v. The King (on the application of VT and Others), the UK Government has lost the latest round in long-running litigation concerning a group of individuals accommodated in basic facilities on the remote British Indian Ocean Territory (the “BIOT”).
Background
The BIOT is an archipelago consisting of over 50 islands located roughly half way between East Africa and Indonesia. It is a British Overseas Territory and is formally administered from London by a Commissioner, who performs both legislative and executive functions.
Diego Garcia is the largest island in the archipelago. It has no settled population but accommodates a substantial US/UK military facility. The facility employs a transient population of about 4,000.
In 2021 a group of individuals of Tamil ethnicity left India by boat, apparently with the goal of reaching Canada. On 3 October 2021 their vessel encountered difficulties in the Indian Ocean and was escorted by the Royal Navy to Diego Garcia. Following their arrival in the BIOT, the individuals made claims for asylum. These claims remain un-determined, and some 61 individuals (including children) have now been living on Diego Garcia for nearly three years. There they have been housed in what have been described as “hellish” conditions. The majority live in tents in Thunder Cove (referred to as the “Camp”). Initially they were confined to the Camp itself, but as a result of an order made on 21 December 2023 they gained access to a nearby beach. They also have limited access to buildings outside the Camp for the purposes of consultations with lawyers, medical treatment and, for children, education. A few individuals who with medical complaints which could not be addressed on Diego Garcia have been flown to Rwanda for treatment.
In May 2024 eleven individuals were granted “bail” on terms which allowed them (in summary) to leave the Camp and walk along highway DG1, and to access beaches from the road. These arrangements appear to have been uncontroversial. When they were put in place, it was envisaged that the limited freedoms granted to the eleven individuals would be extended to the other migrants on Diego Garcia. In any event, it was also expected that the position of all of the individuals would be finally resolved at a hearing scheduled for July 2024. This substantive hearing has, however, been indefinitely adjourned.
The July 2024 Bail Application
In July 2024 a number of the individuals applied for extended bail. Specifically, they sought access to a “nature trail”, and also sought changes to the terms on which their bail could be exercised.
In response to this application (the “July Application”) the Commissioner sought the views of the US authorities responsible for the operation of the military facilities on Diego Garcia. The US authorities provided their views on the July Application a few hours before it was due to be heard (on 23 July 2024). The US position was stark: it opposed any extension of bail on the basis that the proposals posed “operational, security, health and safety risks [to the military facilities on Diego Garcia]… which cannot be mitigated or would be unduly burdensome to mitigate”.
The Commissioner applied for an adjournment of the hearing of the July Application to give him more time to consider the response of the US. This was rejected.
Very shortly after the hearing on 23 July, the Commissioner received letters from (i) the Director General for Africa and the Americas at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; and (ii) the Minister of State for Europe, North America and the UK Overseas Territories. Both emphasised the respect which should be accorded to the US’ concerns. These letters were provided to the Court.
On 26 July Judge Obi of the Supreme Court of the BIOT granted the July Application, subject to some relatively minor caveats. In particular, she extended bail to all the relevant individuals and permitted access to the Nature Trail.
The Commissioner appealed, and the Court of Appeal of the BIOT heard the appeal on 9 August. It handed down its decision, dismissing the appeal, on 20 August.
The Commissioner’s Grounds of Appeal
The Commissioner appealed against the Judge’s order on four grounds:
- It was procedurally unfair for the Judge to have proceeded with the hearing of the July Application on 23 July (i.e. not to have granted the Commissioner’s application for an adjournment to allow more time to consider the US response).
- The Judge exercised her discretion unreasonably because she failed properly to consider the impact of extending bail on US/UK relations.
- The Judge exercised her discretion unreasonably because she failed to attribute due weight to the assessment by the US authorities of the security implications of extending bail.
- The Judge exercised her discretion unreasonably because the July Order necessarily impacted upon decisions by the Commissioner concerning the allocation of resources.
The Court of Appeal’s Determination
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Commissioner’s appeal on all grounds.
Ground 1: Procedural Unfairness
The Court rejected the Commissioner’s contention that it was procedurally unfair for the Judge to refuse to adjourn the hearing of the July Application for two reasons.
First, the Court agreed with the Respondents that there was nothing “new” in the US’ response to the July Application. In summary it took the view that the US’ position had long been clear, and had amounted to “consistent and unvarying opposition” to any bail arrangements. Its response to the July Application was wholly consistent with this. Accordingly the Judge had been entitled to take the view that it was not necessary for the hearing to be adjourned for the Commissioner to have a fair opportunity to present his case.
Secondly, the Court noted that the Judge permitted oral submissions to be made on the two letters which the Commissioner received just after the hearing of the July Application. That further oral hearing constituted an obvious opportunity for the Commissioner to make any additional submissions on the US’ response to the July Application. The fact that he had not sought to make any such submissions undermined the contention that it had been unfair for the Judge not to adjourn the first hearing.
Ground 2: US/UK Relations
The Commissioner’s next ground of appeal relied on a contention that the Judge had failed to attach due significance to the impact that extending bail would have on US/UK relations.
The Commissioner’s case on this ground seems to have been somewhat confused. It appears to have been uncontroversial that “questions relating to international relations… are not generally justiciable”. However, it was also common ground that international relations considerations could not necessarily “dictate the outcome of the court’s enquiry”. The Commissioner’s argument before the Court of Appeal on this ground (at least in part) was that, because the grant of bail “had the potential to have a profound impact on international relations between the UK and [the US]”, the Judge should have exercised extreme caution before granting the July Application. As the Court of Appeal recognised, however, this was inconsistent with the Commissioner’s acceptance that the impact on the UK’s international relationships was just one factor to be considered in the overall balancing exercise. On that basis, the only question was whether the Judge had in fact properly evaluated the security concerns raised by the US. The Court of Appeal concluded that she had, and that there was no warrant for interfering in the evaluative conclusion which she had reached.
Ground 3: US Security Assessment
The Commissioner next argued that the Judge had failed, in summary, to accord sufficient respect to the US’ assessment that the grant of the July Application would interfere with security considerations.
Again, the Court dismissed this Ground. It accepted that it was for the relevant US authorities, rather than the Judge, to take a view on whether the grant of the July Application would have adverse security implications. However, this is not what the Judge had done. She had not questioned the US view of the relevant security implications but had, quite properly, taken that into account as a factor to be weighed alongside other relevant considerations. Her overall evaluation was that the July Application should (broadly) be granted. There was no warrant for interfering with that evaluation. In deciding that the Judge had accorded due respect to the US assessment of the security implications, the Court of Appeal seems to have relied in part on the fact that the Judge rejected aspects of the July Application (such as permitting the individuals to access a social club on Diego Garcia) because of the burdens those aspects would give rise to for the Commissioner.
Ground 4: Resource Allocation
Finally, the Commissioner argued that the Judge had strayed into another non-justiciable area because granting the July Application necessarily had implications for the allocation of resources by the Commissioner (in that there would be costs for the Commissioner associated with the extended bail arrangements).
Again, the Court found little difficulty in rejecting this Ground. It concluded that the Judge had not purported “to tell the Commissioner how to spend the funds available to the BIOT”. Rather she had explicitly recognised that this was a matter for the Commissioner. As was pointed out in argument, decisions as to bail conditions regularly have cost implications for the authorities; it would be surprising indeed if judges making such decisions were unlawfully straying into non-justiciable resource allocation territory.
Comment
It has been suggested (in particular by Joshua Rozenberg: see https://rozenberg.substack.com/p/uk-loses-diego-garcia-appeal) that the Commissioner must have recognised that he was likely to lose the appeal to the Court of Appeal, and that the appeal was only pursued in an attempt to show others (such as the US Government) that the UK was exhausting all its options in seeking to prevent bail being extended. On this view, the Court of Appeal’s decision was, from a legal perspective, “obvious”.
It is true that aspects of the Commissioner’s case before the Court of Appeal seem to have been very weak. In particular, it is difficult to see how the Commissioner could reasonably have hoped to succeed on Grounds 1 or 4.
However, the Court of Appeal’s decision does give rise to some points of genuine legal interest. In discussing Ground 2, the Court of Appeal accepted that the conduct of the UK’s foreign relations is non-justiciable in itself, but that the Crown’s foreign policy priorities can be weighed in the balance against other factors in determining a bail application. Presumably the same is true in other contexts. Similarly, in relation to Ground 3, the Court accepted that it is for the executive (in this case, in effect, the US Government) to form a view as to the state’s security interests, but that its view can be weighed among other factors in an appropriate case. This distinction is one which surely merits further academic, legal and political scrutiny. Put briefly, it is difficult to see how judges can on the one hand be expected to “keep out” of foreign policy and national security questions if the executive’s views on such matters are susceptible to being balanced against other factors (such as, in this case, the interests of individuals in being able to move more freely than has hitherto been the case). The Court’s approach to this issue seems to have been largely a result of the Commissioner’s acceptance that foreign policy and national security considerations did not constitute “trump cards” but were merely factors to be weighed in the balance. The Commissioner might have stood a better chance of success, and his case would certainly have been more intellectually coherent, had that concession not been made.
The second point arising from the Court’s judgment which is of significant interest concerns the way in which the parties and the Court all viewed the July Application through the prism of “bail”. As the Court itself recognised, this case falls far from the ordinary context in which bail principles are applied. One might see this case as demonstrating the admirable ability of English legal principles to address novel factual circumstances. Others might regret that such a unique set of facts could only be addressed by an analytical framework developed in very different cases.
Edward Waldegrave is a barrsiter at 1 Crown Office Row.
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21 January 2013 by Adam Wagner
The UK Supreme Court has today launched a YouTube channel showing short summaries of judgments. The summaries are read out by justices when a judgment is released. There are already ten online and more will be uploaded each time a judgment is released.
Since its launch in 2009, the UK’s new Supreme Court has been doing rather well at online access to justice. Its website is clear and elegant, it publishes excellent press summaries at the same time as judgments, it was the first supreme court to join Twitter (@uksupremecourt now has over 27,000 followers) and its hearings can be watched live online thanks to a partnership with Sky News.
Judgment summaries are a good start. Without wanting to sound ungrateful, what would really be useful is to be able to access recordings of full hearings on YouTube, as is provided on the superb Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal YouTube channel.
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4 June 2020 by Rosalind English
Reyno Dawid De Beer and Liberty Fighters Network (Applicants), Hola Ben Renaissance Foundation (Amicus Curiae) v The Minister of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs (Respondent) – Case No. 21542/2020 High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
2 June 2020
“One need only to think about the irrationality in being allowed to buy a jersey but not undergarments or open- toed shoes “
Update: see my post on a ruling by the New Zealand High Court on the illegality of restrictive measures imposed by the government in the early days of lockdown.
A High Court judge in South Africa has just taken a stand on the ANC government’s reaction to the pandemic. He has ruled that some of the lockdown regulations do not satisfy the rationality test under public law, and that their encroachment and limitation on the freedoms set out in the South African Bill of Rights are not justified in a society based on “human dignity, equality and freedom as contemplated in Section 36 of the Constitution.”
He drew “clear inference” from the evidence, that once the government had declared a national state of disaster, the goal was to flatten the curve by way of retarding or limiting the spread of the virus (“all very commendable and necessary objectives”). However, “little or in fact no regard” was given to the extent of the impact of individual regulations on the constitutional rights of people and whether the extent of the limitation of their rights was justifiable or not.
His criticism was not that the government should have done nothing in the face of the epidemic, but that they took a cartwheel to crush a butterfly.
The starting point was not “how can we as government limit Constitutional rights in the least possible fashion whilst still protecting the inhabitants of South Africa?” but rather “we will seek to achieve our goal by whatever means, irrespective of the costs and we will determine, albeit incrementally, which Constitutional rights you as the people of south Africa, may exercise”.
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26 July 2021 by Byul Ryan-Im
In the news:
Monday was England’s so-called ‘Freedom Day’, with the final coronavirus restrictions lifted. This means nightclubs can reopen; bars are no longer table service only; there are no more limits on attendee numbers at large events; and it is no longer mandatory to wear face coverings in public spaces, although the recommendation to do so remains. It also remains a legal obligation to self-isolate if contacted to do so by NHS Test and Trace, although it is not mandatory to download the NHS Covid-19 app, or to self-isolated if ‘pinged’ by it (i.e. alerted by the app to self-isolate). NHS Test and Trace contacts people who have been named by a positive-testing person as a close contact and are legally obliged to self-isolate or face fines from £1000 for failing to comply. By contrast, the Covid-19 app works by using Bluetooth to ‘ping’ people who may have come into close contact with a covid-positive person. A resulting ‘pingdimic’ has led to concerns about keyworker staff shortages leading to a hospital understaffing and potential supermarket food shortages. Frontline health workers can be exempt from self-isolation in exceptional circumstances, as can other keyworkers if their employers apply for and receive government authorisation specific to a named worker. From August 16th anyone who has had both vaccination doses will not need to self-isolate as a close contact.
Civil liberties organisation Liberty has expressed concerns that so-called “Freedom Day” is in fact “a moment of fear and division”. The organisation has criticised the Government for its “divisive, coercive strategies”, among which it includes “vaccine passports and mandatory vaccinations”. Vaccine passports in particular are condemned as “a step towards a two-tier society”. Despite these concerns, the organisation also expresses a worry that lifting restrictions has “serious implications” for the rights of frontline workers and the clinically vulnerable”.
In other news:
On Wednesday, the government published its Judicial Review and Courts Bill following an Independent Review of Administrative Law and a government consultation. The Bill seeks to “reform the rules around Judicial Review and facilitate a number of procedural improvements across the court system”. One of the reforms proposed is to remove Cart Judicial Reviews, which are High Court reviews of an Upper Tribunal’s refusal to grant permission to appeal. An “unprecedented” coalition of over 220 organisations, including Amnesty International UK, Greenpeace, Refugee Action and Stonewall, has criticised the Bill and proposed changes to the Human Rights Act.
On Friday the 2020 Summer Olympics began with an opening ceremony of dancers and acrobats performing to a near-empty stadium. Outside, protesters clashed with Tokyo police as Japanese citizens showed their anger at the games continuing to be held amidst the fourth declaration of an official state of emergency in Japan due to the coronavirus pandemic. In nine prefectures including Tokyo and Osaka, residents have been asked to go out for essential reasons only. In the week the Games began Japan saw numbers of Covid-19 cases not seen since January.
On Saturday the first ever “Reclaim Pride” march took place in London, with thousands taking to the streets to demand inclusive LGBTI+ rights. The event was organised amidst concerns that traditional Pride events (like London Pride, this year postponed to 11 September) are becoming less like protests and more like “over-commercialised parties”.
In the Courts:
- Royal Mail Group Ltd v Efobi [2021] UKSC 33 – the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from Mr Efobi, a postman for the Respondent, Royal Mail. The Appellant’s claim in the employment tribunal for direct or indirect racial discrimination was dismissed but the decision was overturned on appeal to the EAT. The Court of Appeal then reversed the decision in favour of Royal Mail and Mr Efobi was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. Efobi argued (i) that a change in the wording of equality legislation from “where … the complainant proves facts” to “if there are facts from which the court could decide” removed the burden on the claimant to prove anything at the first stage of employment discrimination cases, and (ii) that the EAT should have drawn adverse inferences from the absence of a potential witnesses for the Respondent Royal Mail. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that (i) the new wording simply clarifies that evidence from both parties must be considered, not only that of the claimant and (ii) tribunals are free to draw or decline to draw inferences using common sense. Furthermore, even if adverse inferences were drawn, the recruiter’s knowledge of Mr Efobi’s race was by itself insufficient evidence of racial discrimination.
- Secretary of State for the Home Department v GA & Ors [2021] EWCA Civ 1131 –the Respondent had applied for British passports for three of her children (British citizens living in Country X) from Her Majesty’s Passport Office (HMPO), for which the Appellant is responsible. HMPO refused the applications for lack of evidence of the consent of a person with parental responsibility under the law of Country X. HMPO considered that person to be the children’s father alone. It was unsafe or impossible for the mother to obtain the father’s consent, as he had been arrested following “months of extremely serious physical and psychological abuse including torture of me.” A declaration signed by the father that he had no objection to his children travelling abroad with their mother was not accepted by HMPO as permission to grant British passports. HMPO’s passport refusal was quashed in a judicial review claim because: (i) there was no evidence to conclude that the father had to consent under the law of Country X; (ii) HMPO failed to consider the application of Article 22 of the 1996 Hague Convention; and (iii) Article 22 did apply and HMPO was entitled to refuse to apply the law of Country X. Article 22 allows the dis-application of an applicable law provision if it would be contrary to public policy, considering the best interests of the child. The Court of Appeal upheld the quashing order and refused the Appellant’s argument that HMPO was not obliged to consider, and should not have considered, Article 22. It also rejected the argument that HMPO should have asked the father alone for his consent, on the basis that the Country Profile for Country X suggested it allocates sole parental responsibility to the father. The Country Profile was insufficient evidence to conclude in this specific case that the mother had no authority to apply for British passports. Furthermore, upholding this law of Country X would be contrary to ECHR Articles 14 and 8, as it discriminates based on sex. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and permission to appeal was refused.
- The High Court has ruled in McNally v Saunders that a retired solicitor’s ‘abrasive’ and ‘frequently puerile’ blog posts are entitled to the same level of protection as mainstream journalism. Chamberlain J struck out a harassment claim brought by a local government officer as having no reasonable prospect of success and has granted summary judgment for the defendant under CPR rule 24.2. The claim was brought under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 by Dr Lisa McNally, MBC Sandwell’s director of public health and a mental health campaigner. McNally was the subject of five blog posts, criticising her decision to post a two-minute video about her own struggle with mental health and questioning her qualifications. She said the posts had caused her ‘crippling’ anxiety about attending meetings and made her worry about her ability to do her job. Given that Saunder’s posts’ were ’frequently puerile tone and style, a casual reader… might be surprised to discover that they are the work of a semi-retired former solicitor,’ the judge said. However ’none of these features disentitles them to the protections afforded by the law to journalistic expression.’ The public interest in McNally being able to continue in her role was outweighed by Saunders’ Article 10 right to free expression.
On the UKHRB:
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18 February 2018 by Guest Contributor
Eleanor Leydon brings us the latest developments in rights law.
In The News:
A Senior District Judge has ruled that upholding the warrant for Julian Assange’s arrest is both in the public interest and proportionate, albeit that Assange has already restricted his own freedom for several years. In determining the proportionality of the proceedings the judge had regard to the seriousness of the failure to surrender, the level of culpability at this stage of the proceedings, and the harm caused, including impact on the community.
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10 April 2020 by darraghcoffey
Note: In Part One, I set out what I considered to be the Government’s rationale in enacting the Coronavirus Act 2020 rather than relying on existing legislation. In a piece for Law Society Gazette Dr Andrew Blick and Prof. Clive Walker have sought to rebut this rationale and argued that the Government should more appropriately have used Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
In Part One, I considered the background to the Coronavirus Act 2020 and some general aspects of the legislation. Here, I focus on some of the substantive provisions of the legislation and briefly explore the role that human rights law has to play in the management of the COVID-19 crisis.
At this point it bears repeating that the UK Government has not derogated from the ECHR under Article 15. Thus, any measures introduced in response to the Coronavirus must be compatible with the UK’s full human rights obligations under the Convention as transposed in to domestic law via the Human Rights Act 1998. Jeremy McBride has produced an excellent piece on the ECHR Blog, in which he analyses the range of various responses to the COVID-19 crisis through the lens of the Convention obligations. Such an exercise is not possible here due to constraints of space. However, towards the end of this piece I will briefly consider the compatibility of the lockdown restrictions on movement with the UK’s ECHR obligations.
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26 November 2013 by David Hart KC
Putistin v. Ukraine, ECtHR, 21 November 2013 read judgment
An extraordinary story, with a twist, and an interesting decision by the Strasbourg Court that lack of respect for the honour and dignity of a dead relative may give rise to a breach of Article 8 and its right to family life.
In 1942 various professional footballers who had previously played for FC Dynamo Kyiv but who were now working in a bakery, ran out in the strip of FC Start. Their opponents (Flakelf) were pilots from the German Luftwaffe, air defence soldiers and airport technicians.
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14 September 2011 by Lucy Series
Last month the Ministry of Justice published a report of a pilot project that ran last year whereby participating family courts produced and published on Bailii written judgments of specified Children Act 1989 cases. The project had three main aims:
- to increase transparency and improve public understanding of the family justice system by publishing anonymised judgments in all serious children cases;
- to help parties by providing written judgments in all cases, even where a matter was not contested;
- to provide judgments which the children involved could access in later life.
The family courts are often perceived as ‘secretive’ or aloof; Munby LJ has made excellent arguments for greater transparency far more eloquently than I could hope to do in this speech (pdf)
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28 May 2010 by Adam Wagner
Set the ball rolling
The recent announcement of the review of libel and privacy law by a high-profile panel has led to a flurry of conjecture, comment and proposals. The new Government has pledged to reform the law of libel, but what shape will the reforms take?
The committee, which was announced last month, is being led by Lord Neuberger, the head of the Court of Appeal, and will be composed of legal and media experts. One notable absence, as Joshua Rozenberg blogs, is Mr Justice Eady, who has been responsible for many of the more controversial “super injunctions”.
The new Coalition Government have pledged to “reform libel laws to protect freedom of speech“. Cases involving libel, defamation and super-injunctions have seen two competing European Convention rights fighting it out; Article 8 (right to privacy) versus Article 10 (freedom of expression).
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8 June 2010 by Adam Wagner
HH Sant Baba Jeet Singh Ji Maharaj v Eastern Media Group & Anor [2010] EWHC 1294 (QB) (17 May 2010) – Read judgment
The High Court has effectively thrown out a libel action against a journalist who claimed in an article that a Sikh holy man was a “cult leader”. The judge’s reasoning was that the disputed points of religious principle were not questions which a secular court could properly decide. In refusing to rule on such cases, are the courts taking an increasingly anti-religious view, and are they now in breach of the human right to religious freedom?
The decision was reported in mid-May, but Mr Justice Eady’s judgment was made publically available yesterday. It highlights controversial issues of whether religious believes are getting a fair hearing in the English courts, and whether “secular” judges are qualified to decide points of religious principle.
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6 November 2011 by Matthew Flinn
Raed Mahajna v Secretary of State for the Home Department IA/21/21631/2011 – Read Judgment
1 Crown Office Row’s Neil Sheldon appeared for the Secretary of State in this case. He is not the writer of this post.
The First-Tier Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber), has upheld the decision of the Home Secretary to deport Raed Mahajna, who had come to the UK to attend a number of meetings and speaking engagements.
Mr. Mahajna (also known as Raed Saleh) was born in Israel in 1968. He is however of Palestinian origin and has been a vocal critic of the Government of Israel. Aware of his intention to travel to the UK, the Home Secretary issued an exclusion order against him on the basis that he had publicly expressed views that fostered hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK. However, this order was never served upon him, and he entered the UK on 25th June 2011. He was subsequently arrested on 27th June and detained until released on bail on 18th July.
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31 January 2011 by Adam Wagner
Shergill v Purewal & Anor [2010] EWHC 3610 (QB) (15 December 2010) – Read judgment
In the commotion surrounding the Christian hotel gay discrimination case, it is easy to forget that there is a long-standing principle that English courts will not decide matters of religious doctrine. This principle has been in play in a run of recent cases involving an Indian holy man and libel claims against journalists.
The most recent case was brought by
Dajid Singh Shergill, a UK-based Sikh activist suing the Panjab Times in relation to 3 articles published in the summer 2008, relating to His Holiness Sant Baba Jeet Singh Ji Maharaj (Jeet Singh), an Indian based preacher. The articles claimed, amongst other things, that Jeet Singh had “
abandoned Sikh Principles“, that he and his supporters were a “
sham“, that Shergill had “
sought to instigate serious riots and create an atmosphere of terror” by proclaiming that Baba Jeet Singh had won a court case in India and was seeking to misappropriate local Sikh temples.
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14 March 2013 by Rosalind English
Eon v France, no. 26118/10 14 March 2013- read judgment (in French only)
The applicant, Hervé Eon, is a French national, a socialist and anti-GM activist living Laval (France). The case concerned his conviction for insulting President Sarkozy.
During a visit by the President to the département of Mayenne on 28 August 2008, Mr Eon had waved a placard reading “Casse toi pov’con” (“Get lost, you sad prick”), a phrase uttered by the President himself several months previously when a farmer had refused to shake his hand at the International Agricultural Show. The utterance was widely disseminated in the media and on the internet, attaining the status of a slogan.
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R (on the application of Dennis Gill) v Secretary of State for Justice – Read judgment
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