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The Supreme Court recently dismissed two appeals concerning the role and rights of siblings in children’s hearings in Scotland. It held that the provisions of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 in question were compatible with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.Background
The appeals concerned whether a sibling is a “relevant person” for the purposes of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (‘the 2011 Act’), which governs the children’s hearings system in Scotland.
A relevant person is defined as including a person who has parental responsibilities or rights in relation to the child (section 200(1) of the 2011 Act). If a person does not fall under this definition, they may still be classed as a relevant person under a procedure set out in sections 79-81. Section 81(3) provides that a person can be deemed a relevant person if it is decided that the person has, or recently had, a significant involvement in the upbringing of the child. In most circumstances, this would not include a sibling.
The latest reports of HM Chief Inspector of Prisons and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights lay bare the conditions in some British prisons.
Some of the language that is used to describe living conditions in the Chief Inspector’s report is shocking – including “appalling”, “squalid”, “intolerable”, “extremely squalid” and beset with “vermin and filth”.
The Chief Inspector’s view is that such conditions “should not feature in 21st century jails”. This conclusion was expressed prior to the further impact caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.
The conclusion of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights is that the Government’s response and the deficiencies in the measures to mitigate the impact of this “have put at risk the right to family life of up to an estimated 17,000 children of mothers in prison”.
In the view of this author, the evidence indicates that in several respects the UK may well be in breach of vital protections for prisoners and their families under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This extended piece will examine these issues in detail.
It has been a quiet week in the courts from a human rights perspective. The Supreme Court gave judgment on a divorce case and a social security fraud, and whilst the Court of Appeal and High Court were more forthcoming in terms of the number of decisions made, family law and commercial cases dominated. Legal buffs may however be interested to note Scales v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2020] EWHC 1747 (QB), in which the High Court applied Spanish law in a road traffic accident case, whilst celebrity watchers and students revising for their civil litigation exams may appreciate seeing how the court applied the test from Denton to grant Johnny Christopher Depp II relief from sanctions (who knew there was a Johnny Christopher Depp I?) – Depp v News Group Newspapers Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 1734 (QB).
A quiet week in the courts did not however extend to a quiet week in the news…
Harry Dunn was killed when his motorcycle collided with a car being driven on the wrong side of the road by Mrs Anne Sacoolas, the wife of a member of the administrative and technical staff of the US Embassy based at RAF Croughton. The Claimants (Harry Dunn’s parents) sought to adduce expert evidence from a retired diplomat Sir Ivor Roberts, and also made an application for specific disclosure.
The Divisional Court summarised the background to the applications as being the judicial review of:-
The decision made by the Foreign Secretary that Mrs Sacoolas had diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
The allegedly unlawful obstruction by the Foreign Secretary of a criminal investigation by the Northamptonshire Police;
The allegedly unlawful acceptance by the Northamptonshire Police of the advice of the Foreign Secretary or the Metropolitan Police that Mrs Sacoolas had diplomatic immunity;
The alleged breach of the investigative duty under Article 2 ECHR as a result of the Foreign Secretary and the Northamptonshire Police’s error of law as to Mrs Sacoolas’s diplomatic immunity;
The allegedly unlawful ceding of sovereignty over a military base in the UK without Parliamentary consent; and
The alleged suspension of the laws of the land without Parliamentary consent through affording diplomatic immunity to family members of the relevant personnel.
How to determine “best interests” in the case of an adult lacking capacity, where a proposed medical donation for the benefit of a close relative may cause lasting harm to the donor?
It is just over five years since the landmark United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Obergefell v Hodges (26 June 2015), and just over fifty-one years since the Stonewall riots (28 June 1969). To the many important dates in Pride Month must now be added 15 June 2020, the date of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v Clayton County, which confirmed that is, in fact, illegal to fire an employee because they are homosexual or transgender.
It might seem surprising to many readers of this blog that there was a question about this. In the United States. In 2020. Yet even here in the UK it can hardly be said that employment protections for gay and transgender people have existed since time immemorial. It was only in December 2003, for example, that the UK Government enacted the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, which prohibited employers from committing direct and indirect discrimination, victimisation and harassment “on grounds of sexual orientation” (for which thanks is owed to the European Union, which mandated such legislation pursuant to the Equal Treatment Framework Directive of November 2000).
It can be said, however, that the legislation in the UK is sufficiently clear to put the question beyond doubt. Since 2010, sexual orientation and gender reassignment have been “protected characteristics” for the purposes of general discrimination law, pursuant to sections 4, 7 and 12 of the Equality Act 2010.
The law in the United States is not so explicit. Rather, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 makes it “unlawful…for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual…because of such individual’s race, colour, religion, sex, or national origin.” The question for the Supreme Court in Bostock was whether the prohibition of discrimination because of an individual’s sex also entailed a prohibition of discrimination on the basis that an employee was gay or transgender.
Three cases were being appealed together, and the facts in each of them were simple, and stark:
Mr Gerald Bostock worked for his local authority (Clayton County) in Georgia as a child welfare advocate. After a decade of employment, during which time the County won national awards for its work, Mr Bostock made the fateful decision to start participation in a recreational gay softball league. He was promptly fired.
Mr Donald Zarda was a sky-diving instructor in New York. He tried to reassure a female customer who had concerns about a tandem skydive with a male instructor by confirming that he was “100% gay”. She complained, and he was dismissed days later.
Ms Aimee Stephens worked in a funeral home in Michigan. At the start of her employment she presented as male. Two years into her employment she underwent psychiatric treatment for “despair and loneliness” and was diagnosed with gender dysphoria. Her clinicians recommended that she start to live as a woman. Several years later, when she informed her employer that she would be returning to work as a woman after her vacation, she was fired because it was “not going to work out”.
In all three cases the employers openly acknowledged that their motive for dismissing their employees was that they were gay/transgender; but they said that was a wholly lawful thing to do. The plaintiffs argued that it was not, pursuant to a proper reading of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964.
The decision was hotly anticipated. In the United States, the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court is lamentably politicised, and after President Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland had been blocked by the Republican-controlled Senate in 2016, and the current occupant of the White House had apparently assured a 5-4 conservative majority by appointing two justices (most recently, following a harrowing confirmation process, Kavanaugh J), socially progressive groups could be forgiven for awaiting the judgment with some trepidation.These background issues are discussed further on the blog here.
On this occasion, they need not have worried. The split of votes was a refreshingly decisive and bipartisan 6-3, including Chief Justice Roberts. What’s more, the majority opinion was written by Gorsuch J, a “conservative justice” appointed in 2017.
The opinions make for a thoroughly enjoyable read (don’t be put off by the 172 pages — it is mostly appendices to Alito J’s dissenting opinion). As a student of English law, I am used to reading judgments which are characterised by temperate language, caveats, a degree of circumspection, or even consternation. In contrast, at least in this case, the opinions of the justices (particularly Gorsuch and Alito JJ) read like the most passionate of essays or written arguments — almost as if they were advocates rather than judges.
Together with anti-racism protests sparked by the death of George Floyd, the coronavirus pandemic has continued to dominate the news. Two recently published reports have highlighted flaws in the government’s response in relation to the provision of social security and domestic abuse support during the crisis.
In Re X (Parental Order: Death of Intended Parent Prior to Birth) [2020] EWFC 39 the Family Court read down section 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 to enable a parental order to be granted where an intending parent died shortly before the child’s birth. This ensured the child’s Article 8 and 14 rights were protected, and prevented much emotional hardship for this family.
The case has already been cited in Re A (Surrogacy: s.54 Criteria) M [2020] EWHC 1426 (Fam) as comprehensively setting out when a court may ‘read down’ the statutory criteria in section 54.
Parental orders – an introduction
Section 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 enables two people to apply for a parental order over a child who has been born as the result of a surrogacy arrangement. A parental order transfers legal parenthood from the legal parents at the time of the child’s birth (usually the surrogate and – if applicable – her husband or civil partner) to the intended parents.
Parental orders are recognised as having a “transformative effect on the legal relationship between the child and the [intended parents]. The effect of the order is that the child is treated as though born to the applicants. It has a clear implication as regards the right to respect for family life under Article 8.” A v P [2011] EWHC 1738 (Family), per Munby J [24].
It is now over a month since the death of George Floyd.
The UK Human Rights Blog and Law Pod are committed to continuing the conversation about racism in the UK prompted by his death and the Black Lives Matter protests.
Michael Paulin has discussed a number of issues in his recent article.
The beginning of this week marked Windrush Day, introduced in June 2018 on the 70th anniversary of the Windrush migration, to celebrate the contribution of the Windrush Generation and their descendants to Britain. In Episode 117, Emma-Louise Fenelon speaks to Martin Forde QC, Independent Adviser to the Windrush Compensation Scheme about racial inequality in the UK, in immigration history and at the Bar. The Counsel magazine front cover interview with Martin Forde QC in their June Issue is available here.
This post is written in response to a comment by a reader, John Burton, of Rosalind English’s post on the latest in the Lockdown challenge launched by Simon Dolan in which Philip Havers QC has been instructed.
We don’t dispense legal advice from the UKHRB, but I thought this was a very interesting question and the editorial board felt it best to try to answer it in a separate post, so here it is, and many thanks to Henry Tufnell, one of our pupil barristers, soon to become one of our new tenants, for taking up the challenge.
The vigilant gaze of the European Commission will begin to turn away from UK when the post-Brexit transition period ends at the turn of the year. The Commission has used its powers as the ‘guardian of the treaties’ to enforce EU laws relating to nature conservation, waste and air pollution. Its absence will leave a governance gap, and replacement institutions are needed to ensure that environmental laws are enforced.
This article discusses the functions and powers of the ESS in the Bill and then analyses the proposals through the lens of the UN’s Paris Principles (used for assessing the credibility of national human rights institutions).
This week the UK government lowered the COVID-19 alert level from level 4 to level 3, with non-essential shops reopening for business on 15 June. July 4 will be “the next big stage” in the government’s plan; it is expected that pubs and restaurants may reopen then. The 2m social distancing rule is under review, and the government have implied that it may be lifted soon.
Meanwhile, the contact tracing app which had been developed by the ‘healthtech’ body NHSX has been scrapped, owing to severe limitations in detecting contacts from iPhones. The government will now move forward instead with a Bluetooth tracing system developed by Google and Apple, looking to incorporate the successful parts of the NHSX app where possible. Whichever system is eventually deployed will face intense scrutiny. Contact tracing apps worldwide are raising human rights concerns, as has been explained by Amnesty International and other organisations.
Black Lives Matter protests continued this week across the cities of the UK, with protesters calling for the removal of statues of figures from UK history associated with the colonial past of the British Empire, such as that of Winston Churchill in Parliament Square. Protesters have also called for the removal of Boris Johnson’s Director of Policy, Munira Mirza. Mirza is a long-standing opponent of the ‘anti-racism’ movement which has gained significant ground during the last few weeks, having been a critic of Blairite ‘multiculturalism’ and the 2017 Lammy Review of BAME groups in the justice system, and having played down allegations of institutional racism such as those raised by the Windrush scandal. She has been asked by the Prime Minister to head a new commission on racial inequalities.
In other news:
The US Supreme Court issued two landmark decisions this week. In Bostock v Clayton County, the court interpreted the word ‘sex’ in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 as including both sexuality and gender identity, such that it is unlawful for an employer to fire someone merely for being gay or transgender. In Department of Homeland Security v Regents of the University of California et al, the court blocked the Trump administration’s attempt to end Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (‘DACA’), a program which protects child immigrants from deportation, on the basis that the administration had failed to provide a ‘reasoned explanation’ for its decision.
UN Human Rights Chief Michelle Bachelet has called for worldwide action on systemic racism. Speaking to the UN Human Rights Council, she said that “behind today’s racial violence, systemic violence and discriminatory policing lies the failure to acknowledge and confront the legacy of the slave trade and colonialism”, and urged countries to “make amends for centuries of violence and discrimination, including through formal apologies, truth-telling policies, and reparations in various forms.”
The US Congress has passed a new law, under which Chinese officials deemed to be responsible for the arbitrary detention and torture of Uighurs will be denied entry to the country and have any assets held in the USA frozen. China’s foreign ministry has strongly criticised the law, stating that the US should ‘immediately correct its mistakes’.
In the courts
There were three noteworthy decisions in the courts this week. These considered, respectively, workers’ rights and coronavirus; criminal procedure and Article 5 ECHR; and Scottish family law and Article 8 ECHR.
R (oao Adiatu & anor) v HM Treasury: this was a judicial review of decisions made by the Treasury in respect of the availability of Statutory Sick Pay (‘SSP’) and the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (‘JRS’) during the pandemic. The challenge was brought by Mr Adiatu, a Nigerian Uber driver with leave to remain, together with the Independent Workers’ Union of Great Britain. The Claimants sought a declaration that the Treasury’s decisions were discriminatory under the ECHR and/or EU law and/or in breach of the public sector equality duty (‘PSED’) under s.149 Equality Act 2010. The court rejected this on all counts: the Treasury was within its margin of appreciation under the ECHR, noting the urgency and practical difficulties involved in applying SSP and the JRS during the coronavirus crisis; the means adopted by the Treasury were proportionate; and ministerial submissions prior to the roll-out of the JRS discussing the possible effects on women and BAME people confirmed that sufficient regard had been had by the Treasury to the PSED.
Archer v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis: in 2012, aged 15, the Claimant was involved in an incident at a chicken shop in Woolwich where he was stabbed in the back and head by local gang-members. He was arrested on suspicion of violent disorder and possession of an offensive weapon, and subsequently detained pursuant to s.38(1)(b)(ii) Police and Criminal Evidence At 1984 (‘PACE’), which authorises detention where “the custody officer has reasonable grounds for believing that [the arrested juvenile] ought to be detained in his own interests.” He sought a declaration of incompatibility on the basis of Article 5 ECHR, together with damages for unlawful detention under s.8 Human Rights Act 1998. The court held that his detention had not been incompatible with Article 5 ECHR, and so he was not entitled to damages, nor was the impugned section of PACE incompatible with Article 5. In reaching this conclusion, the court followed IA v France, where it had been held that ‘own protection’ could be a ‘relevant and sufficient’ reason for detention. Although the detention was justified by the Claimant’s own protection, it was still ‘with a view to’ bringing him before a court, and therefore was “for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority” under Article 5(1)(c)– even if but for the need to protect the suspect, detention would not have been necessary. Granting the declaration would have risked making it “impracticable for the police to fulfil their duties”.
ABC v Principal Reporter & Anor (Scotland): this appeal concerned the role of siblings in the procedures by which ‘children’s hearings’ in Scotland make compulsory supervision orders (‘CSOs’). The hearings in question are attended by the child in question, together with ‘relevant persons’, who must attend or face criminal sanction; ‘relevant persons’ are understood in the legislative scheme as persons who have had a significant involvement in the child’s upbringing, and therefore will ordinarily not include siblings. The Claimants, ‘ABC’ and ‘XY’, had not been deemed relevant persons in respect of their younger siblings who were made subject to CSOs. They argued that the legislative scheme was incompatible with Article 6 and Article 8, and that siblings should have procedural rights in relation to these hearings, in particular to attend and make representations. The court rejected this argument, noting that concerns about privacy and the dissemination of sensitive information outweighed the rights of siblings in these cases. However, Lady Hale and Lord Hodge emphasised in their judgement that there must always be a ‘bespoke enquiry about the child’s relationship with his or her siblings’ in each case.
Yesterday’s judgment of Mr Justice Mostyn in GMC v Awan [2020] EWHC 1553 (Admin) illustrates the fact that the Court’s deference to the specialist Tribunal’s judgment on sanction continues to be extended to cases relating to sexually motivated online misconduct, as also occurred in GMC v X [2019] EWHC 493 (Admin) last year, when Soole J upheld a 12-month suspension.
GMC v Awan concerns a GP’s sexually motivated online chat with someone posing as 13 year old child. The GMC’s appeal under section 40A of the Medical Act 1983 was dismissed by Mostyn J and the 9-month suspension imposed by the Tribunal was upheld.
The Facts
In November 2019 Dr Hafeez-Ur Rehman Awan came before the Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal facing allegations that on 5 January 2016, when he was working as a GP, he had logged into a chat room with the username “medic333” which “obviously signified that he was a member of the medical profession” [#15]. Once in the chat room, the Respondent started exchanging messages with a person with the username “Sophiasheff”, who was in fact a police officer conducting an undercover sting operation.
PHG, linked with Cambridge University, provides independent advice and evaluations of biomedical and digital innovations in healthcare. PHG has recently published a series of reports exploring the interpretability of machine learning in this context. The one I will focus on in this post is the report considering the requirements of the GDPR for machine learning in healthcare and medical research by way of transparency, interpretability, or explanation. Links to the other reports are given at the end of this post.
Just a brief summary of machine learning in healthcare (for the detail, go to PHG’s report Machine Learning Landscape).
Machine learning typically denotes “methods that only have task-specific intelligence and lack the broad powers of cognition feared when ‘AI’ is mentioned”. Artificial intelligence (AI) can be defined as “the science and engineering of making computers behave in ways that, until recently, we thought required human intelligence.” We are only beginning to realise the scope of intelligence that is silicone-based, rather than meat-based, in the reductionist words of neurscientist and author Sam Harris. It is important too to grasp the difference between types of programming. As this report puts it,
Machine learningas a programming paradigm differs from classical programming in that machine learning systems are trained rather than explicitly programmed. Classical programming combines rules and data to provide answers. Machine learning combines data and answers to provide the rules
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