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In its judgment in the case of IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, handed down on 26 November 2025, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the correct test for establishing the existence of family life between non-core family members under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human rights (“ECHR”). It also clarified the proper conceptual framework for considering the subtle interaction between the rights of non-claimant family members and the UK’s Convention obligations to individuals outside its territory. Finally, it emphasised the centrality of the Government’s immigration policy to any exercise considering the proportionality of an interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights in the immigration context.
The Court of Appeal in Re D has overturned final care and placement orders made at an Issues Resolution Hearing (“IRH”), stating that judges must give clear, reasoned findings on the threshold criteria under section 31(2) Children Act 1989 (“CA 1989”), even where proceedings are uncontested or parents are absent.
In delivering the judgment, Cobb LJ, with whom Baker LJ and Miles LJ agreed, criticised the short form reasoning used by the Family Court and stressed the need for transparent judicial decision-making when the State intervenes in family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
In EBB and others v The Gorse Academies Trust [2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin), the Honourable Mrs Justice Collins Rice gave judgment in a multi-faceted, rolled-up permission and judicial review hearing concerning three high school students’ experiences of being disciplined within their school (“the School”).
These appeals – Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport – were a test case for the operation of the UK’s sanctions regime introduced in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The Supreme Court confirmed that while the court’s task is to assess proportionality for itself, a wide margin of appreciation will be afforded to the executive in judging how best to respond to and restrain Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
In U3 (AP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2025] UKSC 19, the Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed an appeal against a decision taken by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”) relating to deprivation of citizenship and refusal of entry clearance on the basis of national security concerns.
The applicant in the ECtHR case of Karsai v Hungary, Mr Karsai, a 47-year-old human-rights lawyer who lives in Budapest, was diagnosed in 2022 with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) – a neurodegenerative disease that causes a progressive loss of motor neuron function leaving the patient completely paralysed, while preserving intellectual function. Mr Karsai maintains that “he will be “imprisoned in his own body without any prospect of release apart from death” and his existence will consist almost exclusively of pain and suffering” (§14). Mr Karsai applied to the ECtHR arguing that the prohibition on assisted dying under Hungarian law violated his right to private life (art. 8 ECHR); the applicant also complained the violation of his right to private life in conjunction of his right not to be discriminated against (art. 14 ECHR) because the Hungarian law offers the option of withdrawal of invasive medical treatments (and, hence, hasten their death) only to terminally ill patients who are dependent on them.
Article 8
Regarding the potential violation of the applicant’s right to privacy, his primary argument centres on his desire to control the timing of his death. Due to his medical condition, he is condemned to a life of physical incapacity, pain, and existential dread. The applicant dismisses palliative care as a viable option: “While palliative care could provide relief with respect to certain aspects of his physical suffering, it could not provide relief from the experience of existential dread” (§91). Instead, he focuses on the fact that he cannot avail himself of assisted suicide provisions either in Hungary or abroad. Hungarian law prohibits assisting a patient in procuring their death, and even those aiding with arrangements for this purpose can face prosecution (§§135; 159).
The Court observed that, due to the lack of a uniform consensus among member states on assisted dying practices, each state is granted a considerable margin of appreciation in implementing policies on such sensitive issues. The court also noted, as the recent case of Mortier v. Belgium held, that the right to life (art. 2 ECHR) does not inherently exclude the decriminalisation of assisted dying. However, this decriminalisation must be accompanied by safeguards to prevent abuses of the right to life (§§126-128; 145).
The Court, finding no violation of art. 8, held that Mr Kasai’s suffering could not dismissed lightly. It noted that the applicant’s complaint mainly focused on “existential suffering” that “although it amounts to genuine and severe anguish, existential suffering relates essentially to a personal experience, which may be susceptible to change and does not lend itself to a straightforward objective assessment” (§158). Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that “existential suffering may be refractory to medical treatment […] and that the use of sedation to alleviate it might be contested or unwarranted in certain situations […]” (§157). Professor Aubry, one of the experts consulted by the Court, emphasised two key points. First, he noted that patients suffering from the same condition as the applicant often exhibit ambivalence about their desire to die as the disease progresses. Second, he underscored the importance of palliative care for individuals affected by ALS, particularly in advanced stages, when they are typically permitted to receive palliative deep sedation and can die peacefully (§46).
Article 14
Regarding the violation of art. 8 ECHR and art. 14 ECHR the Mr Karsai argued that “Hungarian law accorded different treatment to those terminally ill persons with mental capacity who suffered from refractory symptoms but could hasten their death only by means of PAD [physician assisted dying], and those who could do so by having recourse to RWI [refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions” (§170).
In this case the Court held that the applicant’s clinical picture could not be compared to that of terminally ill patients who depend on life-sustaining medical treatments (§174). In fact, Mr Kasai’s diagnosis might lead to invasive life-sustaining interventions only towards the latest stages of his degenerative illness. Furthermore, the withholding or withdrawing of unwanted medical treatments falls within the right to informed medical consent and it is subjected to specific guidelines and safeguards in order to protect the patient’s autonomy (§175).
According to Professor Sandor, who produced an expert opinion for the Court, the right to informed consent is paramount in bioethics. On the other hand, “patients could refuse care, but could not ask for something specific” (§56). For these reasons the Court held that there has been no violation of art. 14 in conjunction with art. 8 of the Convention.
Separate opinions
Two judges’ separate opinions provide an opportunity to delve deeper into the reasoning of the Court’s majority, as they both address the fundamental principles underlying the final decision. Judge Wojtyczek in his separate concurring opinion disagreed with the majority that the applicant’s request to have access to physician assisted dying would fall under his right to respect his private life. The judge emphasised how the right to life – as the practical and effective basis for the enjoyment of all other rights – may hardly “encompass decisions about one’s own life and death” and for this reason, the right to private life, should not extend to the choice of death (§4, Judge Wojtyczek partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion). He noted that the suffering stemming from a personal feeling in relation to the absence of meaning of life may be exacerbated (or not properly tackled) if people can choose their own death.
Judge Felici, dissenting on both accounts with the Court’s majority, firstly emphasised his impression that “the applicant’s legitimate concerns were not taken into account, and that his legitimate request for help fell on deaf ears” (§7, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). In fact, according to Judge Felici, palliative care could not be considered a feasible option to ease the applicant’s suffering since “the expert consulted have indicated that there is currently no medical treatment capable of alleviating existential suffering” (§9, Judge Felici dissenting opinion, my emphasis). In other words, the dissenting Judge stressed an evident reality: so far medicine has not been able to offer a cure to the sentiment that life has lost its meaning. And, for this reason, assisted dying is envisaged as the only possible answer to the applicant existential cry for help. Consequently, the dissenting judge finds that the impossibility for the applicant to avail himself of assisted dying provisions both in his country and abroad would breach his right to privacy enshrined by art. 8 of the Convention.
Specifically, Hungary – compared to other member states which permit assisted dying or are paying great attention on the matter – would have failed to address the severe suffering of the applicant (§5, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). Therefore, Judge Felici dissented that in this instance the margin of appreciation doctrine (which applies on sensitive matters where there is no uniform agreement) should not be invoked. Giving that, “there are no insurmountable legal obstacles to affirming a positive obligation on the part of the State, having regard to all the characteristics of this case, in relation to the application of Article 8 of the Convention” (§6, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).
Secondly, the Judge disagreed with the Court majority’s decision according to which the applicant’s medical condition should be considered similar to the one endured by terminally-ill patients subjected to invasive life-sustaining medical treatments since Mr Kasai’s condition has made him dependant on others for all his personal needs. Hence Judge Felici argued that “the subordination of the decision to take one’s life to whether one is dependent on life-saving treatment represents an unnecessary reduction of the protection of the right to life and an interference in private life, understood as the individual’s capacity for self-determination” (§13, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).
Dr Ilaria Bertini is a Research Fellow at BIOS Centre
The Supreme Court has ruled unanimously that the Scottish parliament does not have the power to pass legislation that would allow for a second referendum on Scottish independence. Such legislation, the Supreme Court found, would touch on ‘reserved matters’, that is, matters affecting the United Kingdom as a whole. The Scottish government unsuccessfully argued that a referendum would be advisory, and as it would not have immediate impact on the existence of the UK, would not touch on reserved matters. Sturgeon, while respecting the ruling, commented that it confirmed that the UK can no longer be pictured as a voluntary partnership and noted that the next general election could serve as a ‘de facto referendum’.
Nurses are preparing to strike for the first time on the 15th and 20th of December. The issues in question include low pay and unsafe staffing levels. The Royal College of Nursing (RCN) has reported that experienced nurses are 20% worse off in real terms than in 2010, due to many pay increases below the rate of inflation, and that 25,000 nursing staff have left the Nursing and Midwifery Council register since last year. If ministers continue to refuse to engage in formal negotiations with the RCN, the strikes will go ahead across England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and are expected to have a severe impact on care.
In Privacy International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the Divisional Court held that s.5 Intelligence Services Act 1994 does not permit the government to issue general warrants to engage in computer network exploitation (“CNE”) – more commonly known as computer hacking. The court also offered valuable guidance on warrants and what is required to make them lawful.
The Issues
There were three issues:
1. Does s.5 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) permit the Secretary of State to issue ‘thematic’ or ‘general’ warrants to hack computers? General warrants are those which purportedly authorise acts in respect of an entire class of people or an entire class of acts (e.g. ‘all mobile phones in London’).
2. Should the court allow the claim to be amended to include a complaint that, prior to February 2015, the s.5 regime did not comply with Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights?
3. If permission is given to amend the claim, should the new ground succeed?
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
In the News:
Internationally there were a number of developments which have significant consequences for human rights. In Russia a prominent critic of Vladimir Putin has allegedly been poisoned. Alexei Navalny, who is known for exposing corruption within the country, suddenly fell ill last week after drinking tea.
Supporters claim the Russian state has tried to silence Mr Navalny’s criticism of President Putin, and then attempted to cover up its actions by stopping Mr Navalny from being treated abroad. Despite initial resistance from doctors, who said that Mr Navalny was too ill to be moved, the leader has now been flown out of Russia. Critics say the developments are part of a wider crackdown on freedom of speech within the country.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
In the News:
Anti-racism protests, sparked by the death of George Floyd, continued across the world. This week much of the focus has been on statues commemorating controversial historical figures. In Bristol, campaigners toppled the statue of a 17th century slave trader called Edward Colston.
The move led to a debate about what ought to be done with such statues. The founder of the Scouts, Robert Baden-Powell, was accused of racism, homophobia, and anti-Semitism. Initially it seemed his statue would be put into storage, but following an outcry it has been boarded up instead. A number of other figures have received similar treatment, including Sir Winston Churchill.
In the US, it seems change is coming to policing. The Democratic Party is proposing a police reform bill which, if passed, would become the Justice in Policing Act of 2020. The Bill would ban chokeholds from being used, limit the use of military weapons, and restrict qualified immunity (the legal principle which has prevented many officers from being sued for alleged misconduct). President Trump confirmed that he ‘generally’ supported ending the use of chokeholds.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
In the News:
ICCSA, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, published its report into protecting children who live outside the UK.
It described how there has been “extensive” sexual abuse of children by British nationals whilst abroad. Between 2013 – 2017, 361 UK nationals requested consular assistance between 2013 – 2017 for being arrested for child sex offences. The inquiry suggested this was likely to be a small proportion of offenders committing crimes abroad.
The report highlights the case of Gary Glitter, who was able to travel abroad and abuse vulnerable children even after he had been convicted. Glitter was later sentenced again for abusing two girls, aged 10 and 11, in Vietnam.
ICCSA concluded that travel bans should be imposed more frequently to prevent this behaviour. It noted that Australia bans registered sex offenders from travelling overseas. ICCSA’s report also argued that the burden of proof for imposing travel bans should be reduced, saying that the need for evidence is often overstated by courts and the police.
The inquiry described the global exploitation of children as worth an estimated £27.7 billion, with developing countries being particularly at risk.
The full report can be read here. More from the BBC here.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
Credit: The Guardian
In the News:
The High Court has heard how MI5, which is responsible for domestic spying operations, may have unlawfully retained the data of innocent civilians for years.
Liberty’s challenge centres on the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which gives the security services the ability to access digital devices and electronic communications. It alleges that the system of information gathering used by the security services is illegal.
As part of a systemic judicial review, the High Court was told MI5 had realised that there were problems with their data handling in January 2016, but that the Prime Minister and Home Secretary were only informed in April. It was also alleged that MI5 has been holding sensitive data without proper safeguards. Liberty argued that the security services had submitted warrant applications which misled judges, because the agencies had incorrectly suggested sensitive data was being properly protected.
Much of the case will be heard in private over the next week.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
Credit: The Guardian
In the News:
The High Court has granted a without-notice injunction which bans protesters from gathering outside a primary school’s gates.
Protesters have been campaigning for weeks against Anderton Park Primary School’s decision to teach its pupils about LGBT issues. The activists argue that the children are ‘too young’ to understand the relationships. Some have also stated that it conflicts with Islamic teaching.
The Headteacher, Sarah Hewitt-Clarkson, told the media that she has received a number of threatening messages. The school had to close early for half-term due to the protests.
Birmingham City Council applied for the injunction last week on the basis that the protests were beginning to jeopardise the safety of staff, pupils and parents. The injunction will last until the 10th June.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
Credit: The Guardian
In the News:
Chelsea Manning, the ex-US intelligence analyst, was released from prison last week.
Manning was found guilty of a variety of charges in 2013, including espionage. She was subsequently given the longest sentence for a security leak in US history. After serving an initial period in jail, the remainder of her sentence was commuted by President Obama in 2017 on the basis that it was “disproportionate” to her crimes.
Ms. Manning has since refused to testify to a grand jury about her connections to WikiLeaks and Julian Assange (its founder). She claims that she has already given testimony as part of her trial in 2013, and objects to the grand jury system in principle. However, prosecutors have suggested that her evidence may have been inaccurate. A judge in Virginia ordered her to be taken into custody for 62 days.
She was released last week after the 62 day period elapsed. In the meantime, however, Ms. Manning was served with another subpoena which requires her to appear before a grand jury on May 16th in order to testify about the same issues. It seems likely, therefore, that she will be imprisoned again for contempt of court. Continue reading →
The Supreme Court has upheld challenges to the legal regimes for disclosing criminal records in England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, finding them to be incompatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
R (P, G and W) and Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Anor [2019] UKSC 3 – Read Judgment
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